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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation considers the question whether there are viable alternatives to the 
conceptual framework within which the South African administrative-law system 
operates, given that the administration now functions under new constitutional 
demands and new approaches to administrative engagement. The intention is not to 
proffer concrete recommendations for such a system, but only to propose an approach 
by means of which questions concerning the legal regulation of the administration and 
administrative function may be addressed. 
The dissertation introduces the concept of the contextualised administrative-law 
system. This concept emphasises the legal relationship between the public 
administration and the judiciary, but is not limited to this relationship. The 
administrative-law system does not operate in a vacuum, though, and is informed by 
the conceptual framework within which the system operates. The system is also a 
function of its geo-political and socio-economic context. 
The historical development of the doctrine of separation of powers, as one aspect 
of the conceptual framework, is traced. Thereby the normative, dynamic and flexible 
nature of the doctrine is established. On this basis, the potential and value of a fourth 
branch, the administration, within the separation-of-powers doctrine is assessed. By 
implication, the administrative function would constitute a fourth, distinct function in 
addition to the legislative, executive and judicial functions. 
The concept of the administrative-law system is consequently applied to the South 
African context. Firstly, the development of the South African system is outlined and, 
secondly, the administrative-law relationship is analysed. This discussion establishes 
that the system is characterised by an embryonic administrative law, the equating of 
administrative law and judicial review, an emphasis on the rule-of-law or “red-light” 
approach to administrative regulation, a rhetoric of deference, and the supremacy of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Therefore, the system must be 
informed by the Constitution and, arguably, by Karl Klare’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism and Etienne Mureinik’s “culture of justification”.  
The content of the separation of powers is also investigated by means of an 
historical analysis of the considerations that rationalise the existence of an 
independent administrative jurisdiction in France. This entails an exposition of the 
Conseil d’État’s structure, organisation and dual function. Principles that describe the 
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French system, other than the pure separation of powers, are discussed, namely, the 
duality of jurisdiction, the separation of administrative and judicial authorities, the 
separation of the administrative jurisdiction and active administration, the maxim “to 
judge the administration is still administering”, and the hybrid nature of 
administrative litigation. 
The legal regulation of public contracts can be regarded as a doctrinal perspective 
of the administrative-law system. The public contract is discussed as one form of 
administration, due to its conceptual ambiguity as a legal instrument on the boundary 
between public and private law and due to the administration’s increasing contractual 
activity. To an extent the contrat administratif of French law indicates that particular 
legal rules are an extension of the broader principles, considerations and institutional 
structures discussed in the preceding sections.  
This dissertation introduces an approach that emphasises the relationship between 
the administration and the judiciary as well as the conceptual framework within which 
the administrative-law system operates. Through the application of this approach to 
the South African context and to public contracting the key concepts and debates 
underlying an appropriate administrative-law system in South Africa are identified 
and investigated. This constitutes a platform for the development of a particular 
administrative-law system and an exposition of viable alternatives to the conceptual 
framework within which the system operates. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die vraag of daar lewensvatbare alternatiewe tot die 
konseptuele raamwerk van die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse administratiefreg-stelsel 
moontlik is. Dié vraag word gestel teen die agtergrond van die nuwe grondwetlike 
vereistes en benaderings waaraan administratiewe interaksie moet voldoen. Die 
bedoeling is nie om aanbevelings vir die bestaande stelsel te maak nie, maar eerder 
om ‘n benadering voor te stel waarin vrae oor die regulering van die administrasie en 
die administratiewe funksie geakkommodeer kan word.  
In die proses skep die proefskrif ‘n nuwe konsep: die administratiefreg-stelsel in 
konteks, wat die regsverhouding tussen die administrasie en die regbank beklemtoon, 
terwyl dit nie beperk is tot die verhouding nie. Uiteraard word die administratiefreg-
stelsel beïnvloed deur die konseptuele raamwerk waarin dit funksioneer, terwyl dit 
verder ook ‘n funksie is van sy geopolitiese en sosio-ekonomiese konteks. 
Die historiese ontwikkeling van die skeiding van magte, een aspek van die 
konseptuele raamwerk, word bespreek en daardeur word die normatiewe, dinamiese 
en buigsame aard van die leerstuk bevestig. Hiermee word die potensiaal en waarde 
van ‘n vierde been, naamlik die administrasie, binne die skeiding-van-magte leerstuk 
oorweeg, met die implikasie dat die administratiewe funksie ‘n onafhanklike, vierde 
funksie vestig, benewens die wetgewende, uitvoerende en regsprekende funksies. 
Die konsep van die administratiefreg-stelsel word gevolglik toegepas op die Suid-
Afrikaanse konteks. Eerstens word die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse stelsel 
uiteengesit en dan tweedens word die administratiefreg-verhouding ontleed. Hierdie 
bespreking bevestig dat die stelsel gekenmerk word deur ‘n onderontwikkelde 
administratiefreg, die gelykstelling van die administratiefreg en geregtelike 
hersiening, die beklemtoning van die regstaat en ‘n sogenaamde rooilig-benadering 
tot administratiewe regulasie, ‘n retoriek van geregtike agting, en die oppergesag van 
die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996. Juis as gevolg hiervan moet 
die stelsel op die Grondwet gegrond word. Daar word ook geargumenteer dat Karl 
Klare se transformerende konstitusionalisme sowel as Etienne Mureinik se kultuur 
van regverdiging die stelsel vorm behoort te gee.  
Die skeiding van magte se inhoud word ook aan ‘n historiese ontleding van Franse 
reg onderwerp om sodoende die rasionaal agter die onafhanklike administratiewe 
jurisdiksie in Frankryk te verduidelik. Dit behels ‘n uiteensetting van die Conseil 
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d’État se struktuur, interne organisering en tweeledige funksie. Die beginsels wat die 
Franse stelsel beskryf, bo-en-behalwe die suiwer skeiding van magte, word bespreek 
en dit is by name die dualiteit van jurisdiksie, die skeiding van administratiewe en 
regsprekende owerhede, die skeiding van die administratiewe jurisdiksie en aktiewe 
administrasie, die leuse wanneer die administrasie beoordeel word, word daar steeds 
administreer, en die gemengde aard van administratiewe regsgedinge.  
Die openbare kontrak word bespreek as ‘n instrument van administrasie gegewe 
die konseptuele dubbelsinnigheid van daardie regskonsep, wat op die grens tussen 
publiek- en privaatreg lê, en as gevolg van die administrasie se toenemende 
kontraktuele aktiwiteit. In ‘n mate dui die Franse contrat administratif daarop dat 
bepaalde regsreëls ‘n uitbreiding van die breër beginsels, oorwegings en institusionele 
strukture is, soos in die voorafgaande afdelings bespreek word.  
Dus stel hierdie proefskrif ‘n benadering voor wat die verhouding tussen die 
administrasie en die regbank, sowel as die konseptuele raamwerk waarbinne die 
administratiefreg-stelsel funksioneer, beklemtoon. Deur hierdie benadering toe te pas 
op die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks, en op openbare kontraktering, word die konsepte en 
debatte geïdentifiseer en ondersoek wat ‘n gepaste administratiefreg-stelsel 
onderskryf. Dit vorm ‘n basis vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n bepaalde administratiefreg-
stelsel en die uiteensetting van lewensvatbare alternatiewe tot die konseptuele 
raamwerk waarbinne die stelsel funksioneer. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 vii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
A large number of people contributed to the successful completion of this 
dissertation. I would like to extend my gratitude to everyone who supported me 
during this time, even where a single conversation contributed to the final product. 
In particular, I gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of the Stellenbosch 
University Hope Project: Law Faculty’s Strategic Research and Outreach Initiative: 
Combating Poverty, Homelessness and Socio-economic Vulnerability under the 
Constitution, the Ciucci Centre for Law & Social Development, and the Socio-
economic Rights and Administrative Justice Research Project (SERAJ), without 
which this dissertation could not have been written. Special thanks is due to the Hope 
Project and SERAJ for the provision of an office and other logistical support.  
I wish to thank Professor AJ van der Walt and Professor Sandy Liebenberg for 
their sound and enabling instruction in post-graduate research, especially during the 
early stages of my dissertation. The academic environment of the CL Marais building, 
under their watch, was also much appreciated. I am also indebted to Mrs King of the 
Public Law Department and Gerda Adams for administrative and practical support 
that has proved vital to the completion of this dissertation. 
I would like to extend a word of thanks to Gustav Muller who communicated his 
confidence in my work. I am also particularly grateful for his regular calls and 
reassurance after his departure from the Stellenbosch Law Faculty. 
I am especially grateful to Professor Quinot, my promotor, for several reasons. 
Without his intervention during the final year of my LLB, I would not have 
considered post-graduate study. Thanks to his expert, inspirational and 
accommodating guidance, the university experience turned out to be what I had 
always hoped it would be. His enthusiasm for the intellectual and the critical 
characterised our exchanges as collegial and interactive rather than hierarchical.  
On a more personal note, I am very grateful to my entire family for their 
unwavering confidence in my abilities, despite my own doubts. Their unconditional 
support, love and interest sustained me to the end. Paps, Mams, Dawid, Patricia, Ian, 
Suzanne, Albertus, Stephan and Naómi, I am grateful to you all. 
Finally, I am forever grateful to Christine, my loving wife, who, from our wedding 
day, graciously and patiently endured the presence of this dissertation in our life. 
More than anyone she encouraged me and shared my trials and tribulations. Without 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 viii  
her empathy and perspective this dissertation may well have met a premature end. I 
am immensely grateful that she selflessly tolerated her distracted husband, not least 
over weekends and holidays. Her contribution to the successful completion of this 
dissertation is fondly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 ix  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION         i 
 
ABSTRACT          iii 
 
OPSOMMING         v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        vii 
 
DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS      xi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS       xvii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System in South Africa  1 
 
CHAPTER 2 
The Framework and Context within which Administrative-Law Systems Operate 14 
 
CHAPTER 3 
The South African Administrative-Law System     57 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The French Administrative-Law System      140 
 
CHAPTER 5   
The Public Law of Contract and the Contrat Administratif 222 
 
CHAPTER 6  
Conclusion          261 
 
GLOSSARY OF FRENCH TERMS       290 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 x  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         297 
 
TABLE OF CASES         314 
 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION        318 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xi  
DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
DECLARATION         i 
 
ABSTRACT          iii 
 
OPSOMMING         v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS        ix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS       xvii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System in South Africa  1 
1 1 Purpose         1 
1 2 Main Themes         3 
1 3 The Conceptual Framework and Context     4 
1 4 The South African Administrative-Law System    7 
1 5 The French Administrative-Law System     8 
1 6 Public Contracting        10 
1 7 Hypotheses         11  
1 8 Methodology         11 
1 9 Research Question        12 
1 10 Structure         12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
The Framework and Context within which Administrative-Law Systems Operate 14 
2 1 Introduction         14  
2 2 Contextualising Constitutional-Law Theory     17 
2 3 The Constitutional Context of South Africa     18 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xii  
2 3 1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  18 
2 3 2 Transformative Constitutionalism     19 
2 4 The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers     20 
2 4 1 The Functions and the Branches of Government   25 
2 4 2 The Theory of Mixed Government     29 
2 4 3 The Theory of the Balanced Constitution    32 
2 4 4 Montesquieu’s Separation of Powers     36 
2 4 5 The Normative Nature of the Separation of Powers   38 
2 4 6 The Relevance of the Separation of Powers in  
Evaluating Constitutional Structures Today    40 
2 5 The Rise of the Administrative State and the Separation of Powers  47 
2 6 Conclusion         53 
 
CHAPTER 3 
The South African Administrative-Law System     57 
3 1 Introduction         57 
3 2 The Origins and Development of the South African  
Administrative-Law System       58 
3 2 1 The Origins of the South African Administrative-Law System 58 
3 2 2 Dicey, Administrative Law and the Droit Administratif  60 
3 2 3 Judicial Review       63 
3 2 4 From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutionalism  64 
3 2 5 Red and Green-Light Theories     66 
3 3 The Legal Relationship between the South African Public  
Administration and the Judiciary      71 
3 3 1 The Constitutional Mandates of the South African Courts  
and Public Administration      71 
3 3 2 The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and  
Checks and Balances in South Africa     73 
3 3 3 Deference and Respect      75 
3 3 3 1 Hoexter on Deference      77 
3 3 3 2 Judicial Notice of Deference     83 
3 3 3 3 The Canadian Connection     99 
3 3 3 4 Critiques of Deference     106 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xiii  
3 3 3 5 Deference, the Separation of Powers, and  
the Question of a Fourth Branch    111 
3 3 3 6 A Culture of Justification and Deference?   114 
3 3 4 The Public/Private-Law Distinction     124 
3 3 5 Democracy and the Counter-majoritarian Dilemma   131 
3 3 6 Co-operative Government      133 
3 4 Conclusion         135 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The French Administrative-Law System      140 
4 1 Introduction         140 
4 2 The Origins and Development of the French Administrative-Law  
System         142 
4 2 1 The Origins of the French Administrative-Law System  142 
4 2 2 An Overview of the Historical Development  
of the French Administrative-Law System    143 
4 2 3 Introducing the Parlements      146 
4 3 The Traditional Explanation for the Existence of the  
Administrative Jurisdiction       150 
4 4 The Constitutional Status of the French Administrative Jurisdiction  153 
4 5 The Duality of Jurisdiction       154 
4 5 1 The Early Origins of an Administrative Jurisdiction   155 
4 5 2 The Distinct Concept of Administrative Litigation   158 
4 6 The Principle of the Separation of the Administrative and Judicial  
Authorities         160 
4 6 1 The Separation of Authorities during the Ancien Régime  160 
4 6 2 The French Revolution of 1789 and the Separation of  
Authorities        162 
4 6 2 1 The Positive Role of the Separation of Authorities  163 
4 6 2 1 1 The Mischief     163 
4 6 2 1 2 The Primacy of the “Ordinary”  
Separation of Powers    164 
4 6 2 1 3 The Intended Purpose of the  
Law of 16-24 August 1790   165 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xiv  
4 6 2 1 4 The New Position and Role of the  
Judiciary     167 
4 6 2 1 5 The Prevailing Conception of  
the Judiciary Applied    169 
4 6 2 1 6 The Constituants had Faith in  
their Renovatory Work   171 
4 6 2 2 The Limits of the Law of 16-24 August 1790  172 
4 6 2 2 1 Adherence to the Unity of Jurisdiction 172 
4 6 2 2 2 The Will to Eliminate All  
Exceptional Jurisdictions   174 
4 6 2 2 3 5 July 1790: The Question of the  
Tribunal of the Administration  177 
4 6 2 2 4 The Tribunal of the Administration:  
A Judicial Organ    179 
4 6 2 2 5 The Import of the Law of 16-24  
August 1790     181 
4 7 The Principle of the Separation of the Administrative Jurisdiction  
and the Active Administration      184 
4 7 1 The Development of the Principle     184 
4 7 2 The Nature and Value of the Principle    195  
4 8 The French Conception of the Separation of Powers as a  
Theory of the Nineteenth Century      198 
4 9 “Juger l’Administration c’est aussi Administrer” and “Juger  
l’Administration, c’est encore Administrer”     199 
4 10 The Conseil d’État        207 
4 10 1 Historical Development      207 
4 10 2 Organisation        209 
4 10 2 1 Membership      210 
4 10 2 2 Structure and Functions of the Conseil d’État 212 
4 10 2 2 1 The Conseil d’État as Court:  
The Section du Contentieux  213 
4 10 2 2 2 The Conseil d’État as Adviser:  
The Administrative Sections  214 
4 10 2 3 Implications of Organisation    216 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xv  
4 11 Conclusion         218 
 
CHAPTER 5   
The Public Law of Contract and the Contrat Administratif    222 
5 1 Introduction         222 
5 2 The Classification of the Contrat Administratif    224 
5 2 1 Contrats Administratifs through Qualification a priori  228 
5 2 1 1 Les Qualifications Légales (Legal Qualifications)  228 
5 2 1 2 L’Identification Directe (Direct Identification)  229 
5 2 1 3 The Accessory Theory     230 
5 2 2 Les Critères Jurisprudentiels (Criteria derived from Case Law) 230 
5 2 2 1 The Organic Criterion      231 
5 2 2 2 Le Critère de la Clause Exorbitante  
(The Exorbitant-clause Criterion)    232 
5 2 2 3 Le Critère du Service Public  
(The Public-service Criterion)    234 
5 3 General Concepts Applicable to the Performance of Contrats  
Administratifs         235 
5 3 1 The Common Will of the Contracting Parties   235 
5 3 2 The Public Service       236 
5 3 3 The State as Contracting Party     237 
5 3 4 La Mutabilité (Adaptability)      238 
5 3 5 L’Équilibre Financier du Contrat (The Financial Equilibrium  
of the Contract)       239 
5 4 The Performance of Contrats Administratifs     240 
5 4 1 The Powers of the Administration     241 
5 4 1 1 Le Pouvoir de Contrôle (The Power of Control)  242 
5 4 1 2 Le Pouvoir de Sanction (The Power to Impose  
Sanctions)       243 
5 4 1 3 Le Pouvoir de Modification Unilatérale  
(The Power of Unilateral Modification)   246 
5 4 1 4 La Résiliation Unilatérale pour Motif d’Intérêt  
Général (The Power of Unilateral Rescission in the  
General Interest)      248 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xvi  
5 4 2 The Rights of the Contractor      249 
5 4 3 The Effect of a Change in the Circumstances   250 
5 4 3 1 La Force Majeure      251 
5 4 3 2 Le Fait du Prince      252 
5 4 3 3 Les Imprévues       254 
5 4 3 4 L’Imprévision       255 
5 5 A Comparative Analysis of the Contrat Administratif   256 
 
CHAPTER 6  
Conclusion          261 
6 1 The Contextualised Administrative-Law System: A New Concept  261 
6 2 The Separation of Powers: Normative, Flexible and Dynamic  263 
6 3 Analysing the South African Administrative-Law System   265 
6 4 Calling for a Debate on Deference, Again     266 
6 5 The Relationship between the Administration and the Judiciary:  
Deference Aside        273 
6 6 Beyond the Pure Separation of Powers: The French  
Administrative-Law System       275 
6 7 The French Administrative-Law System in Practice:  
The Contrat Administratif       281 
6 8 On the Question of an Alternative South African System   286 
 
GLOSSARY OF FRENCH TERMS       290 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         297 
 
TABLE OF CASES         314 
 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION        318
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 xvii  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CAA Cours administratives d’appel 
CC Constitutional Court 
CC decision Conseil Constitutionnel decision 
CE Conseil d’État 
Cf. Compare 
CGPPP Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques 
ch chapter 
CJ Chief Justice 
Constitution Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
ed(s) editor(s)/edition 
e.g. for example 
ÉNA École Nationale d’Administration 
et seq. and the following 
i.e. that is 
J Judge 
JA Judge of Appeal 
LGDJ Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 
P President 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
para Paragraph 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
s section 
ss sections 
TA Tribunaux Administratifs 
TC Tribunal des Conflits 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 1  
CHAPTER 1 
Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System in South 
Africa 
 
 
1 1 Purpose 
 
How does one approach a question such as the following: “how should South 
African law regulate public contracting”? This dissertation formulates an approach to 
address inquiries concerning the legal regulation of the administration and 
administrative function. Thus, in this dissertation no answer is provided to the 
preceding question. Rather, an approach is formulated, rationalised and applied, by 
means of which, it will be argued, questions such as “how should South African law 
regulate public contracting” can be addressed.1 
The central theme is that inquiries concerning the legal regulation of the 
administration and administrative function are a function of the “contextualised 
administrative-law system”, a concept introduced by this dissertation. This system has 
several dimensions. The administrative-law system emphasises the legal relationship 
and interaction between the public administration and the judiciary. However, the 
legal relationship is not synonymous with the administrative-law system, but the 
relationship is an important aspect of the system. The concept has an institutional 
dimension consisting of the public administration and the courts.2 The administrative-
law system is also characterised by the functions performed by the administration and 
the judiciary. There is also a doctrinal dimension, comprising the specific legal rules 
and principles that regulate the relationship of these institutions and their conduct 
individually. Finally, this system operates within a particular geo-political and socio-
                                                
1 “Public contracting” refers to the category of contracts where at least one of the contracting 
parties is a public organ. See ch 5 below. 
2 More specifically, the administrative-law system is concerned with the relationship between the 
administration and the administrative jurisdiction. Administrative jurisdiction refers to the organs 
that exercise legal control over the administration by performing the jurisdictional function. In 
South Africa this function belongs to the judiciary. However, in other jurisdictions, such as 
France, the administrative jurisdiction falls within the administration itself. See ch 4 on the French 
administrative-law system. 
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economic context and within a conceptual framework consisting of political and 
constitutional theory. 
Such an approach acknowledges the political theory and legal norms that apply to 
the administration and the judiciary, without neglecting institutional and contextual 
considerations that inform the system. Consequently, the concept of the 
contextualised administrative-law system can be applied to the South African context 
and employed for comparative purposes. To this end the legal relationship between 
the administration and administrative jurisdiction in France is considered. On the 
basis of the chapters on South Africa and France, public contracting as one form of 
administration is discussed. This constitutes the investigation into an alternative 
administrative-law system in South Africa. 
The purpose of this investigation is to encourage a critical and thorough evaluation 
of the South African administrative-law system. Such an inquiry is necessary to 
ascertain whether this system adheres adequately to constitutional imperatives in 
general and particularly those aimed at addressing socio-economic transformation and 
administrative justice. The scope of this study is purposefully limited to the 
administrative-law system and public contracting as one instrument of administrative 
activity that is employed to realise constitutional imperatives. Even where the state 
concludes contracts without express socio-economic objectives, public contracting 
can, and often does, have significant consequences for socio-economic rights and 
administrative justice. Furthermore, it is argued, the administration cannot escape its 
obligations relating to socio-economic rights and administrative justice under the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Therefore, even in cases of public 
contracting that seem to have no direct bearing on the realisation of socio-economic 
objectives or on administrative justice, constitutional imperatives remain inherently 
important. 
Therefore, traditional approaches to administrative law in South Africa are 
assessed in the light of new constitutional imperatives and of new methods of 
administrative engagement. Within this new constitutional context, the study aims to 
determine, with reference to French law, whether there are viable alternatives to the 
current South African administrative-law system. 
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1 2 Main Themes 
 
In order to facilitate an understanding of the line of reasoning, the main themes, 
which encompass the constituent elements of the dissertation, are set out. The 
administrative-law system represents the central theme. As mentioned, the 
administrative-law system comprises, but is not limited to, the relationship between 
the administration and the judiciary. Thus the system is constituted by the 
administration, the judiciary, and the particular rules regulating these institutions, such 
as administrative law. Administrative law falls within the system because these rules 
are directed at the administration as such, generally speaking. However, for the 
purposes of the administrative-law system, the judiciary and judicial functions are not 
considered in their totality. For example, the judiciary as an institution is only relevant 
so far as it interacts with the administration or affects the administration.  
The administrative-law system does not operate in a vacuum, though. For instance, 
considering the administration in isolation cannot reveal whether the administration is 
realising its objectives in terms of political and constitutional theory. Although 
political and constitutional theory cannot always be separated completely from 
particular legal rules, they are distinct. The administrative-law system is informed by 
choices in political and constitutional theory. Thus, political and constitutional theory 
can be described as the conceptual framework within which administrative-law 
systems operate. Therefore, this conceptual framework constitutes a second, broader 
theme, to the extent that political and constitutional theories shape the administrative-
law system. An example of a principle from this conceptual framework is the 
separation of powers. 
Although not addressed in any detail, the socio-economic and geo-political context 
of a country has a significant effect on the legal relationship between the 
administration and the judiciary. How the administration operates is a function of its 
political role in relation to the actualities of the relevant country.  
Two subordinate themes emanate from the central theme, namely, socio-economic 
transformation and public contracting. The former is included because the South 
African administrative-law system is subject to justiciable Constitutional imperatives 
and, the latter, because public contracting is an instrument employed by the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4  
administration to realise socio-economic objectives with increasing regularity.3 All of 
these themes correspond to the purpose of the dissertation: formulating an approach to 
questions concerning the legal relationship between the administration and the 
judiciary by means of the contextualised administrative-law system, in a new South 
African context. In the following section the content of the themes is explained in 
more detail. 
 
1 3 The Conceptual Framework and Context 
 
An administrative-law system is moulded by a conceptual framework and by its 
socio-economic and geo-political context. Constituent parts of this conceptual 
framework are political theory and constitutional theory. The doctrine of the 
separation of powers is a key component of the conceptual framework, at least in 
South Africa and France. The themes identified above all overlap and they stand in 
interdependent and interactive relationships. Therefore, an analysis of all the elements 
that inform an administrative-law system and of their role within the administrative-
law system is integral to a discussion that evaluates the nature of administrative 
institutions, rules and practices. However, the meaning of these concepts, though 
fundamental, is not absolute, static or uncontested. Interpretations, which arguably are 
more congruent with the transformative concerns of the Constitution,4 are preferred. 
The interrelatedness of the contextual framework and context are indicated below. 
Firstly, constitutional-law theory, or constitutionalism, comprises “a body of 
theoretical prescriptions”5 and “is concerned with the practical ordering of power-
wielding institutions and the structures of the relationship of the individual with these 
                                                
3 Bolton P The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 3-4. See, generally, 
McCrudden C Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, and Legal Change 
(2007) (“[G]overnments play an increasingly important role as an active participant in the market, 
purchasing public works, supplies, and services.” (3)). 
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 10. 
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institutions”. 6  Therefore, constitutionalism is understood as a prescriptive and 
normative doctrine rather than merely a descriptive one.7  
However, in the second place, a constitutional-law theory should not be considered 
as absolute or existing in a vacuum. It is necessary to take a broader view in order to 
identify the factors that inform constitutionalism itself. According to Barber all 
constitutions are subject to political theory.8 In addition, constitutionalism is informed 
by the geo-political and socio-economic context. The dominant political theories and 
the context will consequently define the content of a constitutional theory. Therefore, 
talking about constitutions in the abstract is inherently a limited exercise.9 Political 
theory and constitutionalism are distinguishable, though: Barber differentiates 
superficially between the two by associating the former with the objectives, “the 
ends”, of the state and the latter with the means for realising those objectives.10  
In the third place, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 embodies 
the normative choices of the South African brand of constitutionalism. The 
Constitution also expresses choices in political theory. Therefore the Constitution 
cannot be wholly classified as an incidence of either political or constitutional theory, 
but contains elements of both. Karl Klare’s interpretation of the Constitution as the 
embodiment of a project of “transformative constitutionalism” 11  illustrates how 
constitutionalism and political theory are interconnected. Klare also indicates the 
interdependence between the socio-economic and geo-political context, on the one 
                                                
6 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 
62. 
7 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 10-13. An example of constitutionalism in a descriptive sense is the 
Westminster model, Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: 
Volume One Constitutional Law (2002) 13.  
8 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 
63. 
9 Karl Klare is even of the opinion that “constitutional theory ought to be written from the 
acknowledged perspective of a political morality” (emphasis added), Klare K “Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146-188 at 
150. 
10 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 6 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 
62. 
11 The phrase “transformative constitutionalism” was advanced by Karl Klare in “Legal Culture 
and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146-
188. 
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hand, and political and constitutional theory on the other, at least in the case of South 
Africa. This is even expressed in the Constitution itself: the Preamble provides that 
the purpose of the Constitution is to 
 
“Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights;  
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;  
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state 
in the family of nations.” 
 
This provision combines various choices in political and constitutional theory, such 
as the commitment to democratic values, social justice, the rule of law and socio-
economic concerns (i.e. “the quality of life of all citizens”). 
Finally, the doctrine of the separation of powers is a constitutional tool. Ostensibly, 
the doctrine of the separation of powers is synonymous with the idea of trias 
politica.12 Currie and De Waal define the doctrine as follows: the “[s]eparation of 
powers means that the functions of government must be classified as either legislative, 
executive or judicial and that these functions must be performed by different branches 
of government.”13 
The doctrine of the separation of powers as trias politica is accepted almost 
without reservation in South Africa.14 The doctrine is most often justified as securing 
the liberty of individuals against the state: the purpose of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers is to “maximise individual freedom”15 by “dividing the functions 
                                                
12 Du Plessis L An Introduction to Law (1999, 3rd ed) 90; Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 171. 
13 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 95. 
14 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 92-93; Davis DM & Klare K “Transformative Constitutionalism and 
the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights 403-509 at 
509 where they bemoan “the lack of critical sharpness with respect to separation-of-powers 
issues”. 
15 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 91. 
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of government and allocating them to different institutions”,16 i.e. deconcentrating 
power. To identify these characteristics as the basic tenets of the doctrine without 
more can be misleading and restrictive. 
Whatever the content of the doctrine of the separation of powers may be, the 
doctrine is entrenched in South African law. Although it is not expressly mentioned in 
the Constitution the Constitutional Court held, in South African Association of 
Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath,17 that the doctrine of the separation of powers is an 
implicit provision,18 Chaskalson P stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that our 
Constitution provides for such a separation [of powers]”. 
In an attempt to determine a workable and progressive interpretation of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers, its early origins and its role in political contexts 
very different to the one in which the doctrine as such was conceived, are discussed. 
This discussion begins with Montesquieu who is regarded as the father of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers.19 He contended that “power should be a check to 
power”20 and this is the basis for his doctrine of the separation of powers.  
The separation of powers in the South African context is also discussed. By 
juxtaposing the South African administrative-law system with the French system, I 
intend to indicate the broad range of different interpretations of the separation of 
powers that are possible. 
 
1 4  The South African Administrative-Law System 
 
On the basis of the concept of the administrative-law system and the meaning of 
the separation of powers in chapter two, the South African administrative-law system 
is discussed. Firstly, the characteristics of the South African system are identified by 
means of an historical overview of its development. Secondly, six factors that 
                                                
16 91. 
17 2001 1 SA 883 (CC). 
18 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paras 18-22. 
19 See Franz Neumann’s explanation as to why Montesquieu deserves this accolade, and not John 
Locke, in the Editor’s Introduction of Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws tr Nugent T (1959) lv-
lix. Montesquieu’s classic work, De l’Esprit des Lois, in which he sets out his doctrine of the 
separation of powers, was originally published in 1748. 
20 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws tr Nugent T (1959) 150. 
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characterise the relationship between the administration and the judiciary are 
identified and discussed critically. 
South Africa is still in the early stages of a fundamental political transition. It has 
undergone a political conversion from an administrative-law system characterised by 
parliamentary sovereignty to one informed by the principles of constitutionalism. The 
Constitution implies a shift in socio-economic priorities, whereby the entire 
population stands to benefit, and a move away from an oppressive and elusive 
administration to one characterised by the notions of participatory democracy, co-
operative governance and accessibility. 21  Constitutional imperatives require the 
establishment of an appropriate administrative-law system. 22  Thus, institutional 
concerns form part of the response to fundamentally new constitutional imperatives. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers does not imply that the three classical 
branches of government are the ideal and final combination to fulfil all the functions 
of government;23 especially if one considers how dramatically society has changed 
since the publication of Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois. 
The new administrative-law system of South Africa is still in its infancy. It stems 
from the English model of parliamentary sovereignty and was strongly influenced by 
Diceyan doctrine, at least until the advent of the Constitution.24 In South Africa, one 
set of courts presides over all judicial matters, whether of an administrative or other 
nature.  
 
1 5  The French Administrative-Law System 
 
France has a very developed administrative-law system as opposed to South 
Africa’s, or even the English model.25 The general position26 is that the French 
interpretation of the separation of powers has resulted in a singular system, especially 
                                                
21 See ss 19, 195 and ch 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
22 Sections 33 and 195 of the Constitution, for instance, require an efficient administration. 
23 “There is no natural set of institutions which exists prior to the state”, Barber NW “Prelude to 
the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 73. 
24 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 40, 45-51, 57-71; Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 
2nd ed) 13-20. 
25 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 3. 
26 See 4 3 and 4 4 below. 
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from the perspective of common-law systems steeped in the Diceyan tradition. The 
unique nature of French administrative law is elucidated in Article 13 of the Law of 
16-24 August 1790: 
 
“Judicial functions are distinct and will always remain separate from administrative functions. 
It shall be a criminal offence for the judges of the ordinary courts to interfere in any manner 
whatsoever with the operation of the administration, nor shall they call administrators to 
account before them in respect of the exercise of their official functions”.27 
 
The Conseil d’État, France’s highest administrative court, is a realisation of this 
approach to administrative adjudication, although the precise role of the Law of 16-24 
August 1790 is contested.28 To this day, the Conseil d’État serves as both a judge of 
the administration and as an advisory institution to the government on legal matters.29 
In line with principles such as juger l’administration, c’est encore administrer30 or the 
separation of the active administration and administrative jurisdiction, France adheres 
to the dualist tradition in terms of which juridictions administratives, administrative 
courts, and juridictions judiciaires, ordinary courts, preside over cases of an 
administrative nature and civil cases, respectively. The French comparison provides a 
variety of different interpretations of the so-called “French separation of powers” an 
appreciation of which may enrich the principle for the South African context. 
It is within this general administrative-law context that the contrat administratif,31 
the French administrative contract, exists. The contrat administratif is subject to a 
body of rules separate to that of the contrat privé (private-law contract) and “the 
French regard an administrative contract as essentially an arrangement between 
                                                
27 The English translation is from Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 
46. 
28 See ch 4. 
29 Auby J-B & Cluzel-Métayer L in Seerden RJGH (ed) Administrative Law of the European 
Union, its Member States and the United States (2007) 61. 
30 There is no English equivalent for this maxim. It means that “to judge the administration is still 
administering” (own translation). 
31 In order to avoid any confusion between the terms contrat administratif, public contract, state 
contract, government contract and administrative contract I shall not translate the French 
terminology when referring to contrats administratifs. I shall also refer to contrats de droit privé, 
private-law contracts, as the French administration can enter into contrats administratifs and 
contrats privé, Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998) 202. 
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unequal parties”.32 Therefore, it is regulated by special rules of which the more 
important are characterised by the inequality of the parties.33 The administrative 
courts deal with legal disputes relating to contrats administratifs. Thus, it will be 
argued, the contrat administratif can be regarded as part of the doctrinal dimension of 
the French administrative-law system. Therefore, the rules regulating the contrat 
administratif are an application of the general principles set out in the section on the 
French system. 
 
1 6  Public Contracting 
 
In line with international trends,34 the South African government has increasingly 
made use of contracts to realise its mandates, especially in the sphere of service 
delivery. However, general contract law has failed to account for these changes. In 
general, whenever the administration concludes a contract either the private law of 
contract or general administrative law applies. This legal position has resulted in a 
binary and formalist approach to public contracting. Thus, the specificity of the 
administration concluding contracts has not been explored in the South African 
context. The contrat administratif, however, provides an example of a developed and 
sophisticated branch of law that recognises the implications of the administration as 
contractor. Public contracting is discussed as one form of administration, particularly 
since the concept of the public contract traverses the boundaries between public law 
and private law. 
This increase in public contracting, the embryonic character of the South African 
administrative-law system, and the Constitutional imperatives to which the 
administration and the judiciary are subject require an assessment of the very nature 
of the South African administrative-law system. Such an approach would heed against 
potentially unsuitable and undesirable principles and institutional arrangements 
becoming entrenched further. 
 
                                                
32 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 202. 
33 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 9. 
34 See Auby J-B “Comparative Approaches to the Rise of Contract in the Public Sphere” (2007) 
Public Law 40-57. 
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1 7  Hypotheses  
 
The South African administrative-law system has significant institutional and 
substantive shortcomings. 35  The South African system stems from English 
administrative law, which is characterised by the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the primacy of judicial review. Although the introduction of the 
Constitution has revolutionised this legal position, the administrative and legal 
structures have remained largely the same.36 One set of courts still presides over all 
judicial matters, whether of an administrative or other nature. The Constitution lays 
out imperatives that the administration and the judiciary must perform, but there is 
little concrete guidance as to how these imperatives are to be realised, especially on an 
institutional level. In particular, legal rules pertaining to state contracting fall short of 
regulating this sphere satisfactorily. Differences in expertise, a lack of understanding 
of the particular “needs of government”37 and a limited interpretation of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers has resulted in a, perhaps unnecessary, tension between 
the administration and the judiciary.  
Although the introduction of the Constitution means that the traditional 
understanding of the role of the administration, of administrative law and of the 
institutions that implement administrative law has changed fundamentally, the 
question of an appropriate alternative system that correlates with this change in 
understanding is yet to be addressed.  
 
1 8 Methodology 
 
I discuss the conceptual framework within which administrative-law systems 
operate by means of a literature study, with particular emphasis on the nature of the 
separation of powers. On the basis of the separation-of-powers analysis the South 
African administrative-law system is discussed by means of a doctrinal methodology. 
This is followed by a comparative analysis of South African and French 
                                                
35 See Quinot G The Judicial Regulation of State Commercial Activity (2007) 28-29. 
36 The establishment of the Constitutional Court being the obvious addition to the institutional 
body.  
37 Mitchell JDB “The Real Argument about Administrative Law” (1968) 46 Public Administration 
167-169 at 167. 
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administrative-law systems. I employ a doctrinal methodology in order to assess 
administrative law rules that have developed through case law and that are contained 
in legislation or codes. This assessment is made with reference to relevant public-law 
and political concepts.  
 
1 9 Research Question 
 
Are there viable alternatives to the conceptual framework within which the South 
African administrative-law system operates, given that the administration now 
functions under new constitutional demands and new approaches to administrative 
engagement? In addressing this question this dissertation does not propose to 
formulate specific alternatives to the current administrative-law system. The intention 
is to develop an approach by means of which viable alternatives may be formulated 
and developed. 
 
1 10 Structure  
 
In chapter two (“The Framework within which Administrative-Law Systems 
Operate”) I identify elements that constitute part of the conceptual framework of an 
administrative-law system. They are political theory and constitutionalism. In the 
South African context one would consider its particular brand of constitutionalism and 
the geo-political and socio-economic context in giving content to this framework. The 
different interpretations of the aforementioned concepts are discussed and it is 
indicated that they do not necessarily impose strict or absolute requirements. 
Chapter three (“The South African Administrative Law Regime”) sets out the 
current administrative-law system in South Africa by means of a literature study. The 
approach to administrative-law problems employed by the courts is considered, 
especially where different branches of the law overlap with administrative issues. I 
discuss this in the light of the fact that the South African administration is required to 
realise Constitutional imperatives. Pertinent structural and substantive legal 
shortcomings are identified. I rely on existing studies and on case law to substantiate 
these arguments as it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to do otherwise. 
The abovementioned shortcomings suggest that South African administrative-law 
requires further development. The ensuing question is: in which direction could 
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and/or should South African administrative law develop? I submit that a comparative 
study of South African administrative law and more developed jurisdictions would be 
a useful point of departure for addressing this question. I propose that the French 
administrative-law system be drawn upon in order to engage with the shortcomings 
and challenges facing the South African courts and administration. 
Therefore, the investigation into the South African administrative-law system is 
followed by a discussion of the French administrative-law system in chapter four. The 
early origins and development of the French administrative-law system are discussed 
and an exposition of the current legal regime and structures in France is presented. 
The value of the French administrative system in general (especially the dual court 
system, the dual role of the Conseil d’État as consultative body to the executive and 
as a court, and the training of the personnel of the Conseil d’État as experts in 
administration) is discussed. 
In chapter five (“Public Contracting and the Contrat Administratif”) the point of 
departure is the public contract as an administrative instrument that is employed with 
escalating regularity worldwide and, specifically, in South Africa. This leads to a 
discussion and exposition of the contrat administratif as a particular aspect of French 
administrative law and illustrates the application of a very different conception of the 
administrative-law system in an area of particular conceptual difficulty. 
In the final chapter I draw conclusions based on the analyses in the preceding 
chapters. I intend to indicate how much room there is, in terms of the theoretical and 
normative framework of administrative law, within which to manoeuvre when 
deciding on appropriate strategies with which to achieve Constitutional objectives by 
means of the South African administrative-law system. I argue that, at the very least, 
the French administrative law model, in general, and the contrat administratif, in 
particular, provide convincing motivation to re-evaluate the current South African 
system and that it even offers attractive alternatives to the latter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Framework and Context within which Administrative-Law 
Systems Operate 
 
 
2 1 Introduction  
 
This dissertation introduces the concept of “the contextualised administrative-law 
system”. The administrative-law system emphasises the legal relationship between the 
public administration and the judiciary. The concept has an institutional dimension 
consisting of the public administration and the courts.1 There is also a doctrinal 
dimension, comprising the legal rules that regulate the relationship of these 
institutions and their conduct individually. However, only certain aspects of the 
administrative-law system as a whole are investigated. Since public contracting, as 
one fast-developing and conceptually challenging area of public administration, 
operates within this system, the system itself will inform and partially constitute 
public-contract regulation. After all, administrative law and public contracting 
presuppose the existence of a public administration. Thus, the concept of the 
administrative-law system draws attention to the view that public-contract regulation 
is not reducible to the legal rules applied to contractual disputes, regardless of whether 
those rules are of a private-law or public-law nature; public-contract regulation is a 
function of the rules applied in addition to the nature of the institutions which 
interpret and apply them and the relationships between those institutions. The 
administrative-law system also emphasises the distinct relationship between the 
administration and the courts, a relationship obscured by the separation of powers. In 
                                                
1 Or rather, the institutions are the administration and those institutions that apply legal rules to the 
administration. This distinction is necessary because in some legal systems, jurisdictions separate 
from or independent of the judiciary preside over administrative litigation. Therefore, defining the 
administrative-law system as comprising the courts alone would be misleading in not identifying 
the institutions that apply the law to the administration. For example, in France the Conseil d’État, 
the supreme administrative jurisdiction, is an institution formally within the administration, though 
independent. Therefore, in discussions on the administrative-law system generally, references to 
the courts or judiciary do not exclude administrative jurisdictions or other jurisdictional organs 
which play a central role in applying the law to the administration, such as the Conseil d’État, 
administrative tribunals in the UK. 
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fact, this relationship per se is not identified by the separation of powers whatsoever, 
because the administration is classified merely as a component of the executive 
branch. For instance, there are fundamental differences between the function of 
formulating policy and the function of implementing policy and legislation, but both 
are the responsibility of the executive in terms of the separation of powers. However, 
the administration and administrative function in a modern sense only developed after 
the formulation of the separation of powers. Whether the separation of powers has 
incorporated this development is an inquiry addressed in this chapter. 
Public contracting, a broad term defined in chapter five for the purposes of this 
dissertation, is one form of administering among various types of administrative acts, 
whether unilateral or bilateral; thus the contract is an administrative instrument 
employed by the administration. In South Africa there is no branch of law dedicated 
to state contracting and so, when the administration concludes contracts, 
administrative law or (private) contract law could apply. In some jurisdictions, most 
notably France, there are distinct, general legal rules dedicated to the regulation of 
public contracting beyond the mere technical rules of public procurement commonly 
found in most legal systems. However, as mentioned, even the existence of such a 
dedicated branch of law cannot reveal the nature and extent of public-contract 
regulation independently. In addition to the administrative-law system adopted by a 
particular country two other elements mould public-contract regulation. Firstly, the 
political and constitutional theories adopted by a nation mould the legal regime 
regulating public contracting. Secondly, the political and constitutional theories are 
interdependent on the geo-political and socio-economic context. Therefore, the 
framework within which public contracts are regulated has three dimensions:2 in the 
first place, the national geo-political and socio-economic context; secondly, political 
and constitutional theories; and, finally, the administrative-law system, which 
                                                
2 Naturally, these three concepts overlap significantly. Nevertheless, they are not co-extensive. 
The conceptual and normative framework and the context are separated from the administrative-
law system because the latter is a function of the former: the public administration and the 
judiciary derive their normative foundation from constitutionalism. In addition, relevant factors to 
be taken into consideration when making decisions, whether judicial or administrative, on the 
basis of this normative foundation, are influenced significantly by the context. The administrative-
law system is not separated from the rules applied in particular instances, but this should not result 
in conflation of the doctrinal and institutional dimensions of the system. The very structure of the 
system can influence the type of rules that are applied and the way in which they are applied.  
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includes the particular legal rules applicable to public contracting. These three 
dimensions considered collectively constitute the “the contextualised administrative-
law system”. In other words, a clear understanding of public contracting as an act 
occurring within an administrative-law system is an important step towards an 
analysis of the law of public contracting.3 In addition, the administrative-law system 
itself is dependent on the conceptual and normative framework within which the 
system operates; in turn, this framework and its context are interdependent. 
This dissertation focuses on the legal aspects of these three dimensions, which are 
identified in this chapter. Thus, the point of departure is the conceptual and normative 
framework within which administrative-law systems operate. The political and socio-
economic context, political theories, and constitutionalism are not discussed in the 
abstract, however. These topics will be addressed in chapter three on the South 
African administrative-law system. Below only the interrelatedness of these concepts 
is indicated. 
One central component of constitutionalism constitutes the focus of this chapter, 
namely, the doctrine of the separation of powers. I discuss the origins and 
development of the separation of powers from the identification of governmental 
functions to Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois. In this way the doctrine is defined 
and differentiated from related theories. This historical perspective reveals the 
normative foundations and nature of the doctrine. Once the content and the normative 
nature of the doctrine have been determined the function of the doctrine is clarified. 
The discussion on the doctrine of the separation of powers concludes with an enquiry 
into the analytical value of the doctrine. Subsequently, I address the question whether 
the rise of the administrative state has implications for the doctrine of the separation 
of powers. More specifically, the question “should the administration constitute a 
fourth branch alongside the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, in terms of the 
separation of powers” is addressed. 
 
                                                
3 Or towards analysing other forms of administration. 
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2 2 Contextualising Constitutional-Law Theory 
 
Constitutionalism is the theory of constitutional law. 4  As mentioned, 
constitutionalism is normative and is concerned with the institutional structure of the 
state.5 The institutional structure is usually informed by certain normative objectives 
and the structure is intended to contribute to the realisation of these objectives. Thus, 
constitutionalism is both a normative concept as well as a descriptive concept.6  
It is important to acknowledge, from the onset, that constitutional-law theories 
operate within a particular context. No universal or absolute constitutional-law theory 
exists. As mentioned, the geo-political and socio-economic context of a region 
informs the constitutional-law theory: as the context changes so do the correlated 
theories. Therefore, a constitutional-law theory should not be considered as absolute 
or existing in a vacuum, nor can there be an ideal type.  
 
“Behind every theory of administrative law there lies a theory of the state. As Harold Laski 
once said, constitutional law is unintelligible except as the expression of an economic system 
of which it was designed to serve as a rampart. By this he meant that the machinery of 
government was an expression of the society in which it operated; one could not be understood 
except in the context of the other.”7 
 
Barber also indicates that all constitutions are subject to political theory or 
theories.8 Therefore, analysing constitutions in the abstract is inherently a limited 
exercise.9 
                                                
4 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 10. 
5 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 
62; Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 10. 
6 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 10-13.  
7 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 1. 
8 He contends, “[w]ritings about constitutions are always undertaken in the service of political 
theory” and “[a]ny normative claims made by a constitutional writer must draw on political 
theory”, Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-
88 at 63, 68. 
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In order to analyse a particular constitutional-law theory, or constitutionalism, the 
factors that constitute and inform it should be identified. It has been shown that 
political theory and context inform the content of constitutional theory. However, 
even though constitutionalism is a function of political theory and context, 
constitutionalism simultaneously attempts to shape the political and socio-economic 
reality.  
 
2 3 The Constitutional Context of South Africa 
 
2 3 1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation the context is predominantly national, focusing 
on South Africa.10 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is the code 
that embodies the norms11 of the South African brand of constitutionalism. It imposes 
both negative and positive obligations upon the state. For instance, everyone has the 
right to access to information,12 to just administrative action,13 and to bring a matter 
before the courts or independent tribunals.14 The Promotion of Access to Information 
Act15 and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act16 give content to sections 32 
                                                                                                                                       
9 Karl Klare is even of the opinion that “constitutional theory ought to be written from the 
acknowledged perspective of a political morality” (my emphasis), Klare K “Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146-188 at 
150. 
10 The context that informs a constitutional law theory is not limited to a national context. For 
instance, the emergence of the European Union has introduced an added dimension to the idea of a 
political or socio-economic context. 
11 “Constitutions are codes of norms which aspire to regulate the allocation of powers, functions, 
and duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and to define the relationships 
between these and the public”, Finer SA, Bogdanor V & Rudden B Comparing Constitutions 
(1995) 1. 
12 S 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
13 S 33. 
14 S 34. 
15 Act 2 of 2000. 
16 Act 3 of 2000. 
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and 33, respectively. Chapter ten of the Constitution sets out values and principles that 
govern the public administration; section 217 regulates public procurement.17  
 
2 3 2 Transformative Constitutionalism18 
 
Deriving meaning from these broad constitutional provisions has proved 
challenging. Various interpretive devices have been employed to establish “the” 
meaning of constitutional texts. Transformative constitutionalism is one approach to 
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. It has no absolute definition19 and its 
meaning is bound to be dynamic, an appropriate quality in the light of 
constitutionalism’s interdependency on political theories and context. Nevertheless, 
Klare’s original “definition” is the point of departure. He describes transformative 
constitutionalism as:  
 
“[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed 
(not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction.”20 
 
This “project” treats the Constitution as a legal and political instrument that has a 
significant role to play in transforming South African society comprehensively.21 It 
involves striving towards substantive equality and a different legal culture.22  
                                                
17 See Bolton P “The Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics” (2008) 
37 Public Contract Law Journal 781-802 (“The public procurement system in South Africa is 
afforded constitutional status” (802)). 
18 The phrase “transformative constitutionalism” was advanced by Klare in his seminal article 
“Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146-188. 
19 Langa P “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351-360 at 
351.  
20 Klare K “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 146-188 at 150. 
21 Notably, Klare raises the question whether law can fulfil such a role, Klare K “Legal Culture 
and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146-
188 at 150. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 20  
The judiciary is tasked with upholding the Constitution,23 the public administration 
with the implementation of law and the administration of policy.24 The public service, 
as a part of the public administration, “must...execute the lawful policies of the 
government of the day.”25 In any event, the public administration as a whole is always 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.26 Therefore, if the Constitution has set in 
motion, and is steering, the project of transformative constitutionalism, the public 
administration cannot act contrary to this project; such conduct would be 
unconstitutional and invalid.27 The judiciary is under an obligation to determine 
whether the conduct of the administration, in particular administrative action, is 
constitutional or unconstitutional. 
The public administration and the judiciary play a pivotal role in any democratic 
state and especially in terms of transformative constitutionalism. Consequently, the 
relationship between the judiciary and the public administration is pertinent to the 
success of the project of transformative constitutionalism. In order to determine the 
content and nature of this relationship, the doctrine of the separation of powers is 
discussed.  
 
2 4 The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers 
 
The separation of powers is a constitutional concept that prescribes specific 
constitutional structures in order to realise normative objectives.28 It is an integral 
aspect of constitutionalism and the wording of Article 16 of the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 illustrates this emphatically:  
 
                                                                                                                                       
22 Langa P “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351-360 at 
352-353. 
23 Ss 165(2), 172(1)(a). 
24 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 6; s 197(1) of the Constitution. 
25 S 197(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Organs of state, defined in s 
239, and the executive are also bound by the Bill of Rights in terms of s 8(1). 
26 S 195(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
27 S 172(1)(a). 
28 See Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 4. 
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“Any society in which the safeguarding of rights is not assured, and the separation of powers is 
not observed, has no constitution.”29  
 
Therefore, the doctrine is an essential component of the conceptual framework of 
the administrative-law system. In this section the origins and development of the 
separation of powers are discussed. The purpose of the discussion is to indicate the 
nature of the functions and branches of government, and the nature of the 
relationships between the branches of government, with the emphasis on the 
administrative-law relationship.30 The relationship between the administration and the 
judiciary, in particular, has fundamental implications for legally conceptualising the 
conduct of the administration, including state contracting. 
The origins and development of the separation of powers are relevant here because 
they contribute to determining the content of the doctrine. Establishing the content of 
the doctrine is in itself no mean undertaking as it is neither unambiguous nor static.31 
In fact, much of the original literature does not clearly define the doctrine. 32 
Furthermore, associated or even foundational concepts, such as human nature, power, 
liberty, tyranny, mixed government, balanced government, checks and balances, the 
branches of government, and the functions of government, have changed meaning 
over time, have different meanings or have been defined vaguely. Therefore, 
distinguishing the doctrine from similar concepts is a necessary, preliminary step 
towards giving content to the separation of powers as related concepts are employed, 
sometimes indiscriminately, as synonymous33 to the doctrine.  
                                                
29 The English translation is from Barendt E “The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers” 
(1995) Public Law 599-619 at 599. 
30 Uhler reasons that  
 
“[i]n order to appraise the influence of the doctrine of the separation of powers upon the 
formulation of certain concepts of administrative law, it is essential to review its historical 
evolution. Only complete awareness of the historic political environment attending is reception 
into a given governmental scheme can insure the requisite definiteness of meaning.” (Review of 
Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 3 (footnotes omitted). 
31 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 2. 
32 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 12. 
33 For instance, “modern commentators on the doctrine often follow the lead of Madison and write 
of political checks and balances rather than the separation of powers, frequently suggesting that 
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In order to facilitate his explanation of the separation of powers’ development, 
Maurice Vile makes use of a definition he calls the “‘pure’ doctrine” 34  and 
circumscribes as follows: 
 
“It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the government be 
divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. To 
each of these three branches there is a corresponding identifiable function of government, 
legislative, executive, or judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined to the 
exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other 
branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of government must be 
kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to be at the same time a member of 
more than one branch. In this way each of the branches will be a check to the others and no 
single group of people will be able to control the machinery of the State.”35 
 
The pure doctrine serves as a “bench-mark”36 or standard edition so that the 
ambiguous and inconsistent formulations of the doctrine do not impede a coherent 
discussion of its development. It consists of four elements:37 one, it is recommended 
that government agencies are divided among three categories, namely, the legislative, 
the executive and the judiciary; two, government has three functions which comprise 
all its activities; three, a separation of personnel is recommended between the 
branches of government; and, four, if the separation of functions, branches and 
personnel is maintained then the branches will check one another and not infringe 
upon the functions of the others. 
Ostensibly, the doctrine of the separation of powers is synonymous with the idea of 
trias politica.38 Accordingly, Currie and De Waal define the doctrine as follows: the 
“[s]eparation of powers means that the functions of government must be classified as 
either legislative, executive or judicial and that these functions must be performed by 
                                                                                                                                       
the two doctrines are identical”, Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis 
of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 3; for 
more on the indiscriminate usage of terminology in this regard, also see 26, 26 n 2. 
34 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 13. 
35 13. 
36 13. 
37 14-17. 
38 Du Plessis L An Introduction to Law (1999, 3rd ed) 90; Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 171. 
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different branches of government.”39 This interpretation of the doctrine has been 
endorsed and employed by the South African courts.40 Defined in this way it is 
accepted uncritically in South Africa.41 Yet, to identify these characteristics as the 
basic tenets of the doctrine without more may be misleading and restrictive. 
Whatever the content of the doctrine of the separation of powers may be, it is 
entrenched in South African law. Although the “separation of powers” is not 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution the Constitutional Court held, in South 
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath,42 that the doctrine of the 
separation of powers is an implicit provision, Chaskalson P stating that “[t]here can be 
no doubt that our Constitution provides for such a separation [of powers]”. 43 The 
Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the 
courts”44 and that the courts are independent,45 that the “legislative authority of the 
national sphere of government is vested in Parliament”,46 and that “[t]he executive 
authority of the Republic is vested in the President”.47 By contrast, in the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 the doctrine is entrenched as such, but 
not defined at all. Thus, even though the Constitution makes no express reference to 
the doctrine, the provisions that the Constitutional Court has taken to define the 
doctrine seem largely to endorse the “pure” doctrine of the separation of powers, or 
the trias politica. Constitutional checks and balances, however, temper these 
provisions.  
                                                
39 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 95 (emphasis added).  
40 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) paras 45, 106-113; De Lange v Smuts NO 
1998 3 SA 785 (CC) paras 44, 60; South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 
2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paras 21-22. See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd 
ed) 24. 
41 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 92-93; Davis DM & Klare K “Transformative Constitutionalism and 
the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights 403-509. 
42 2001 1 SA 883 (CC). 
43 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paragraphs 18-22. 
44 S 165(1). 
45 S 165(2). 
46 S 43(a). 
47 S 85(1). 
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Discussions on the origins of the separation of powers usually begin with 
Montesquieu48 who is regarded as the father of the doctrine.49 However, Gwyn and 
Vile show that the doctrine of the separation of powers did not originate with 
Montesquieu.50 In fact, the doctrine of the separation of powers developed over a 
considerable period of time. The early origins of the separation of powers lie in 
antiquity where “governmental functions, and the theories of mixed and balanced 
government, were evolved”.51 Its development is intertwined with these concepts. 
Naturally, the meaning of the doctrine is also dependent on other associated concepts 
that developed under the Greeks and the Romans, especially the rule of law. These 
concepts have themselves developed and the meanings attributed to them today may 
be very different to the “original” ones. Nevertheless, it was only during the 
seventeenth century in England that the fully-fledged doctrine came into being.52 
Below, the conceptual evolution of governmental functions and branches is 
discussed on the basis of Vile and Gwyn’s historical exposition of the separation of 
powers. Subsequently, the theory of mixed government, the theory of balanced 
government and checks and balances are distinguished from the separation of 
powers.53 In relation to this background the normative nature of the separation of 
                                                
48 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 4, 100; Vile MJC 
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 76. 
49 See Neumann F in the Editor’s Introduction of Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws tr Nugent T 
(1959) lv-lix.  
50 WB Gwyn and Maurice Vile published their classic works on the development of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers in 1965 and 1967, respectively. Unfortunately, Vile was unaware of 
Gwyn’s earlier work by the time his book went to press, see the “Preface” in Constitutionalism 
and the Separation of Powers (1967). Vile published a second edition in 1998 wherein he refers to 
Gwyn in the bibliography, but the original 1967 text was left unrevised, except for the addition of 
ch 13. Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998, 2nd ed) xi. 
51 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 2-3, 21. 
52 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 9; Vile MJC Constitutionalism 
and the Separation of Powers (1967) 3. Note that Montesquieu was discussing the English 
constitution in formulating the separation of powers. 
53 I rely heavily on Vile’s treatment of this matter in his classic work Constitutionalism and the 
Separation of Powers. This book is considered to be the seminal text on the development, from 
antiquity to the twentieth century, of the doctrine of the separation of powers.  
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powers is established. Finally, the relevance of the separation of powers in evaluating 
constitutional structures in the modern context is analysed. 
 
2 4 1 The Functions and the Branches of Government 
 
Gwyn employs two criteria to determine whether an idea qualifies as a statement 
concerning the separation of powers:54 firstly, the separation of powers addresses the 
powers or functions of government and, secondly, it is normative. Therefore, the 
origins of the separation of powers lie with the identification of governmental 
functions. 
Today the functions and branches of Western governments are each typically 
described as threefold: the executive, legislative and judicial functions that correspond 
to the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, respectively. This identification and 
division of the functions of government “evolved slowly over many centuries”,55 but 
associating a function with a particular agency is a much later development.56  
 Political science has been concerned with the proper functions or activities of 
government since antiquity.57 For instance, Aristotle identified three elements of the 
state, namely, deliberation, magistracy and judicial activity, which are present in all 
                                                
54 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 5. 
55 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 21. 
56 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 22. Sebastian Seedorf and 
Sanele Sibanda state that “the idea that the accumulation of power can be (best) prevented by the 
introduction of distinctive institutions with defined functions, areas of competence and 
jurisdiction, which exercise public power in mutual co-operation, was foundational to the Roman 
republic of the sixth century BC”, “Separation of Powers” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2008, 2nd ed) 1 12-1 – 12-98 at 12-4. Taking Vile’s 
position to be accurate, this statement appears to be incorrect to the extent that Seedorf and 
Sibanda contend that specific functions of government were allocated to particular agencies in 
order to promote liberty. Gwyn’s understanding of the separation of powers’ origins endorses this 
analysis on the basis of the doctrine’s normative character: “[b]ecause it is a normative doctrine, it 
has been erroneous for some commentators to maintain that the doctrine was known in ancient 
times on the strength of Aristotle’s classification of governmental functions”, The Meaning of the 
Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the United 
States Constitution (1965) 9.  
57 Carré de Malberg R Contribution à la Théorie Générale de l’État II (2004) 2. This work was 
originally published in two volumes in 1920 and 1922 by Sirey.  
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constitutions. In making this distinction Aristotle was concerned only with identifying 
the numerous activities of state organs;58 he made no attempt to allocate these 
functions to specific state organs and he was not opposed to one organ simultaneously 
participating in all three activities.59 Therefore, Aristotle did not separate state organs 
according to their functions and there was no separation of personnel. That there were 
tasks of a different nature among the activities of the state is clear, though. 
Although Aristotle devised a threefold distinction of state activities, they do not 
correspond to the modern executive, legislative and judicial functions. Instead, 
Aristotle divided political science into legislative science, the task of the “law-giver”, 
on the one hand, and politics or policy, which is concerned with action and 
deliberation, on the other: the threefold classification of state activities was the 
concern of the former; the latter was subdivided into deliberative and juridical 
science.60 Legislative science and politics or policy do not correspond to the modern 
definitions of the legislative and executive functions either, but Aristotle’s twofold 
division of political science was concerned with “the difference between making a 
general rule on the one hand, and judging particular instances, on the other”.61  
Vile links the concern with the functions of government to the idea of “government 
according to law”: 
 
“There is an essential connection between the notion of government according to law and the 
concept of the functions of government. This connection forms the basis of the concern with 
function down through the ages, and is the explanation of the persistence of this concept in 
spite of the many attacks made upon it. Government according to law presupposes at least two 
distinct operations, the making of the law, and putting it into effect.”62 
 
Therefore, a twofold classification of governmental functions was passed down by 
the Greeks: one, the “making” of general rules, which apply generally, and, two, the 
                                                
58 See Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 3-4. 
59 Carré de Malberg R Contribution à la Théorie Générale de l’État II (2004) 2. See also 
Vanderbilt AT The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and its Present-Day Significance (1963) 
39. 
60 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 21. 
61 24. 
62 21. 
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application of those rules to specific cases. The former became known as the 
legislative function and the latter as the executive function. Thus, governmental 
functions are closely associated with an awareness of the primacy of “government 
according to law”; in turn, “government according to law”, constituted by the making 
of law and administering law, is dependent on the nature of law.  
A twofold classification of governmental functions was employed until the 
publication of De l’Esprit des Lois in the eighteenth century, when the modern 
threefold classification became established.63 However, the concepts of the legislative 
and executive functions employed by Locke, for instance, are significantly different 
from Aristotle’s twofold classification of political science. The discrepancies between 
the ancient and modern understandings of these state functions are linked to the 
conception of the nature of law. It is the evolution of the view of the nature of law that 
led, firstly, to a change in the classification of state functions and, then, to associating 
functions to specific organs of state. Thus, until the Middle Ages these functions 
could not be associated with a correlating governmental agency because of the 
reigning conceptions of law and of sovereignty.64 What, then, was the nature of law 
considered to be and how did this affect the development of state functions? 
Vile explains that law was considered to be “divinely-inspired custom” until the 
Middle Ages and therefore humankind was incapable of creating law.65 Consequently 
the more modern conception of the legislature, an institution constituted of men and 
women that can actually make law, could not exist:66 “[t]here could, therefore, be only 
one ‘function’ of government - the judicial function; all acts of government were in 
some way justified as aspects of the application and interpretation of the law”.67 This 
                                                
63  Importantly, some authors maintained that there were only two powers, legislative and 
executive, and that the judicial function was a form of executive power. See Uhler A Review of 
Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 5 (“[I]t is not open to serious doubt that 
Montesquieu, in keeping with many writers, including John Locke, recognized only two primary 
powers of the state, the legislative and the executive.” (footnotes omitted)); Troper M La 
Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 45-46. 
64 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 24. 
65 24. 
66 24. 
67 24. 
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judicial function is not synonymous with the modern usage of the term, but it 
encompassed all the activities of the state, regardless of which agency performed it.68  
Marsilius of Padua illustrates the transition from this ancient conception of law to a 
more modern version where the overall judicial function split into executive and 
legislative functions exercised by distinct agencies.69 Based on Aristotle’s twofold 
division of political science, Marsilius apportioned the legislative and executive 
functions to distinct agencies, the former belonging to the people and the latter to the 
ruler. Placing the legislative power in the people was an important development 
because, although law was still considered to be divine, the people were responsible 
for any amendments to and interpretation of the law according to the needs of the 
time. Marsilius argued that it was more appropriate for the ruler to put this law into 
effect because “a few” perform this function more efficiently than “the people”. 
Therefore, under Marsilius the legislative function acquired a more modern 
countenance by being placed with the people, but, more importantly, he placed the so-
called legislative and executive functions in distinct hands. This apportionment of 
powers was based on efficiency grounds and therefore does not adhere to Vile’s “pure 
definition” which requires a separation of powers for the purpose of securing political 
liberty. Gwyn notes a similar allocation of legislative and executive functions to 
Parliament and government, respectively, in the first half of the seventeenth century, 
but his analysis differs from Vile’s:70 Gwyn’s twofold criteria for the qualification of 
an idea as referring to the separation of powers is satisfied here. Thus, the 
apportionment of functions amounts to the “earliest version of a normative doctrine of 
a separation of these functions”, that of efficiency.71  
However, it was only in the seventeenth century that the idea that Parliament 
creates law became established.72 Concurrently, the meaning of the executive function 
was virtually equivalent to the modern definition of the judicial function: “[t]he 
modern notion of an executive power distinct from the machinery of law enforcement 
through the courts, could hardly be envisaged in an age when almost the only impact 
                                                
68 24. 
69 27-28. 
70 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 30-31. 
71 31-33. 
72 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 25. 
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of government upon the ordinary citizen was through the courts and the law-
enforcement officers.”73 Based on this twofold legislative-executive classification, the 
idea of distinct functions performed by separate agencies in order to limit government 
developed in English thought during the seventeenth century. 74  Although the 
independence of judges was an established idea, the judiciary as an independent 
branch separate from the executive branch would only appear in the eighteenth 
century.75 Thus, “[b]y the time of the English Civil War one of the fundamental 
elements in the doctrine of the separation of powers, an abstract classification of the 
functions of government into two or three categories, had been developed to a high 
degree under the impact of the contest between King and Parliament”.76 The merging 
of these ideas with the theory of mixed government led to the apportionment of 
distinct abstract functions to separate branches.77  
  
2 4 2 The Theory of Mixed Government 
 
The ancient theory of mixed government, or of the mixed constitution, required the 
participation of every governmental branch or of every constitutional type in all the 
activities of the state.78 The theory has a class basis79 in terms of which the monarchy, 
the aristocracy, and the people, as represented by the consul, the senate, and the 
popular assemblies, respectively, each have selfish interests. Each class is reflected in 
a type of constitution, namely, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.80 Thus,  
 
                                                
73 28-29. 
74 28. 
75 28-32. 
76 32-33. 
77 33. 
78 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 24; Vile MJC Constitutionalism 
and the Separation of Powers (1967) 36. 
79 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 33, 35-36. 
80 This threefold division of the types of constitution was proposed by Polybius, whereas Plato and 
Aristotle advocated different twofold divisions, Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of 
Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the United States 
Constitution (1965) 24 n 1.  
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“the major concern of ancient theorists of constitutionalism was to attain a balance between the 
various classes of society and so to emphasize that the different interests in the community, 
reflected in the organs of the government, should each have a part to play in the exercise of the 
deliberative, magisterial, and judicial functions alike.”81  
 
It was thought that where the main components of society performed each 
governmental function collectively, then the various classes, represented by different 
state organs, would prevent any particular interest from promoting its own agenda at 
the cost of the others.82 The rationale for a theory of mixed government was the 
prevention of arbitrary rule, the limitation of power, and “achieving liberty under 
law”;83 it is the promotion of these normative objectives by means of “instituting 
internal checks within government”84 which links it to the separation of powers.85 
Nevertheless, the theory of mixed government and the separation of powers are 
“logically quite distinct”,86 even though they are associated with one another and even 
though the latter evolved from the former: mixed government has a class basis and is 
concerned with balancing interests by means of collective governance whereas the 
pure doctrine classifies governmental functions, apportions each to a particular branch 
and limits the branches to the performance of a single function.87  
In terms of the theory of mixed government democracy is naturally the stronger 
element of the legislature and several strategies were developed to limit its impact:88 
bicameral parliament where two houses balance one another, the decentralisation of 
government, and the apportionment of functions to separate branches so that “popular 
                                                
81 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 23. 
82 33. 
83 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 26. 
84 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 34. 
85 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 26; Vile MJC Constitutionalism 
and the Separation of Powers (1967) 34, 36. 
86 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 33. 
87 For a list of differences between the theory of mixed government and the separation of powers, 
see Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 26-27. 
88 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 33-34. 
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opinion in the legislature can be slowed down”.89 These modifications to the theory of 
mixed government gradually resulted in a shift to the more modern idea of the 
separation of powers.90 The interests of the state and the monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy of mixed government became associated with the executive, judicial and 
legislative powers of the separation of powers.91 
This shift from the theory of mixed government to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers involved two developments: one, during the seventeenth century, the idea that 
distinct agencies should only perform certain functions and, two, during the 
eighteenth century,92 the introduction of the independent judicial branch to prevailing 
political thought.93 A corollary of the earlier development was the limitation of the 
monarch’s power to the execution of law; this signifies “the beginning of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers, and at the same time the beginning of the end for the 
doctrine of mixed government.”94 
Therefore, in the seventeenth century: 
 
“All the elements of the pure doctrine of the separation of powers were now present in the 
minds of the men who witnessed the struggle between King and Parliament, and who had come 
to fear the arbitrary rule of either. All that was needed for the doctrine was the idea that the 
agencies of government should be restrained by each being confined to the exercise of its own 
appropriate function.”95 
 
The catalyst for the further development and establishment of these ideas were the 
constitutional challenges posed by the English Civil War96 and the Commonwealth 
and, therefore, during the seventeenth century, even before the publication of Locke’s 
Second Treatise, the ideas of the separation of powers were already well advanced.97  
                                                
89 34. 
90 34. 
91 33. 
92 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 5. 
93 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 36-37. 
94 38. 
95 45. 
96 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 37. 
97 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 51. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 32  
 
2 4 3 The Theory of the Balanced Constitution 
 
However, even though the ideas of the separation of powers were quite developed 
and well known during the seventeenth century, it would only become the dominant 
constitutional doctrine in the eighteenth century.98 The ideas of the separation of 
powers, having evolved from the theory of mixed government and, in particular, the 
circumstances of the English Civil War and the Commonwealth, were at hand during 
the Restoration. However, this period saw the restoration of Charles II as King. The 
separation of powers could not be reconciled with this situation because the doctrine 
did not require the King having a share in the legislative power or having a place in 
the House of Lords. The theory of mixed government was the more appropriate theory 
in this context and it was drawn upon again99 and emphasised between 1660 and the 
early eighteenth century.100 
The events of the Civil War had a permanent effect on the ancient theory of mixed 
government. As a result the theory which reappeared during the Restoration was the 
familiar theory of mixed government, modified in two respects: one, “the King, 
although he still had powerful and important prerogatives, must acknowledge the 
supremacy of the law, and, therefore, of the legislature” and, two, by now “the basic 
ideas of the doctrine of the separation of powers (although, of course, it was not 
known by that name) were part of the general currency of English political 
thought.”101 Consequently, between 1660 and 1750 the theory of mixed government, 
legislative supremacy, and the ideas of the separation of powers were merged into the 
English theory of the balanced constitution, which would provide the foundation for 
Montesquieu’s “exposition” of the English Constitution in Book XI of De l’Esprit des 
Lois.102 
                                                
98 53. 
99 53. 
100 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 67-68. 
101 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 53. 
102 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 109-113; Vile MJC 
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 53-54. 
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The theory of the balanced constitution developed gradually because the theory of 
mixed government and the separation of powers could not easily reconcile; also the 
theory of mixed government rejected a judicial branch.103 The separation of powers’ 
twofold distinction of governmental functions, legislative and executive, and mixed 
government’s threefold distinction of governmental agencies, by now divided into 
King, Lords and Commons, was an obstacle to their merging. In terms of the theory of 
mixed government, the addition of a branch made up of independent judges would 
constitute a fourth branch and the threefold division could not accommodate this. 
Conceptually, such a development did not make sense, but the Settlement Act of 1701 
established the independence of judges nonetheless. However, adherence to the theory 
of mixed government resulted in the association of the judicial function with the 
House of Lords.104 
Reverend George Lawson’s work illustrates how the judicial function came to be 
severed from the traditional twofold division of functions105 and how the ideas of the 
Civil War and Protectorate evolved into the theory of the balanced constitution of the 
eighteenth century.106 His contribution in this regard lies in his treatment of the 
“relationships between mixed government and the separation of powers”.107 Lawson 
reformulated the meaning of the executive power by dividing the traditional executive 
power into two.108 His new executive power denoted the “carrying out of judgments, 
rather than the carrying into effect of the law as a whole”109 and this signifies a move 
in the direction of the modern understanding of the executive function as opposed to 
the judicial function. In addition, he advocated legislative supremacy.110 John Locke 
made the subsequent move towards a theory of the balanced constitution in 
reconciling the idea of legislative supremacy with the ideas of the separation of 
powers.111 
                                                
103 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 54. 
104 54. 
105 55. 
106 57. 
107 57. 
108 55-56. 
109 56. 
110 57. 
111 57-58. 
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Vile characterises the following statement by Locke as “the essence” of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers: 
 
“[B]ecause it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the 
same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hand the power to 
execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, 
and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby 
come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community”.112 
 
Although Locke’s theory of government did not amount to the “pure doctrine”, the 
“essential elements” in his theory are the following:113 one, the executive ruler is part 
of the legislature, not in the sense that the legislative and executive powers are merged 
or that the king can legislate, but in the sense that the king assents to legislation, and, 
two, the legislature oversees the execution of the law, but cannot participate in it. Vile 
describes this view of governmental powers as “the basis of the theory of the balanced 
constitution, a theory which we may label as a partial separation of functions, for 
there was a sharing of the legislative authority, but a fundamental division of function 
between executive and legislature.”114 
Locke, however, neglected the separation of personnel and the judicial function 
and he failed to allocate a more important role to the theory of mixed government.115 
The later addition of these elements would constitute the English theory of balanced 
government: “a partial sharing and a partial separation of the functions of government 
among distinct bodies of persons”.116 Henry Bolingbroke described the partial sharing 
and separation as the simultaneous “independency” and mutual “dependency” of the 
                                                
112 Locke J The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes (1824, 12th ed) Vol 4 324. Locke and 
Montesquieu’s ideas on the separation of powers are founded on theories of human nature. This 
variable is important to bear in mind since these ideas on the separation of powers are a response 
to particular conceptions of human behaviour in the political context that, so the argument goes, 
warrant certain institutional arrangements. In a final assessment of the separation of powers none 
of its various objectives can be left by the wayside. 
113 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 65-66. 
114 66. 
115 66, 67. 
116 73. 
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parts of government.117 On the one hand, the mutual dependency of the branches 
entails that each part of government controls other branches, to a certain extent, and, 
on the other hand, this interdependence of the branches presupposes their 
independence,118 otherwise the dominant branch can act without limitation and the 
other branches are then completely dependent on that branch, thus disturbing the 
balance. This arrangement is reminiscent of checks and balances. 
The ideas of the separation of powers was fundamental to the theory of the 
balanced constitution, even though it was but an element of the theory.119 Vile 
characterises the dominant constitutional theory of the eighteenth century, the 
separation of powers featuring prominently, as follows:  
 
“The division of the functions of government among distinct agencies is there, but neither the 
functions nor the agencies follow the categories of the pure doctrine of the separation of 
powers, and in one vital function the authority is shared, not divided. The idea of the separation 
of persons is also very important, demanding at least a partial separation among the agencies of 
government [...] The idea of checks to the exercise of power, through the opposition of 
functionally divided agencies of government in distinct hands, is there, but it is a much more 
positive view of the necessary checks to the exercise of power than the pure doctrine 
envisaged.”120 
 
Montesquieu would build on this foundation in his De l’Esprit des Lois, which 
became the most influential work on the doctrine of the separation of powers. He 
travelled in England from 1729 to 1731,121 and his understanding of the separation of 
powers is an exposition of the English separation of powers, as he saw it.122  
 
                                                
117 See Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 95; Vile MJC Constitutionalism 
and the Separation of Powers (1967) 74. 
118 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 74. 
119 74. 
120 74. 
121 Shackleton R Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (1961) 117. 
122 Unfortunately, the journal documenting his travels in England is lost, it was probably burnt by 
his grandson, thereby depriving us of a better understanding of the development of his ideas in the 
English context (Shackleton R Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (1961) 117-118). Nevertheless, 
Montesquieu’s substantial debt to English constitutional thought cannot be denied. 
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2 4 4 Montesquieu’s Separation of Powers 
 
Unfortunately, the extent of Montesquieu’s role in the development of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers is obscure and, before it can be assessed, it must be 
acknowledged that “[a] remarkable degree of disagreement exists about what 
Montesquieu actually did say.”123 In this regard, Vile identifies two schools of 
thought: the one maintains that Montesquieu advocated the pure doctrine of the 
separation of powers (“a thoroughgoing separation of agencies, functions, and 
persons”) and the other that he was concerned with a “partial separation of powers, 
that is the pure doctrine modified by a system of checks and balances.”124 Vile then 
assesses these schools of thought in an attempt to determine what Montesquieu said. 
Montesquieu’s contribution to the doctrine of the separation of powers is threefold; 
two of his innovations relate to the functions of government and one to a branch of 
government.125 Firstly, he uses the term “executive” in a virtually modern sense, that 
of putting the law into effect. Thus, he finishes the process, illustrated by Lawson, in 
terms of which the old “executive” power becomes the judicial power. Secondly, his 
endorsement of the idea of the judicial function having a co-ordinate role with the 
legislative and executive functions establishes the threefold division of government 
functions that persists to this day.126 Finally, he places the judicial function with the 
ordinary courts, severing its association with the House of Lords.  
                                                
123 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 85; see also Gwyn WB The 
Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption 
of the United States Constitution (1965) 3. See Gwyn WB “The Indeterminacy of the Separation 
of Powers and the Federal Courts” (1989) 57 George Washington Law Review 474-505 (“The two 
or three-fold classification of government authority has been characterized since its origin by 
ambiguity of meaning.” (477)); “The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the 
Framers” (1989) 30 William & Mary Law Review 263-268 (“Disagreement about the doctrine is 
probably inherent because ... a large variety of institutional arrangements can satisfy the separation 
of powers norm.” (265)); Magill ME “The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law” (2000) 
86 Virginia Law Review 1127-1198 (“We do not agree on what the principle requires, what its 
objectives are, or how it does or could accomplish its objectives.” (1128-1129)). 
124 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 85-86 (footnotes omitted). 
125 88, 96. 
126 Cf. Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 45-
46. 
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Montesquieu was not the first to give the executive branch the capacity to veto 
legislation. Nevertheless, he understood this check of power differently to his 
predecessors: “[w]hereas the English writers saw the King as an essential part of the 
legislative branch itself, he saw the executive as a separate branch which has a part to 
play in the exercise of the legislative function.”127 
Even though all the elements of the pure doctrine of the separation of powers are 
present in Montesquieu’s work, he was not merely a proponent of the pure doctrine.128 
Building on the foundation of the theory of mixed government Montesquieu combines 
the pure doctrine with the idea of checks and balances between the legislature and the 
executive in De l’Esprit des Lois, contending that the separation of powers and checks 
and balances are necessary to secure liberty.129 He argued for both negative and 
positive checks on the exercise of power, the former effected by a separation or 
independence of powers and the latter by giving each branch some control over the 
other. 
Building on the English constitutional thought of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, Montesquieu established the doctrine of the separation of powers 
as the constitutional theory to control state power, due to the timing of his publication 
and his influential innovations. Despite Montesquieu’s indebtedness to the earlier 
ideas of the separation of powers, he contributed much. He attached less weight to the 
ideas of mixed government than English writers. But whether either Locke or 
Montesquieu is the author of the separation of powers really hinges on the definition 
of the separation of powers. However, as Vile’s exposition of the doctrine’s 
development indicates, the ideas that constitute the separation of powers were already 
in currency during the seventeenth century.  
 
                                                
127 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 92. 
128 93. 
129 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 111-113. See also Vanderbilt AT 
The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and its Present-Day Significance (1963) 45. 
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2 4 5 The Normative Nature of the Separation of Powers130  
 
As a constitutional instrument, the separation of powers is, in essence, a normative 
doctrine. However, constitutionalism as a normative and prescriptive doctrine as 
opposed to a descriptive one is a relatively modern development. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the separation of powers was still in the 
process of becoming an independent doctrine, the ideas of the separation of powers 
were more normative than the content of constitutionalism itself. Therefore, the 
normative character of the separation of powers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries makes the doctrine all the more significant because it added a distinctly 
normative flavour to a taxonomical conception of constitutionalism. Gwyn 
characterises the separation of powers as “a normative doctrine prescribing certain 
governmental arrangements which should be created or perpetuated in order to 
achieve certain desirable ends”,131 and, as mentioned above, he regards a normative 
objective as a prerequisite for the doctrine. 
The doctrine is most often explained and justified as securing the liberty of 
individuals against the state: the purpose of the doctrine of the separation of powers is 
to “maximise individual freedom” by “dividing the functions of government and 
allocating them to different institutions”.132 Montesquieu warns that: 
 
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body 
of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner”.133  
 
He therefore argues for a separation of the legislative and executive, placing each 
in distinct hands, in order to counter tyranny or to promote political liberty. The idea 
                                                
130 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 8-9, 11. 
131 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 5. See Hough M “Die 
Ontwikkeling en Kontemporêre Betekenis van die Leerstelling van Verdeling van Staatsgesag” 
(1978) 11 De Jure 346-363. 
132 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 91. 
133 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws tr Nugent T (1959) Book XI Chapter 6 151-152. Note the 
reliance on human nature, concerning both the holder of power and the perception of the public. 
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of promoting liberty or, negatively, countering tyranny or arbitrary rule, is central to 
the pure doctrine. Montesquieu defines liberty as “a right of doing whatever the laws 
permit”.134 In other words:  
 
“To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a 
check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do 
things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law 
permits.”135 
 
In terms of Vile’s pure doctrine, the separation of powers is enforced to secure 
political liberty.136 If powers are not separated in order to promote political liberty 
then it is not the pure doctrine of the separation of powers, it seems. Thus, he contends 
that Marsilius’ separation of the legislative and executive functions does not qualify 
as the separation of powers because it is concerned with efficiency.137  Gwyn, 
however, indicates that the separation of powers has been advocated for promoting the 
following five normative objectives:138 firstly, efficiency,139 secondly, the creation of 
law in the common interest, thirdly, the impartial administration of the law and the 
equality of all before the law, including administrators, fourthly, the accountability of 
the executive to the legislature, and, finally, the balancing of governmental powers. 
These normative objectives entail five corresponding, what Gwyn calls, “versions” of 
the doctrine, namely, the efficiency, common interest, impartial rule of law, 
                                                
134 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws tr Nugent T (1959) Book XI Chapter 3 150 (footnotes 
omitted). 
135 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws tr Nugent T (1959) Book XI Chapter 4 150. 
136 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 13. 
137 28. 
138 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 127-128; for a similar set of values 
said to be promoted by the separation of powers, see Bellamy R “The Political Form of the 
Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy” (1996) 44 
Political Studies 436-456 at 255. 
139 Efficiency has been recognised by various other authors as an objective of the separation of 
powers, for instance, see generally, Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 
Cambridge Law Journal 59-88; Saunders C “Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch” 
(2006) 11 Judicial Review 337-347.  
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accountability, and balancing versions.140 Likewise, Meyerson indicates how the 
separation of powers promotes the rule of law.141 
 
2 4 6 The Relevance of the Separation of Powers in Evaluating Constitutional 
Structures Today 
 
Determining whether the separation of powers has a role to play 
contemporaneously in thinking about constitutional arrangements is problematic. 
Arguments for and against the doctrine can only square off against one another if they 
are evaluating the same issues and this requires adequate agreement regarding, at 
least: the content of the doctrine; to which values the doctrine supposedly contributes; 
which values should be assessed in order to determine the doctrine’s failure or 
success; which other factors, external to the doctrine, might warp such an assessment 
or impact upon the same values as the doctrine; 142  the causality between the 
implementation of the doctrine and its alleged success or failure; whether the 
separation of powers is the appropriate mechanism to promote certain values; and the 
emphasis to be attributed to perceptions of the failure or success of the doctrine. And 
then, of course, there is the matter of the counterfactual, a question which can only be 
answered with much speculation: what would the control of governmental power and 
the relationship between the individual and the state have come to, were the doctrine 
completely absent? Unfortunately, addressing every aspect of such a separation-of-
powers appraisal is beyond the scope of this study.143 Nevertheless, the main points of 
contention directed at the separation of powers are identified and assessed. 
                                                
140 In terms of Gwyn’s analysis, an argument for the separation of powers based on considerations 
of efficiency, such as that of Marsilius, would certainly qualify as an early incidence of the 
doctrine. 
141 Meyerson D “The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law 
Journal 1-6. 
142 For instance, Gwyn points out that ombudsmen and the electorate also participate in securing 
the accountability version of the doctrine, “The Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of 
Democratic Government” in Goldwin RA & Kaufman A Separation of Powers – Does It Still 
Work? (1986) 65-89 at 69. 
143 A final assessment of the separation of powers cannot be persuasive without addressing these 
issues. 
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Critics of the doctrine of the separation of powers have contended that no material 
distinction of the functions of the branches of government is possible;144 that the 
doctrine does not secure, or even contribute to the achievement of, political liberty;145 
that the doctrine infringes upon legislative supremacy and therefore democracy; and 
that the doctrine slows down government, leading to inefficiency. The doctrine has 
also been criticised for being out-dated, implying that as an institutional model it 
cannot address the aforementioned challenges because it has not adapted or cannot 
adapt satisfactorily to societal changes since the time of Montesquieu. I do not attempt 
to discuss each point comprehensively. Instead, general arguments for and against 
each topic are presented to illustrate their contested status.146  
In response to Sir Ivor Jennings’s view that there is no material distinction between 
the functions of government,147 Barendt argues that they can be defined in general 
terms in a constitution in order to be apportioned to the branches of government.148 He 
adds that it is the role of the courts to delineate these functions. Furthermore, the 
doctrine “is not in essence concerned with the allocation of functions as such” because 
its primary objective is the prevention of power build-ups which may lead to tyranny 
and, therefore, “[t]he allocation of functions between three, or perhaps more, branches 
of government is only a means to achieve that end.”149 One could also mention that 
the legal or political effect of the various functions is substantively different. This 
analysis is in agreement with the normative claims of the pure doctrine. Thus, the 
                                                
144 See Bellamy R “The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and 
Representative Democracy” (1996) 44 Political Studies 436-456 at 256; Barendt E “The Rule of 
Law and the Separation of Powers” (1995) Public Law 599-619 at 603. 
145 See Brennan G & Hamlin A “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers” (1994) 6 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 345-368; Bellamy R “The Political Form of the Constitution: The 
Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy” (1996) 44 Political Studies 436-456 
at 256. 
146 Even though this is not an exhaustive exposition of separation-of-powers criticism, it is 
significant that but two of Gwyn’s five versions are attacked in the literature dealt with below. 
147 As to the contention that there is no material distinction between governmental functions 
perhaps the emphasis on the mental processes involved is undue, see Green F “Separation of 
Governmental Powers” (1920) 29 Yale Law Journal 369-393 at 373: “[i]t is of fundamental 
importance to notice that the difference between legislative, executive and judicial action depends 
upon the kind of action taken and not upon the kind of mental process involved in deciding 
whether and how to take it.” 
148 Barendt E “The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers” (1995) Public Law 599-619 at 605. 
149 606. 
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separation of powers prevents an over-concentration of power and the classification of 
functions is incidental to this. Even though the functions are not absolutely 
conceptually distinct, for practical purposes the differentiation is useful. 
Barber rejects Barendt’s overall argument because Barendt “has equated the 
doctrine of separation of powers with a theory of the state”.150 According to Barber, 
Barendt’s argument is based on two assumptions, upon which he does not elaborate: 
one, liberty and a powerful state are irreconcilable and, two, the courts must uphold 
this liberty by ensuring division among the branches of government. This situation has 
important implications for the balance of power between the branches, but Barendt 
does not deal with these matters. Ultimately, Barber emphasises the diverse 
applications of the doctrine in different jurisdictions and that this diversity should 
discourage granting the courts a “general jurisdiction to police divisions of power 
within the constitution.” 151  Nevertheless, Barber considers the “essence” of the 
doctrine to be “the meeting of form and function”.152 However, this “meeting of form 
and function” does not imply the fragmentation of power nor that the judiciary decides 
the content of the separation of powers. He envisages an apportionment of functions 
to the correlating branches of government being based on allocating functions to those 
agencies most apt at performing them. Thus, he does not contend that the functions of 
government cannot be divided into abstract categories, but he bases this division on 
efficiency rather than the dilution of power; he does not consider the extent of the role 
courts have to play in this regard to be obvious or universal. 
Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin pose the question “whether the separation of 
powers contributes to the resolution of the principal-agent problem in favour of the 
principal” or, in other words, “whether (or when) the separation of powers does, in 
fact, act as an effective constraint on the abuse of power, and if so, how and why.”153 
On the basis of an analogy with economic competition, they then find that there is a 
presumption against the vertical separation of powers actually protecting citizens from 
                                                
150 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 
61-62. 
151 88. 
152 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 
at 59. Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 4. 
153 Brennan G & Hamlin A “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers” (1994) 6 Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 345-368 at 346 (footnotes omitted). 
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the abuse of power.154 The vertical separation of powers results in an externality 
between the branches, which cannot be internalised:155 “the separation of powers 
holds the prospect of exploiting citizens more fully rather than offering any protection 
from exploitative government.”156 They summarise their argument as follows: 
 
“[W]herever two (or more) functionally distinct, self-seeking agents are each subject to control 
mechanisms by the common principal, the principal would not lose – and will benefit in many 
instances – from integrating the two agencies and subjecting the integrated agency to some 
subset of the controls previously employed. To put the same point more directly and in 
constitutional terms: if a constitution is to be designed to protect citizens from exploitation by 
government, it should not incorporate a functional separation of powers.”157 
 
Vile counters that “any theory of politics must begin with a discussion of human 
nature”,158 a topic that is not addressed by Brennan and Hamlin at all. Furthermore, he 
considers the assumptions on which they base their study to be too far removed from 
reality to make a real contribution.159  
Brennan and Hamlin evaluate the separation of the branches of government’s 
relationship with the abuse of power. In other words, they only analyse negative 
checks on power. Already in the eighteenth century Montesquieu realised that 
separating powers alone would not be an adequate check on power; he therefore 
combined the pure separation of powers with checks and balances. Furthermore, it is 
arguable whether state power is by nature divisible, especially in an economic sense. 
What the separation of powers does is not to divide power or sovereignty itself, but to 
fragment the mechanisms by means of which that power is exercised; this amounts to 
functional and institutional separation. 
The separation of powers, as a result of the executive’s legislative veto, has also 
been critiqued for infringing upon legislative supremacy. This dilutes democratic rule. 
                                                
154 Brennan G & Hamlin A “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers” (1994) 6 Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 345-368 at 347-352, 367. A separation of power between the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary is a vertical separation, 346-347. 
155 Brennan G & Hamlin A “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers” (1994) 6 Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 345-368 at 361. 
156 352.  
157 363 (footnotes omitted). 
158 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998, 2nd ed) 407 n 55. 
159 407 n 55. 
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Strictly speaking, of course, a power to veto is a check, but more importantly, this 
critique is debunked by the fact that majority rule is not absolute. The binding legal 
status of a bill of rights testifies to this. The dangers of majority rule were already 
documented in Plato’s account of mixed government. Similarly, the separation of 
powers stands for the protection of values that are threatened by competing norms and 
by the structure of government. Before the rise of parliaments, the implementation of 
the separation of powers was motivated to counter the dangers inherent to state power 
vested in the ruler, which is an argument in favour of democratic principles. But, in 
the context of a different political landscape, the federalists argued in favour of the 
separation of powers precisely because of the limits of democratic governance: 
 
“Rejecting separation of powers will not make democratic man or bureaucratic man any more 
capable of rule than he ever was. Our problem is that we want the blessings of a free 
democracy without any of its difficulties or inefficiencies. The framers wanted democracy in 
actuality but were profoundly aware of its dangerous propensities, and they created a structure 
designed to minimize them. We have lost their sober perspective on human affairs and human 
capacities and have come to believe that altering institutions can not only change the course of 
events but even alter the nature of man.”160 
 
That democratic principles are valuable is by no means thereby denied.  
The separation of powers has been critiqued for institutionalising inefficient 
government, especially in the United States, as it prevents adequate “presidential 
leadership”.161 Lloyd N. Cutler strongly advocated this view, saying that “[t]he 
separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its 
merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today.”162 
Gwyn offers a reminder that the initial rationale for the separation of powers was 
                                                
160 Anderson AS “A 1787 Perspective on Separation of Powers” in Goldwin RA & Kaufman A 
(eds) Separation of Powers – Does It Still Work? (1986) 138-167 at 159 (footnotes omitted). 
161 Goldwin RA & Kaufman A (eds) “Preface” in Separation of Powers – Does It Still Work? 
(1986) ix.  
162 Cutler LN “To Form a Government” (1980) 59 Foreign Affairs 126-143 at 127. Cf. Calabresi 
SG & Bady K “Is the Separation of Powers Exportable?” (2010) 33 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 5-16. 
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based on efficiency.163 It was argued at an early stage that law-making is more 
appropriately performed by a large body, whereas putting it into effect required a 
small group that could act expediently. Barber goes further than Gwyn, asserting that 
“the core of the doctrine is not liberty, as many writers have assumed, but 
efficiency.”164 
Nevertheless, efficiency in itself cannot be a measure of the validity or invalidity of 
the separation of powers. A despotic and exploitative government may be extremely 
efficient. This observation provides some evidence of the separation of powers’ 
constitutional limitations. However, when efficiency is evaluated as a normative 
objective, it has to promote additional values determined by political theory. 
Efficiency as an independent criterion can be misleading. Thus, in the assessment of 
the separation of powers, efficiency should not be considered in isolation or over-
emphasised. 
Undoubtedly, the idea of separating or dividing holders of power in order to 
promote normative objectives has yielded encouraging results. The separation of 
church and state is a classic example of a separation of power, the necessity of which 
is widely accepted. 165  Barendt points out that the separation of powers could 
complement arguments based on a bill of rights in civil liberties cases as has been 
shown in the United States of America, France and Germany, but neglected in the 
United Kingdom.166 The validity of the doctrine of the separation of powers is usually 
discussed in the context of the branches of the state, but it may be instructive to 
consider the merits of fragmenting power in a wider sense to appreciate its actual role. 
Sometimes the lesser of two, or many, evils may be considered to be a successful 
resolution; perhaps, at worst, the separation of powers slots into this category.  
There is no universal model for the application of the doctrine of the separation of 
                                                
163 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 34-35. 
164 Barber NW “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 59-88 at 
59. 
165 Braithwaite J “On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a 
Republication Separation of Powers” (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law Journal 305-361 at 
307. 
166 Barendt E “The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers” (1995) Public Law 599-619 at 600. 
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powers;167 the Constitutional Court has acknowledged this position.168 The separation 
of powers is able to accommodate diverse interpretations, as the constitutional 
arrangements of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and South 
Africa testify. All of these nations have incorporated the doctrine in their 
constitutions, in some way or another. The doctrine’s flexibility should be 
emphasised, rather than its supposed incoherence or inconsistency. For instance, 
Saunders argues that  
 
“[a] doctrine of separation of powers now provides the principal framework within which the 
relationship of the courts to the other branches of government is resolved in this [the United 
Kingdom] and many other Commonwealth countries. The courts were not originally the 
principal focus of the doctrine; clearly, however, it can be adapted to the purpose.”169 
 
Essentially, the separation of powers was not about upholding the “pure doctrine” 
or trias politica.170 The trias politica was a solution to the challenges faced by 
Western governments in their attempts to realise certain normative objectives by 
structuring the state in such a way that it maintains these objectives itself. What may 
be asserted with confidence is that the separation of powers does not independently 
guarantee, for instance, governmental efficiency, political liberty or legislative 
supremacy. There are simply too many factors that have an effect on these and other 
outcomes. Similarly, that the separation of powers, in tandem with other constitutional 
mechanisms, has no significant place in constitutional thought and practice has yet to 
be shown considering the preceding literature overview. 
 
                                                
167  O’Regan K “Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers under the South African Constitution” (2005) 8 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 120-150 at 121. 
168 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 108. 
169 Saunders C “Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch” (2006) 11 Judicial Review 337-347 
at 347. 
170 See Vanderbilt AT The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and its Present-Day Significance 
(1963) 50 (“The doctrine of the separation of governmental powers is not a mere theoretical, 
philosophical concept. It is a practical, workaday principle. The division of government into three 
branches does not imply, as its critics would have us think, three watertight compartments.”). 
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2 5 The Rise of the Administrative State and the Separation of Powers 
 
One of the significant developments, subsequent to the formulation of the 
separation of powers by Montesquieu, is the rise of the administrative state. In 1941 
Carr noted the changing role of the state, a process that took off during the nineteenth 
century: 
 
“We nod approvingly today when someone tells us that, whereas the State used to be merely 
policeman, judge, and protector, it has now become schoolmaster, doctor, house-builder, road-
maker, town-planner, public utility supplier and all the rest of it. The contrast is no recent 
discovery. De Tocqueville observed in 1866 that the State ‘everywhere interferes more than it 
did; it regulates more undertakings, and undertakings of a lesser kind; and it gains a firmer 
footing every day, about, around and above all private persons, to assist, to advise, and to 
coerce them.’”171 
 
This amounts largely to a description of the rise of the administration, in the 
modern sense of the word, over the last 200 years in performing administrative 
functions. In other words, the administration, in particular, embodies these transitions 
described by Carr. Thus the role of the administration has changed fundamentally in 
the recent past, a process that is still on-going. 
The evolution of administrative law as a distinct and legitimate branch of law has 
been a parallel process. “Administrative law” presupposes the recognition of “the 
administration” in a modern sense and, by implication, administrative functions.172 
The concepts of administrative function, administration and administrative law are 
thus interlinked. Therefore, the recognition of administrative law in a particular 
national jurisdiction is indicative of the recognition of the administration and 
administrative function as distinct governmental entities. Determining when the 
administration was recognised in this way is important in positioning the 
administration’s development in relation to the separation of powers’ development. 
Vile shows that the early stages of the separation of powers’ creation involved 
                                                
171 Carr CT Concerning English Administrative Law (1941) 10.  
172 However, the converse is not necessarily true: the existence of the administration does not 
imply the existence of administrative law. For example, Dicey argued that there was no separate 
branch of administrative law applicable to the administration in England. He did, however, 
acknowledge the existence of the administration.  
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identifying distinct state functions and, later, allocating these functions to organs of 
state. This exercise is repeated here: the approximate time periods when the 
administrative function, the administration and administrative law were established 
are identified. 
In the context of the United Kingdom “it is usual to point to the nineteenth century, 
especially its second half, as the period of economic, social and legal history which 
gave birth to the framework of the modern interventionist administrative state”.173 In 
South Africa the administration was shaped under British occupation and took on a 
new role during the nineteenth century, a role that has continued to expand.174 Thus, 
in these nations the modern concept of the administration is a relatively recent 
development and so, by implication, is administrative law. 
The essence of administrative law is “law relating to the control of governmental 
power.”175 More specifically, Baxter defines administrative law as “that branch of 
public law which regulates the legal relations of public authorities, whether with 
private individuals and organizations, or with other public authorities.”176 In response 
to Baxter, Hoexter states that “[i]n South Africa today ... it is more accurate to regard 
administrative law as regulating the activities of bodies that exercise public powers or 
perform public functions, irrespective of whether those bodies are public authorities in 
the strict sense.”177 However, as the Diceyan position on administrative law has 
demonstrated, rules governing the administration can exist without recognising 
administrative law as such.178 Even though administrative functions, administrative 
                                                
173 Pollard D, Parpworth N, Hughs D (eds) Constitutional and Administrative Law (2007, 4th ed) 
18. See Port FJ Administrative Law (1929) 74; Carr CT Concerning English Administrative Law 
(1941) 10; Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) 6-7; Wade HWR & Forsyth C Administrative Law 
(2009, 10th ed) 3-4; Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 1-3. 
174 Wiechers M Administratiefreg (1973) 18; Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) 9-10. “The 
ever-expanding control by public authorities of interests which were purely private interests at the 
turn of the century has emphasized public law problems in legal practice.” (Preface in Rose Innes 
LA Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals in South Africa (1963)). 
175 Wade HWR & Forsyth C Administrative Law (2009, 10th ed) 4. 
176 Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) 2. 
177 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 2. 
178 The appellation “law of the administration” can be applied to the same body of rules during the 
period when administrative law was not recognised as a unique and distinct field of law and the 
administration was not a distinct organ of state. For instance, Mestre demonstrates that French 
administrative-law rules existed during the Middle Ages. However, the administrative function 
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organs and corresponding legal rules probably predate their recognition as such, this 
chapter is concerned with the identification of the administrative function, the 
administration and administrative law in the modern sense of these concepts, as 
distinct notions.  
As mentioned, the rise of the administrative state originated in the eighteenth 
century. Nevertheless, Dicey famously denied the existence of English administrative 
law as late as 1914.179 In France, the jurists of the Ancien Régime did not formally 
recognise the autonomy of administrative law and the expression was not employed 
until the nineteenth century.180 In fact, traditionally it is only in 1873 that a decision of 
the Tribunal des Conflits formally established the concept of droit administratif.181 
Nevertheless, it is accepted that modern French administrative law originated in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution of 1789.182  
Given the primacy of Montesquieu’s separation of powers in modern constitutions, 
one should note that the modern conceptions of the administrative function, the 
administration and administrative law, encapsulated by the phrase “the rise of the 
administrative state”, only developed well after the classic formulation of the 
separation of powers. In France, Montesquieu’s separation of powers precedes a 
distinct administrative law by at least 50 years. In the United Kingdom, on the basis of 
Dicey’s analysis, the separation of powers precedes administrative law by over 150 
years. Thus the rise of the administrative state and the parallel evolution of 
administrative law can be situated in the nineteenth century. The transition from the 
“law of the administration” to “administrative law” is emphasised simply to indicate 
                                                                                                                                       
and the administration did not yet exist in the modern sense of those terms and, thus, 
administrative law, in the sense employed contemporaneously, could not have existed either. 
Nevertheless, rules similar to modern administrative-law rules were applied to organs of state 
comparable to modern administrative organs. As mentioned, these rules are referred to as the “law 
of the administration”.  
179 An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) 330. 
180 Mestre J-L Introduction Historique au Droit Administratif Français (1985) 12. 
181  Blanco, TC 8 February 1873. See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit 
Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 26-27. 
182 Schwarze J European Administrative Law (2006, revised ed) 100; Auby J-B & Cluzel-Métayer 
L “Administrative Law in France” in Seerden RJGH (ed) Administrative Law of the European 
Union, its Member States and the United States: A Comparative Analysis (2007, 2nd ed) 61-92 at 
61. 
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that the administrative function and the administration were not directly incorporated 
into classical separation-of-powers theory.  
Despite the far-reaching effects of the rise of the administration, the triadic 
interpretation of the separation of powers has remained dominant. This suggests that 
the administration has not been incorporated into the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
In addition, classical separation-of-powers theory precedes other significant 
developments that took place in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that 
characterise the modern state and, due to the uncritical acceptance of Montesquieu, 
have not been incorporated to modify the separation of powers: 
 
“No other field of academic inquiry is so dominated by a single thinker, let alone an 
eighteenth-century thinker. However great he may have been, Montesquieu did not have the 
slightest inkling of political parties, democratic politics, modern constitutional designs, 
contemporary bureaucratic techniques, and the distinctive ambitions of the modern regulatory 
state. And yet we mindlessly follow him in supposing that all this complexity is best captured 
by a trinitarian separation of power into the legislative, judicial and executive – with 
comparative administrative law somehow captured in the last branch of the trinity.”183 
 
                                                
183  Ackerman B “Good-bye, Montesquieu” in Rose-Ackerman S & Lindseth PL (eds) 
Comparative Administrative Law (2010) 128-133 at 128. To this list of developments one could 
add modern economic structures, institutions and regulation. Similarly, in the American context, 
see Marshall MH “The Separation of Powers: A Comparative View” in Klaaren J (ed) A Delicate 
Balance: The Place of the Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy (2005) 16-26 at 22: 
 
“The Constitution that limits governmental authority today is largely the product of an 
eighteenth century, Revolutionary War mentality ... As originally written, it condoned slavery 
and presumed the total disenfranchisement of all women ... It failed utterly to anticipate and 
account for other dangers that arose soon after its adoption, such as the rise of national political 
parties and elections based on the cult of personality.” 
 
See Pariente A “Introduction” in Pariente A (ed) La Séparation des Pouvoirs: Théorie Contestée 
et Pratique Renouvelée (2007) (La séparation des pouvoirs est “un principe toujours présent, mais 
une longtemps mal comprise et peu étudiée.” (3)). For an analysis of the relationship between the 
separation of powers and political economy, see Reitz JC “Political Economy and Separation of 
Powers” (2006) 15 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 579-625. On the interaction 
between the separation of powers and voter behaviour, see Nzelibe JO & Stephenson MC 
“Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design” 
(2010) 123 Harvard Law Review 617-654. 
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Thus, Ackerman argues not only that the separation of powers has not assimilated 
the administration, but also that other fundamental developments have been ignored 
by separation-of-powers theory. In short, the separation of powers is out-dated. One 
example is the separation of power’s failure to recognise differences between the 
parliamentary and presidential systems.184 This sequence of events demands a serious 
reconsideration of the traditional separation of powers and invites the question 
whether the administration has been integrated satisfactorily within the executive 
branch and function, that is, without undermining the values that the separation of 
powers strives to promote. If not, can and should the administration be incorporated 
within the separation of powers? If so, how? 
According to Ackerman in his scathing critique of the trias politica,  
 
“it is past time to rethink Montesquieu’s holy trinity. Despite its canonical status, it is blinding 
us to the world-wide rise of new institutional forms that cannot be neatly categorized as 
legislative, judicial, or executive. Although the traditional tripartite formula fails to capture 
their distinctive modes of operation, these new and functionally independent units are playing 
an increasingly important role in modern government. A ‘new separation of powers’ is 
emerging in the twenty-first century. To grasp its distinctive features will require us to develop 
a conceptual framework containing five or six boxes - or maybe more. And so we must say a 
fond farewell to Montesquieu, and create a new foundation for comparative administrative law 
that is equal to the challenges of modern government.”185  
 
The administration is one such “new institutional form”, that is, new in relation to 
the separation of powers. Vile elaborates on how the separation of powers has failed 
to include the administration, despite the rise of the administrative state: 
                                                
184  Ackerman B “Good-bye, Montesquieu” in Rose-Ackerman S & Lindseth PL (eds) 
Comparative Administrative Law (2010) 128-133 at 131-133. 
185  Ackerman B “Good-bye, Montesquieu” in Rose-Ackerman S & Lindseth PL (eds) 
Comparative Administrative Law (2010) 128-133 at 129. Similarly, Harlow and Rawlings claim 
that “given the present state of fusion between executive and Parliament, the idea of a constitution 
held in balance by triadic division of functions is quite simply untenable”, Law and Administration 
(2009, 3rd ed) 23. For a comprehensive discussion on a new separation of powers informed by 
contemporary notions of democratic legitimacy, institutional specialisation and human rights, see 
Ackerman B “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) Harvard Law Review 633-729 (“This is an 
explanatory essay on a big subject, and it will serve its purpose if it jogs us out of ritualistic 
incantations of Madison and Montesquieu. The separation of powers is a good idea, but there is no 
reason to suppose that the classical writers have exhausted its goodness.” (727)).  
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“Bureaucracy has been with us, of course, for more than two hundred years, but the modern 
administrative state exhibits such complexity of structures and such a proliferation of rules that 
the earlier conception of an “executive” consisting of a body of civil servants putting into 
effect, under the direction of ministers, the commands of the legislature is no longer 
tenable.”186 
 
However, this does not mean that functions other than the three separation-of-
powers categories were not recognised at an early stage. Even between Locke and 
Montesquieu there are actually four governmental functions:187 the legislative, the 
executive, the prerogative, and the judicial. The merging of the executive and 
prerogative functions into the single executive function of separation-of-powers 
analysis “obscures the fact that in large areas of government activity those responsible 
for day-to-day government decisions will not be ‘executing the law’, but exercising a 
very wide discretion.” 188  Locke divided governmental functions into two parts, 
legislative and executive, but he subdivided the executive function: the ruler acting 
strictly in terms of law, mainly internal affairs, and in terms of his prerogative, mainly 
foreign affairs. The ruler could exercise his prerogative, or “discretionary power”, for 
the common good only under certain circumstances:189 firstly, where the executive 
was required to act without legislative authorisation for the common good, but 
because the legislature was only infrequently in session it had failed to provide the 
necessary legislative authorisation; secondly, where, because of the generality of law 
which could not provide for all cases, exceptional cases had to be considered on its 
own merits; and, thirdly, also due to the generality of law, where strict compliance to 
the letter of the law would result in detrimental consequences for the majority of 
society. Although the administrative tasks of government are not necessarily directly 
linked to the prerogative powers of a ruler in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, 
they are related to the extent that they emphasise discretion, public interest, 
expedience and aptitude. It is important to note this early recognition of a 
                                                
186 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998, 2nd ed) 399. 
187 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 87. 
188 87. 
189 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 78-79. 
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governmental power that does not fit into the executive category, in the modern sense 
of the concept.  
In the final analysis, Vile argues that the increasing autonomy of the public 
administration and increasing differentiation between bureaucrats and politicians have 
resulted in a fourth political branch and function.190 Political leaders now initiate and 
formulate policy and legislation whereas the administration puts the law into effect. 
Therefore, Vile recommends, for analytical purposes, referring to the “policy branch” 
and the administration instead of to the executive only, as the latter is no longer 
appropriate for the reasons set out above.191  
The assertion that there should be four major political branches and functions 
requires that our understanding of the separation of powers, as a tripartite division for 
the control of power, be reconsidered. The question now is: how is the administration 
to be regulated, considering its evolution subsequent to separation-of-powers theory? 
In the modern constitutional state, this requires not only that citizens be protected 
from the administration’s abuse of power, a negative form of control, but also 
ensuring that the administration complies with the positive obligations imposed upon 
it, a positive form of control.192 
 
2 6 Conclusion 
 
Once the conceptual framework and context that serve as the basis of the 
administrative-law system is acknowledged the nature, development and value of that 
system can be analysed. A discussion on the doctrine of the separation of powers may 
seem far removed from an investigation into state contracting, but the very occurrence 
of the conclusion of contracts by government raises fundamental political and 
constitutional questions. For instance, does the classification of public contractual 
activity as either a (private-law) contract or administrative action adequately reflect 
the legal, political and social situation? Are the South African courts the appropriate 
forum within which to address administrative law issues, especially when they relate 
                                                
190 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998, 2nd ed) 400. 
191 However, such a terminological adjustment may have problematic implications in jurisdictions 
such as South Africa and the United States of America, where the appellation of “executive” is 
entrenched in their Constitutions. 
192 See 3 2 5 below on red-light and green-light theories. 
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to state conduct that exhibits strong commercial form? Is it appropriate to treat organs 
of state as private individuals when they conclude contracts? How does one regulate 
the administration’s contractual arrangements in order to determine whether it is 
authorised to participate in particular contractual arrangements? These questions are 
pertinent to the “functions” of and the relationship between the different branches of 
government. Put simply, what is the role of the state and, who, in government, is 
allowed to do what and why? It is suggested that the separation of powers, which has 
addressed questions of this nature since at least the seventeenth century, is integral to 
answering these questions from a constitutional perspective.193 Yet, these questions 
can only be addressed by the separation of powers once a process of normative 
prioritisation provides adequate guidance about where a state is headed and 
wherefrom. In South Africa, the project of transformative constitutionalism provides 
such a normative framework.  
Thus, before administrative-law systems and state contracting can even be 
discussed directly more fundamental aspects of the administrative-law system require 
attention. Political theory, context, constitutionalism and the separation of powers are 
such aspects. The factors I have identified do not constitute an exhaustive or even a 
comprehensive list. Nevertheless, they are indispensible to a discussion on public 
contracting.  
Context and choices in political theory inform the content of a national, 
constitutional-law theory. Therefore, an ideal-type constitutional-law theory, 
independent of space and time, does not exist: 
 
“The great theme of the advocates of constitutionalism, in contrast either to theorists of 
utopianism, or of absolutism, of the right or of the left, has been the frank acknowledgement of 
the role of government in society, linked with the determination to bring that government 
under control and to place limits on the exercise of its power.”194 
 
Whenever meaning is derived from or content given to a constitutional provision 
the political theories and the political and socio-economic context, which constitute 
the foundation of the Constitution, or any constitutional law theory, must be factored 
into the process of interpretation. Transformative constitutionalism is an instrument of 
                                                
193 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 3. 
194 1. 
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interpretation in this mould and the value of transformative constitutionalism as an 
epistemological device is its practical orientation and acknowledgment of the social 
and political factors which influence decision-making. This idea is emphasised by 
Klare who advocates a “postliberal reading” of the Constitution195 and points out that 
the nature of the Constitution’s provisions supports such a reading: 
 
“In support of a postliberal reading, one would highlight that the South African Constitution, in 
sharp contrast to the classical liberal documents is social, redistributive, caring, positive, at 
least partly horizontal, participatory, multicultural, and self-conscious about its historical 
setting and transformative role and mission. To put it another way, the Constitution embraces a 
vision of collective self-determination parallel to (not in place of) its strong vision of individual 
self-determination.”196 
 
In South Africa, the Constitution embodies this normative framework that 
regulates the state, individuals and their relationships. The doctrine of the separation 
of powers is entrenched in the Constitution and it prescribes certain constitutional 
structures in order to promote specific normative objectives. I have indicated how the 
doctrine of the separation of powers has developed from the theories of mixed 
government and the balanced constitution on the basis of Vile’s and Gwyn’s analysis 
of the subject. Later, after the ideas of the pure doctrine were established, it was 
combined with the notion of checks and balances. The doctrine has always been in a 
state of evolution, whether it is the development of the content of the doctrine itself, 
or whether it is the way the doctrine is interpreted and applied. Today, the doctrine of 
the separation of powers is present in some form or another in the constitutional-law 
theory of all Western nations. 
The public administration and the judiciary play pivotal roles in realising political 
and socio-economic objectives set by the Constitution and, therefore, their 
relationship is of the utmost importance. It has been shown how the administrative-
law system is informed by the normative content of constitutionalism. In addition, I 
have discussed the separation of powers as a distinctly constitutional instrument that 
promotes constitutional norms by means of institutional arrangements. 
                                                
195 Klare K “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 146-188 at 151-156. 
196 153 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). 
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The rise of the administrative state has arguably introduced a fourth function and 
branch to the classical threefold division of the separation of powers. The separation 
of powers should be drawn upon to determine the nature of the administration’s 
relationship with the other branches, especially with the judiciary, and to evaluate 
alternative forms of administrative accountability, such as administrative courts. To 
this end the French administrative-law system will be discussed. I have emphasised 
context and the national character of constitutionalism, therefore my purpose in 
considering French administrative law is not to propose the importation of the droit 
administratif. Rather, its relevance to this dissertation lies with the fact that in France 
administrative action and public administration have been recognised as a function 
and branch, respectively, of a fundamentally different character for over one-hundred-
and-fifty years. The French have the benefit of having grappled with the conceptual 
difficulties of incorporating an administrative-law system into their legal framework. 
In the United Kingdom and South Africa the administrative-law system was left 
virtually unattended until sixty years ago. However, broadly speaking, the challenges 
faced by modern regulatory states are the same problems faced in all Western nations 
since antiquity: 
 
“Western institutional theorists have concerned themselves with the problem of ensuring that 
the exercise of governmental power, which is essential to the realization of the values of their 
societies, should be controlled in order that it should not itself be destructive of the values it 
was intended to promote.”197 
 
The Constitution has entrenched the normative objectives and values of South 
Africa and the project of transformative constitutionalism describes the role of these 
norms. How these norms are realised from a legal perspective depends to a significant 
extent on the public administration, the judiciary and, by implication, their 
relationship. Since the conceptual and normative framework within which they 
operate has been established the administrative-law system itself can be assessed in 
the following chapter. 
                                                
197 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 1. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The South African Administrative-Law System 
 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
I have defined the administrative-law system as comprising the public 
administration, the judiciary and the adjudication of the public administration. The 
purpose of the definition is to draw attention to the legal relationship between the 
judiciary and the public administration, particularly, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, when the latter concludes contracts or participates in state commercial 
activity. The definition also confines the discussion to the issues most pertinent to this 
dissertation, in an area where many disciplines are relevant and overlap.1  
An analysis of the administrative-law system reveals the legal and political context 
within which state contracting operates. This context moulds state contracting. The 
purpose of discussing the administrative-law system is to determine how this context 
moulds state contracting by setting out the characteristics of the administrative-law 
system and the legal relationship between the judiciary and the public administration. 
Once the taxonomy and dynamics of the South African administrative-law system are 
determined, the system can be used as a framework for comparison with the French 
administrative-law system and as the legal and political framework that moulds and 
contains state contracting. 
In this chapter I discuss the South African administrative-law system in two parts. 
Firstly, I trace the origins and development of the system and, secondly, I consider the 
legal relationship between the judiciary and the public administration. The 
development of the administrative-law system involves three stages and each is dealt 
with separately. The first stage is the coming into being of administrative law as an 
independent and recognised field. The second concerns the ideological transformation 
of the administrative-law system. This transformation entails the transition from an 
                                                
1  Not only are philosophy, economics, sociology, the science of public administration, 
jurisprudence, political science, political theory, political philosophy etc. relevant in analysing this 
relationship, but relationships of a different nature exist between the public administration and the 
judiciary, for example, political, strategic or illicit relationships.  
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administrative-law system informed by parliamentary sovereignty to one informed by 
constitutionalism, specifically transformative constitutionalism. The third stage 
concerns the evolution of an alternative role for the administrative-law system in 
society. This new role enables the public administration to achieve its extensive 
mandates subject to the constraints of administrative justice, as opposed to a system of 
mere control by judicial review. The purpose of discussing the origins and 
development of the administrative-law system is to facilitate a determination of the 
nature, elements and characteristics of the legal relationship between the judiciary and 
the public administration.  
In the second part of the chapter, the legal relationship between the public 
administration and the judiciary is discussed in terms of six elements which inform 
this relationship. These are: one, the constitutional mandates of the South African 
courts and public administration; two, the South African understanding and 
application of the doctrine of the separation of powers; three, the idea of deference or 
respect; four, the public/private-law distinction; five, democracy and the counter-
majoritarian dilemma; and, six, co-operative government. Of these six elements, the 
idea of deference seems to dominate discussion in South Africa regarding the 
relationship between the judiciary and the administration and this element will 
consequently be assessed in greatest detail. 
 
3 2 The Origins and Development of the South African Administrative-Law 
System  
 
3 2 1 The Origins of the South African Administrative-Law System  
 
The predominant influence on the South African administrative-law system has 
been English administrative law, or rather, the traditional English attitude towards 
administrative law. Although Roman-Dutch law has had some influence, mainly on 
administrative remedies, the origin of South African administrative law is England.2 
Therefore, the establishment and development of administrative law in South African 
is intertwined with the recognition of administrative law in England. 
                                                
2 See generally Wiechers M Administratiefreg (1973) 19, 34-36; Baxter L Administrative Law 
(1984) 27-35; Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 14. 
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Consequently, South African administrative law, as an independent and legitimate 
branch of law, has laboured under a relatively late start. Perhaps it could be argued 
that French administrative law enjoyed an early and pioneering start, ahead of South 
Africa and England.3 But, by the 1950s, the Industrial Revolution had come and gone, 
the nature and functions of the state had changed fundamentally, and were rapidly 
changing still, and the rise of the welfare and administrative state was already well on 
its way; in other words dramatic socio-economic and political changes had occurred 
that necessitated a complementary administrative-law system. Yet, although these 
changes catalysed the development of administrative law in all these countries, the 
very status of administrative law in England and South Africa was still dubious. The 
recognition of administrative law was inhibited thereby. Therefore, the development 
of South African administrative law should be characterised as having a late start in 
relation to England and, especially, France.  
This late start and the subsequent slow development of South African 
administrative law are due to English conceptions of the state as embodied in 
Westminster constitutionalism.4 Foundational to Westminster constitutionalism is the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. For over a century, the great proponent of 
parliamentary sovereignty, Albert Venn Dicey, has been roundly condemned for his 
restraining influence on administrative law.5 In fact, he denied its very existence.6 His 
role is significant in the South African context because, unlike other branches of 
South African law, such as the law of sale or emptio venditio, constitutional law, in a 
descriptive sense, and administrative law have an English law foundation.7 Therefore, 
                                                
3 See 4 2 below on the early origins of the French administrative-law system. 
4 For an overview of Westminster constitutionalism, see Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New 
Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One Constitutional Law (2002) 12-16. 
5 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 21; Parker EM “State and 
Official Liability” (1906) 19 Harvard Law Review 15-19.  
6 Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) 330. 
7 Beinart B “Administrative Law” (1948) 11 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 204-233 at 206; Wiechers M Administratiefreg (1973) 19; Boulle L, Harris B & Hoexter C 
Constitutional and Administrative Law: Basic Principles (1989) 107-110; Du Plessis L An 
Introduction to Law (1999, 3rd ed) 53-54; Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd 
ed) 14. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 60  
in relation to the development of administrative law, South Africa has followed in 
England’s footsteps:8 
 
“South African administrative law before 1990 bore all the hallmarks of the English common-
law based approach as it had developed prior to the middle of the twentieth century: distrust of 
the administration, over-reliance on judicial review of administrative action, an artificially 
drawn distinction between review and appeal, and a stultified formula of the grounds of 
review.”9 
 
3 2 2 Dicey, Administrative Law and the Droit Administratif 
 
Dicey based his view of administrative law on the primacy of the rule of law and 
parliamentary sovereignty. In his influential work, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution,10 which has shaped English and South African legal thinking 
for over a century, he defined these concepts. His understanding of the rule of law 
entailed three elements: the supremacy of law, equality before the “ordinary” law as 
declared by the “ordinary” courts, and the constitution as a product of judicial 
decisions.11 Under Westminster constitutionalism the rule of law is understood in 
terms of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty: 
 
“Parliamentary sovereignty means ... that Parliament ... has, under the English Constitution, the 
right to make or un-make any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised 
by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”12  
                                                
8 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 21-22. 
9 Corder H “Reviewing Review: Much Achieved, Much More to do” in Corder H & Van der 
Vijver L (eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 1-19 at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). See also 
Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 14 (“[T]he influence of English 
constitutional doctrines and grounds of review was enormous. Indeed, this influence is still 
apparent throughout South African administrative law.” (Footnote omitted)).  
10 First published in 1885. All references to his book are from Dicey AV Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed). 
11 Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) 187-196. For 
a thorough discussion on Dicey’s conception of the rule of law see Wade ECS “Introduction” in 
Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) xcvi-cli. See 
also Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 6; Currie I & De Waal J (eds) 
The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One Constitutional Law (2002) 75-76.  
12 Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) 39-40. 
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Thus, parliamentary sovereignty “is best understood as the absence of substantive 
constraints on the power of Parliament.”13 
In the light of Dicey’s views, the public administration and its associated 
administrative power are elements which require legal control.14 Control over the 
public administration is effected by the judiciary in the form of judicial review of 
administrative action. In terms of the rule of law every person, whether citizen or 
administrator, is equal before the law. This means that every person is subject to the 
same legal rules as the ordinary courts declare them.15 Thus, Dicey emphasised “the 
concept of formal or procedural equality” as integral to the rule of law,16 preferring “a 
unitary court structure, in which administrative cases are handled by ‘ordinary’ courts 
and judges and public officials stand at least theoretically on an equal footing with 
private persons.”17   
Dicey thought that his position, as set out above, was irreconcilable with his 
understanding of the droit administratif. He understood French administrative law as 
the application of a separate branch of law, droit administratif, a subsection of public 
law, to public officials by separate courts that have exclusive jurisdiction over 
administrative law matters; there was certainly no such law in England. This 
perception is not incorrect, but his emphasis on comparing droit administratif to the 
common law was misplaced.  
Dicey deemed that the droit administratif “rests on ideas foreign to the 
fundamental assumptions of our English common law, and especially to what we have 
termed the rule of law.”18 The fact that a public official would appear before an 
administrative court instead of an ordinary court, his alleged transgression to be 
evaluated in terms of administrative-law rules instead of ordinary legal rules, defied 
Dicey’s element of equality before the law. He was under the impression that the 
French approach afforded less protection to the citizen than was the case in England.  
                                                
13 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 14. 
14 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 139-140. 
15 Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) 193-194. 
16 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 8. 
17 9. 
18 Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1959, 10th ed) 329. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 62  
Dicey’s denial of the existence19 or desirability of administrative law in England 
stemmed from this hostility towards and misconception of the droit administratif. 
Although he came to tentatively acknowledge the development of an English 
administrative law of sorts in 1915,20 his hostile attitude towards administrative law 
had become entrenched in the minds of common-law lawyers and in common-law 
legal culture. This led Beinart in 1948 to describe the South African perception of 
administrative law as follows: 
 
“[R]eared and nurtured in the traditional Diceyan concept of the rule of law and the 
individualistic conception of society, the South African lawyer like his English counterpart, is 
still wont to regard administrative law as an undesirable outcrop, and has given it scant 
attention”.21 
 
Clearly, Dicey has left a robust legacy:22 his “Introduction to the Law of the 
Constitution ... acts almost as a substitute for a written constitution.”23 This Diceyan 
ideology “left English administrative law with a great mistrust of executive or 
administrative action but without any theoretical basis for its control.”24 Thus, in the 
context of the changing nature of Western governments,  
 
                                                
19 390. 
20 See Dicey AV “The Development of Administrative Law in England” (1915) 31 Law Quarterly 
Review 148-152 (“Modern legislation and that dominant legislative opinion which in reality 
controls the action of Parliament have undoubtedly conferred upon the Cabinet, or upon the 
servants of the Crown who may be influenced or guided by the Cabinet, a considerable amount of 
judicial or quasi-judicial authority. This is a considerable step towards the introduction among us 
of something like the droit administratif in France, but the fact that the ordinary law courts can 
deal with any actual and provable breach of the law committed by any servant of the Crown still 
preserves that rule of law which is fatal to the existence of true droit administratif.” (152)). 
21 Beinart B “Administrative Law” (1948) 11 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 204-233 at 206. 
22 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 21. 
23 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 4. 
24  Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 16. See Hoexter C 
Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 145. 
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“Dicey’s mistrust of discretionary power was to become ... a theme dominating administrative 
law in the second half of the twentieth century. It started administrative law on a collision 
course with governments that wish to use administrative law ‘instrumentally’ for socialist or 
welfare-oriented purposes”.25  
 
This has been the experience in South Africa and the Diceyan tradition continues 
to exert a significant influence on the South African administrative-law system, even 
during the constitutional dispensation. 
 
3 2 3 Judicial Review 
 
According to Innes CJ’s established classification in Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council,26 judicial review refers to three distinct 
processes, namely, the review of inferior courts of justice, 27  the review of 
administrative bodies28 and special statutory reviews.29 Only the second type of 
review is relevant for the purposes of this discussion. 
The primacy of the rule-of-law doctrine and apartheid policies promoted judicial 
review as the dominant form of control over the public administration.30 Furthermore, 
in South Africa, administrative law originated from judicial review itself and is 
largely constituted by it, as a consequence. 
 
                                                
25 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 18. 
26 1903 TS 111 at 114-117. See also Rose Innes LA Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals 
in South Africa (1963) 2-12. 
27 1903 TS 111 114 (Review “denotes the process by which, apart from appeal, the proceedings of 
inferior Courts of Justice, both Civil and Criminal, are brought before this Court in respect of 
grave irregularities or illegalities occurring during the course of such proceedings.”). 
28 1903 TS 111 115 (“Whenever a public body has a duty imposed upon it by statute, and 
disregards important provisions of the statute, or is guilty of gross irregularity or clear illegality in 
the performance of the duty, this Court may be asked to review the proceedings complained of and 
set aside or correct them.”). Although now quite dated, see LA Rose Innes’s seminal work dealing 
specifically with this type of review, namely, Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals in South 
Africa (1963). 
29 1903 TS 111 116-117. 
30 That is, in the absence of a bill of rights, judicial review was a powerful instrument with which 
to attack the administration of discriminatory policies. 
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“In the use of this inherent review jurisdiction the various divisions of the Supreme Court 
developed a body of principles that came to be called administrative law. In this they relied 
heavily on the English administrative law that was part of South Africa’s colonial heritage, and 
to a lesser extent on principles of Roman-Dutch law.”31  
 
In fact, “the terms ‘administrative law’ and ‘judicial review’ have often been 
synonymous.”32 
Before the democratic dispensation, judicial review had special resonance as the 
instrument of judicial activists and liberals. Judicial review was virtually the only 
judicial restraint on administrative power during the pre-democratic period:33 
 
“In the absence of other effective safeguards and procedures, judicial review had a crucial role 
to play in the administrative system. Its importance was further exaggerated by the absence of 
a democratic and supreme constitution with a justiciable Bill of Rights. Legal education, too, 
tended to emphasise judicial review”.34   
 
Judicial review continues to occupy a central role in South African administrative 
law as the principal form of legal control over the public administration. This is the 
case despite the promulgation of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000. 35  PAJA reinforces the primacy of judicial review rather than a broader 
conception of administrative justice. This is evident in the definition of 
“administrative action” in section 1 and the grounds of review in section 6 of PAJA. 
 
3 2 4 From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutionalism 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty, an element of Westminster constitutionalism, 
establishes that parliament can make or un-make any law, that is, without substantive 
                                                
31 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 14 (footnote omitted). 
32 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 485. 
33 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 13. See also Hoexter C “The 
Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 South African Law 
Journal 484-519 at 484.  
34 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 59. 
35 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 particularly at 519. 
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constraints. Westminster constitutionalism was introduced to South Africa by the 
promulgation of South Africa’s first constitution, the Union Constitution of 1909.36 
Thus, Westminster constitutionalism would come to dominate South African 
administrative law and judicial review until the democratic dispensation: 
 
“The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty ... was a fundamental constraint on the powers of 
the courts in the pre-democratic era – and, what is worse, on their enthusiasm for protecting 
rights.”37 
 
The promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993 and then of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ushered in a 
new era of rights-based administrative law and judicial review. The democratic 
foundation laid by the Constitution also legitimised and defined the mandates of the 
executive. 
Section 33 of the Bill of Rights entrenches a right to administrative justice, in 
terms of which: 
 
“[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair.”38  
 
PAJA gives effect to section 33(3) of the Constitution that requires that legislation 
be enacted to give effect to this right. Administrative law and judicial review are 
empowered by the Constitution itself and by PAJA: 
 
“This flows from the Constitution’s subordination of Parliament and all other organs of state to 
the supremacy of the Constitution. The review power of the courts is no longer grounded in the 
common law and subservient to the authority - or whim - of the legislature.”39 
 
Klare’s “transformative constitutionalism” describes South African 
constitutionalism. Transformative constitutionalism has been welcomed by South 
                                                
36 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 12. 
37 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 14. 
38 S 33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
39 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 18. 
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African academics as an ideological compass for the constitutional project. 40 
According to Klare transformative constitutionalism is a “project” of comprehensive 
social and political transformation.41 In terms of this project the Constitution is a legal 
and political instrument that has a significant role to play in transforming South 
African society.42 Thus, the Constitution is placed in historical, geo-political and 
socio-economic context and the function of the Constitution is derived from this 
context. Transformative constitutionalism provides an approach to constitutional 
interpretation that is based on the general goal of transforming South African society. 
The right to administrative justice should be viewed as an integral part of this project, 
given the central role of the public administration in realising socio-economic change 
and the judiciary’s role as the guardian of the Constitution. In addition, in giving 
content to the right to administrative justice one should draw on the ideas of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
 
3 2 5 Red and Green-Light Theories 
 
The nature of one administrative-law system under parliamentary sovereignty is 
vastly different to the nature of the same system under constitutionalism. However, 
the constitution of a nation is not the only significant determinant of how that system 
                                                
40 Klare’s seminal article on transformative constitutionalism, “Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146-188, has enjoyed an 
enthusiastic response; see, for instance, the impressive list compiled by AJ van der Walt in 
“Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court 
Review 77-128 at 91 n 56. Subsequent responses to Klare’s transformative constitutionalism 
include Roux T “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South 
African Constitution: Distinction without a Difference?” (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 258-
285; Van Marle K “Transformative Constitutionalism as / and Critique” (2009) 20 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 286-391. Recently, Dennis Davis and Karl Klare have also assessed the progress of 
the project of transformative constitutionalism, Davis DM & Klare K “Transformative 
Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 26 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 403-509. See also Dennis Davis’s short response to Roux, Davis DM 
“Transformation: The Constitutional Promise and Reality” (2010) 26 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 85-101 at 100 n 60. 
41 “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146-188 at 150. 
42 See, regarding the question whether law can fulfil this role, “Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146-188 at 150. 
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operates. Another important determinant of an administrative-law system is the 
political function, and nature, of administrative law, the judiciary and the public 
administration. In this section I examine the evolution of an alternative role for the 
administrative-law system in society. This role enables the public administration to 
achieve its extensive mandates subject to the constraints of administrative justice, as 
opposed to a retrospective system of mere control by judicial review.  
Harlow and Rawlings’s objective in the first edition of Law and Administration 
was “to reinstate the link between public law and politics, restoring an essential 
dimension of administrative law”.43 To this end, they identified two schools of 
thought on the nature of administrative law and the control of state power: “red light 
theory” and “green light theory”. 44  Although both theories were based on 
governmental responses to the emerging welfare state, they are fundamentally 
different.45 The differences between the theories are summarised as follows: 
 
“Red light theorists believed that law was autonomous to and superior over politics; that the 
administrative state was dangerous and should be kept in check by law; that the preferred way 
                                                
43 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 44. 
44 See Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) ch 1. They coined the terms 
red-light and green-light theories in the first edition of Law and Administration, which was 
published in 1984. Harlow and Rawlings do not characterise administrative-law systems as either 
red or green, nor do they support the one or the other (see xvi, 48). They are not  
 
“against accountability and control. [Their] position is as it always has been that control of the 
executive and administration can and should be exercised in ways complementary to judicial 
review that may be more effective.” (xvi). 
 
Thus, red-light theory and green-light theory can be seen as two extremes on a continuum, see 
Klaaren J “Redlight, Greenlight” (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 209-217 at 
210, between judicial review as the primary form of control over the administration, on the one 
hand, and judicial review as one form of control that is complemented by other control 
mechanisms, on the other. For Harlow and Rawlings the distinction is still valid, “[e]ven if the 
battle has migrated” (Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 45). Cf. in 
the South African context, Klaaren J “Redlight, Greenlight” (1999) 15 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 209-217 (“[T]he traffic-light metaphor has become ill-suited for the administrative 
law challenges presently facing South Africa.” (209)). 
45 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 31-32, quoting Taggart M 
“Reinvented Government, Traffic Lights and the Convergence of Public and Private Law. Review 
of Harlow and Rawlings: Law and Administration” (1999) Public Law 124-138. 
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of doing this was through adjudication; and that the goal should be to enhance liberty, 
conceived in terms of the absence of external constraints. Green light theorists ... believed that 
law was not autonomous from politics; that the administrative state was not a necessary evil, 
but a positive attribute to be welcomed; that administrative law should seek not merely to stop 
bad administrative practice, and that there might be better ways to achieve this than 
adjudication; and that the goal was to enhance individual and collective liberty conceived in 
positive and not just negative terms.”46 
 
On the one hand, red-light theory assigns to administrative law, as its primary 
concern, the control of state power and the ordinary courts enforce this control.47 Red-
light theorists advocate a liberal state where ultra vires is the watchword for state 
conduct.48 Therefore, the rule of law and judicial control are central to red-light 
theorists. The views of Dicey and Wade fall into this school.49 On the other hand, 
green-light theory conceptualises administrative law as “a vehicle for political 
progress and welcomes the ‘administrative state’.”50 Both theories are concerned with 
the control of state power but where “[r]ed light theory prioritises courts ... green light 
theory prefers democratic or political forms of accountability.”51 
The difference between red and green-light theories is essential to analysing the 
legal relationship between the public administration and the judiciary. Each theory 
apportions a fundamentally different role to the public administration and, 
consequently, to the judiciary. Thus, courts have a different role to play in relation to 
the public administration. However, it is not simply the list of tasks that is allocated to 
each “branch” that differs, but the way the administration and judiciary interact and 
the nature of their functions. This emphasises the interdependence of the branches of 
the state and the conceptual and contextual framework within which they operate.  
                                                
46 Tomkins A “In Defence of the Political Constitution” (2002) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
157. 
47 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 23; Hoexter C Administrative 
Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 139. 
48 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 139. 
49 Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 22-25. 
50 31. 
51 38. 
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Red-light theorists see courts as apolitical, even above politics, independent, 
impartial and objective.52 The conception fits a pure separation-of-powers doctrine, 
with clearly differentiated branches and correlating functions: courts merely apply the 
law and cannot usurp the functions of the executive, which are policy formulation and 
public administration.53 Thus courts may review the legality of decisions, but may not 
pronounce on the merits, thereby maintaining the distinction between review and 
appeal.54 
Under green-light theory, courts are less interventionist and actually support the 
executive in the implementation of policy objectives:55  
 
“[l]egislation and administrative action are given priority over judicial scrutiny and judicial 
lawmaking, not only because they are more efficient and systematic but also because they are 
more democratic.”56 
 
Green-light theorists favour internal control for the administration as opposed to 
traditional and external judicial control.57 Internal controls are potentially a more 
prospective form of control, as opposed to the external and backward-looking control 
of judicial review,58 although jurists may assert that judicial decisions influence the 
conduct of administrators.59 Therefore, green-light theory can be seen as a response to 
the counter-majoritarian dilemma.  
In the South African context red-light theory characterises administrative law, 
especially if one considers the primacy of judicial review.60 This is the result of South 
Africa’s English administrative-law heritage and the emphasis on the rule-of-law 
                                                
52 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 140. 
53 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 140. See 2 4 above on the pure 
separation of powers. 
54 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 140. 
55 140. 
56 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 140. However, whether the 
legislature and the administration are more efficient, systematic and democratic is arguable in 
terms of political theory and is also a factual enquiry; these qualities cannot be assumed. 
57 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 141. 
58  See Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 40; Hoexter C 
Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 141 n 184. 
59 See Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 40. 
60 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 143.  
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doctrine which still dominates legal education.61 Hoexter adds to this that green-light 
theory has possibly been on the backburner in South Africa due to the  
 
“negative connotations attached to state intervention in the apartheid era, a period in which 
interventionist government was inevitably associated with repressive rather than responsive 
government. Liberal commentators tended to reject both the outdated red-light theory and the 
more interventionist green-light view, and argued instead for a far more interventionist and 
creative judiciary in order to soften the blows of repressive government.”62 
 
Hoexter concludes that “the rule of law model [or, red light theory] provides an 
increasingly unhelpful and unrealistic theoretical framework for judicial review”63 and 
this holds for administrative law in general. Three reasons are advanced for this 
conclusion.64 Firstly, red-light theory ignores “fluctuations in the courts’ attitudes 
towards the administration”65 such as judicial activism or restraint. This undermines 
red-light theory’s claims of an objective and apolitical judiciary. Secondly, red-light 
theory operates from the Diceyan point of departure that the administration is not to 
be trusted, rather than viewing courts as facilitating the tasks of the administration.66 
Finally, distinctions that are foundational to the rule-of-law model and that mould 
administrative-law systems are being undermined: for example distinctions between 
public and private, appeal and review, substance and process, and merits and legality 
are increasingly cosmetic. 67  Nevertheless, these concepts and their supposed 
differences continue to play a major, and sometimes decisive, role in the analysis of 
administrative-law systems, especially judicial analysis. 
                                                
61 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 143. See Hoexter C “The Future of 
Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 
484-519 at 487-488. (“[A]nti-apartheid lawyers of the pre-constitutional era presided over a 
strangely truncated system of administrative law and subscribed to a highly interventionist or ‘red-
light’ model of judicial review.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis added)). 
62 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 143-144 (footnotes omitted, 
emphasis in original). 
63 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 144. See Harlow C & Rawlings R 
Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 8. 
64 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 144-146. 
65 144. 
66 145. 
67 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 145-146; Harlow C & Rawlings R 
Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 18-22. 
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Hoexter then asks what should replace the “threadbare” rule-of-law theory and 
suggests that one should look to the 1996 Constitution.68 For her the crux of the 
matter is the development of “a theory of judicial intervention and non-intervention”, 
in other words, “a theory of deference or respect”, to determine the new and 
constitutional role of courts.69   
In the following part of this chapter the legal relationship between the public 
administration and the judiciary is discussed. The purpose of the preceding discussion 
on the origins and development of the administrative-law system is to facilitate a 
determination of the nature, components and characteristics of that legal relationship.  
   
3 3 The Legal Relationship between the South African Public Administration 
and the Judiciary 
 
This legal relationship is characterised and informed by numerous factors. I have 
identified six elements which inform the legal relationship between the public 
administration and the judiciary: one, the constitutional mandates of the South African 
courts and public administration; two, the South African understanding and 
application of the doctrine of the separation of powers; three, the idea of deference or 
respect; four, the public/private-law distinction; five, democracy and the counter-
majoritarian dilemma; and, six, co-operative government. These elements shape the 
nature, components and characteristics of the administrative-law system. These 
elements are indicative of the judiciary and public administration’s competences and 
legal and political functions, how they interact and should interact, how it is 
determined whether public or private law applies, and how the principle of democracy 
informs the administrative-law system in a constitutional democracy. 
 
3 3 1 The Constitutional Mandates of the South African Courts and Public 
Administration 
 
The Constitution assigns both positive and negative duties to the judiciary and the 
public administration. As the supreme law of South Africa, any law or conduct that is 
                                                
68 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 146. 
69 146. 
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inconsistent with the Constitution is void.70 Therefore, the constitutional mandates 
which courts and administrative agencies are bound to perform define the functions of 
each branch. Thus, the constitutional allocation and nature of functions are the starting 
point to understanding the legal relationship between the judiciary and the public 
administration. In addition, these constitutional mandates affect the South African 
separation of powers and, consequently, checks and balances and deference. 
Section 165(1) of the Constitution places the judicial function, or authority, in the 
courts. The judicial function or mandate is to apply the Constitution “impartially and 
without fear, favour or prejudice.”71 Furthermore, the Constitution is the supreme law 
of South Africa72 and it applies to all law and binds all the branches of the state.73 The 
Constitution is justiciable74 and any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is legally indefensible.75 Court orders are binding, even if it applies to an 
organ of state.76 Therefore, the South African courts are the guardians of the supreme 
Constitution. 
The jurisdiction of the South African courts is unitary. The judicial system consists 
of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, High Courts, Magistrates’ 
Courts and “any other court established or recognised” by an Act of Parliament.77  
The public administration is not defined in the Constitution and is “generally 
understood to mean the organs and functionaries of the executive branch of the state 
that are concerned with the day-to-day business of implementing law and 
administering policy.”78 The public administration meets the constitutional definition 
of “organ of state”, though.79 Section 195 of the Constitution sets out the basic values 
and principles that govern the public administration such as democratic values,80 
                                                
70 Ss 2, 172(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
71 S 165(2). 
72 S 2. 
73 S 8(1). 
74 S 165(2). 
75 S 172(1)(a). 
76 S 165(5). 
77 S 166. 
78 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 6 (footnote omitted). 
79 S 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
80 S 195(1). 
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efficiency,81 accountability82 and transparency.83 In addition, the public administration 
must be development-orientated.84 The public administration includes the public 
service.85  
 
3 3 2 The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances in 
South Africa 
 
The pure doctrine separates government into distinct branches and apportions 
different governmental functions to each branch.86 Checks and balances modify the 
pure doctrine by enabling each branch to exercise some control over the functions of 
the other branches. This has fundamental implications for the interaction between the 
judiciary and the public administration: not only does the pure doctrine determine 
what each branch may and may not do, checks and balances qualify the pure doctrine 
to a limited extent. Furthermore, the doctrine of the separation of powers is not an end 
in itself, but an institutional strategy to achieve normative objectives.87 Therefore, the 
separation of powers and checks and balances are foundational to the legal 
relationship between the judiciary and the public administration. They are also 
intertwined with the constitutional mandates imposed upon the judiciary and the 
public administration, the idea of deference, the public/private-law distinction and co-
operative government.  
Constitutional Principle VI, which had to be incorporated into the final 
Constitution for the Constitution to be valid, read as follows: 
 
“There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and judiciary, 
with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.”88 
                                                
81 S 195(1)(b). 
82 S 195(1)(f). 
83 S 195(1)(g). 
84 S 195(1)(c). 
85 S 197. 
86 See 2 4 above on the pure doctrine of the separation of powers. 
87 See 2 4 5 above. 
88 Sch 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. See O’Regan K 
“Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers 
under the South African Constitution” (2005) 8 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 120-150. 
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However, in the Constitution there is no express reference to the “separation of 
powers”. Nevertheless, in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v 
Heath89 Chaskalson P found, on behalf of a unanimous court, that the doctrine of the 
separation of powers is an “implicit” or “implied” term of the Constitution.90 Thus, 
the requirement that Constitutional Principle VI be incorporated in the Constitution is 
satisfied.  
In the light of the normative nature of the doctrine of separation of powers, it is 
noteworthy that Constitutional Principle VI indicates that accountability, 
responsiveness and openness are “ensured” by a separation of powers and checks and 
balances. The absence of efficiency from these normative objectives is conspicuous.91 
The Constitution provides for the separation of powers by apportioning functions 
to the governmental branches. In the national sphere, the legislative function is vested 
in parliament,92 the executive function is vested in the president93 and the judicial 
function is vested in the courts.94 In other words, the separation of powers “is based 
on inferences drawn from the structure and provisions of the Constitution, rather than 
on an express entrenchment of the principle.” 95  Basically, the constitutional 
provisions relating to the separation of powers amount to a pure doctrine in terms of 
which three branches, each with a particular and exclusive function, are identified. 
The normative objectives that this particular governmental arrangement seeks to 
promote or secure are not expressly identified in the Constitution. 
In the analysis of what the competences of the executive and judiciary are, the 
inquiry is what is included in the judicial function and the executive function, 
respectively. The Constitution provides little assistance in this regard because these 
functions are not defined. From sections 85 and 165 one can deduce that the judiciary 
                                                
89 2001 1 SA 883 (CC). 
90 Paras 18-22. 
91 However, efficiency as a normative objective of the public administration is entrenched in s 
195(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
92 S 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
93 S 85. 
94 S 165. 
95 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) para 21. 
See Langa P “The Separation of Powers” in Klaaren J (ed) A Delicate Balance: The Place of the 
Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy (2006) 27-34 at 29-32. 
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should neither execute laws, its own judgments nor formulate policy and the executive 
should not decide legal disputes.96 
Checks and balances are a legitimate exception to the pure separation of powers. 
Checks and balances grants each branch limited capacity or competence to encroach 
upon the other branches’ functions. In this way each governmental branch can 
exercise some control over the other branches. According to Currie and De Waal, one 
incidence of checks and balances is the competence of the executive to execute court 
orders.97 Another control is the executive’s part in appointing judges.98 
In terms of checks and balances, the judiciary can exercise control over the 
executive and public administration by means of judicial review. 99  Courts are 
empowered to review administrative action by section 33 of the Constitution and 
section 6 of PAJA. Therefore, the power to review administrative action is derived 
from the Constitution and PAJA, which gives effect to section 33 of the 
Constitution.100  
 
3 3 3 Deference and Respect 
 
Deference has proven to be the key analytical concept describing the legal 
relationship between the public administration and the judiciary. The significance of 
                                                
96 See Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 108. 
97 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 112. The interdependence of the two processes of adjudication and of 
the subsequent execution of the judgment is reminiscent of Henry Bolingbroke’s simultaneous 
“independency” and mutual “dependency” of the parts of government, Gwyn WB The Meaning of 
the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the 
United States Constitution (1965) 95; Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 
(1967) 74. 
98 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 113. See ss 174(3), (4), (6) and 175 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996. From a democratic perspective the question to what extent the appointment 
of judges differs from the appointment of administrators, both by the executive, deserves attention. 
99 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 113.  
100 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA; In Re: Ex Parte Application of the President of RSA 
2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 32-45; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 22. 
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deference lies in its focus on the relationship between the administration and the 
judiciary101 and on a particular aspect of it, namely, determining when judicial 
intervention or non-intervention with administrative action is appropriate.102 How the 
judiciary should intervene, once it is has been decided that it is appropriate to do so, is 
equally relevant; the manner of intervention is largely concerned with the degree of 
judicial scrutiny. There are two prevailing arguments103 justifying the adoption of a 
theory of judicial deference: one, courts lack democratic legitimacy in relation to the 
executive and administration and, two, courts have inferior institutional capacity or 
competence in relation to the political branches. Nevertheless, the precise content of 
deference and the manner in which deference can guide the courts in determining 
whether intervention is appropriate or not in a particular case are uncertain. 
In this section Hoexter’s understanding of deference and the judicial notice of her 
ideas are discussed. The emphasis overall is on deference in South Africa. 
Subsequently, the theoretical foundation of deference as received in South Africa is 
set out. Dyzenhaus and Mullan’s views on deference are discussed, despite the fact 
that they write in the Canadian context, because their ideas are foundational to the 
deference debate in general. Other non-South African sources are discussed to the 
extent that they identify the nature of deference, the boundaries of deference itself and 
the scope of the deference debate. An attempt to formulate a theory of deference is not 
made; attempts at formulating actual, fully-fledged theories of deference, as opposed 
to theorising about deference, are not summarised or analysed, except as far as they 
relate to deference as presently applied by the South African courts.104 
 
                                                
101 See, for instance, Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and 
Scope (2012). 
102 Hoexter, referring to Cockrell, identifies the problem of judicial review in an un-integrated 
administrative-law system as one requiring “principles of restraint or deference to guide the 
courts’ intervention in administrative law” (Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South 
African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 484-519 at 500).  
103 Lenta P “Judicial Deference and Rights” (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 456-467 
at 456. 
104 Therefore, Daly’s A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope 
(2012) and McLean’s Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa (2009) are not analysed. Daly’s argument is expressly aimed at the contexts of the UK, 
Canada and the USA. McLean has not dealt with Hoexter’s understanding of deference, which this 
section takes as the point of departure for evaluating deference in the South African context. 
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3 3 3 1 Hoexter on Deference 
  
In the wake of the enactment of PAJA in 2000, Hoexter published an important 
article105 on the future of judicial review under this new statute. In this article, her 
discussion on a “theory of deference” established deference as a prominent topic in 
South African administrative law.  
Hoexter describes the nature of the type of deference she advocates as follows: 
 
“[T]he sort of deference we should be aspiring to consists of a judicial willingness to 
appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of administrative agencies; to 
admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues; to accord their 
interpretations of fact and law due respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interests 
legitimately pursued by administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints under 
which they operate. This type of deference is perfectly consistent with a concern for individual 
rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. It ought to be shaped not by 
an unwillingness to scrutinize administrative action, but by a careful weighing up of the need 
for – and the consequences of – judicial intervention. Above all, it ought to be shaped by a 
conscious determination not to usurp the functions of administrative agencies; not to cross over 
from review to appeal.”106 
 
In Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO,107 the first South African case108 to 
address “Hoexter’s deference”, Cameron JA cited and endorsed this description of 
deference.109 Subsequently, Schutz JA in Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
                                                
105 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519. 
106 501-502 (footnote omitted). 
107 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). 
108 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 152. 
109 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) paras 21-22. Subsequent cases 
where Hoexter’s conception of deference enjoyed judicial notice include Nyathi v MEC for 
Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 
2008 1 SA 474 (CC); Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 
(SCA); Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA); Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC); Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental 
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Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd110 also cited Hoexter’s take on deference with 
approval, adding that: 
 
“[j]udicial deference does not imply judicial timidity or an unreadiness to perform the judicial 
function. It simply manifests the recognition that the law itself places certain administrative 
actions in the hands of the executive, not the judiciary.”111 
 
In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs,112 O’Regan J 
agreed with Schutz JA’s understanding of deference and paraphrased Hoexter’s 
description, stating that: 
 
“[i]n treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a Court is 
recognising the proper role of the Executive within the Constitution. In doing so a Court should 
be careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other 
branches of government. A Court should thus give due weight to findings of fact and policy 
decisions made by those with special expertise and experience in the field.”113 
 
Hoexter points out that O’Regan J, however, preferred the use of the word 
“respect” to “deference” in her judgment.114 O’Regan J, citing Dyzenhaus, states that:  
 
“The use of the word ‘deference’ may give rise to misunderstanding as to the true function of a 
review Court ... [T]he need for Courts to treat decision-makers with appropriate deference or 
respect flows not from judicial courtesy or etiquette but from the fundamental constitutional 
principle of the separation of powers itself.”115 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) (see Quinot G 
Administrative Law Cases and Materials (2008) 581-582). 
110 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA). 
111 Para 50. This statement does not express more than the pure separation of powers. 
112 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
113 Para 48. 
114 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 152; “Standards of Review of 
Administrative Action” in Klaaren J (ed) A Delicate Balance: The Place of the Judiciary in a 
Constitutional Democracy (2005) 61-72 at 71. 
115 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 46 (footnote omitted). 
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In light of the prominent judicial notice116 which Hoexter’s article, “The Future of 
Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law”, has received, it is necessary 
to consider the article’s import in depth. The article’s discussion on deference forms 
part of a broader topic: what is the future of judicial review under the recently enacted 
PAJA? Hoexter contends that what administrative law needed at that time was “an 
integrated system of administrative law in which judicial review could play a more 
suitable and more limited role” and “the construction of an appropriate theory of 
deference.”117 These changes are still required by the South African administrative-
law context. The South African context is characterised by the equating of judicial 
review and administrative law, by the over-emphasis of judicial review as a 
constitution during the absence of a bill of rights and, generally, by lawyers who are 
pro-review and anti-administration. This contrasts with other common-law 
jurisdictions where the primacy of review has been challenged increasingly and where 
judicial review is described as marginal, peripheral and undemocratic.118 In South 
Africa, the role of judicial review has been more prominent. South Africa’s 
administrative-law past, the over-emphasis on judicial review and the commitment to 
socio-economic transformation combine to invite the question “[h]ow should we 
respond to this depressing charge-sheet?”119 PAJA has failed to address this question 
satisfactorily which means that the system of administrative law has not been 
integrated and judicial review maintains its prominence.120 It is within this context and 
in response to the preceding question that Hoexter discusses deference.  
Deference is concerned with “when and to what extent judges should intervene” 
with administrative action.121 In the South African context this question is significant 
                                                
116 See the discussion below, 3 3 3 2 Judicial Notice of Deference. 
117 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 484. 
118 See Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 
117 South African Law Journal 484-519 at 486, 488-495. 
119 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 492. Hoexter does qualify the shortcomings of South 
African administrative law, see 492-494. Importantly, judicial review is not criticised in order to 
have it eradicated, but, instead, to identify a suitable role for review in an integrated system of 
administrative law. 
120 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 499. 
121 500. 
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because of the primacy of judicial review as a controlling mechanism of 
administrative action and the resulting, potentially undesirable, judicial activism. 
Subsequently, Hoexter outlines the nature of the version of deference122 she would 
advocate; she identifies and examines three themes that inform and constitute a South 
African theory of deference, namely, variability,123 the scope of “administrative 
action”, and reasonableness review. 124 Variability means that “the principles of 
legality (or negatively, the grounds of review) need not be applied in an all-or-nothing 
fashion, and that the intensity of judicial scrutiny may vary according to the 
context.” 125  This approach can be applied to various components of the 
administrative-law system such as natural justice, fairness, reasonableness, and the 
duty to give reasons.126 Hoexter identifies factors that can vary the “intensity of the 
court’s scrutiny and its willingness to intervene in a particular case”:127 the factors 
include the policy content of the decision, the latitude of discretion available to and 
the expertise of the decision-maker, and the impact of the decision. Variability in this 
sense is incongruent with a classification of government functions, with formalism 
and with conceptualism.128  
                                                
122 501-502.  
123 On the notion of variability as an incidence of deference, see Taggart M “Proportionality, 
Deference, Wednesbury” (2008) New Zealand Law Review 423-482; Daly P A Theory of 
Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012) ch 4. See also the response 
to Taggart’s article, Craig P “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury: Taking up Michael 
Taggart’s Challenge: Proportionality, Rationality and Review” (2010) New Zealand Law Review 
265-301; Hickman T “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury: Taking up Michael Taggart’s 
Challenge: Problems for Proportionality” (2010) New Zealand Law Review 303-326; King J 
“Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury: Taking up Michael Taggart’s Challenge: 
Proportionality: A Halfway House” (2010) New Zealand Law Review 327-367; Knight DR 
“Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury: Taking up Michael Taggart’s Challenge: Mapping the 
Rainbow of Review: Recognising Variable Intensity” (2010) New Zealand Law Review 393-431; 
Mullan D “Proportionality, Wednesbury: Taking up Michael Taggart’s Challenge: Proportionality 
- A Proportionate Response to an Emerging Crisis in Canadian Judicial Review Law?” (2010) 
New Zealand Law Review 233-264. 
124 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 502-519. 
125 502. 
126 502-503. 
127 503. 
128 503-505. 
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The scope of administrative action is pertinent to deference because it is a 
precondition for judicial review and for the application of section 33 of the 
Constitution and of PAJA.129 During the pre-constitutional period, South African 
courts defined “administrative action” widely to compensate for the absence of a bill 
of rights,130 facilitated by the absence of a statutory definition. However, under the 
constitutional dispensation, administrative action need not serve as an instrument of 
judicial activism.131 The Bill of Rights, legislation giving effect to the Bill of Rights 
and the separation of powers require a more nuanced understanding of the scope of 
administrative action. 
Hoexter justifies the inclusion of the third theme, reasonableness review, by its 
dubious reputation as a ground of review: “such scrutiny is often thought to breach the 
distinction between appeal and review”.132 Overstepping the line between review and 
appeal conflicts with the idea of deference. Reasonableness requires administrative 
action that is, at least, rational133 or justifiable. In order to determine whether 
administrative action is rational, the merits of administrative decisions will have to be 
scrutinised.134 As for respecting the distinction between review and appeal when 
scrutinising the merits, Froneman DJP’s admonishment in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v 
Marcus NO135 should be kept in mind: 
 
“[i]n determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the reasons given for 
it, value judgments will have to be made which will, almost inevitably, involve the 
consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter in some way or another. As long as the Judge 
determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute his or 
her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally 
justifiable, the process will be in order.”136 
 
                                                
129 502. 
130 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 173. 
131 174. 
132 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 502. For the distinction between appeal and review see 
Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 65-67, 108-111. 
133 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 340. 
134 351-352. 
135 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC). 
136 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC) para 36. 
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An outline of the idea of deference can be drawn from the foregoing discussion: 
deference requires judicial respect for the constitutional competence bestowed on the 
executive, without compromising its own competence, and is informed by three 
themes, variability, the scope of “administrative action”, and reasonableness review. 
Also, deference itself derives its force from the separation of powers.137 
Evidently, Hoexter expressly attempted to introduce a debate on deference in the 
wake of the promulgation of PAJA, because, she speculated, “what ought to have 
been a rich debate about deference may never take place at all.”138 In other words, at 
the time of writing her article, such a debate, in Hoexter’s view, had not yet taken 
place; and PAJA had disappointed in not introducing or furthering that debate. 
Hoexter describes the nature of deference, as she understands it, and roughly 
demarcates its boundaries without claiming to mark out deference completely.139 This 
is clear from the language she employs in discussing deference. For example, the 
heading of the section dealing with deference reads “towards a theory of 
deference”.140 She talks about “the sort of deference we should be aspiring to”.141 She 
suggests that “we may perhaps take inspiration from Dyzenhaus’s exploration of the 
idea of deference”.142 Hoexter employs open language that encourages further debate 
on deference, rather than proposing to define deference or determine its content. It is 
                                                
137 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 500 (“If we are to take seriously the separation of powers 
dictated by our Constitution, then we must embrace a more balanced vision of the role of review. 
This means shaking off the anti-administration ethos and abandoning the intuition that judicial 
intervention is automatically and inevitably a desirable thing. As Cockrell suggests, it means 
admitting the need for principles of restraint or deference to guide the courts’ intervention in 
administrative law.”). 
138 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 485. 
139 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 501 (“Whatever deference means – and I shall now say in 
broad terms what I think it means ...”). Cf. Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: 
Basis, Application and Scope (2012) 208: “I recognise that adopting my ideal-type in its entirety 
may not be immediately feasible, but courts may be able to accommodate it partially, within 
existing judicial review doctrine.” Hoexter makes no such claim. 
140 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 499 (emphasis added). 
141 501 (emphasis added). 
142 501 n 79 (emphasis added). 
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advisory and directive rather than prescriptive and preceptive. She does not attempt to 
formulate a definition of deference or proffer her version of an established legal 
principle. Ultimately, Hoexter refers to her “view of deference” because “‘theory’ is 
too ambitious a word”.143 
 
3 3 3 2 Judicial Notice of Deference 
 
Despite Hoexter’s intention to introduce a debate, the South African courts have 
applied her description of deference as a legal definition and legal principle. In 
Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO,144 Cameron JA identifies the task before the 
decision-maker 145  as a “prime instance of what commentators have dubbed 
‘polycentric decision-making’.”146  The decision was characterised as polycentric 
because various public interests had to be balanced against one another, such as the 
“fair reconsideration of the appellant’s tender” and the “broader responsibilities” of 
the decision-maker.147 Cameron JA finds that “[i]t is in just such circumstances that a 
measure of judicial deference is appropriate to the complexity of the task that 
confronted” the decision-maker.148 Thus, where a decision-maker is confronted with a 
polycentric issue the court should act with judicial deference because of the 
complexity of the decision.149 Cameron JA quotes from Hoexter’s “The Future of 
Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” 150  and endorses her 
                                                
143 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 143; Administrative Law in South Africa 
(2012, 2nd ed) 151. Note that Hoexter has not changed her wording (“view of deference” rather 
than “theory”) in the second edition, suggesting that, in her view, deference has not as yet 
progressed to the level of a “theory” of deference. 
144 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). 
145 The KwaZulu-Natal assets committee, represented by the first respondent. 
146 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) para 20. 
147 Para 20. 
148 Para 21. 
149 Consequently, it seems that an applicant who feels aggrieved by a polycentric administrative 
act is more vulnerable, or less likely to enjoy the protection of the courts, than an applicant 
affected by a simple administrative act. If this is not the case, then it is difficult to see whether 
deference plays an independent role. In turn, determining whether an administrative decision is 
polycentric is itself a difficult inquiry. 
150 (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 484-519. 
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description 151  of judicial deference. On this basis, Cameron JA finds that the 
“conclusion is unavoidable” that the decision-maker “acted unimpeachably” in taking 
supervening circumstances into consideration. 152  He makes this finding without 
explaining why deference is required at polycentric decision-making, why deference 
is appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case, or what precisely the 
role of deference is in the case. Cameron JA could have reached the same conclusion 
on the basis of the distinction between appeal and review. 
In Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd,153 
Schutz JA reviewed a decision on reasonableness grounds,154 amongst others. He 
found that since the decision-maker “[had] a wide discretion to strike a balance, in 
furtherance of the objectives and principles” of the relevant legislation and was 
“[giving] effect to government economic policies”, “judicial review of the exercise of 
powers calls for deference, in the sense stated in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson 
NO”.155  
Schutz JA quotes156 from Du Plessis v De Klerk157 and S v Lawrence158 for 
authority that courts are not adept at factual, economic or political inquiries,159 that 
courts should therefore exercise restraint in making findings on them and that this 
restraint is linked to the different roles of the court and the other branches.160 Schutz 
                                                
151 501-502. 
152 Arguably, the same conclusion could have been reached without referring to deference. For 
instance, the argument could have been formulated in terms of the separation of powers or the 
distinction between appeal and review. 
153 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA). 
154 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 45 
(“Were the decisions capricious or based upon arbitrary or irrelevant considerations?”). 
155 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 47. 
156 Paras 48-49. 
157 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 180. 
158 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) para 42. 
159 See, generally, Fuller LL “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard Law 
Review 353-409. 
160 Considered in isolation, this suggests that the courts are limited when it comes to these matters. 
However, arguably it is only when the administration has made factual, economic or political 
inquiries that the judiciary is required to show deference. Should the courts show deference to the 
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JA elaborates along this vein in characterizing the decision as polycentric and in 
stating that the court cannot prefer one decision over another on the basis that the one 
is better than the other.161 As authority for this latter statement, he quotes162 from Bel 
Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape163 where Chaskalson P said 
that “[c]ourts cannot interfere with rational decisions of the Executive that have been 
made lawfully, on the grounds that they consider that a different decision would have 
been preferable.” 164  The court’s function is not to test the correctness or the 
“substance” of the decision, but the “procedure by means of which it was arrived 
at”,165 otherwise the distinction between review and appeal is lost.166  
Schutz JA points out that judicial deference “simply manifests the recognition that 
the law itself places certain administrative actions in the hands of the executive, not 
the judiciary.”167 This is a clear statement of the pure doctrine of separation of powers 
in terms of which different functions are apportioned to different branches of the state. 
                                                                                                                                       
findings of private institutions such as banks or doctors? Since deference flows from the 
separation of powers it would seem that this is not the case. However, if the reason is simply that 
the courts are not adept at these sorts of inquiry why is deference only appropriate in the one case 
and not the other? In medical cases for instance the court has no specialised medical knowledge 
and the opposing parties bring expert witnesses to testify before the court, taking opposite views 
on the same matter. Why is it unproblematic for courts to take such cases on appeal, but not assess 
administrative arguments purely on the merits at judicial review? There should be some concern 
when deference is shown to the party who has allegedly infringed the right to just administrative 
action on the basis not of the argument alone, but factors external to the facts. In the light of the 
Preamble, ss 1(a), 1(c), 2 7, 165 and 172 such a stance amounts to impartiality or non-justiciability 
where the case has already reached court and the judge is asked to review the case. This does not 
go against Hoexter’s general argument that there is an over-reliance on review. However, the 
problem is not solved by diluting the review process on the basis that other forms of protection are 
desirable and that the system itself must balance the need for administrative freedom and 
independence, on the one hand, and the protection of individuals, on the other. These issues 
require systemic changes. 
161 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 51. 
162 Para 51. 
163 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 87. 
164 Para 45. 
165 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 52. 
166 Para 52. 
167 Para 50. 
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In concluding the discussion on the alleged capriciousness of the decision, Schutz JA 
summarises the preceding arguments: 
 
“Judicial deference is particularly appropriate where the subject matter of an administrative 
action is very technical or of a kind in which a court has no particular proficiency. We cannot 
even pretend to have the skills and access to knowledge that is available to the Chief Director 
[the decision-maker]. It is not our task to better his allocations, unless we should conclude that 
his decision cannot be sustained on rational grounds.”168 
 
With that he finds that the application on reasonableness grounds fails. Deference 
and rationality are interwoven in this discussion. Although Schutz JA clearly 
identifies the facts upon which the decision was made,169 why they were relevant170 
and why the decision-maker dealt with them rationally in the circumstances,171 it is 
unclear what role deference plays or should play in the analysis of the reasonableness 
of decisions or how the analysis would have differed without deference.  
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd172 was 
taken on appeal to the Constitutional Court. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism173 O’Regan J discusses deference174 under the 
                                                
168 Para 53. 
169 See, for instance, Schutz JA’s approval of the reasons furnished by the decision-maker 
(Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) paras 39-
45). 
170 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 54. 
171 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) paras 41-
43, 45, 51 (The decision-maker “[was] obliged to have regard to a broad band of considerations 
and the interests of all that may be affected”). 
172 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA). 
173 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). The Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) case has subsequently become the standard case on deference. See, 
for instance, Nyathi v MEC for the Department of Health Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC) where 
Madala J held that “[t]he separation of powers doctrine needs to be respected and due deference 
afforded to the other arms of government, especially when the matter relates to complex 
procedures beyond the expertise of this Court” (para 208). Madala J refers to Bato Star as 
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heading “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of the … decision”.175 Thus, deference is discussed in 
the context of reasonableness review. In terms of O’Regan J’s treatment of deference 
in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,176 
what is the content of deference, or rather, what is said about deference? The 
placement of her discussion on deference suggests that it is an aspect of 
reasonableness review or that it plays a role in reasonableness review.  
O’Regan J mentions Schutz JA’s reference to Hoexter’s “The Future of Judicial 
Review in South African Administrative Law”177 and quotes the latter’s description of 
the nature of deference. O’Regan J endorses178 Schutz JA’s negative description of 
deference: “[j]udicial deference does not imply judicial timidity or an unreadiness to 
                                                                                                                                       
authority for the meaning of deference and for the contention that deference flows from the 
separation of powers (para 88). 
174 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) at paras 46-48. 
175 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) at para 41. O’Regan also discusses deference under reasonableness in “Breaking Ground: 
Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in our Administrative Law” (2004) 121 South African Law 
Journal 424-437 at 435-437. Deference is described as a “ground rule” of reasonableness review 
(435). O’Regan also identifies several factors that inform deference, with reference to the 
Canadian system. She reasons  
 
“The challenge that lies ahead requires the development of determining how many levels of 
scrutiny there should be, their precise form, and which levels of scrutiny are appropriate to 
which types of jurisdiction. The factors that I outline in commencing my discussion - expertise 
of the tribunal, polycentric decisions, the need for an efficient administration, the constitutional 
commitment to responsiveness, transparency and accountability - must all feature in this 
development.” 
 
Corder responds to O’Regan’s article in “Without Deference, with Respect: A Response to Justice 
O’Regan” (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 438-444. He agrees with O’Regan J that “an 
emphasis on approach or philosophy is what is needed now in South African administrative law” 
(442), but raises several questions concerning the difference between reviewing executive and 
administrative acts and concerning the nature of reasonableness review. 
176 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
177 (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 484-519. 
178 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) at para 46. 
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perform the judicial function.”179 Also, the word deference itself may detract from the 
“true function of a review court”;180 “[t]his can be avoided if it is realised that the 
need for courts to treat decision-makers with appropriate deference or respect flows 
not from judicial courtesy or etiquette but from the fundamental constitutional 
principle of the separation of powers itself.”181  
O’Regan J clearly states that deference or respect derives from the doctrine of 
separation of powers. She quotes from the House of Lords judgment, R (on the 
application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation,182 where Lord 
Hoffmann indicates that 
 
“[i]n a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to 
decide which branch of government has in any particular instance the decision-making power 
and what the limits of that power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided 
by the courts.”183 
 
Thus, 
 
“[t]he allocation of these decision-making responsibilities is based upon recognised principles 
… [W]hen a court decides that a decision is within the proper competence of the legislature or 
executive, it is not showing deference. It is deciding the law.”184 
 
Therefore, where a court determines the decision-making competence of another 
branch of government, it is merely deciding the law. The decision-making 
competence of a branch is determined by the separation of powers. Where a court 
determines the content of the separation of powers and other law in the context of 
                                                
179 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) at para 
50. 
180 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) at para 46. 
181 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) at 46 (footnote omitted). Citing Dyzenhaus (para 46 n 32), O’Regan J employs “respect” as 
an alternative term for “deference” (46). 
182 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL). 
183 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL) para 75. 
184 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL) para 76. 
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allocating powers it is not acting with deference and is not required to act out of 
deference.  
O’Regan J adopts this analysis and applies it in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism:185 “[i]n treating the decisions of 
administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a court is recognising the proper 
role of the executive within the Constitution.”186 In other words, respect amounts to an 
appreciation of and compliance to competence. This is nothing more than an 
application of the separation of powers and other principles, such as checks and 
balances, which determine the allocation and scope of state functions. 
The question remains what is the relation between deference and reasonableness 
review? The preceding quotation of O’Regan J sets out the content of deference or 
respect: there is appropriate respect when courts, in evaluating the decisions of 
administrative agencies, recognise the proper role of the executive within the 
Constitution.187 O’Regan J reasons that respect entails that judges should not endow 
themselves with superior judgement regarding the functions of other branches; this 
can be avoided by “[giving] due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made 
by those with special expertise and experience in the field.”188 In turn, due weight is a 
function of the character of the decision and the identity of the decision-maker.189 
Thus, it would appear, the more complicated a decision is and the more of an expert 
the decision-maker is, the more weight courts should attach to findings of fact and 
policy decisions. However, O’Regan J immediately qualifies the importance of the 
complexity of a decision and the identity of a decision-maker: 
 
“A court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity 
of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker.”190  
 
Therefore, the character of the decision and the identity of the decision-maker are 
factors that assist the court in determining the weight to be attached to findings of fact 
and policy decisions. These factors are not decisive, though. The decisive criterion is 
                                                
185 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) paras 48-54. 
186 Para 48. 
187 Para 48. 
188 Para 48. 
189 Para 48. 
190 Para 48. 
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the reasonableness of the decision and there is not necessarily a direct relationship 
between the complexity of the decision and the identity of the decision-maker. 
Therefore the link between deference and reasonableness review could lie in the 
courts’ very attachment of weight to findings of fact and to policy decisions in the 
courts’ determination of the reasonableness of decisions, for this acknowledgement is 
an incidence of the courts’ recognition of the proper role of the executive.191 This is so 
regardless of whether that weight turns out to be decisive or not. 
O’Regan J attempts to combine the idea of respect and reasonableness review: 
 
“A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or 
considerations and which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise in that 
area must be shown respect by the courts. Often a power will identify a goal to be achieved, but 
will not dictate which route should be followed to achieve that goal. In such circumstances a 
court should pay due respect to the route selected by the decision-maker. This does not mean 
however that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in the achievement of 
the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the 
reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision.”192  
 
O’Regan J has already indicated that respect requires courts to acknowledge the 
proper role of the executive. How are courts to acknowledge the proper role of the 
executive where an executive decision is scrutinised, or where there is a call for it to 
be scrutinised? This question seems to be the crux of how respect and reasonableness 
review overlap. In the preceding quotation, O’Regan J says that where the executive 
has a polycentric issue before it or has a discretion regarding the route to be taken 
courts must respect the decision. Thus, courts can respect the proper role of the 
executive by respecting the executive’s decision. However, this is unhelpful to the 
inquiry. Now, the question is merely how do courts respect executive decisions under 
reasonableness review. In addition, O’Regan J finds it necessary to qualify this point 
by adding that the respect owed by courts to the executive’s decisions does not 
preclude unreasonableness review.  
                                                
191 Or the proper role of the legislative branch. See Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: 
Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 
279-307 at 303. 
192 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 48 (emphasis added). 
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If the decision-maker “did take into account all the factors, struck a reasonable 
equilibrium between them and selected reasonable means to pursue the identified 
legislative goal in the light of the facts before him, the applicant cannot succeed”193 
with reasonable review. Thus “[t]he court’s task is merely to determine whether the 
decision made is one which achieves a reasonable equilibrium in the 
circumstances.” 194  Therefore, regardless of the respect owed by the courts to 
executive decisions, such decisions will be subject to reasonableness review in any 
case. Initially, O’Regan J seems to state that respect is a factor in deciding whether a 
decision is reviewable at all. By subsequently negating this assertion respect becomes 
a factor in reasonableness review. The question remains, how does respect operate in 
reasonableness review? 
Thus, O’Regan J partially detracts from her original position that respect originates 
in the doctrine of separation of powers and that respect is concerned with competence: 
she explicitly considers respect and reasonableness review together. Lord Hoffmann 
also analyses deference as a principle determining and allocating the competences of 
the branches of government. O’Regan J, however, applies Lord Hoffmann’s argument 
in the context of reasonableness review which is concerned not with the allocation of 
power, but with the manner in which that power is exercised. The allocation of power 
and the content of that power are related but distinguishable. For instance, where the 
separation of powers allocates the judicial function, i.e. the function of stating the law, 
to the judiciary this allocation in itself does not define the content of the judicial 
function. However, where deference informs reasonableness review, the content of the 
judicial function, in relation to the administrative function, is affected. This raises the 
question whether deference is concerned with the allocation of powers, the scope of 
powers or both? Seemingly, deference is a principle that permeates law in a very wide 
sense, from the inquiry of the allocation of functions to the content and application of 
that function.  
A variable standard of review is based on the idea that there is a spectrum of 
reasonableness, between irrationality and perfect proportionality, within which there 
is scope for different decisions that are all reasonable. That one option is more or less 
reasonable than another is beside the point. Reasonableness review is an exercise in 
                                                
193 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 50. 
194 Para 49. 
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determining whether a decision falls within the spectrum or not.195 The decisive 
inquiry is where the boundaries of reasonableness lie. In terms of reasonableness 
review, all decisions within the boundaries of rationality and proportionality are 
reasonable.  
The fact that courts cannot interfere with different options falling within the 
spectrum between the cut-off for reasonableness and proportionality, even where one 
decision is patently better than another, is in itself an acknowledgement of the 
constitutionally ordained function of the executive branch and, therefore, an incidence 
of deference as employed by O’Regan J. The scope of reasonableness review derives 
from the nature of judicial review, which maintains the difference between review and 
appeal. In this sense, deference does nothing new. Thus, is deference merely 
descriptive, describing the courts’ position in relation to the executive during review 
proceedings as opposed to appeal or does it add something new to judicial review? 
In Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General: Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management, 196  Harms JA 
summarises the decision of the court a quo197 as follows: Van Zyl J found that “the 
review application was an appeal in disguise” and “that this was one of those cases in 
which due judicial deference should be accorded to policy-laden and polycentric 
administrative acts that entail a degree of specialist knowledge and expertise that very 
few, if any, judges may be expected to have”;198 the act to which the court a quo 
deemed deference was due was the algorithm that had been developed by a professor 
of mathematics.199 On appeal the appellant asked for the mechanical application of the 
formula to be reviewed in terms of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA.200 The formula itself was 
not challenged.201 
                                                
195 Obviously, if a decision is more than simply reasonable, i.e. proportional, it will pass the test of 
reasonableness review.  
196 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA). 
197 2004 5 SA 91 (C). 
198 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA) para 2. 
199 Para 8. 
200 Paras 11-14. 
201 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA) para 13 (“[T]he 
appellant ... did not pursue the attack on OMP-02 or the decision to use a single allocation. (It 
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Harms JA explains his understanding of deference, citing Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism:202 
 
“In exercising its review jurisdiction a court must treat administrative decisions with 
‘deference’ by taking into account and respecting the division of powers inherent in the 
Constitution.”203 
 
Here, once again, an aspect of the definition of the pure separation of powers is 
stated succinctly. Thus, Harms JA does not contribute to the content of deference. It 
seems, however, that deference is a feature of the review process itself and its content 
amounts to recognition of the allocation of functions. 
After considering the outcome of the formula’s application, Harms JA responds to 
Van Zyl J’s view on deference:  
 
“[o]ne does not need to understand the ‘complex processes, mathematical or otherwise’ ... to 
realise that at least some of the results produced by the simple application of the formula were 
irrational and inexplicable and consequently unreasonable.”204 
                                                                                                                                       
should be noted that the minister’s determination of the TAC has never been in contention.) The 
use of a formula to determine the allocation of fishing rights is also not in issue.”). 
202 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
203 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA) para 12 (emphasis 
added). 
204 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA) para 18. Harms JA 
does not explain at all why the results are irrational. He states that the appellant was “prejudiced” 
without explaining why (para 19). He notes certain differences in allocation and that there were 
“glaring anomalies” (paras 14-18). He does not explain why these differences amount to 
anomalies. In this context, it is rather puzzling that Harms JA concludes that the “simple 
application of the formula” was unreasonable. Assuming that “some” of the results were 
“irrational and inexplicable”, and Harms JA does not specify whether he means inexplicable in 
terms of formal logic, statistics, mathematics, law or a combination of the aforementioned, this 
does not necessarily make the decision unreasonable in terms of administrative law: Harms JA 
would have to explain why some distorted results render the decision unreasonable in law. He 
reasons that  
 
“A reasonable decision-maker would, in [his] judgment, have used a formula to make a 
provisional allocation but would have considered the output as a result of the application of the 
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It seems that Harms JA accepts Van Zyl J’s understanding of deference in 
principle. In other words, the court would have had to accord due deference to the 
expert assessment of the administration if the unreasonableness inquiry depended on 
an analysis of “complex processes”. However, on the facts the unreasonableness of 
the decision could be ascertained without engaging with the “complex processes, 
mathematical or otherwise”. Thus, where the unreasonableness of the decision is 
apparent without the need for non-judicial expertise, little or no deference is due, it 
would appear. This approach accords with the variable standard of review. However, 
it raises several questions. If deference flows from the separation of powers, why is it 
not relevant whenever the administration performs an administrative function? Why 
should the court not defer to the administration’s decision to  apply the formula 
mechanically? These questions are not addressed by the court, unfortunately, despite 
Harms JA’s reference to the separation of powers and the allocation of functions. 
In Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director General: Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management,205 the formula for the 
allocation of fish was developed by the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
                                                                                                                                       
formula and then have considered whether the output gives reasonably justifiable results 
bearing in mind the facts. That the results were distorted would have been patent to anyone 
applying his or her mind to them. Some participants were inexplicably and unreasonably 
favoured; at least the appellant was prejudiced, but not only the appellant. A reconsideration of 
the formula or of the input fed into it would have been called for. If the problem had not been 
solved thereby, the results would have been adjusted to make some sense.” (Para 19). 
 
It could be that some distorted results are unavoidable given the complexity of the matter. It could 
be that this formula produced the least distorted output. Strangely, having said that the formula 
itself is not at issue, Harms JA mentions that noticing the anomalies would have called for “[a] 
reconsideration of the formula”. Perhaps the final results could not be adjusted. Above all, it is 
unclear how one could know that the output is irrational without knowing exactly how the 
mathematical formula producing the output operates; the terms of the formula would at least 
partially dictate whether any result was distorted or not. Furthermore, whether these 
inconsistencies result in prejudice and favour is not a given. Also, as mentioned, this does not 
necessarily make the application of the formula unreasonable in law. Occasional mathematical or 
statistical inconsistency does not automatically amount to unreasonableness in law. Cf. the opinion 
of the experts who created and applied the formula, Butterworth DS, De Oliveira & De Moor CL 
“Are South African Administrative Law Procedures Adequate for the Evaluation of Issues Resting 
on Scientific Analyses?” (2012) 129 South African Law Journal 461-477. 
205 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA). 
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Tourism in terms of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 with the expert 
assistance of a mathematician.206 Thus the administration was closely involved in the 
process leading to the final formula. Consequently, considering the crucial link 
between the separation of powers and deference that was established in Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,207 the presence of 
administrative expertise and experience is apparent and the reference to deference 
understandable, even though Harms JA did not rely on it directly to come to his 
decision. 
In the case of Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl208 the link between 
administrative expertise and deference appears more tenuous. The central issue was 
the methodology adopted by the actuary for the appellants in the determination of a 
formula for the transfer of pension funds.209 
Brand JA explains the relevance of deference to the case as follows: 
 
“Particularly in the light of the training, skills, experience and intricacies involved in the 
application of actuarial science, I believe that this is a matter where judicial deference is 
appropriate.”210 
 
This is a curious comment as courts are required to show deference to the 
executive branch or, more specifically, the public administration itself. The actuaries 
that represented the respondents would have had the same qualities identified in the 
preceding quotation and their findings have enjoyed no special recognition. As 
mentioned, deference is based on the separation of powers and requires respect for the 
findings of fact and policy decisions of the executive precisely because of the 
executive’s function and its position as an elected branch tasked with balancing 
various factors in making political decisions and implementing legislation. Arguably 
the issue is not purely whether De Wit, the actuary for the appellants, acted rationally, 
but also whether the information he furnished to the decision-maker was dealt with 
reasonably as it was the task of the decision-maker to transfer an amount calculated in 
                                                
206 Paras 1, 3-4, 8. 
207 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
208 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA). 
209 Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA) paras 9, 17-18, 35. 
210 Para 39. 
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terms of the regulations. Ultimately, the core of the argument proffered here is that 
deference is appropriate where the public administration takes a decision that is 
essentially linked to its function. This makes the following remark, made with 
reference to the deference owed to the decision-maker’s actuary, all the more 
puzzling: 
 
“In these circumstances it is almost self-evident, I think, that the respondents have failed to 
make out a case that De Wit’s methodology was not one which an actuary could reasonably 
have adopted, ie that De Wit had failed to act rationally in the execution of his brief.”211 
 
It appears that Brand JA introduces deference simply to reinforce his finding that 
De Wit’s methodology was rational. If this is in fact so, it is questionable whether 
deference plays any role here at all since the reasonableness of De Wit’s methodology 
was established without reliance on deference.  
Furthermore, the decision-maker in this case had little scope for discretion in terms 
of regulation 2(4)(b) of the transfer regulations at issue here: 
 
“[T]he AIPF had to make available to a member who elected to terminate his membership, an 
amount ‘equal to the funding percentage multiplied by the actuarial obligation of the [AIPF] 
in respect of that member as determined by the actuary on the date on which his membership 
of the fund is terminated, with interest thereon calculated at the bank rate from that date to the 
date on which the amount is paid …’”.212 
 
The empowering provision virtually obliged the decision-maker, AIPF, to accept 
the amount determined by the actuary. The amount calculated by the actuary was not 
one of several factors to be considered by the decision-maker in determining the 
amount to be paid over nor was the decision one of a range of potentially reasonable 
decisions to be taken under these circumstances. Deference is partly a strategy to 
avoid crossing over from review to appeal by acknowledging different purposes for 
scrutinising the merits of a decision.213 Hoexter argues that 
 
                                                
211 Para 39 (emphasis added). 
212 Para 9. 
213 See Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1999 SA 304 (LAC) para 36. 
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“it is, in fact, quite impossible to judge whether a decision is within the limits of reason or 
‘defensible’ without looking closely at matters such as the information before the 
administrator, the weight given to various factors and the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
decision. Only cases decided on the narrowest and most technical of grounds will not entail 
such scrutiny: for instance, review for failure to comply with a mandatory formality will not 
necessarily involve scrutiny of the merits.”214  
 
If the administrator in this case had no particular expertise or discretion in relation 
to the decision to be made and there was no need to scrutinise the merits of the 
administrator’s decision, why is deference relevant here at all? This case raises a 
number of questions concerning the content of deference, particularly where expertise 
in a particular field is required, but it is neither the administrator that possesses that 
expertise nor is it clear that the expertise relates to the administrative function. The 
case law discussed above indicates that in certain circumstances the court should defer 
to the relative expertise of the administrator. However, in the Van Zyl case, the court 
purports to defer to actuarial determinations215 with little or any involvement of 
administrators. This points to an unresolved inquiry in the application of deference: 
once it has been shown that courts should defer to relative expertise the questions 
“expertise in relation to what is relevant” and “the expertise of whom” remain. A 
principle of deference to mere expertise as such could entail absurd implications: the 
administration could, for example, consult or employ experts simply to activate due 
deference. The statutory mandates imposed upon the administration concern many 
functions and activities. Whether the subject matter of a given statute requiring 
implementation by the administration amounts to the administrative function per se 
and administrative expertise requires further investigation. 
In MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay216 Langa CJ dealt with deference in 
the context of discrimination. The applicants contended that deference should be 
shown to school authorities217 and that it was a factor to be taken into consideration in 
determining fairness.218 They also linked deference to the doctrine of the “margin of 
                                                
214 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 351 (footnotes omitted; emphasis 
added). 
215 Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA) para 39. 
216 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
217 MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) paras 26, 80. 
218 Para 79. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 98  
appreciation” applied by the European Court of Human Rights and the House of 
Lords. 219  Langa CJ firstly pointed out that “the doctrine [of the margin of 
appreciation] is not a useful guide when deciding either whether a right has been 
limited or whether such a limitation is justified.”220 Then he succinctly disposed of the 
contention that deference is appropriate in the circumstances: 
 
“This Court has recognised the need for judicial deference in reviewing administrative 
decisions where the decision-maker is, by virtue of his or her expertise, especially well-
qualified to decide.
 
It is true that the Court must give due weight to the opinion of experts, 
including school authorities, who are particularly knowledgeable in their area, depending on 
the cogency of their opinions. The question before this Court, however, is whether the 
fundamental right to equality has been violated, which in turn requires the Court to determine 
what obligations the School bears to accommodate diversity reasonably. Those are questions 
that courts are best qualified and constitutionally mandated to answer. This Court cannot 
abdicate its duty by deferring to the School’s view on the requirements of fairness. That 
approach is obviously incorrect for the further reason that it is for the School to show that the 
discrimination was fair. A court cannot defer to the view of a party concerning a contention 
that that same party is bound to prove.”221 
 
Langa CJ acknowledges the role of deference in the context of judicial review of 
administrative decisions. However, he seems to indicate that the weight that should be 
attached to the determination of experts depends on the “cogency” of those 
determinations.222 Thus, it is unclear what the role of deference is since deference 
seems to be no more than according due weight to arguments based on their cogency. 
However, where human rights are concerned, no deference is due.223 Thus, section 33 
of the Constitution appears to be an exception to this position. 
 
                                                
219 Para 80. 
220 Para 80. 
221 Para 81 (footnote omitted). 
222 See Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695. 
223 See Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012) 
ch 5. 
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3 3 3 3 The Canadian Connection 
 
Hoexter and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism224 have established deference as a prominent topic and legal principle, 
respectively. In doing so, both Hoexter and O’Regan J draw on the work of 
Dyzenhaus: the former in writing her seminal article on deference225 and, the latter, in 
preferring the word “respect” to “deference”.226 
Dyzenhaus’s conception of deference as respect is his response to the following 
questions: 
 
“How should judges in common law jurisdictions respond to administrative determinations of 
the law? Should they defer to such determinations or evaluate them in accordance with their 
sense of what the right determination should have been?”227  
 
Significantly, he points out that these questions are interwoven with political and 
legal theory.228 Dyzenhaus is critical of formalistic arguments for the justification of 
judicial review, such as the ultra vires or common-law justifications,229 because they 
do not assist courts in resolving administrative-law disputes and they do not recognise 
the legitimate place of the public administration in the legal order.230  
                                                
224 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
225 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 151 n 245. 
226 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 46 n 
32.  
227 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 279. 
228 279. 
229 For a critical discussion and comparison of the ultra vires and common law justifications for 
review, see Jowell J “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” 
(1999) Public Law 448-460. 
230 De Ville JR “Judicial Deference and Différance: Judicial Review and the Perfect Gift” (2006) 9 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 41-89 at 42-43. In terms of this position, the question 
“what is the constitutional place of the administration within the legal order” should be posed. In 
South Africa, the constitutional place of the administration certainly entails a stringent code of 
conduct, see ss 8(1), 33 and 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100  
 The function of judges has been contested because of disagreement over the 
question whether the legislature is the only source of law.231 The result is two 
“camps” which are “poles on a continuum between which debate still moves 
today.”232 There is, on the one side, the “democratic positivists” and, on the other, the 
“liberal antipositivists”.233 The former argues that judges may merely apply the law 
promulgated by the legislature, the only law, while the latter sees “the common law as 
the value-laden background against which legislation [is] to be interpreted”.234 
Naturally, each view is based on a different understanding of the will of the people 
with different implications for judicial deference. The “task” before both “is no less 
than providing a theory of democratic legal order, one which justifies a workable 
account of the role for judicial review in the new political context” which is “one in 
which it is assumed that administrative agencies legitimately have power to make and 
interpret law at the same time as administrative power is increasingly devolved on 
quasi-public and private entities.”235 The importance of this observation should not be 
overlooked: the respective functions of the judiciary and the administration are a 
function of politics and political theory. Consequently, the choice exercised regarding 
political theory will determine the nature of judicial review. 
Thus, Dyzenhaus’s point of departure is that “the justification of review and 
guidance on how such review should proceed can only be found in a political theory 
of the rule of law.”236 He has adopted the legal and political stance of anti-positivist 
and proceduralist democrat.237 With this outlook he has developed a model of judicial 
review which is founded on reasonable justification, a particular theory of democracy 
and of the rule of law:238 “[his] thesis is that the substance of the rule of law is the 
equality of all citizens before the law and that the form of the rule of law is the 
                                                
231 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 279. 
232 280. 
233 280. 
234 280. 
235 286. 
236 De Ville JR “Judicial Deference and Différance: Judicial Review and the Perfect Gift” (2006) 9 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 41-89 at 43 (footnote omitted). 
237 41. 
238 41. 
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procedures whereby public officials demonstrate that they have lived up to – are 
accountable to – that substance.”239 
Dyzenhaus attempts “to show that a close examination of some leading Canadian 
decisions, mainly on the topic of judicial deference to administrative decisions, can 
assist us in this task [of providing a theory of democratic legal order].”240 He 
identifies two types of judicial deference, namely, “submissive deference” and 
“deference as respect”.241 On the one hand, submissive deference is based on the 
Diceyan model of law and “what it requires of judges is that they submit to the 
intention of the legislature, on a positivist understanding of intention.”242 On the other 
hand,  
 
“[d]eference as respect requires not submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered 
or which could be offered in support of a decision, whether that decision be the statutory 
decision of the legislature, a judgment of another court, or the decision of an administrative 
agency.”243 
 
Furthermore: 
 
“Deference as respect ... provides an ideal which can inform an attempt to rearticulate the 
relationships between the legislature, the courts and the administration in such a way that the 
courts retain a legitimate role as the ultimate authority on the interpretation of law. 
In statutory interpretation, this ideal requires of judges that they determine the intention of 
the statute, not in accordance with the idea that there is some prior (positivistic) fact of the 
matter, but in terms of the reasons that best justify having that statute.”244 
 
                                                
239 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 307 (footnote omitted). 
240 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 286. The discussion focuses on Canadian 
Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation [1979] 2 SCR 227 
and Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police [1979] 1 SCR 
311. 
241 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 286. 
242 286. 
243 286. 
244 303. 
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Dyzenhaus explains that this involves judges setting out the best reasoning that 
resulted in the final statute and where the meaning of legislation is contested this 
process will contribute to giving meaning to the legislative provisions.245 Thus,  
 
“[w]hen the statute is one that sets up a regulatory regime and a tribunal to decide disputes that 
may arise out of the regime, this interpretative approach requires judges to take the tribunal’s 
decision seriously ... because what they are primarily concerned to do is to find the reasons that 
best justify any decision, whether legislative, administrative or judicial. And, if the court has 
before it not only a statute to interpret, but also a tribunal’s interpretation of that statute, then 
the tribunal’s interpretation makes a difference to the structure of the interpretative context.”246 
 
Reasons for adopting this “attitude” of judicial deference include the legislature’s 
choice of the tribunal as the primary forum, the relative speed and economy with 
which it can dispose of matters and its possible expertise.247 This attitude involves 
treating the tribunal’s reasoning with respect, regardless of the subject matter of the 
reasoning, whether factual or legal, “by asking whether that reasoning did in fact and 
also could in principle justify the conclusion reached.”248 
Finally, the “principle” of deference as respect 
 
“is inherently democratic. It adopts the assumption that what justifies all public power is the 
ability of its incumbents to offer adequate reasons for the decisions which affect those subject 
to them. The difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the democratic right of the 
latter to require an accounting for acts of public power.”249 
 
Dyzenhaus’s model of deference is formulated within the Canadian context, which 
has a developed principle of judicial deference. Therefore, it is instructive to properly 
                                                
245 303. 
246 303. 
247 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303-304. See Daly P A Theory of 
Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012) ch 2 on the central 
importance of the “declared constitutional principle” of “legislative intent” and ch 3 on the 
“practical justifications for curial deference” such as expertise and complexity. 
248 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 304 (emphasis added). 
249 305. See also 307. 
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contextualise deference as respect. To this end David Mullan has usefully considered 
the exportability of Canadian judicial deference in a critical analysis of the 
principle.250 
Mullan indicates that judicial deference to administrative decisions is an 
established and developed principle in Canadian law.251 In order to determine whether 
and to what degree deference is appropriate, the circumstances of the case are 
subjected to a pragmatic and functional analysis that the Supreme Court introduced 
and has been modifying for over twenty years.252 The elements of this analysis are: 
 
“1. The presence or absence of a privative clause or statutory right of appeal (or any other 
statutory scope of review indicator, including, in the case of discretionary authority, the 
width of the discretion and the language in which it is conferred). 
2. The expertise of the reviewing court relative to that of the statutory authority in relation to 
the matter in issue. 
3. The purposes of the legislation and the relevant provision(s) in particular. 
4. The nature of the question in two senses. Is it a question of law, mixed law and fact, fact, or 
discretion? Is the question one that relates to the very reasons for the conferral of the 
statutory authority and the core of that authority's expected area of expertise?”253 
 
Importantly, the outcome of this analysis is highly dependent on the context.254 
Once the court has completed the analysis and balanced the factors against each other 
                                                
250 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61. On the role 
of deference in Canada, see also, Mullan DJ “Judicial Deference to Administrative Decision-
Making in the Age of the Charter” (1985-1986) 50 Saskatchewan Law Review 203-223; “The 
Future of Canadian Administrative Law” (1991) 16 Queen’s Law Journal 77-94; “Judicial 
Deference to Executive Decision-Making: Evolving Concepts of Responsibility” (1993) 19 
Queen’s Law Journal 137-178. 
251 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 42. For 
further discussion on deference in the Canadian context see Lewans M Administrative Law and 
Curial Deference (2010) available at 
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/24813/6/Lewans_Matthew_R_201006_SJD_the
sis.pdf> (accessed 26.08.2013), Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, 
Application and Scope (2012), Lewans M Administrative Law and Judicial Deference 
(forthcoming 2014). 
252 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 42, 42 n 2. 
253 50-51.  
254 51. 
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a standard of review255 is determined and only then applied to the issue before the 
court.256 
Mullan indicates that judicial deference is criticised for various reasons.257 Firstly, 
the concept of deference per se is challenged on the following grounds: a Diceyan 
understanding of the rule of law undermines the constitutional foundation of 
deference; the role of the courts of law as guardians of administrative justice is 
compromised; deference, as a response to institutional competence, sometimes 
overrates the expertise of administrative decision-makers or misconceives the nature 
of decisions as bona fide; and the pragmatic and practical factors are flexible to the 
extent that judges can come to any conclusion. Secondly, the Canadian version of 
deference is contested: it is too complex, time-consuming, and unpredictable; “the 
extension of the pragmatic and functional analysis to review for abuse of discretion 
was inappropriate”;258 the constitutionalisation of judicial review with the advent of 
human rights legislation is problematic in relation to administrative discretion; “the 
Supreme Court itself has come to question the universality of the need to conduct a 
pragmatic and functional analysis in all cases in which judicial review is being sought 
on substantive grounds.”259 Thirdly, it is argued that deference should be intensified: 
“there is no reason to exempt procedural decision-making from the pragmatic and 
functional analysis”; 260  courts too readily classify issues as purely legal or 
precedential thus asserting its superior competence in relation to such issues; “there 
are also problems in reconciling the possibility of the application of a standard of 
                                                
255 Originally the pragmatic and functional analysis could result in one of three standards of 
review, namely, correctness, reasonableness or patent unreasonableness. Subsequently, with the 
dismissal of the standard of patent unreasonableness, the number of standards were reduced to 
two. See Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope 
(2012) 16. 
256 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 51. “[T]he 
Supreme Court now holds lower courts to the responsibility to conduct a pragmatic and functional 
analysis and establish a standard of review as a precondition to moving to the consideration of the 
merits of any application for judicial review on substantive grounds” (49). 
257 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 51-55. 
258 53. 
259 54. 
260 54. 
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[in]correctness or unreasonableness to an exercise of discretion with the catchall 
Wednesbury standard of review of the merits of discretionary decision-making.”261  
The origins and development262 of judicial deference in Canada reveal “what in its 
detail is an indigenous system of judicial review, the precise parameters of which are 
unlikely to commend themselves to the courts of other jurisdictions.”263 However, 
there are common philosophical considerations at the foundation of Canadian judicial 
review which have much to offer:264 an increasingly plural legal reality demands 
respect for administrative agencies because such a legal context cannot accommodate 
courts as the supreme authority on all questions of law, fact and the interpretation of 
law; the more administrative decision-makers develop and improve internal systems 
that address their shortcomings, the more respect is appropriate; to relieve the pressure 
on the judiciary, courts should primarily hear issues of jurisprudential and 
constitutional significance; and the exorbitant costs of judicial review necessitates 
alternative mechanisms that secure administrative justice and equality.  
However, Mullan notes that these factors cannot in themselves justify the Canadian 
version of judicial deference, although they make a case for limits in the judicial 
review of administrative action. 265  Deference must be justified by “a coherent 
conception of the proper constitutional role of the courts in relation to statutory and 
prerogative decision-making.”266 This reiterates Dyzenhaus’s argument that deference 
is a function of a choice in political theory. It is only once certain choices in political 
theory have been made and a certain conception of the rule of law adopted that 
deference can be explained and justified. Thus, the parameters and objectives of the 
administrative-law relationship are a function of political theory and the rule of law. 
 
                                                
261 54-55 (footnote omitted). 
262 See Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 55-56. 
It is noteworthy here that the attitude towards review assumed by the United States Supreme Court 
for scrutinising administrative agencies during the New Deal is foundational to Canadian judicial 
deference (56). This resonates with Dyzenhaus’s assertion that judicial review can only be given 
meaning on a foundation of political and legal theory. 
263 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 56. 
264 57-58. 
265 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 58. Cf. 
Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012) chs 2, 
3. 
266 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 58. 
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3 3 3 4 Critiques of Deference 
 
Dennis Davis attempts to contextualise judicial review in the manner suggested by 
Dyzenhaus and Mullan.267 He identifies judicial review as an important mechanism 
for enhancing transparency, accountability and participation in order for government 
to justify its decisions.268 With reference to Murray Hunt, Davis says that “the central 
question of a system of administrative law, particularly when located within a 
constitutional dispensation, is ‘what are the proper boundaries to the respective 
powers of different branches of government, and who decides on where those 
boundaries are drawn?’”269 Davis argues that “the development of administrative law 
in the 21st century is to be located within the context of constitutional rights.”270 This 
statement in itself is a choice in political theory. Thus, in the light of Mullan’s 
contention that deference is justified by the constitutional role of the courts, Davis 
identifies the promotion of transparency, accountability and participation and the 
guardianship of constitutional rights as that role. Within this context “the key question 
concerns the function of the judge in mediating between the law and legislative and 
executive politics.”271 The concept of judicial deference is a relatively recent response 
to this question.272 Deference, however, merely leads to a further inquiry, namely, 
“[w]hat enquiry must be undertaken which will inform the court as to the level of 
                                                
267 Davis DM “To Defer and then When? Administrative Law and Constitutional Democracy” 
(2006) Acta Juridica 23-41. 
268 23. 
269 23 (footnote omitted). 
270 Davis DM “To Defer and then When? Administrative Law and Constitutional Democracy” 
(2006) Acta Juridica 23-41 at 25. The advent of human-rights law has resulted in a new dimension 
for judicial review and, by implication, deference that requires serious attention. Jowell states the 
significance of deference, in this context, powerfully: “the most difficult question for the courts in 
the interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) is the extent to which they should defer to 
Parliament and other institutions of government on matters relating to the public interest” (Jowell 
J “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity” (2003) Public Law 592-601 at 
592). 
271 Davis DM “To Defer and then When? Administrative Law and Constitutional Democracy” 
(2006) Acta Juridica 23-41 at 25. 
272 25. 
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scrutiny which must then be employed to review the particular decision on the facts 
placed before the reviewing court?”273 
Davis concludes that  
 
“the concept of deference which has earned such enthusiastic judicial mention has not been 
based on clear principle nor on a recognition that administrative law is now located within the 
context of a rights culture, as opposed to the context of the earlier two periods of the classical 
and the social. A central problem has been the absence of an engagement with the implications 
for a body of law constructed initially in the classical period and developed in the social period 
but which must now be used by courts which function in the rights period.”274 
 
In other words, the justification for deference required by both Dyzenhaus and 
Mullan has not been satisfied in the South African context. As mentioned, Mullan 
argues that deference is justified by “a coherent conception of the proper 
constitutional role of the courts in relation to statutory and prerogative decision-
making”275 and Dyzenhaus argues that “the justification of review and guidance on 
how such review should proceed can only be found in a political theory of the rule of 
law.”276 Thus, in the first place, according to Davis judicial review and administrative 
law in general have not as yet been integrated in a rights culture and context. This has 
implications for the very nature of administrative law and therefore, in this sense, 
administrative-law theory is outdated. Secondly, on Mullan’s interpretation, the 
constitutional role of the courts cannot be determined in isolation: the judiciary’s 
                                                
273 33. 
274 Davis DM “To Defer and then When? Administrative Law and Constitutional Democracy” 
(2006) Acta Juridica 23-41 at 39. Davis argues that, in South Africa, “a theory of deference fails 
to capture the positive, dialogic role that a court is required to play within the scheme of socio-
economic rights”, merely entails that courts defer to superior institutional competence in 
determining socio-economic policy, and “within the South African historical context … is far too 
closely aligned with the jurisprudence of apartheid to constitute a model for the transformation of 
the legal landscape” (Davis DM “Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights in the South African 
Constitution: Towards ‘Deference Lite’?” (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301-
327 at 319-320 (footnote omitted)). See Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review 
and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 305 on 
the public administration and the courts as elements in “a web of public justification”. 
275 Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” (2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 58. 
276 De Ville JR “Judicial Deference and Différance: Judicial Review and the Perfect Gift” (2006) 9 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 41-89 at 43 (footnote omitted). 
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function is also defined in relation to the functions of the other branches, which 
reiterates the importance of the relationship between the branches. Simply put, the 
judicial role is a function of the executive and legislative functions. 
TRS Allan goes further than Davis in questioning the foundation of a theory of 
deference.277 While Davis asserts that deference in South Africa is not informed by 
the correct legal context, i.e. constitutional democracy and a rights culture, Allan is 
sceptical of the very enterprise of judicial deference and he argues that “[t]here is no 
logical space for any free-standing doctrine of deference”.278 
In relation to a specific case before the court, Allan says that the scope of judicial 
review and of administrative discretion cannot be determined or balanced in the 
abstract, that is, without considering the applicable legal questions in all the 
circumstances.279 In other words: 
 
“Insofar as talk of ‘deference’ promises to short-circuit such analysis, suggesting a direct 
linkage between deep-level constitutional theory and the resolution of particular rights-claims, 
it generates only confusion and misunderstanding.”280 
 
                                                
277 See Allan TRS “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in Dyzenhaus D 
(ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004) 289-306; “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of 
‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 671-695; “Deference, Defiance, and 
Doctrine: Defining the Limits of Judicial Review” (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 
41-59; “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 127 
Law Quarterly Review 96-117. 
278 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 694 (emphasis in original). See Allan TRS “Common Law 
Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in Dyzenhaus D (ed) The Unity of Public Law 
(2004) 289-306 at 305-306. 
279 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 676; “Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits 
of Judicial Review” (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 41-59 at 49. Regarding the 
primacy of context, see Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 45; Mullan DJ “Deference: Is it Useful Outside Canada?” 
(2006) Acta Juridica 42-61 at 51. See also Jowell J “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or 
Institutional Capacity” (2003) Public Law 592-601 at 598-599 where he contends that, regarding 
institutional capacity, “there is no magic legal or other formula to identify the ‘discretionary area 
of judgment’ available to the reviewed body” (599) (footnote omitted).  
280 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 676. 
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Allan characterises the factors which are indicative and supportive of a measure of 
due deference281 as “plainly external to the intrinsic quality of the decision under 
review”.282 This is deeply problematic because due deference requires of a court to 
evaluate the arguments before it in the light of the decision-maker’s characteristics 
instead of that of the decision283 and is tantamount to non-justiciability.284 In addition, 
deferring to administrative decision-makers on the basis of expertise or superior 
access to information compromises judicial independence and neutrality. 285 The 
external questions are distinguished from the “internal questions of expert judgement 
and procedural diligence, as demonstrated in relation to the matter in issue”.286 
Anyhow, the criteria which make up a doctrine of deference are incorporated in 
“ordinary judicial procedures, which do not try to replicate ... decision-making 
processes”,287 and in the distinction between appeal and review which prevents judges 
substituting their own decisions for those of administrative decision-makers. Judicial 
review’s emphasis on the context of the decision also incorporates these criteria.288  
The courts’ main concern must be the reasons for the decision: 
                                                
281 Such as the decision-maker’s expertise or thorough procedures. See Allan TRS “Human Rights 
and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 
at 687-688. 
282 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 688. See Allan TRS “Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: 
Defining the Limits of Judicial Review” (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 41-59 at 51. 
283 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 688. 
284 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 689. 
285 Allan TRS “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in Dyzenhaus D (ed) 
The Unity of Public Law (2004) 289-306 at 289-290. 
286 Allan TRS “Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of Judicial Review” 
(2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 41-59 at 59 (emphasis in original). 
287 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 692. See Allan TRS “Common Law Reason and the Limits of 
Judicial Deference” in Dyzenhaus D (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004) 289-306 at 306; 
“Deference, Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of Judicial Review” (2010) 60 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 41-59 at 43 (“What is really needed is a reminder that even a 
proportionality test need not (and generally should not) amount to the substitution of a judicial 
view for the public body’s opinion on the merits”). 
288 Allan TRS “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in Dyzenhaus D (ed) 
The Unity of Public Law (2004) 289-306 at 295, 297. 
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“A ‘legal culture of justification’ demands the supremacy of reason; and reason is satisfied by 
nothing less than persuasive argument, closely tailored to the circumstances of the particular 
case in question.”289 
 
Ultimately, “[t]here can be no presumption of superior institutional competence”290 
without which there can be no real doctrine of judicial deference. As for constitutional 
competence,291  
 
“[t]he allocation of scarce resources is a matter for which primary responsibility must lie with 
the political branches of government; but any complaint of illegality must be examined on its 
own terms.”292 
 
Allan states his position succinctly thus: 
 
“Deference is not due to an administrative decision merely on the ground of its source or 
‘pedigree’, but only in the sense (and to the extent) that it is supported by reasons that can 
withstand proper scrutiny.”293 
 
                                                
289 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 694 (footnote omitted). 
290 692. 
291 See Jowell J “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” (1999) 
Public Law 448-460 at 451-452. 
292 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 693. The adjudication of justiciable socio-economic rights 
complicates this scenario. 
293 Allan TRS “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in Dyzenhaus D (ed) 
The Unity of Public Law (2004) 289-306 at 291-292. For Allan, deference entails that the reasons 
provided for a decision are not evaluated objectively, but from the perspective of the decision-
maker that relied on those reasons to take a decision, that relies on them in judicial proceedings 
and has a direct interest in the dispute. Where the court accepts those reasons on face value the 
maxim nemo iudex in sua causa is implicated and could be compromised. On this interpretation 
deference implies “taking the administration’s word for a decision”. However, deference here 
could also refer to courts not taking a hostile stance to explanations which are unfamiliar or 
political, i.e. not strictly legal, which is what Dyzenhaus advocates, at least in the sense that such 
explanations can and should contribute to the meaning of legal texts.  
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A further concern is that deference contributes to a misleading rhetoric of judicial 
restraint. Lenta explains that, in South Africa, “judicial decisions are punctuated by a 
rhetoric of restraint that is intended to allay concerns about the court’s usurpation of 
political functions that fall properly within the domain of the legislature or the 
executive.”294 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court is attacked from two sides.295 On 
the one hand, when the Constitutional Court refrains from entering into the political 
realm it is criticised for not protecting socio-economic rights sufficiently. On the other 
hand, when it allegedly trespasses onto the functions of the legislature or executive it 
is accused of usurping their functions, which is undemocratic and, hence, illegitimate 
behaviour.296 In other words, the Constitutional Court is simultaneously accused of 
both exercising too little and too much restraint. Courts, instead of articulating the 
constitutional foundation from which they intervene with administrative decisions and 
“sensing that they are on thinner constitutional ground in substantive review than on 
procedural review, do all they can to cover their tracks by laying false clues and 
donning elaborate camouflage”,297 such as the employment of a rhetoric of deference. 
 
3 3 3 5 Deference, the Separation of Powers, and the Question of a Fourth 
Branch 
 
The strategy of “camouflage” is apparent when the rhetoric of deference is 
contrasted with the separation of powers. Deference is often associated with the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Quite how deference or respect relates to the 
separation of powers is uncertain. O’Regan J says that deference flows from the 
separation of powers,298 but what does this mean? O’Regan J does not explain how 
deference derives from the separation of powers, or whether the ideas of the 
separation of powers simply support deference. Is the idea of deference an aspect of 
the separation of powers? Does deference supplement the separation of powers? Or is 
                                                
294 Lenta P “Judicial Restraint and Overreach” (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 
544-576 at 544. 
295 544-545. 
296 544-545. 
297 Jowell J “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” (1999) 
Public Law 448-460 at 454. 
298 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 46. 
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deference merely congruent with the separation of powers? These distinctions are 
relevant because they affect the content of deference and the way content can be given 
to deference. 
For instance, the notion of checks and balances is additional to the separation of 
powers because it is not necessarily a part of the pure doctrine, but it relies on the 
existence of the doctrine. Whereas the pure doctrine limits the power of any one 
branch, checks and balances ensure that the branches are directly answerable to one 
another. Thus, the idea of checks and balances modifies the pure doctrine and it 
complements the pure doctrine. In other words, conceptually the doctrine can exist 
without checks and balances, but the opposite is impossible. Likewise, the inquiry 
here is whether deference is an expression of the separation of powers itself, whether 
deference complements the doctrine, or whether deference merely relies on the 
separation of powers. 
Apportioning functions to different state branches in order to achieve certain 
normative objectives is precisely the concern of the separation of powers, even of the 
pure doctrine. In terms of the pure doctrine, the judiciary is not permitted to encroach 
upon the executive function. Therefore, if deference merely “consists of a judicial 
willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of 
administrative agencies”,299 implies “recognising the proper role of the Executive 
within the Constitution”300 or “manifests the recognition that the law itself places 
certain administrative actions in the hands of the executive”301 it is arguable whether 
deference contributes anything beyond the content of the pure separation of powers.  
Unlike the doctrine of the separation of powers, which addresses a wide range of 
political and legal relationships, deference focuses on, but is not limited to, the 
relationship between the public administration and the judiciary. This focus is useful 
especially where a fourfold classification of state branches and functions in terms of 
the separation of powers is not employed. The executive branch and function has 
limited analytical potential because of its dual nature. The executive function includes 
                                                
299 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 501. 
300 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 48. 
301 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 50. 
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both policy formulation and the administration or implementation of policy and 
legislation. The executive branch includes both the Cabinet and the public 
administration which are powerful and divergent organs of state. The Constitution, 
however, only provides for the executive authority which is vested in the president302 
and which the president exercises with the Cabinet.303 In the light of the case for a 
separation of powers that accommodates four branches of government304 this is 
unfortunate. The Constitution has been interpreted as providing a threefold distinction 
of government branches and functions.305 On this interpretation the Constitution does 
not reflect the rise and importance of the public administration in the welfare or 
administrative state. However, the Constitution can be read to require a threefold 
division of branches and functions as a minimum requirement. This is plausible 
considering the Constitution’s express recognition of the administration and its role.306 
It is also not clear at what stage of the judicial process deference should be 
employed. Potentially it could be employed in the determination of what constitutes 
administrative action, in deciding the intensity of judicial scrutiny and in deciding 
whether and how to intervene with administrative action. This implies a wide role for 
deference as it would feature, perhaps decisively, in deciding whether section 33 
applies, how it applies, and whether and how it should be enforced. Deference could 
possibly also be employed at the same stages of legality enquiries. 
If a fourth branch of the state is introduced for purposes of state-power analysis 
and the control of that power, then deference is largely an aspect of the separation of 
powers. The fact that deference focuses on a particular relationship within the 
separation of powers, namely the relationship between the public administration, as 
part of the executive, and the judiciary, will be largely subsumed by the addition of a 
fourth branch. The fourth branch acknowledges that the public administration is 
distinguishable from the executive precisely because of its quotidian functions and 
nature. Because of the rise of the public administration’s mandate and impact it 
                                                
302 S 85(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
303 S 85(2). 
304 See 2 5 above on the reasoning behind a fourth branch, or multiple branches. 
305 See South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paras 
18-22. 
306 See s 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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requires more analysis than afforded in previous periods. Nevertheless, deference can 
still make a valuable contribution by providing actual guidance on how to determine 
the competencies of the branches of government and the legitimate scope of checks 
and balances. Then deference would serve to determine when courts may, and how 
courts should, intervene in administrative action. To be precise, deference would 
serve to determine when scrutiny is appropriate, the standard or manner of scrutiny 
and how the court should intervene with administrative action. 
If the threefold distinction of government branches and functions persists, then 
deference will have an even more valuable role to play. Under the threefold division, 
deference addresses the relationship between the public administration and the 
judiciary. Deference can play two roles: one, deference can draw attention to the 
importance of the public administration-judiciary relationship and, two, deference can 
serve as a gauge for when and how the judiciary should scrutinise administrative 
action and how it should intervene. Then it is a term that admits of the limits of the 
separation of powers, as presently understood in South Africa, and makes a 
contribution by providing guidance where the separation of powers is silent. For, 
although the separation of powers and checks and balances are concerned with the 
competencies of the branches of government, the separation of powers provides little 
guidance as to how competencies are determined, how they should be apportioned and 
how they should be balanced. This is where deference can contribute to the 
conceptual analysis of the relationship between the public administration and the 
judiciary. 
 
3 3 3 6 A Culture of Justification and Deference? 
 
Dyzenhaus’s central argument on deference is that courts must take administrative 
decisions seriously. 307  This amounts to a “new understanding of the deference 
principle”, namely, “deference as respect” as opposed to “deference as 
submission”. 308  What the serious consideration of administrative determinations 
entails requires elaboration. Firstly, Dyzenhaus argues that judges should give 
                                                
307 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303. 
308 302-303. 
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“independent weight” to the reasoning of administrative tribunals.309 Secondly, this 
“acknowledgement” of administrative determinations nevertheless requires “the close 
judicial scrutiny of the tribunal’s reasoning”, which Dyzenhaus describes as a 
“curious feature”. 310  Thirdly, such close consideration of administrative 
determinations raises the “paradox of rationality”, but close scrutiny and deference 
are compatible where deference is understood as respect, as opposed to submission.311 
Finally, deference as respect changes the “interpretive context”: rather than relying on 
a positivist understanding of the law, the meaning of a statute is determined by 
reference to the best reasons for having that statute.312 Determining the meaning of a 
statute in this manner is a “reconstructive project” and the reasons may be 
“legislative, administrative or judicial”.313 According to Dyzenhaus, this change in the 
“interpretive context” makes a significant difference to a court’s range of decisions.314 
In addition to the implications of deference as respect, Dyzenhaus describes the 
nature of his conception of deference as follows: 
 
                                                
309 302. 
310 302.  
311 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 302-303. This suggests that deference is 
not limited to determining the intensity of review, cf. Daly P A Theory of Deference in 
Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012) ch 4, nor does close scrutiny of the facts 
exclude deference. 
312 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303. 
313 303. 
314 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303-304. Taking administrative 
determinations seriously, in the sense advocated by Dyzenhaus, reinforces both red-light and 
green-light theories of administrative law. On the one hand, administrative acts are scrutinised 
closely and the administration is required to justify its acts. This can be characterised as a form of 
control. On the other hand, the administration, as the branch specialised in administrative matters, 
is entitled to justify its actions with reference to the reasons that best justify the decision, even of 
those reasons are administrative or other reasons. 
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“[d]eference as respect ... provides an ideal which can inform an attempt to rearticulate the 
relationship between the legislature, the courts and the administration in such a way that the 
courts retain a legitimate role as the ultimate authority on the interpretation of the law.”315 
 
Significantly, deference as respect emphasises the relationship between the 
branches of state.316  Therefore, Dyzenhaus does not merely try to identify the 
functional sphere of each branch317 and exceptions to that sphere.318 He goes further 
by pointing out that deference is concerned with the interaction between the branches; 
and it is argued that this interaction can be shaped by deference. Deference can inform 
the reshaping of the relationship, but does not necessarily constitute the reshaping 
itself. He also explains the rationale for this argument: factors such as the rule of law, 
equality and democracy affect the relationship and must inform the relationship.319 
Thus factors external but related to the separation of powers and checks and balances 
inform the relationship. This reinforces the argument in favour of evaluating the 
administration, as well as judicial review, as a component of an administrative-law 
system, rather than compartmentalising the branches and their functions as an end in 
itself. The wording in the preceding quotation, “can inform an attempt to rearticulate 
the relationship”, also suggests that the “attempt” is yet to be made and that the role of 
deference, at this stage at least, is relatively modest as an informing ideal. 
Thus, deference as respect is a guiding principle rather than a legal rule.320 As 
mentioned, deference “provides an ideal which can inform an attempt to rearticulate 
the relationship” between branches of state; deference is limited to the extent that the 
judiciary remains the “ultimate authority on the interpretation of the law”.321 The 
                                                
315 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303. 
316 Dyzenhaus argues that only deference as respect can “rearticulate the proper relationship 
between the legislature, administrative agencies and the courts” (“The Politics of Deference: 
Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 
279-307 at 286). 
317 On the basis of the separation of powers or legislative authorisation. 
318 In the form of checks and balances, for instance. 
319 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303-305. 
320 286. 
321 303. 
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status of the judiciary is thereby preserved, but the scope of legal argument is 
broadened. 
Therefore, attempts to describe deference as equating administrative and judicial 
conclusions of the law are incongruent with Dyzenhaus’s position. Likewise, 
arguments where courts are only required to cast a cursory glance over administrative 
determinations are also inconsistent with Dyzenhaus’s position. The emphasis is 
rather on the value of administrative arguments, instead of the author of the argument. 
It is the judicial approach to administrative decisions that is challenged: the emphasis 
is on which reasons are relevant and how courts should assess reasons, rather than the 
source of the reasons. The emphasis is on what constitutes valid legal argument, rather 
than treating the administration leniently. Dyzenhaus advocates an integrated 
approach where democracy, the rule of law and equality play a role in forming 
judicial decision-making. Thus, the emphasis is on how courts treat administrative 
arguments, rather than how courts treat the administration.  
Dyzenhaus does not claim that his exposition of deference as such can provide 
answers in particular cases, in the sense of the scope of reasonableness, for instance. 
Decisions must be “supportable”, not necessarily supported. 322  Where the 
administration is concerned, courts must determine whether a decision is “supportable 
by the reasons it [administrative tribunal] in fact and could in principle have 
offered”323 and “even if the reasons in fact given do not seem wholly adequate to 
support the decision, the court must first seek to supplement them before it seeks to 
subvert them.”324 Thus, where administrative decisions are before the court, the court 
goes the extra mile to determine whether the decisions are supportable or justifiable, 
but does not thereby evade close judicial scrutiny. 
                                                
322 304-305. 
323 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 305. Dyzenhaus reiterates this point: in the 
event of recourse to a court “that recourse must be on the basis of the question whether the 
tribunal’s decision was supportable by the reasons it in fact and could in principle have offered.” 
(305). See De Ville JR “Judicial Deference and Différance: Judicial Review and the Perfect Gift” 
(2006) 9 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 41-89 at 53 (“Asking whether a decision is 
justifiable is also different from asking whether a decision is justified.”). 
324 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 304 (emphasis added). 
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On the whole, Dyzenhaus makes a claim similar to the one made by Hoexter.325 
Hoexter also sees Dyzenhaus’s contribution in this light, referring to his “exploration 
of the idea of deference”.326 They both discuss in broad terms what deference should 
be and why, rather than what deference implies in a particular case. Nevertheless, in 
cases like Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism,327 deference is drawn upon in a manner that suggests Dyzenhaus and 
Hoexter formulated factors that are directly applicable to reasonableness review of 
administrative action. 
Whether the judiciary can simply take administrative determinations of the law 
seriously by choice from one day to the next is debatable. At least, it cannot be 
assumed that the judiciary have the capacity to effect such a change by the mere 
assumption of a new approach ceteris paribus. For instance, the French 
administrative-law system suggests that the legal assessment of the administration and 
administrative function requires both doctrinal and structural innovation.328 Simply 
obliging judges to take these determinations “seriously” will not necessarily solve the 
problem. How are judges without any required training in public administration, 
economics or political theory supposed to take these determinations seriously? Is it 
different from expecting a senior administrator to judge a complex legal case? In 
France, for example, the legal scrutiny of administrative matters requires specialised 
judges, rigorously trained in administration and also involved in administration, as we 
shall see in the next chapter. Taking administrative determinations seriously amounts 
to a change in legal culture, i.e. “a new imagination and self-reflection about legal 
method, analysis and reasoning”,329 potentially also on the institutional level. 
Dyzenhaus does not advocate taking the administrator’s word at face value; rather, 
administrative and other justifications require recognition as legally legitimate 
justifications for certain decisions. Administrative determinations form part of the 
context within which the legal validity of administrative decisions are assessed. This 
                                                
325 In her article, “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 
117 South African Law Journal 484-519. 
326 501 n 79 (emphasis added). 
327 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
328 See chs 4 and 5 below on the French administrative-law system and the contrat administratif, 
respectively. 
329 Klare K “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 146-188 at 156. 
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is the core of deference as respect, rather than avoiding engagement with 
administrative decisions. This approach does not point in one direction or the other 
when viewed in the abstract; this would be the case where the seniority of the 
administrator plays a role regardless of the facts of a particular case. 
Therefore, on the whole, both Dyzenhaus and Hoexter call for a developed theory 
of deference, but do not claim to have formulated it. Rather, they describe the nature 
of the deference they have in mind. This is significant in the South African context in 
particular because their discussions have been employed as final claims about 
deference. In addition, deference as respect should be understood in the light of 
Etienne Mureinik’s “culture of justification”. Dyzenhaus says that the “idea of a legal 
culture of justification ... is of crucial importance to [his] own work.” 330  He 
specifically acknowledges his debt to Mureinik.331 More particularly, Dyzenhaus’s 
“thesis depends on a theory which connects the value of equality with the rule of law 
through the idea of a legal culture of justification.”332 Considering the central role of 
the idea of a legal culture of justification, arguments suggesting that deference entails 
a superficial approach to the administration seem inaccurate. Dyzenhaus underlines 
the importance of deference as a democratic principle: 
                                                
330 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 279 n *; see De Ville JR “Judicial 
Deference and Différance: Judicial Review and the Perfect Gift” (2006) 9 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 41-89 at 41. 
331 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 279 n *, 302 n 62. 
332 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 302 (footnote omitted). Regarding his 
“thesis”, Dyzenhaus states:  
 
“In an era where agencies are going to face complex questions about the relationship between 
private and public power, and may increasingly differ among themselves about how to resolve 
such questions, judges will have to be alert to both the substance and the form of the rule of 
law. My thesis is that the substance of the rule of law is the equality of all citizens before the 
law and that the form of the rule of law is the procedures whereby public officials demonstrate 
that they have lived up to – are accountable to – that substance. 
It is an anti-positivist thesis in that it claims a distinct moral content to the rule of law. But 
it is also a democratic thesis, in that it requires that the content be developed through the 
institutions of government and not determined by abstract philosophising.” (307, footnote 
omitted). 
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“[deference as respect] adopts the assumption that what justifies all public power is the ability 
of its incumbents to offer adequate reasons for the decisions which affect those subject to them. 
The difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the democratic right of the latter to 
require an accounting for acts of public power. 
The legislature, the administration and the courts are then just strands in a web of public 
justification. The courts’ special role is as an ultimate enforcement mechanism for such 
justification. When administrative tribunals make decisions on points of law, those subject to 
the decision are entitled to require that the tribunal should offer reasons that in fact justify the 
decision. Should they not be satisfied, recourse to the courts should be available. But that 
recourse must be on the basis of the question whether the tribunal’s decision was supportable 
by the reasons it in fact and could in principle have offered.”333 
 
Allan also emphasises the role of a culture of justification as he argues against a 
doctrine of deference. It is surprising that he also refers to Dyzenhaus with approval. 
Allan’s central argument is not only that a freestanding doctrine of deference is 
undesirable, but virtually a theoretical impossibility.334 He assesses the cogency 
specifically of a freestanding, independent doctrine or theory, which determines the 
scope of review and can limit the judiciary’s control of the political branches 
regardless of the merits of the particular case. 
He is adamant that factors external to the case at hand, which delineate the 
functional spheres of the branches of state, are inherent to the judicial review 
process335 and so dependent on context that they have little, if any, meaning in the 
abstract. Citing Dyzenhaus, Allan argues that 
 
“[i]f the protection of individual rights is to be compatible with the exercise by public 
authorities of discretionary powers to act in furtherance of the general interest, there must be 
                                                
333 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 305. 
334 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 672, 675, 694. Allan certainly has critics, some of whom 
seem to qualify as detractors. For Allan’s response to his critics see “Judicial Deference and 
Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 96-117. 
Also see Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope 
(2012) 26-35. 
335 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 679-680, 694. 
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some division of competence between the legal and political branches of state. The courts must 
cede to Parliament and government an appropriate sphere of decision-making autonomy, 
protected from judicial interference. The boundaries of that sphere of autonomy, however, 
cannot be settled independently of all the circumstances of the particular case; for only the 
facts of the particular case can reveal the extent to which any individual right is implicated and 
the degree to which relevant public interests may justify the right’s curtailment or qualification. 
The balance of judgment, as between judicial opinion and that of the legislature or public 
officials, will depend on the range of discretion applicable in all the circumstances: judges 
should “defer” to the conclusions of other persons only to the extent that the reasons offered in 
support of those conclusions prove persuasive. There is, then, no means of defining the scope 
of judicial powers, or prescribing the limits of official discretion, as regards the details of any 
particular case, without examination of the specific legal issues arising in all the 
circumstances.”336 
 
Thus, Allan recognises a sphere of administrative autonomy.337 He also recognises 
                                                
336 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 676 (footnote omitted). 
337 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 673. In order to argue that administrative autonomy has been 
infringed upon by the judiciary, one would have to determine the content and scope of the 
administrative function. The administration has a constitutional mandate to perform an 
administrative function; therefore, the independence of the administration, in terms of the 
separation of powers, is limited to the performance of that function. Likewise, the judiciary is 
constrained by the separation of powers, as well as checks and balances, to remain separate, both 
institutionally and functionally, from the legislature and executive. In other words, the separation 
of powers protects the independence of the branches so far as their relative functions are 
concerned. The legislative function is protected from executive or judicial interference. Although 
the content of a particular function itself and the boundaries between the functions are difficult to 
determine, a branch is shielded from undue interference with its own function. When the 
administration strays into the executive sphere by formulating policy, for instance, the 
administration cannot rely even on its demonstrated expertise or its actually reasonable assessment 
of the information before it. Here, expertise in the administrative function itself is all that is 
relevant. Where the administration employs experts, such as economists or actuarial scientists, the 
administration does not thereby become an expert in economics or actuarial science, nor are those 
functions necessarily part of the administrative function. Though their findings may play a critical 
role, the administrative function relates to how that information is utilised in order to realise policy 
and implement legislation. Thus deference is only due to the administration in relation to the 
administrative function. See Anthony RA “Which Agency Interpretations Should get Judicial 
Deference? – A Preliminary Inquiry” (1988) 49 Administrative Law Review 121-137 (“This study 
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that factors, such as the relative expertise of the decision-maker, are relevant in the 
determination of constitutional boundaries. However, such factors only have meaning 
in relation to the particular facts of a case.338  
It is interesting to note that Allan consistently refers to Dyzenhaus with 
approval,339 since Dyzenhaus is generally referenced as an advocate340 of deference 
and Allan an opponent341 of deference. Notably, Allan limits his critique to “an 
independent theory or doctrine of deference”,342 even though this does not necessarily 
explain Allan’s reliance on Dyzenhaus. Allan’s endorsement of Dyzenhaus’s position, 
and by implication deference as respect, supports the reading of Dyzenhaus set out 
above. Thus, Dyzenhaus and Allan’s positions are not necessarily opposed and can be 
read as complementary. 
Furthermore, Allan indicates that his critics do not seem to disagree with his 
contention that these factors are dependent on context.343 However, even if they are 
assessed in isolation from the facts, Allan contends that the judiciary would be 
compromising its independence, impartiality, neutrality and objectivity.344 Where 
deference is employed as a separate enquiry, independently of the facts,345 “[t]he 
                                                                                                                                       
considers the extent to which ... various forms of agency interpretive expression should be 
“accorded” deference by the courts that review them.” (121, emphasis added)). 
338 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 690. 
339 See, for instance, Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due 
Deference’” (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 676 n 16, 694 n 69; “Deference, 
Defiance, and Doctrine: Defining the Limits of Judicial Review” (2010) 60 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 41-59 at 47, 54, 57. 
340 See, for instance, Taggart M “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” (2008) New Zealand 
Law Review 423-482 at 455. 
341 See, for instance, De Ville JR “Judicial Deference and Différance: Judicial Review and the 
Perfect Gift” (2006) 9 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 41-89 at 41. 
342 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 672 (emphasis in original). 
343 Allan TRS “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 
127 Law Quarterly Review 96-117 at 3 n 15. 
344 116. 
345 The so-called “two-stage analysis”, Allan TRS “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal 
Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 96-117 at 108. 
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effect is precisely the same as the application of a doctrine of non-justiciability”.346 
Allan’s position can be read as largely congruent with the South African position 
in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.347 
O’Regan J makes it clear that institutional considerations cannot be decisive:348  
 
“Section 2 of the Act requires the decision-maker to have regard to349 a range of factors which 
are to some extent in tension. It is clear from this that Parliament intended to confer a 
discretion upon the relevant decision-maker to make a decision in the light of all the relevant 
factors. That decision must strike a reasonable equilibrium between the different factors but the 
factors themselves are not determinative of any particular equilibrium. Which equilibrium is 
the best in the circumstances is left to the decision-maker. The court’s task is merely to 
determine whether the decision made is one which achieves a reasonable equilibrium in the 
circumstances.”350 
 
In the final analysis, Allan’s rejection of factors operating in isolation from the 
facts, such as those identified by Hunt that include the decision-maker’s “relative 
                                                
346 Allan TRS “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 
127 Law Quarterly Review 96-117 at 108. 
347 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) paras 48-54. 
348 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 48:  
 
“A court should ... give due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with 
special expertise and experience in the field. The extent to which a court should give weight to 
these considerations will depend upon the character of the decision itself, as well as on the 
identity of the decision-maker. A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a 
range of competing interests or considerations and which is to be taken by a person or 
institution with specific expertise in that area must be shown respect by the courts. Often a 
power will identify a goal to be achieved, but will not dictate which route should be followed 
to achieve that goal. In such circumstances a court should pay due respect to the route selected 
by the decision-maker. This does not mean however that where the decision is one which will 
not reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on 
the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that 
decision. A court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the 
complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker.”  
349 Emphasis in original. 
350 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 49 (emphasis added). 
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expertise” and democratic accountability,351 is in line with Dyzenhaus’s plea to take 
administrative determinations seriously and to justify incidences of public power 
through justification; Allan’s position is also congruent with a culture of 
justification.352 
 
3 3 4 The Public/Private-Law Distinction 
 
When a court presides over a case to which the public administration is party, 
either public law or private law could apply.353 This in itself is significant because the 
same scenario could be assessed in terms of one of two different sets of rules 
depending on the judge’s classification of the dispute: 
 
“Disputes flowing from state commercial activity are hence treated by courts as either a matter 
of administrative law or of contract. The classification of the action under scrutiny 
consequently becomes all-important.”354  
 
In addition, when administrative agencies act they may themselves have to decide 
which rules are applicable to the action in determining how to proceed. Their 
understanding of the distinction between public and private law will have an effect on 
which rules they believe are applicable. Thus, the public/private-law distinction 
impacts on the relationship between the judiciary and the public administration by 
determining which legal rules apply in a particular case, how to make the choice 
between the two basic sets of rules and by potentially affecting the behaviour of the 
public administration. The distinction is linked to the constitutional mandates of the 
judiciary and public administration because the distinction determines whether public 
or administrative-law rules apply or not. The distinction may also have an effect on 
deference. For instance, where it has been decided that the nature of state conduct is 
                                                
351 Allan TRS “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’” (2006) 65 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695 at 687. 
352 694. 
353 See Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) chapter 3. On the value 
of the distinction between public-law and private-law regulation, without resorting to a dogmatic 
approach, see Woolf H “Public Law - Private Law: Why the Divide? A Personal View” (1986) 
Public Law 220-238. 
354 Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 128. 
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private in a contractual issue involving an organ of state, the implication is often that 
the contract was concluded on a platform of equality and that the administrative 
agency did not act with state power or from a position of authority.355 Since deference 
flows from the separation of powers one could argue that deference would not apply 
in such a case, even though the administration is a party acting with expertise. 
Traditionally, administrative law and constitutional law are classified as 
subcategories of public law.356 More specifically, administrative law is that branch of 
public law that governs the legal relationships of state authorities, whether with 
private subjects or other state authorities.357 The other grand category is private law, 
which governs the relationships between private subjects. However, the activities of 
public authorities are not always categorised as of a public nature, nor are the 
activities of private subjects always of a private nature. Therefore, the question of 
what characterises law or conduct as public or private requires elaboration and the 
exercise of distinguishing between public and private activities for the purposes of 
either applying public or private law is of critical importance. This involves two 
inquiries: what characterises public and private law, respectively, and how does one 
determine which branch applies in a particular case.   
Attempts to distinguish between public law and private law date from the Roman 
Empire, at least.358 Over the centuries various standards have been formulated to 
distinguish between the two types of law, but their boundaries have remained 
nebulous. The function, usefulness and desirability of the distinction have also been 
subjected to regular scrutiny. 
The simplest distinguishing factor is the identity of the parties:359 where the state is 
party to a legal relationship, public law applies and if not, private law applies. Public 
and private law are also distinguished according to the primary concern of each 
branch of law:360 public law is primarily concerned with the public interest, whereas 
                                                
355 See Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 
1013 (SCA) para 18; Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 139-140. 
356 Hahlo HR & Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 117. 
357 Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) 2. See Hahlo HR & Kahn E The South African Legal 
System and its Background (1968) 118. 
358 Hahlo HR & Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 115 (“The 
dichotomy, public and private law … is found in the Digesta of Justinian”). 
359 Hahlo HR & Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 116. 
360 116. 
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private law is primarily concerned with private interests. Another traditional 
distinction hinges on the presence or absence of governmental authority: 
 
“[P]ublic law relates to the distribution and exercise of governmental authority. Whereas 
private law governs the legal relations between subjects, being on an equal footing, public law 
governs the relations of governmental bodies among themselves or with subjects in a 
relationship of subordination.”361  
 
In these terms, whereas private law regulates equal and voluntary relationships, 
public law regulates unequal and authoritative relationships.362 The inequality of the 
public law relationship is defined by the presence of state authority.363 
Even though under the traditional distinctions the expansion of public law has been 
acknowledged,364 they have not proven to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
expansion conceptually. Possibly, the traditional distinctions overemphasise the 
significance of an organ of state’s presence, even where the criterion is the presence 
of state authority. Two questions on the nature of public power illustrate the 
incapacity of traditional criteria to fully address the distinction between public and 
private law: one, “whether action taken by a public entity in a contractual or other 
seemingly private-law setting is an exercise of private or public power” and, two, 
“whether and when private entities are capable of exercising public powers or 
performing public functions.” 365  Therefore, “it is more accurate to regard 
administrative law as regulating the activities of bodies that exercise public powers or 
perform public functions, irrespective of whether those bodies are public authorities in 
a strict sense.”366 Thus, the emphasis is on the nature of the power that is exercised or 
the nature of the function that is performed, rather than on the actor.367 
This criterion encompasses the implications for the public/private-law distinction 
that were brought about by the expansion of the welfare state, privatisation and 
                                                
361 116-117 (footnotes omitted). 
362 Wiechers M Administratiefreg (1973) 3. 
363 Wiechers M Administratiefreg (1973) 3 (“[D]ie aanwesigheid van owerheidsgesag”). 
364 Hahlo HR & Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 117. 
365 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 185. 
366 2. 
367 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 1 SA 1 
(CC) paras 141, 143. See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 185-193. 
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outsourcing. Nevertheless, the more modern criterion merely poses a better question 
by focusing on the relevant issues, namely public power and public function. The 
inquiries “what characterises public law and private law” and “how does one 
determine which branch applies in a particular case” remain unresolved. But, from the 
administrative-law perspective, unlike under the traditional criteria, the answer is now 
the product of the question “what makes a power or function public”.368  
In Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC369 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine the nature of a power exercised in a 
contractual context, which has traditionally been regarded as a strictly private-law 
issue. The legal question was whether the cancellation of a contract by the appellant, 
an “organ of state” in terms of section 239 of the Constitution, amounted to 
administrative action.370 This question hinged on the inquiry of what the nature of that 
power was.371 Streicher JA found that the cancellation of the contract was not 
administrative action and that, consequently, the respondents were not entitled to the 
benefits of natural justice.372 
In determining whether the cancellation of the contract amounted to the exercise of 
public power, Streicher JA reasoned as follows.373 With reference to President of the 
Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union,374 he recognised that 
“[o]ther considerations which may be relevant” to the determination of whether 
conduct is administrative action “are the source of the power, the subject matter, 
whether it involves the exercise of a public duty and how closely related it is to the 
implementation of legislation”.375 Streicher JA found that the appellant obtained the 
power to cancel the contract from the terms of the contract and from common law, 
even though the appellant is a statutory public authority that was enabled by statute to 
                                                
368 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 3-5. 
369 2001 3 SA 1013 (SCA). 
370 Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 1013 
(SCA) paras 1-2. 
371 Para 17. 
372 Para 22. 
373 See Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 
1013 (SCA) paras 17-22. 
374 2000 1 SA 1 (CC). 
375 Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 1013 
(SCA) para 17. See the minority judgment of Langa CJ in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 
(CC) para 186. 
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enter into the contract.376 Thus the identity of the contracting party and the original 
source of the power are not decisive in determining whether administrative or private 
law applies. Streicher JA indicates that the terms of the contract were determined by 
the parties and not dictated by statute and that these terms were negotiated and agreed 
to on a platform of equality between the contracting parties.377 The appellant did not 
act, in deciding the terms of the contract or in cancelling the contract, from a position 
of superiority as a result of its status as a public authority.378 Furthermore, “[w]hen 
[the appellant] purported to cancel the contract, it was not performing a public duty or 
implementing legislation; it was purporting to exercise a contractual right founded on 
the consensus of the parties, in respect of a commercial contract.”379 Streicher JA then 
concludes that “[i]n all these circumstances it cannot be said that the appellant was 
exercising a public power.”380 Thus, Streicher JA considers the identity of the actor, 
the source of the power, the relationship between the contracting parties, whether the 
public authority acts from a position of superiority and what the public authority 
purported to do in determining whether the appellant exercised public or private 
power.  
Streicher JA emphasises the fact that the appellant “purported” to cancel the 
contract on the ground of material breach in terms of contract law.381 The relevance of 
what the appellant professes to have done, as a factor in determining whether 
administrative law or private law applies, is questionable. Why should the appellant’s 
possible misunderstanding of the nature of the power he is exercising influence the 
branch of law that applies? 
In the minority judgment of Chirwa v Transnet Ltd,382 Langa CJ states that the 
main issue at stake “is whether the applicant’s dismissal constitutes administrative 
action in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act”.383 To this end Langa 
                                                
376 Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 1013 
(SCA) para 18. 
377 Para 18. 
378 Para 18. 
379 Para 18. 
380 Para 18. 
381 See Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services Western Cape CC 2001 3 SA 
1013 (SCA) paras 18, 20. 
382 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) paras 154-196. 
383 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 154. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 129  
CJ considers whether the decision to dismiss “amounted to an exercise of public 
power or the performance of a public function.”384 Concerning the characterisation of 
a power or function as public, Langa CJ says the following: 
 
“Determining whether a power or function is “public” is a notoriously difficult exercise. There 
is no simple definition or clear test to be applied. Instead, it is a question that has to be 
answered with regard to all the relevant factors including: (a) the relationship of coercion or 
power that the actor has in its capacity as a public institution; (b) the impact of the decision on 
the public; (c) the source of the power; and (d) whether there is a need for the decision to be 
exercised in the public interest. None of these factors will necessarily be determinative; 
instead, a court must exercise its discretion considering their relative weight in the context.”385 
 
In Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 386  the Supreme Court of Appeal 
subsequently qualified the import of Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection 
Services Western Cape CC; 387 the court also overruled the majority finding of 
Mustapha v Receiver, Lichtenburgh.388 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Thabiso Chemicals (Pty) Ltd,389 
the respondent (“Thabiso”) claimed damages from the appellant (“the Government”) 
for the alleged wrongful cancellation of a contract between them.390 The case was 
decided in favour of the Government on the basis of the terms of the contract only: the 
audi alteram partem rule and other administrative law principles were found not to be 
applicable to the dispute.391 As authority for this contention Brand JA cites392 Cape 
Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services CC 393  and Steenkamp NO v 
                                                
384 Para 181. 
385 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) para 186. See Quinot G State Commercial 
Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) chapter 3 where all the determinative factors of the 
public/private-law distinction are analysed. 
386 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) paras 9-10. 
387 2001 3 SA 1013 (SCA). 
388 1958 3 SA 343 (A). See Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 68-
71. 
389 2009 1 SA 163 (SCA). 
390 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Thabiso Chemicals 2009 1 SA 163 (SCA) para 1. 
391 Para 18. 
392 Para 18. 
393 2001 3 SA 1013 (SCA) para 18. 
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Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape.394 Brand JA explains that the statutory 
source of the cancellation was merely a term of the contract: 
 
“The fact that the Tender Board relied on authority derived from a statutory provision (ie s 4(1) 
(eA) of the State Tender Board Act) to cancel the contract on behalf of the Government, does 
not detract from this principle. Nor does the fact that the grounds of cancellation on which the 
Tender Board relied were, inter alia, reflected in a regulation. All that happened, in my view, is 
that the provisions of the Regulations – like the provisions of ST36 – became part of the 
contract through incorporation by reference.”395 
 
Quinot points out, however, that despite Brand JA’s reliance on Cape Metropolitan 
Council v Metro Inspection Services CC396 as authority for the application of private 
law, Streicher JA’s comment that had the appellant cancelled the contract in terms of 
the regulations it would have been exercising a public power is inconsistent with 
Brand JA’s finding.397 
This brief survey of South African case law illustrates the significance of the 
public/private-law divide and the far-reaching implications the choice of either public 
law or private law has. Thus, the public/private-law divide informs the administrative-
law relationship: the divide determines which branch of law applies; the 
administration might prefer one legal route over another in relation to the same 
decision simply to avoid public-law scrutiny; and legal argument focuses on whether 
public or private law applies rather than on the nature and substance of the dispute 
itself. 
Finally, although the South African courts have identified guiding factors, a 
complete definition of public power or public function remains elusive. This is not 
surprising as the scope and nature of the adjective “public” is dynamic; there are also 
theoretical short-comings in the current “classification approach” to state commercial 
                                                
394 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) paras 11, 12. 
395 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Thabiso Chemicals 2009 1 SA 163 (SCA) para 
18. Quinot contends that Brand JA “diminished the role of source as classification criterion” (see 
Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 77).  
396 2001 3 SA 1013 (SCA) para 18. 
397 Quinot G “Public Procurement” (2008) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review of South African Law para 
2.1. 
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activity: 398  the approach is indeterminate and inconsistent with the project of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
 
3 3 5 Democracy and the Counter-majoritarian Dilemma 
 
The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines “democracy”, firstly, as 
“government by the whole population, [usually] through elected representatives” and, 
secondly, as a “classless and tolerant society”. 399  One of the functions of the 
Constitution is to “[l]ay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by 
law”.400 This suggests that democracy is not limited to majoritarianism. Due to the 
enormous populations of most nations direct democracy is no longer viable and, 
therefore, the election of representatives embodies the idea of government by the 
people. Alan Bullock identifies the following criteria of representative democracy: 
one, “whether ... elections are free”; two, “whether such elections provide an effective 
choice”; and, three, “whether the elected body of representatives ... has the right of 
legislation, the right to vote taxes and control the budget ... and the right to publicly 
question, discuss, criticize and oppose government measures without being subject to 
threats of interference or arrest.”401 
Judicial review of administrative action is sometimes accused of infringing upon 
democratic principles, especially in the context of socio-economic rights litigation.402 
The charge is that judges are not appointed democratically and that the judiciary is 
elitist, i.e. that judicial review undermines the core elements of representative 
democracy.403 Where the judiciary is required to adjudicate upon politically loaded 
issues, which typically fall within the competence of the executive, these 
                                                
398 Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 128-132. 
399 Thompson DF (ed) The Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) 227. 
400 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
401 Bullock A & Trombley S (eds) The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (2000, 3rd ed) 
208-209. 
402 See Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 63. 
403 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 30. 
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characteristics give rise to the so-called “counter-majoritarian dilemma”.404 When 
reviewing administrative action relating to socio-economic rights courts can 
potentially direct the implementation of policy or legislation by the public 
administration, which, it is argued, is beyond judicial competence.405 In such a case, 
the courts are said to lack democratic legitimacy.406  
However, Bullock points out that “[d]emocracy is based on a belief in the value of 
the individual human being, and a further criterion is therefore the extent to which 
certain basic rights are guaranteed ... to every citizen.”407 The Constitution reinforces 
a balance between “the rule of the many” and the protection of every citizen’s human 
rights. The founding provision of the Constitution, section 1, puts this forcefully:  
 
“The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on the following 
values:  
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms ...  
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.  
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters role, regular elections and a multi-party 
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.”408 
 
Clearly, human dignity and representative democracy have been placed on an equal 
footing as foundational to the sovereign democratic state of the Republic of South 
Africa. The acknowledgement of the co-ordinate status of human dignity and 
democracy clarifies the counter-majoritarian dilemma and the lack of democratic 
legitimacy: in terms of the South African democratic standard, the protection of 
human rights, including the right to administrative justice,409 by the courts, cannot be 
illegitimate in itself, unless the courts act beyond their competence. As a corollary to 
the criterion of human rights protection, “democracy is held to require the 
                                                
404 30, 30 n 70. 
405 30. 
406 30. 
407 Bullock A & Trombley S (eds) The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (2000, 3rd ed) 
209. 
408 Emphasis added. 
409 S 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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establishment of an independent judiciary and courts to which everyone can have 
access.”410 Under the Constitution, there may be no absolute majority rule:411 
 
“South Africa’s Constitution embodies a conception of democracy that goes well beyond 
representation, elections, and majority.”412  
 
Such an understanding of democracy has far-reaching implications for the roles of 
the judiciary and the public administration and their interaction. It also has 
implications for arguments based on the principle of democracy. All branches of the 
state have a democratic role to play and are legitimised by democratic principles.413 
Democracy affects constitutional mandates, the content of the separation of powers 
and checks and balances, deference, the public/private distinction and co-operative 
government.  
  
3 3 6 Co-operative Government 
 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution sets out the principles of co-operative government 
and intergovernmental relations. These principles apply to all spheres of government 
and the organs of state within each sphere.414 Co-operative government is relevant to 
the analysis of the legal relationship between the public administration and the 
judiciary because it “must influence the interpretation of the constitutional provisions 
conferring power on the various spheres of government.”415 This has implications for 
                                                
410 Bullock A & Trombley S (eds) The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (2000, 3rd ed) 
209. 
411 See Lenta P “Judicial Deference and Rights” (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 456-
467 at 459. 
412 Klare K “Legal Subsidiarity & Constitutional Rights: A Reply to André van der Walt” (2008) 1 
Constitutional Court Review 129-154. 
413 On the role of the separation of powers in protecting human rights without compromising 
democratic values, see Neuborne B “Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the 
United States” (1982) 57 New York University Law Review 363-442. 
414 S 41(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
415 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 121. 
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understanding the doctrine of separation of powers,416 checks and balances, the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma and deference. 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution establishes a co-operative form of federalism, instead 
of competitive federalism.417 Co-operative government implies that, as opposed to the 
allocation of exclusive legislative and executive responsibilities, spheres of 
government share responsibilities:418 
 
“All spheres of government, be they national, provincial or local, must co-operate vertically 
and horizontally.”419 
 
Without the proper and harmonious functioning of the organs of state within each 
sphere it will be virtually impossible for different spheres to co-operate. The Bill of 
Rights applies to all organs of state,420 the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land421 and the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld by the courts.422 Therefore 
courts play a pivotal role in co-operative government, even though the courts are not 
“generally thought to be engaged by [the] principles of co-operative government.”423 
So, 
 
                                                
416 See Bushbuck Ridge Border Committee v Government of the Northern Province 1999 2 193 
(T); Woolman S & Roux T “Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations” in 
Woolman S, Roux T, & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, RS, July 
2009) 14-15. 
417  Woolman S & Roux T “Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations” in 
Woolman S, Roux T, & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, RS, July 
2009) 14-1; Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume 
One Constitutional Law (2002) 119. 
418 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 119. 
419  Woolman S & Roux T “Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations” in 
Woolman S, Roux T, & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, RS, July 
2009) 14-7. 
420 S 8(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
421 S 2. 
422 S 165(2). 
423  Woolman S & Roux T “Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations” in 
Woolman S, Roux T, & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, RS, July 
2009) 14-15. 
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“[w]hile the different spheres of government have distinct responsibilities, they must work 
together in order for the South African government as a whole to fulfill its constitutional 
mandate.”424 
 
Thus, in order for co-operative federalism to function the spheres of government 
and the organs of state within each sphere must work together and co-operate.425 Co-
operative government reinforces the idea that all the branches of state have a common 
agenda, even though they have different functions and keep each other in check.426 
This influences the interpretation and adjudication of disputes involving the public 
administration.427 It should also influence the administration’s interpretation of its 
mandates. The thought of the fulfilment of the South African constitutional mandate 
without the participation of the courts, in terms of co-operative government, cannot be 
entertained. 
 
3 4 Conclusion 
 
The development and origins of South African administrative law illustrate the 
significant and lasting impact of the English doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty 
and rule of law. The force of the Diceyan influence meant that administrative law had 
a late start and developed slowly in South Africa. Administrative law was also 
                                                
424  Woolman S & Roux T “Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations” in 
Woolman S, Roux T, & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, RS, July 
2009) 14-9. 
425 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume One 
Constitutional Law (2002) 123. 
426 See s 41 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
427 S 41(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 reads,  
 
“[a]n organ of state involved in an inter-governmental dispute must make every reasonable 
effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, 
and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute.” 
 
From the judiciary’s perspective this provision can be likened to s 7(2) of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, which provides that internal procedures must be exhausted 
before the courts may hear an application for judicial review. Thus, in both instances the courts 
remain uninvolved, at least initially, until other processes have been followed. This affects the way 
in which courts approach disputes related to the administration. 
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virtually synonymous with judicial review, and to a significant extent still is. 
Consequently, administrative law has laboured under negative associations of judicial 
control of and interference with the public administration, lack of democratic 
legitimacy and a mistrust of the public administration. This was exacerbated by the 
over-exuberant delineation of administrative action and employment of review during 
apartheid to compensate for the absence of a bill of rights. Therefore, the present 
administrative-law system in South Africa, which is characterised by red-light theory, 
should not be seen as an automatic response to the challenges raised by the rise of the 
welfare state, privatisation, outsourcing and socio-economic rights litigation, but as 
the product of the superimposition of the Diceyan ideology on a unique context and 
history. Thus, in the final analysis, the South African administrative-law system can 
be characterised by the prominence of judicial review, as illustrated by PAJA,428 and 
by the emphasis on the rule of law. 
The legal relationship between the judiciary and the public administration was 
discussed by means of six elements in order to identify the factors that inform and 
define this relationship. Firstly, the courts and public administration are subject to 
specific constitutional mandates. The courts play an integral role in South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy as guardians of the Constitution while the public 
administration is given the primary responsibility of realising the Constitution’s 
promise of socio-economic transformation. Secondly, the separation of powers and 
checks and balances are entrenched in the Constitution, defining the allocation of 
functions and the manner in terms of which the public administration and the judiciary 
may interact. Furthermore, the separation of powers is justiciable. Nevertheless, it has 
not been defined in the Constitution and there is potential for the development of this 
doctrine and the expansion of its application. Thirdly, the idea of deference has 
become an important topic of debate since Hoexter’s article, “The Future of Judicial 
Review in South African Administrative Law”,429 which established the concept as a 
guiding principle for judicial intervention and non-intervention. Although the 
meaning of deference and its role are unclear, it has been endorsed and applied by the 
Constitutional Court. The relationship between deference and the doctrine of 
                                                
428 See Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 
117 South African Law Journal 484-519. 
429 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519. 
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separation of powers and checks and balances is also unclear. The South African 
courts seem to have equated the pure separation of powers and deference. In addition, 
whether three or four branches of government are recognized for the purposes of 
separation-of-powers analysis will have implications for the role deference plays. 
Importantly, at present deference enjoys a very wide application in judicial review. 
Deference has been employed to determine whether judicial review is appropriate, 
what the standard of scrutiny to be applied by courts should be and how to intervene 
with the public administration’s decisions. This is in line with the elements of 
deference Hoexter identified: variability, the scope of “administrative action”, and 
reasonableness review. However, deference is challenged from many angles. Even the 
existence of the enterprise itself is criticised. Therefore, a comprehensive and critical 
evaluation of the origins and development of deference, both in South Africa and 
abroad, is required in the light of the constitutional principles and context of South 
Africa. Also, a theory of deference can only proceed from a choice in political theory 
that identifies, inter alia, the constitutional role of the administration and the 
judiciary. This exercise is necessary before deference is accepted and incorporated 
further into South African law at face value.   
Fourthly, the expansion of the welfare or administrative state, of outsourcing and 
of privatization has undermined the traditional criteria for distinguishing public law 
and private law. The distinction between public and private law is now best 
understood as hinging on the nature of the power that is exercised or the nature of the 
function that is performed. This development has important implications for analysing 
state administration and particular administrative practices such as public contracting 
because the identity of the actors is no longer decisive. Also, the law of contract, 
which is traditionally situated in the private-law domain, has to be reconceptualised to 
accommodate its changing role as a method of public administration. The distinction 
between public and private law is essential in this regard.  
Fifthly, democracy is a founding value of the Constitution. Therefore, judicial 
review has been criticised as undemocratic where the courts adjudicate over socio-
economic rights cases and “direct” the allocation of state resources. However, even if 
it is assumed that democracy is not also based on the value of the individual citizen, 
another founding value, human dignity, balances the lack of democratic legitimacy 
that may arise in such cases.  
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Finally, chapter 3 of the Constitution sets out the principles of co-operative 
government and intergovernmental relations. These principles aim to co-ordinate the 
spheres of government and the organs of state within each sphere in order to achieve 
the mandates imposed by the Constitution. These principles also oblige the courts to 
allow organs of state to resolve inter-governmental disputes internally before hearing 
these disputes. The courts must take the principles of co-operative government into 
consideration for the purposes of interpretation, they must allow for political solutions 
and they can play a valuable role in promoting the principles of co-operative 
government by clarifying constitutional mandates and constitutionally appropriate 
avenues for pursuing them.  
In chapter two the nature of the separation of powers was discussed. Arguments in 
favour of incorporating the administration and administrative function into separation-
of-powers analysis were also presented. In this chapter the characteristics of the South 
African administrative-law system were identified on the foundation of the concepts 
formulated in the previous chapter. The elements that characterise the legal 
relationship between the administration and the judiciary were discussed, with 
particular emphasis on the deference debate. On the whole the South African 
administrative-law system is characterised by red-light theory, with judicial review 
the central topic. Calls for an integrated administrative law and a suitable role for 
judicial review have been made by, for instance, Hoexter. This has been adopted by 
the courts and applied as a settled matter in the form of a rhetoric of deference. 
However, the content of the rhetoric of deference amounts to the pure separation of 
powers. This leaves various questions concerning the content of administrative 
justice, the content and nature of deference, the appropriate role of administrative law 
and judicial review within the administrative-law system, and the nature of the 
relationship between the administration and the judiciary unaddressed. 
In chapter four a different approach to the legal relationship between the 
administration and the judiciary is explored, namely, the French administrative-law 
system. Can the debate be conducted in terms beyond the pure separation of powers, 
judicial review or deference? The French system is renowned for its alternative 
interpretation of the separation of powers430 and its administrative courts as well as 
                                                
430 See, for instance, in the English legal literature, Schwartz B “A Common Lawyer looks at the 
Droit Administratif” (1951) 29 The Canadian Bar Review 121-138 at 126; Bermann GA “The 
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the recognition of administrative law as a distinct branch.431 How is the existence of 
this alternative system explained and justified? This is the central question of the 
following chapter, chapter four. The response to this question can be described as a 
variety of constitutional principles and explanations. In chapter five, however, the 
French system is assessed on the doctrinal level by considering the French 
administrative contract. 
                                                                                                                                       
Scope of Judicial Review in French Administrative Law” (1977) 16 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 195-254 at 197; Cummins RJ “The General Principles of Law, Separation of 
Powers and Theories of Judicial Decision in France” (1986) 35 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 594-628 at 598; Merryman JH “The French Deviation” (1996) 44 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 109-119 at 118; and in the French literature, Bénoit F-P “Les 
Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. Le Juge et le 
Droit Public II (1974) 283-295 at 283; Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice 
Administrative et Séparation des Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-783 at 770; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712. See also 
Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of 
Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 12. 
431 See Blanco, TC 8 February 1873. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The French Administrative-Law System 
 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
French administrative law has been referred to for comparative purposes since the 
first academic publications dedicated to administrative law in South Africa.1 More 
recent contributions also mention the French example as a classic alternative, but, 
along with the earlier works, are limited to cursory discussions.2 These discussions are 
regarded as the point of departure for this chapter and they are not revisited. Instead, 
the explanations and principles that describe and justify the legal relationship between 
the administration and the administrative jurisdiction in France are identified. For the 
purposes of this dissertation those elements that have led to the existence and 
maintenance of an independent administrative jurisdiction, within the administration 
itself, are pertinent. Therefore, the discussion is largely historical,3 more so than the 
chapter on the South African administrative-law system. 
Four characteristics of the French administrative-law system are particularly 
significant in relation to common-law jurisdictions. Firstly, the French administrative 
jurisdiction is a court separate from the judiciary and not merely a specialised court 
within the judicial branch. This is the so-called French “duality of jurisdiction”. 
Secondly, the administrative jurisdiction is part of the administration and not of the 
judiciary. Thirdly, the Conseil d’État, the supreme administrative jurisdiction, has a 
dual function as both adviser and judge of the administration. Finally, the 
administrative jurisdiction is independent, despite falling within the administration. 
These characteristics define the relationship between the administration and the 
administrative jurisdiction in France and distinguish the French administrative-law 
system from the South African system. Therefore, the questions “how did the French 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Wiechers M Administratiefreg (1973) 21-25. 
2 See, for instance, Bolton P The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 16 n 16; 
Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 259-261. 
3  Although there is some debate, set out below, on which principles justify the French 
administrative-law system, they were all formulated before the twentieth century and have 
remained since. 
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administrative-law system develop as it did, culminating in these particular 
characteristics”, and “why did this system endure” are explored in the historical 
discussion that follows. The inquiry can be reduced to one theme, namely, the 
explanation for the development and existence of an independent administrative 
jurisdiction within the administration. 
The development of the French administrative-law system dates from the Middle 
Ages. The long historical period under discussion warrants an overview of the main 
events. The significance of these events varies according to the different principles or 
explanations that rationalise the administrative-law system in question. 
The “traditional explanation” relies on the so-called “French interpretation” of the 
separation of powers. In terms of the French interpretation the 1789 Revolution is the 
foundation of the French system. In particular, the Law of 16-24 August 1790, which 
declared the principle of the separation of authorities, is the founding act of the 
administrative jurisdiction, thereby separating administrative and ordinary courts. 
This interpretation has received constitutional recognition in France and is the 
explanation most often proffered for the existence of the French system. The influence 
of this interpretation is illustrated by the prevalence of this explanation in English 
literature on French administrative law. 
However, leading administrative law theorists, such as Sandevoir, Troper, 
Chevallier and Velley challenge the accuracy of the French interpretation on 
numerous grounds. These critiques are discussed in some detail in order to give an 
overview of the different views on the significance of the 1789 Revolution and the 
Law of 16-24 August 1790. 
Other explanations for the French administrative-law system, though less well 
known than the French interpretation, are also authoritative in French academic 
literature. These explanations are the early origins of a duality of jurisdiction due to a 
simple division of labour; the principle “to judge the administration is also 
administering”; and the principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction 
and the active administration. Each explanation is discussed towards providing an 
overview of the theories that rationalises the existence of an independent 
administrative-law system. The purpose of this chapter is not to identify the correct or 
more persuasive explanation, in the event that this is possible. Rather, the 
explanations and principles that characterise and rationalise the legal relationship 
between the administration and the administrative jurisdiction, along with any critique 
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of these, are simply identified. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess the 
value of each explanation and principle within the French context. Finally, the 
institutional product of the various explanations and principles, the Conseil d’État, is 
discussed in order to illustrate the French administrative-law system itself. 
 
4 2 The Origins and Development of the French Administrative-Law System 
 
4 2 1 The Origins of the French Administrative-Law System 
 
The precise origins of the French administrative-law system are uncertain. One 
school of thought argues that French administrative law dates from the Middle Ages, 
that early traces of modern principles can be identified in the laws and customs of that 
period.4  Another school regards administrative law as a product of the French 
Revolution of 1789 and, specifically, of the Conseil d’État.5 These schools are not 
necessarily in direct opposition as much depends on the definitions attributed to 
concepts such as “administration”, “administer”, “administrative jurisdiction” and 
“administrative law”. 
Nevertheless, leading academics such as Jean-Louis Mestre and Francis-Paul 
Bénoit have convincingly demonstrated the pre-Revolutionary origins of French 
administrative law. 6  Mestre explains, in his Introduction Historique au Droit 
Administratif Français, how a vast body of administrative law rules developed 
                                                
4 Mestre JL Un Droit Administratif à la fin de l’Ancien Régime: Le Contentieux des Communautés 
de Provence (1976); “Les Racines Seigneuriales du Droit Administratif Français” (1981) IV 
Annuaire Européen d’Administration Publique 783-799; “La Contribution des Droit Romain et 
Canonique à l’Élaboration du Droit Administratif” (1982) V Annuaire Européen d’Administration 
Publique 925-943; “Les Fondements Historique du Droit Administratif Français” (1982-1983) n° 
34 Études et Documents publiés par Le Conseil d’État 63-80; Introduction Historique au Droit 
Administratif Français (1985); Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968); “Les 
Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. Le Juge et le 
Droit Public II (1974) 283-295. See also Weidenfeld K Les Origins Médiévales du Contentieux 
Administratif (XIVe – XV Siècles) (2001). 
5 Auby JB & Cluzel-Métayer L “Administrative Law in France” in Seerden R (ed) Administrative 
Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States: A Comparative Analysis 
(2007) 61-92 at 61. 
6 See n 4 above. 
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between the eleventh century and the end of the Ancien Régime,7 based on two 
elements: one, the seigniorial regime and, two, the contribution of learned law, 
specifically, Roman Law and canon law.8  
The feudal lords developed prerogatives based on the privileges of the royalty that 
preceded them. These prerogatives were refined by the revival of Roman law and the 
development of canon law. The refinement of ancient law culminated in a complete 
body of administrative-law rules by the end of the Ancien Régime. Mestre argues that 
after the 1789 Revolution the French government did not completely break away from 
these rules but, rather, formalised many of them and institutionalised the fundamental 
aspects of French administrative law and review. 
 
4 2 2 An Overview of the Historical Development of the French Administrative-
Law System 
 
On the basis of these early origins, the historical development of the French 
administrative-law system can broadly be divided into two broad periods: one, the 
period of the Ancien Régime, dating from the Middle Ages to the 1789 Revolution 
and, two, the period from the Revolution to the twentieth century. The following 
section provides an overview of the historical development of the French 
administrative-law system over these two periods. In this overview the main events 
and developments in the creation of the French administrative-law system are 
identified. 
According to Gaudemet the existence of administrative litigation in France dates 
back to the twelfth century, during the Ancien Régime.9 The allocation of the function 
of deciding administrative litigation was a complex matter, though. The conflicts 
between the monarchy and the courts for the right to preside over administrative 
                                                
7 The Ancien Régime refers to the French socio-political system in place before the 1789 
Revolution. 
8 Mestre J-L Introduction Historique au Droit Administratif Français (1985) 16. 
9 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 327-
328. 
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litigation are characteristic of the Ancien Régime.10 During this period the institution 
presiding over administrative litigation changed regularly.11 
With the Edict of Saint-Germain in 1641 the monarchy took a decisive step 
towards reserving administrative litigation for the administration itself.12 It addressed 
the conflict by declaring that the Parlements and other ordinary courts were 
established solely to secure justice for French citizens, in other words, to hear disputes 
between private persons and criminal law cases. The ordinary courts were expressly 
prohibited from taking cognizance of affairs concerning the state, the administration 
or the government, a function reserved for the king. Two decisions of the Conseil on 
19 October 1656 and 8 July 1661 reaffirmed that the cognizance of administrative 
affairs is reserved for organs closely associated to royal power.13 This prohibition met 
with much resistance from the Parlements.  
A milestone in the development of the French administrative-law system is the 
French Revolution of 1789. On 26 August 1789 the Assemblée Nationale 
Constituante adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen that 
instituted the separation of powers, which declared in article 16: 
 
“Any society in which the safeguarding of rights is not assured, and the separation of powers is 
not observed, has no constitution.”14  
 
The reforms brought about during the Revolution professed to institute a decisive 
break with the absolutist past of the Ancien Régime. However, the Revolution also 
drew on the heritage from the Ancien Régime by systematising it and subjecting it to 
new concepts,15 such as the separation of powers.16 A particular concern was that the 
Parlements had been hostile towards the administration and had constantly interfered 
                                                
10 See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 
328. 
11  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 49-63. 
12 48. 
13 48. 
14 “Toute Société dans laquelle la garantie des Droits n’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des 
Pouvoirs déterminée, n’a point de Constitution.” The English translation is from Barendt E “The 
Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers” (1995) Public Law 599-619 at 599. 
15 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 328. 
16 De l’Esprit des Lois was published in 1748. 
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with their activities. The revolutionaries therefore passed the Law of 16-24 August 
1789, article 13 of which prohibited the courts from interfering with the activities of 
the administration; in doing so the principle of the separation of administrative and 
judicial authorities was promulgated. 17  Shortly thereafter the Law of 6, 7-11 
September 1790 and the Law of 7-14 October 1790 allocated administrative litigation 
to the active administration itself. 
The revolutionary reforms resulted in the system of the administrateur-juge or 
administration-juge in terms of which the administration was its own judge.18 This 
system would eventually develop into the modern administrative jurisdiction. 
The creation of an advisory administration, the Conseil d’État, in close proximity 
to the active administration, was the next significant development.19 Established in 
1799, the advisory administration consisted of administrative advisors whose function 
it was to give advice to active administrative authorities. In practice, administrative 
litigation gradually came to be deferred to the advisors. Nevertheless, the Conseil 
d’État was performing its advisory and litigious functions on the basis of justice 
retenue20 which meant that formally the Conseil d’État was advising the sovereign 
and therefore decisions still emanated from the sovereign. Thus, the administration 
was still overseeing itself, albeit with the intermediary of the advisory administration. 
Subsequently the Law of 24 May 1872 enacted that the Conseil d’État decides 
administrative litigation by means of justice déléguée instead of justice retenue;21 thus 
its decisions were made in its own capacity and not formally on behalf of the 
sovereign. From then on the Conseil d’État presiding as a court could dispense with 
                                                
17 See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 
328. 
18 See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 
329. Administrateur-juge or administration-juge means administrator-judge or administration-
judge, respectively, which refers to the administrator or administration presiding over 
administrative litigation instead of a judge within the judiciary. 
19 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 329-
330. 
20 The system of justice retenue means that legally it is always the king or the emperor which 
judges (Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue 
Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 722). 
21 The Conseil d’État’s capacity to pronounce judgments in the name of French citizens, instead of 
in the name of the head of state, is known as the justice délégué (Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 48). 
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litigation without interference from the head of state. At the same time a Tribunal des 
Conflits was established to identify the competent institution where there was a 
jurisdictional conflict between the administrative and judicial jurisdictions.  
However, the doctrine of the ministre-juge 22  would impede these positive 
developments. Until the end of the nineteenth century the legislation of 1799 did not 
eradicate the system of the administrateur-juge. This implied that ministers remained 
the administrative judges of the common law within their sphere of responsibility. The 
jurisdiction of the Conseil d’État was merely additional to the jurisdiction of the 
ministers, but did not substitute the former’s jurisdiction for the latter’s. Therefore, 
private individuals were still obliged to bring their cases before the relevant minister 
in the first instance and only then, on appeal, could these case be brought before the 
Conseil d’État. This situation diluted the reforms granting the Conseil d’État the 
capacity of justice déléguée. Thus, the active administration remained an 
administrative jurisdiction, as was the case before 1872. 
However, in the case of Cadot, CE 13 December 1889 the Conseil d’État formally 
abandoned the theory of the ministre-juge by allowing direct recourse to the Conseil 
d’État as a court of first instance, without having to appear before the ministerial 
jurisdiction. From then on it was the administrative judge of the common law and this 
development completed the separation of the active administration from the 
administrative jurisdiction, as expressed by the principle of the separation of the 
administrative jurisdiction and the active administration.23 
 
4 2 3 Introducing the Parlements 
 
The Parlements played a pivotal role in the development of the French 
administrative-law system. Therefore an overview of the historical function and 
nature of the institutions named Parlements is required. In this section I discuss the 
meaning of the word Parlement, the origins, development and status of the 
Parlements, their characteristics and the problems associated with the Parlements. 
                                                
22  Under the system of the administrateur-juge the ministre-juge, literally “minister-judge”, 
implies that the minister of a particular state department was the common-law judge of matters 
within his department. 
23  See, generally, Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la 
Juridiction Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970). 
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Although the French word for parliament is parlement, before the 1789 Revolution 
parlement designated an altogether different institution: historically, the word 
parlement referred to a French high court.24 Therefore, where I employ the word 
Parlement it is in its historical sense, designating the judicial institution; and I prefer it 
to the English word parliament to avoid any association with a representative 
legislative body.  
Initially there was only one Parlement, the Parlement of Paris, which originated in 
the Curia Regis.25 The Curia Regis “was at the same time a feudal court and a royal 
court”26 as well as “a council of the government”.27 Gradually the Curia Regis divided 
into three sections, namely, the Council of the King, the Chamber of Accounts, and 
the Parlement.28 The Parlement was the judicial section that later became independent 
of the Court of the King.29 Thus, the Parlement of Paris was a court of first instance 
and of appeal.30 
Despite the Parlement’s independence, 
 
“[t]he judgments of the king’s court were the work of both the judges who composed it and of 
the king who presided over it. Once the Parliament became detached from the king’s court, it 
acquired by that very fact a power of its own and an independent jurisdiction. Its judgments 
were its exclusive work. Nevertheless, the king was always in theory the chief of the 
Parliament, and it rested with him to come and sit in it as well as to revise its judgments.”31 
 
                                                
24 Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation 
of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9 n 21. See Brissaud J A 
History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 432 n 4 (“[I]n the 1200s, the word [Parlement] 
was understood to mean a judicial body in France”). 
25 Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation 
of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9; Brissaud J A History of 
French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 432, 443. 
26 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 432 (footnote omitted). 
27 435. 
28 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 379, 435. See, generally, Saint-
Bonnet F & Sassier Y Histoires des Institutions avant 1789 (2008) 320-332. In Brissaud’s A 
History of French Public Law James W Garner has translated Parlement by Parliament; therefore 
I retain the word Parliament where it appears in quotations.  
29 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 435-437. 
30 441-442. 
31 440-441 (footnotes omitted).  
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Initially, the Parlement of Paris had jurisdiction over the whole kingdom of France, 
but as the territory of France expanded the creation of provincial Parlements became 
necessary.32 Nevertheless, despite its judicial character, a critical characteristic of the 
Parlements was their contested political role.33 The political role played by the 
Parlements had a legislative and executive 34  form: the Parlements exercised 
legislative power by making general orders or regulations and by refusing to register 
royal ordinances. The Parlements had come to inscribe royal acts and ordinances on 
their registers, as a formality, in order to, inter alia, satisfy publicity requirements and 
to have a copy in its possession.35 In the hands of the Parlements, the registration of 
royal acts gradually became a validity requirement.36 However, from the king’s 
perspective the validity of his acts did not depend on their registration,37 France being 
an absolute monarchy. On the whole, at the onset of the 1789 Revolution, the 
Parlements were able to control nearly every political and administrative matter by 
                                                
32 Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation 
of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9; Brissaud J A History of 
French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 443. 
33 See Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 445-451. Brissaud explains 
that 
 
“[a]lthough the [Parlement of Paris] was above all a judicial body, its powers were far from 
being confined to the administration of justice. We see it, without there being any precise text 
to determine its functions, behaving like a high administrative authority, watching over the 
administration and the victualing of Paris, controlling the administration of the communes, 
reforming the universities, and occupying itself with highway administration, with public 
monuments, with hospitals, and with the police; it sent its members to visit prisons; it assured 
the execution of the regulations of the craft guilds; it prohibited fairs and markets in times of 
epidemics; it forbade certain plays at the theatre, suppressed books, and, in 1606, established a 
tax for the benefit of the poor. Whether we see here a survival of the primitive functions of the 
Council of the King or an extension of its judicial authority, the Parliament of Paris had, in the 
1400s and 1500s, a large share in the administration of public affairs. Specialization of services 
caused it to return little by little (but never completely) to its true sphere.” (442-443, footnotes 
omitted). 
34 Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation 
of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9-11; Brissaud J A History 
of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 358, 445-447. 
35 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 446. 
36 446 (footnote omitted). 
37 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 446-447; “All justice Emanated 
from the King was an undisputed axiom in the 1500s.” (427, footnote omitted). 
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means of a veto. 38  The increasing specialisation of functions resulted in the 
Parlements being limited to their judicial role and deprived of political functions, at 
least formally.39  
The perceived political interference of the Parlements was problematic before the 
1789 Revolution precisely because France was an absolute monarchy. The conflicts 
between the royal authority and the Parlements “derived from the very fact that 
whatever powers the parlements possessed were delegated ones” and “[i]n theory 
these courts continued to owe their authority to the Crown, which might revoke and 
exercise it personally at will.”40  
This political role was exacerbated by other characteristics of the Parlements, 
namely, the venality41 and heredity of the judicial office:42  
 
“After the 1300s and 1400s it was not rare to see the incumbent of a public office ... disposing 
of it for the benefit of a third party by the indirect method of a resignation in his favor ... Public 
office was already in many respects purchasable; there was a regular trade in offices. The needs 
of the treasury led to the regularization and the legalization of the practice.”43 
 
                                                
38 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 448. 
39 449. 
40 Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation 
of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9. 
41 Saleability or purchasibility. 
42 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 447. 
43 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 458-459. The consequences of 
the Parlement’s interference were significant, Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A 
Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France 
and the United States (1942) 10: 
 
“to obstruct the central administration, it had now become impossible to divest them their 
powers. The judicial offices – parlements and inferior tribunals alike – in the course of time 
had become venal and hereditary. With the constantly increasing needs of the royal treasury, 
the sale of these offices had become a substantial source of revenue, to the obvious detriment 
of royal sovereignty. In turn, the judicial officers found themselves compelled to ‘sell justice’ 
in order to reimburse themselves and to get a return on their investment. When, under Louis 
XIV, reforms were proposed, it was found that the evil was too firmly rooted to be eradicated. 
A class of public officials had come into existence whose tenure would no longer yield to ex 
parte revocation. Crown and judiciary alike depended on the established system for income.” 
(footnotes omitted). 
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The combination of the Parlements’ political role and the venality and heredity of 
office created  
 
“in an absolute monarchy, by the simple fact of the separation of powers, an organ of 
resistance and of control. The Parliament, recruited from the higher middle class, claimed to be 
the guardian of the fundamental laws of the kingdom and considered itself as a moderating 
power designed to curb the excesses of royal absolutism.”44 
 
The significance of the Parlements’ political power role lies in the reaction of the 
royal authority against the Parlements during the Ancien Régime and the 1789 
Revolution. The Parlements’ political role45 was perceived as abuse and therefore 
strong measures would be adopted to prevent its recurrence; ultimately, on 4 October 
1790 the Constitutional Assembly abolished the Parlements themselves. 46  This 
constituted a decisive step in the development of the French administrative-law 
system. 
 
4 3 The Traditional Explanation for the Existence of the Administrative 
Jurisdiction 
 
According to the so-called “traditional explanation” for the existence of the 
administrative jurisdiction, the Law of 16-24 August 1790 constitutes the foundation 
of modern French administrative law and the duality of jurisdiction.47 The principle of 
the separation of administrative and judicial authorities, proclaimed in article 13 of 
                                                
44 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 447 (footnote omitted). 
Although this quotation refers to the separation of powers, from Brissaud’s discussion as a whole 
of the development of the Parlements, it seems that he means the separation or specialisation of 
functions as a result of an increase in governmental activities rather than the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, strictly speaking. 
45 See 4 6 2 1 1 below. 
46 Brissaud J A History of French Public Law tr Garner JW (1969) 451. 
47 Bénoit F-P “Les Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. 
Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 283-295 at 283; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 723; Velley 
S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des Pouvoirs” 
(1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-783 at 770. 
See also Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 45.  
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this law, implies that the judiciary may not interfere with the active administration 
and, accordingly and consequently, may not preside over administrative litigation.48 In 
prohibiting ordinary judges from interfering with the activities of administrative 
bodies in any way the law intended to exclude administrative litigation from the 
competence of the judicial tribunals in the name of the independence of the 
administration.49 The establishment of a distinct administrative jurisdiction is the 
result of the principle of the separation of authorities understood thus.50 The principle 
of the separation of authorities itself constitutes the French expression or 
interpretation of the separation of powers, the principle also emanating from the 
particular interpretation of the separation of powers.51 Therefore, the administrative 
jurisdiction is the outcome of a particular interpretation of the separation of powers in 
1789.52  
Thus, firstly, the traditional explanation holds that article 13 of the Law of 16-24 
August 1790, in proclaiming the principle of the separation of authorities, constitutes 
the foundation of administrative law and the duality of jurisdiction; secondly, the 
prohibition that courts may not interfere with administrative activities implies that 
courts may not preside over administrative litigation which necessitated the 
establishment of a distinct administrative jurisdiction; and, finally, the principle of the 
separation of authorities is itself the product and content of a particular interpretation 
of the separation of powers: the French interpretation of the separation of powers. 
Thus, the primacy of the principle of the separation of authorities in relation to the 
administrative jurisdiction is evident. 
                                                
48 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712. 
49 712. 
50 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712. See Bénoit F-P “Les Fondements de la Justice 
Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 283-
295 at 283. 
51 Bénoit F-P “Les Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. 
Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 283-295 at 283.  
52 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712. 
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This view of the development of the administrative jurisdiction has been endorsed 
by the majority53 of French public-law specialists. For example, both René Chapus 
and Yves Gaudemet54 maintain that administrative law originated in the principle of 
the separation of authorities, instituted by the Law of 16-24 August 1790 and 
reiterated by the Law of 16 fructidor An III, and that the separation of authorities 
withdrew administrative litigation from the competence of the ordinary courts;55 also, 
in their view, the revolutionary interpretation of the separation of powers is expressed 
in the principle of the separation of authorities. 56  English writing on French 
administrative law has also widely adopted the traditional explanation.57 In 1987, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel endorsed the traditional explanation.58 
                                                
53 Bénoit F-P “Les Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. 
Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 283-295 at 283 (“La justice administrative en France est très 
généralement présentée comme ayant pour base initiale le principe de la séparation des autorités”); 
Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 770 (“[U]ne opinion très généralement admise”); Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation 
au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712 
(“[L]a présentation doctrinale classique”).  
54 Gaudemet and Chapus have each authored an established contemporary treatise on French 
administrative law. 
55 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 2-3; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 328-329. 
56 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 2; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 328. 
57 See, for instance, Schwartz B “A Common Lawyer looks at the Droit Administratif” (1951) 29 
The Canadian Bar Review 121-138 at 126 (“In France, as in the common-law world, the 
separation of powers forms a cornerstone of constitutionalism. The doctrine there has, however, 
received an interpretation wholly unlike that to which the common lawyer is accustomed.”) 
(footnote omitted); Bermann GA “The Scope of Judicial Review in French Administrative Law” 
(1977) 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 195-254 at 197 (“[T]he principle of separation 
of powers has been interpreted in France to forbid the tribunaux judiciaires to ‘interfere in any 
way whatsoever with the performance of administrative functions.’”) (footnote omitted); 
Cummins RJ “The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and Theories of Judicial 
Decision in France” (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 594-628 at 598 
(“The fundamental distinguishing feature of this legal structure is a special application of the 
principle of separation of powers.”), (“[T]he special separation of powers established by the law of 
16-24 August 1790 remains a fundamental principle of the constitutional tradition.”) (601); 
Merryman JH “The French Deviation” (1996) 44 The American Journal of Comparative Law 109-
119 at 118 (During the 1789 Revolution “a peculiar doctrine of separation of powers, born of 
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4 4 The Constitutional Status of the French Administrative Jurisdiction 
 
In the decision of 23 January 1987,59 the Conseil Constitutionnel pronounced on 
the constitutional foundation and the scope of the competence of the French 
administrative jurisdiction.60  The Conseil Constitutionnel held that the measures 
contained in articles 10 and 13 of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 and in the decree of 
16 fructidor An III which established the principle of the separation of administrative 
and judicial authorities do not in themselves have constitutional status; thus the 
principle itself cannot have constitutional status.61 This implies that the principle is 
not a necessary corollary of the doctrine of the separation of powers that was 
proclaimed in article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 
which was subsequently granted constitutional status by the Conseil Constitutionnel.62 
Consequently, the Conseil Constitutionnel stated that in accordance with the 
“French conception” of the separation of powers, there appears among the 
“fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic”, one in terms of 
which, except for matters reserved by their nature to the judicial authority, the 
annulment or amendment of decisions taken, in the exercise of public power 
prerogatives, by authorities exercising executive power, falls in the last instance under 
                                                                                                                                       
conditions specific to 17th and 18th century France and generalized and universalized in the works 
of Montesquieu and other Frenchmen, came to play an important role in the design of the new 
French legal system.”). See also Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of 
the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United States 
(1942) 12. 
58 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 770; Chevallier J “Séparation des Autorités Administratives et Judiciaires” in Duhamel O 
& Meny Y (eds) Dictionnaire Constitutionnel (1992) 970-971 at 971. 
59 CC decision no 86-224 DC of 23 January 1987.  
60 Long M, Weil P, Braibant G, Delvolvé P & Genevois B Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence 
Administrative (2007, 16th ed). See Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice 
Administrative et Séparation des Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-783 at 767-770.  
61 Long M, Weil P, Braibant G, Delvolvé P & Genevois B Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence 
Administrative (2007, 16th ed) 664-665, 667. 
62 667. 
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the competence of the administrative jurisdiction.63  This motivation constitutes, 
according to the Conseil Constitutionnel, the constitutional foundation of the 
competence of the administrative jurisdiction as well as the scope of that 
competence.64 
This foundation of the administrative jurisdiction follows two linkages.65 Firstly, 
the Conseil Constitutionnel drew on the French conception of the separation of 
powers: while the separation of authorities is not the necessary consequence of the 
separation of powers, there is nevertheless in the French juridical tradition a relation 
between the two ideas.66 Secondly, the reference to this tradition enabled the Conseil 
Constitutionnel to link the competence of the administrative jurisdiction to the 
“fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic”.67 
The position of the Conseil Constitutionnel consecrates the traditional explanation 
for the existence of the administrative jurisdiction, to a significant extent. The 
traditional explanation is based on the primacy of the principle of the separation of 
administrative and judicial authorities which has a twofold meaning in terms of this 
explanation: firstly, the courts are prohibited from interfering with the active 
administration and, secondly, the institution of a special jurisdiction to preside over 
administrative litigation is required.68 
 
4 5 The Duality of Jurisdiction 
 
The existence of an administrative jurisdiction during the Ancien Régime is a 
controversial question that, according to Chevallier, depends on the criterion 
employed to define such a jurisdiction.69 In terms of one view a true administrative 
jurisdiction, independent of the judiciary, existed throughout the Ancien Régime. 
During the Revolution this jurisdiction was merely re-established and, thus, cannot be 
                                                
63 665, 667-668. 
64 668. 
65 668. 
66 668. 
67 668. 
68 Chevallier J “Séparation des Autorités Administratives et Judiciaires” in Duhamel O & Meny Y 
(eds) Dictionnaire Constitutionnel (1992) 970-971 at 970. 
69  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 41-42. 
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a product of modern public law. Another view holds that during the Ancien Régime 
there were neither procedural guarantees nor an independent administrative 
jurisdiction. Therefore an administrative jurisdiction cannot be said to have existed. 
Chevallier contends that these two criteria both define jurisdiction, but that the 
latter criterion is a relatively recent development.70 Firstly, the “material criterion” 
simply defines administrative jurisdiction as the organ tasked with resolving 
administrative litigation.71 The second criterion defines jurisdiction according to the 
formal and organic requirements of a jurisdictional organ. The latter did not apply 
before the late nineteenth century and therefore the concept of jurisdiction was based 
on the material criterion; thus, the status of judge depended on the function 
performed, not the nature of the institution and decision. As unsatisfactory as the 
material criterion may be, it was applied before the nineteenth century and, therefore, 
it is possible to refer to an administrative jurisdiction during the Ancien Régime and 
before 1872.72  
 
4 5 1 The Early Origins of an Administrative Jurisdiction 
 
Bénoit’s contention73 that the duality of jurisdiction is an historical occurrence, 
dating from the very origin of French public institutions during the late Middle Ages, 
is congruent with the material criterion. Initially, during the seigniorial period, all 
state functions were merged in the person of the royal authority and there was no 
separation of functions. This was a logical situation because the sovereign held all 
state power: there was no administration, judicial jurisdiction or administrative 
jurisdiction as there was only one authority, the feudal lord, which exercised all of 
                                                
70 42. 
71 In order to define administrative litigation one must be able to distinguish between the 
administrative and jurisdictional functions. Therefore, while the particular character of 
administrative litigation may have been recognised at an early stage, the concept was by no means 
certain or developed since the administrative and judicial functions were merged after the Middle 
Ages.  
72  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 42.  
73 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 273, 275. Cf. Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 327. 
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these powers.74 A maxim of the time, “all justice emanates from the king”,75 indicates 
that the king dispensed all justice and any delegation of power could be revoked; thus 
the autonomy of any judicial function was theoretically impossible.76 The feudal lord 
would give his officers tasks to complete in his name, but there was no distinction 
between administrative or jurisdictional functions.77 Similarly, with the rise of the 
monarchy, royal functionaries were at the same time, in effect, administrators and 
judicial and administrative judges.78  
With the rapid increase in the number of state activities, and the consequent 
division of labour, Bénoit explains how two trends gradually progressed until the end 
of the monarchical period: one, distinguishing between administrative and 
jurisdictional functions and, two, specialisation within the jurisdictional function.79 
Regarding the first trend, in a slow process, some royal representatives specialised in 
either the administrative or the jurisdictional function. This split was necessitated by 
the need to apportion labour; it was not the result of a preconceived principle 
distinguishing functions. Only at the start of the eighteenth century did a conceptual 
distinction evolve between the administrative and jurisdictional functions as 
“administration” and “jurisdiction” gained their modern meanings.  
In terms of the second trend judges tasked with criminal cases and cases between 
individuals were limited to hearing only these cases. Administrative affairs and affairs 
concerning the state fell outside of their competence and they were prohibited from 
hearing cases related to these matters. Requests or petitions to the king on 
administrative matters were addressed to his administrative representatives. This 
arrangement was apparently in conflict with the first trend, which distinguished 
between administrative and jurisdictional functions, because these representatives had 
                                                
74 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 275; Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique 
du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 
43. 
75 Own translation from “Toute justice émane du roi”. 
76  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 43. 
77 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 275. 
78 275. 
79 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 275-277. See Chevallier J L’Élaboration 
Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de l’Administration 
Active (1970) 43-44. 
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a distinctly administrative character but were nevertheless tasked with presiding over 
administrative litigation.80 At the time, the intendants and the Conseil du Roi were 
more administrative organs specialised in administrative litigation than true 
jurisdictions in the modern sense of the word.81 They were at least as independent as 
the Parlements, although politicised.82  
Thus, on the whole, the specialisation within the jurisdictional function was 
characterised by a duality of jurisdiction during the Ancien Régime.83 The Monarchy 
recognised the distinction between administrative and jurisdictional functions, but 
never granted a monopoly over the whole jurisdictional function to the judiciary.84 
From the onset the same judge did not hear matters concerning both individuals and 
administrative matters; administrative litigation was reserved for “judges” close to the 
administration.85  
The preceding historical account demonstrates that even before the Revolution 
France had never had a single jurisdictional function, but, rather, jurisdictional 
functions: the administrative jurisdiction originated under the Monarchy at the same 
time as the judicial jurisdiction.86 This development has also been confirmed by other 
leading administrative-law experts such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Edouard 
Laferrière.87 Therefore the duality of jurisdiction emerged historically as an institution 
of the Ancien Régime.88  
                                                
80 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 276. 
81 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 277. See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 47. See also Uhler A Review of 
Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9. 
82 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 277. 
83 277. 
84  Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 277. In addition, any function the 
Parlements exercised was delegated to them by the monarchy and could be revoked, Uhler A 
Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers 
and Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 9. 
85 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 277. 
86 277. 
87 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 277. See Chapus R Droit Administratif 
Général I (2001, 15th ed) 14; Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 129 
n 6. 
88 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 277. 
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Thus Bénoit demonstrates that due to the increase in state functions during the late 
Middle Ages a division of labour was required. As a result of this division of labour 
distinct administrative and judicial jurisdictions were established for practical reasons. 
Therefore, at an early stage during the Ancien Régime, an administrative jurisdiction 
existed, independently of the 1789 revolution and article 13 of the Law of 16-24 
August 1790. 
 
4 5 2 The Distinct Concept of Administrative Litigation 
 
Chevallier argues that the development of an administrative jurisdiction during the 
Ancien Régime was closely associated with an additional process, beyond the division 
of labour: the recognition of the specificity of administrative litigation and the 
difficulties associated with allocating the competence to preside over administrative 
litigation.89 The specificity of administrative litigation became apparent when the 
judicial and administrative functions were distinguished and the problem of the 
allocation of administrative litigation arose. Subsequently, exceptional jurisdictions 
were created to preside over administrative litigation, but they gradually aligned with 
the autonomous Parlements; as a result administrative litigation was allocated to the 
active administration, and this was the position until the 1789 revolution. 
During the thirteenth century the Curia Regis, adviser to the state, legislator and 
supreme court, divided into the Grand Conseil, concerned with governmental and 
legislative matters, the Chambre des Comptes, concerned with state finance, and the 
Parlement,90 competent to decide private disputes. The distribution of functions was a 
practical concern and the division of labour was not based on principle.91 Since the 
various functions were conceptually vague there was much intrusion between all of 
the branches.  
                                                
89  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 44-49. See Braibant G & Stirn B Le Droit 
Administratif Français (2005, 7th ed) 31. 
90 Initially, there was only the Parlement of Paris and later numerous provincial Parlements were 
established to address the proliferation of cases.  
91  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 46-47. 
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The king, as absolute sovereign, remained the supreme judge until the end of the 
Ancien Régime and the Parlement, stemming from the Curia Regis, was merely the 
recipient of delegated power.92 The king could legitimately substitute his decision for 
any decision taken by the Parlement and withdraw any case from the Parlement’s 
jurisdiction.93 Gradually, however, the Parlement became independent and this led to 
conflicts with the monarchy for control of certain functions that would last for 
centuries.  
The opposing claims revealed a seemingly hybrid matter, administrative litigation, 
which both organs claimed as rightfully theirs:94 on the one hand, the judiciary 
claimed authority over administrative disputes on the basis of the cases’ nature as a 
legal dispute; on the other hand, the administration felt that its own authority was 
implicated and therefore prohibited the Parlements from performing this function. 
Consequently, whenever a matter arose affecting the general interest, administrative 
action or state finance, the judiciary were not authorised to hear the matter.95 
The administration justified their position with reference to the necessity of 
centralising administrative decision-making, the need for special procedures for 
administrative litigation and the protection of the administration from efforts by 
judges to control administrative action by means of the contentieux administratif, in 
other words, “administration in the form of the judiciary”.96 Thus at an early stage 
judicial courts were prohibited from presiding over litigation originating in the 
activity of royal agents.97 
From the time of Louis XIII the principle of “juger l’administration, c’est encore 
administrer” emerged. 98  The Edict of Saint-Germain of 1641 recognised the 
specificity of the contentieux administratif in relation to judicial litigation; it 
                                                
92  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 45; Uhler A Review of Administrative Acts: A 
Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France 
and the United States (1942) 11. 
93  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 45. 
94 47. 
95 47. 
96 47. Own translation from “L’administration en la forme judiciaire”. 
97 48. 
98  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 48. See 4 9 below. 
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prohibited Parlements from taking cognizance of any matter that could concern the 
state, the administration or the government.99 This principle was reaffirmed by two 
decisions of the Conseil on 19 October 1656 and 8 July 1661 reserving administrative 
affairs to organs closely associated to royal power.100 From then on edicts and 
ordinances of the king stated that all disputes originating in administrative action are 
to be brought before the intendants.101  
By the end of the Ancien Régime, royal authority had prevailed and most 
administrative cases were not resolved by the courts.102 However, the prohibition was 
not absolute since the Parlements remained competent in respect of some 
administrative litigation.103 These conflicts allowed a clear idea of the contentieux 
administratif to emerge and after the fourteenth century its existence was 
established.104  
 
4 6 The Principle of the Separation of the Administrative and Judicial 
Authorities105 
 
4 6 1 The Separation of Authorities during the Ancien Régime 
 
According to the traditional explanation the principle of the separation of 
authorities was first proclaimed in article 13 of the Law of 16-24 August 1790. Given 
this law’s central, founding role in the development of the duality of jurisdiction,106 
Bénoit’s critique107 of the originality of article 13 is set out below. 
                                                
99  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 48; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif 
Français (1968) 278.  
100  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 48. 
101 48. 
102 49. 
103 49. 
104 49. 
105 Uhler refers to the “differentiation of agencies”, Review of Administrative Acts: A Comparative 
Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in France and the United 
States (1942) 12. 
106 At least in terms of the traditional explanation. 
107 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 278-279. 
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As state functions became more defined and as competences were distributed 
among various royal agents, the courts reacted against this process of specialisation 
due to the strict limitation of their functions. The courts, in particular the Parlements, 
not only rejected the distinction between administrative and jurisdictional functions 
and the limitation of their jurisdiction, but declared themselves competent to preside 
over administrative matters originating in the activities of the active administration 
and over litigation between the administration and private individuals. Thus, the 
courts encroached upon administrative litigation and the functional sphere of the 
administration, thereby impeding the completion of the administrative and 
jurisdictional structure set in motion during the Monarchy. This state of affairs 
resulted in continuous conflict between the administration and the courts. 
The Monarchy immediately responded to the courts’ opposition. The Monarchy 
had created judicial judges to hear cases between individuals and not to interfere with 
administrative matters under the pretence of judging the administration. Therefore, in 
1641 the Monarchy prohibited judicial judges from presiding over any administrative 
matter in the Edict of Saint-Germain.108 The purpose was to safeguard the progress 
that had been made and thus, according to Bénoit, Richelieu formally laid down a 
principle which has been maintained ever since and which would come to be known 
as the principle of the separation of authorities. This principle prohibits judicial judges 
from taking cognizance of administrative matters and administrative litigation.109 The 
Edict of Saint-Germain declared unequivocally that judicial courts were only created 
to render justice to French subjects and that they were expressly forbidden from 
                                                
108 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 278; Bénoit F-P “Les Fondements de la 
Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel Waline. Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 
283-295 at 284. See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général 
(2001, 16th ed) 328. 
109 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 278. Bénoit contends that the provisions 
which prohibited the judiciary from interfering with the administration and from presiding over 
administrative litigation later became known as the principle of the separation of authorities. In 
contrast, Chevallier, Sandevoir and Troper argue that there is no link between the separation of 
authorities, as declared in the Law of 16-24 August 1790, and the decision to prohibit the judiciary 
from presiding over administrative litigation. Therefore, a distinction should be maintained 
between the judiciary’s interference with the administration through litigation and other forms of 
interference. In addition, here Bénoit is referring to the import of the principle during the Ancien 
Régime, as opposed to the those authors who discuss the principle’s meaning in the light of the 
Revolution and the revolutionary debates, in particular. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 162  
deciding any matter concerning the State, the administration or the government. Thus, 
150 years before the Revolution the principle of the separation of authorities was 
formally proclaimed; in other words, this proclamation followed the installation of a 
jurisdictional duality and was the consequence, not the cause, of this factual duality.110 
However, the Edict of Saint-Germain did not finally resolve the conflict: as the 
Monarchy weakened during the second half of the eighteenth century the Parlements 
again flouted the prohibitions. They refused to register royal ordinances for reform, 
interfered with the functioning of the administration, gave orders to administrative 
authorities and summoned the king’s agents under the pretext of judging them.111 At 
the time the Parlements’ conduct was considered abuse and a contributing factor to 
the outbreak of the 1789 Revolution. This shows that the idea of the separation of 
authorities had become accepted and politically attacks upon it were regarded as 
inadmissible.  
The Edict of Saint-Germain and article 13 of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 have 
very similar wording. Therefore, the Edict of Saint-Germain questions the professed 
originality of article 13 as a formulation of the Revolution. Furthermore, the Edict of 
Saint-Germain precedes the separation-of-powers doctrine by over 100 years,112 
which undermines the argument that the separation of authorities flows from the 
separation of powers and is the French interpretation of the separation of powers. 
Nevertheless, the Edict of Saint-Germain and article 13 cannot necessarily be equated. 
 
4 6 2 The French Revolution of 1789 and the Separation of Authorities  
 
The principle of the separation of administrative and judicial authorities, as the 
innovative concept of the traditional explanation, is critiqued, not only by Bénoit on 
the basis of the preceding argument, but also by Sandevoir, Troper, Velley, Mestre 
and, in particular, Chevallier. In surveying their critiques, the role of article 13 of the 
                                                
110 Bénoit F-P “Les Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel 
Waline. Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 283-295 at 284. 
111 Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 279; Uhler A Review of Administrative 
Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in 
France and the United States (1942) 10.  
112 As mentioned, Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois was published in 1748. 
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Law of 16-24 August 1790 is set out in two parts.113 The first part explains what the 
constituants and the Assembly sought to achieve with the promulgation of the Law of 
16-24 August 1790 and particularly article 13, expressing the principle of the 
separation of authorities. The second part indicates what the Law of 16-24 August 
1790 did not attempt to address whatsoever and what was left unresolved at the time 
the statute was promulgated. 
 
4 6 2 1 The Positive Role of the Separation of Authorities 
 
4 6 2 1 1 The Mischief  
 
A useful starting point in determining the actual role of the Law of 16-24 August 
1790 on the organisation of the judicial branch is to identify the mischief that the 
statute sought to remedy. Certainly, in proclaiming this law, the constituants’ 
principal priority was to react against the abuses perpetrated by the courts of the 
                                                
113 Sandevoir provides a timeline of the stages constituting the determination of the authorities 
competent to preside over administrative litigation during the revolutionary period, Sandevoir P 
Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 52. This timeline is reproduced below in order 
to facilitate the subsequent discussion: 
 
22 December 1789: The first draft on judicial organisation is presented to the Assembly in 
terms of which administrative litigation is allocated to an exceptional jurisdiction named 
tribunal d’administration (“tribunal of the administration”). 
24 March 1790: Thouret opens the general discussion. 
30 March 1790: Chabroud argues for the full jurisdictional competence of the judiciary. 
31 March 1790: A programme for discussion is tabled by Barrère de Vieuzac. It consists of ten 
questions on principles and the ninth addresses exceptional tribunals. 
27 May 1790: The ninth question is tabled for discussion, but the discussion is postponed. 
5 July 1790: The second draft on judicial organisation is presented to the Assembly, also 
suggesting the allocation of the contentieux administratif to a tribunal of the administration. 
The provision that will later become article 13 of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 is adopted. 
July 1790: Pezous proposes the idea of the administrateur-juge. 
12 August 1790: The question of a tribunal of the administration is adjourned again. 
16 August 1790: The Law of 16-24 August 1790 is adopted without any mention of 
administrative litigation. 
6 September 1790: The Law of 6, 7-11 September 1790 is adopted, enacting the system of the 
administrateur-juge. 
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Ancien Régime;114 specifically, article 13 prohibited the courts from interfering with 
the activities of the administration. Therefore, it is also important to characterise the 
perceived nature of these abuses, from the perspective of the constituants, in order to 
appreciate the mischief and the intended role of the statute.  
Chevallier argues that the constituants were targeting a particular mischief: during 
the Ancien Régime the Parlements had exercised both legislative and regulatory 
powers, in addition to their jurisdictional competences.115 The constituants regarded 
such a merging of powers, which rendered the Parlements both administrators and 
legislators, as one of the abuses distorting the exercise of judicial power. Such an 
encroachment was intolerable in a good constitution. Significantly the distrust of the 
Parlements did not result from their deciding administrative litigation, but from the 
political role these courts had played during the Ancien Régime and this alone.116 
Thus, it is the political competences exercised by the Parlements during the Ancien 
Régime which constituted the mischief. 
 
4 6 2 1 2 The Primacy of the “Ordinary” Separation of Powers  
 
Sandevoir demonstrates that, as far as the Assemblée Constituante of 1789 was 
concerned, the separation of powers was a vital principle that the constituants 
considered dogma.117 Significantly, especially for the purposes of this discussion, 
Montesquieu’s theory was central in all matters; even the idea of a justice 
                                                
114  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 66-67; Chevallier J “Du Principe de 
Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 714. 
115 On the one hand, they participated in the exercise of the legislative function by means of the 
power of registering ordinances (ordonnances); this, gradually led to the Parlements controlling 
the regularity of ordinances through vérification and to examination of their legitimacy/cogency 
(“bien-fondé”) in leading to the submission to the king of “remontrances”. On the other hand, they 
assumed the right to make regulations, not only for judicial matters, but also for all matters 
concerning public order, in exercising police competences; in addition the Parlements did not 
hesitate to summon royal agents to appear before them and to give them instructions (Chevallier J 
“Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit 
Administratif 712-723 at 714). 
116 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 53; Troper M La Séparation 
des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 52. 
117 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 46-49. 
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administrative was strongly influenced by the separation of powers. Therefore, the 
important question is what the separation of powers entailed for the constituants. 
Specifically, from 22 December 1789 onwards, the guiding role of the separation 
of powers in relation to the justice administrative is evident. The debates concerning 
the judicial branch reveal numerous references to the separation of powers. 118 
However, contrary to what may be expected given the traditional explanation, 
Sandevoir explains that the separation of powers was restrictive:119 it impeded the 
development of a justice administrative. The reason for this obstructive effect was the 
following: for the constituants the application of the separation of powers as such 
superseded their distrust of the Parlements. Nevertheless, the question remains: how 
did the constituants understand the separation of powers to allow for this effect?  
A corollary of the separation of powers was the idea of jurisdictional unity which 
implies that deciding cases naturally falls within the judicial branch and that the 
notion of judges outside this branch is impossible.120 Therefore, having judges within 
the executive was simply impermissible.121 This explains how the separation of 
powers impeded the development of the justice administrative, rather than serving as 
a catalyst, despite the distrust of the Parlements.122 
 
4 6 2 1 3 The Intended Purpose of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 
 
In the light of the mischief which the Law sought to remedy and the primacy of the 
separation of powers in its ordinary sense, as opposed to the so-called French 
conception, the question “what was the original meaning attributed to article 13123 by 
the constituants and the Assemblée” is discussed. In other words, what was the content 
of the principle of the separation of authorities in the Law of 16-24 August 1790? 
                                                
118 47. 
119 See Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 47. 
120 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 48-49; see Chevallier J 
L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de 
l’Administration Active (1970) 66-67 (the revolutionaries’ narrow understanding of the separation 
of powers implied that each organ of state is entrusted through delegation with a portion of 
sovereignty in order to exercise their function, and their function alone). 
121 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 49. 
122 48. 
123 See Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 53. 
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Sandevoir shows why, in his view, the separation of authorities itself was 
concerned with the application of the separation of powers, as defined in the 
preceding section, to the relationship between the judiciary and the administration.124 
In terms of this analysis, the separation of authorities was simply an expression of the 
separation of powers, understood conventionally, in a specific context. In particular, 
Sandevoir demonstrates on two grounds that the meaning of article 13 is less original 
than has been thought since the nineteenth century: one, in proclaiming the principle 
of the separation of authorities, the constituants were not referring to the separation of 
jurisdictions, but exclusively to the separation of powers and, two, in proclaiming the 
separation of powers the constituants were not referring to a so-called French 
conception, but exclusively to the “rational”, or ordinary, conception of the separation 
of powers.125 
The fundamental principles having been proclaimed in article 16 of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen on 26 August 1789, the next step was to apply 
them. The dominant principle in relation to the judiciary was the separation of 
powers; therefore the purpose of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 was simply to apply 
the separation of powers to the structure of the judiciary.126 The primacy of the 
separation of powers was pertinent to the distrust of the Parlements. Significantly, as 
mentioned, this distrust was the result of the political role played by the Parlements 
during the Ancien Régime and not of their competence in matters of administrative 
litigation. The application of the separation of powers was expected to remedy these 
abuses perpetrated by the Parlements. As such article 13 merely restated the 
prohibition already promulgated in the earlier Law of 22 December 1789 on 
administrative assemblies, which declared that judges may not interfere with the 
activities of administrative organs in any way;127 judicial interpretation of the Law of 
                                                
124 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 52-56. 
125 52-53. 
126 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 53; see Chevallier J “Du 
Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit 
Administratif 712-723 at 716. 
127 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 54-55, 56; Velley S “La 
Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des Pouvoirs” (1989) 
Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-783 at 772. Velley 
refers to the Law of 22 December 1789-January 1790 (772). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 167  
22 December 1789 makes it clear that the law only prohibited infringements of the 
separation of powers.128  
Thus one can identify three important characteristics of the separation of 
authorities, indicative of its content in terms of Sandevoir’s analysis: one, the 
separation of authorities did not imply a duality of jurisdiction; two, the separation of 
authorities implied and restated an application of the ordinary separation of powers; 
and, finally, the separation of authorities was a response to the political infringements 
of the courts during the Ancien Régime, which did not include administrative 
litigation. Therefore the purpose of the Law was to apply the separation of powers as 
a response to the abuses of the Ancien Régime. These observations reveal the nature of 
the principles, but introduce another question: how did the Law of 16-24 August 1790 
structure and regulate the judiciary in order to realise the fundamental principles 
which this statute sought to apply? 
 
4 6 2 1 4 The New Position and Role of the Judiciary 
 
The Law of 16-24 August 1790 was a response to the political role exercised by 
the Parlements and an expression of the separation of powers. In particular, article 13 
affirmed the principle of the separation of authorities, which applied the separation of 
powers to the relationship between the judiciary and the administration. In addition, 
the Law regulated the position of the judiciary in relation to all the branches of 
government and this requires elaboration. Therefore the following discussion 
considers the position of the judiciary in government generally as well as in relation to 
the administration. This clarifies the meaning of the principle of the separation of 
authorities.  
Chevallier argues that the constituants intended to react against the abuses of the 
Parlements through two strategies.129 Firstly, the integrity of the judicial function had 
to be established since the earlier merging of functions had compromised this 
function;130 and, secondly, strict limitations had to be set for the judicial branch by 
                                                
128 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 55. 
129 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714. 
130 That is, the judicial branch’s exercise of legislative and administrative functions in addition to 
its jurisdictional functions amounted to a non-separation of powers. 
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subordinating the judiciary to the legislative branch and separating the judiciary from 
the administrative branch.  
Chevallier relies on the constituants’ position for the judiciary within the 
institutional structure of the state and their definition of the judicial function to justify 
his argument.131 On the whole, the judiciary was placed in a subordinate position to 
the legislature. This was the case since legislating was regarded as the supreme 
function and therefore all other state functions were subordinate to it. Notably, authors 
such as Montesquieu and Rousseau, with his idea of law as the expression of the 
general will, supported this view. As far as the Assemblée was concerned the 
legislature, executive and judiciary were not three equal powers in terms of the 
separation of powers: the judicial and the administrative functions were both 
subordinate to the legislative function.132 Consequently, the judicial function could 
only be strictly subject to the law.133 
The judicial function itself was defined as a mechanical application of the law to 
specific cases, i.e. performing the judicial function was simply the formulation and 
declaration of a syllogism.134 The debates of the Assemblée and the position of the 
judiciary within the governmental structure reinforce the conception of the judicial 
function as the mechanical application of law.135 This implied that judges were to 
keep to the letter of the law, remaining faithful to the will of the legislator.136 In other 
words, judges determined whether the facts of a particular case came within the 
application of a law and, if so, applied the law.137 The Law of 16-24 August 1790 was 
                                                
131 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714-715. 
132 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 176-
177; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue 
Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714. 
133 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 172; 
Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de 
Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714. 
134 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 50; 
Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de 
Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714-715. 
135 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 50. 
136 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714-715. 
137 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 50. 
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simply the legislative expression of these conceptions of the judiciary’s position and 
function.138 
 
4 6 2 1 5 The Prevailing Conception of the Judiciary Applied 
 
The mischief, the purpose, the prevailing principles and the status of the judiciary 
in terms of these principles have been established. It has also been shown that the 
separation of powers was applicable to the judiciary’s relationship with both the 
administration and the legislature.139 Nevertheless, the constituants went further by 
determining specific boundaries within which the courts were to operate.140  
As mentioned, the organisation of the judiciary by means of this statute was 
essentially an exercise in applying the separation of powers for the specific purpose of 
preventing the judiciary from interfering with the legislature and the administration.141 
The separation of powers was not merely declared in the abstract to be applicable to 
the judiciary, though, but applied separately to the relationships between the judiciary 
and the legislative and administrative branches.142 In other words, the statute gave 
specific content to the separation of powers in the context of these relationships. 
The debates on the drafts for the Law of 16-24 August 1790 indicate how the 
separation of powers was applied to these relationships. Regarding the limitations of 
the judiciary in relation to the legislature,143 the First Constitutional Committee144 
declared unanimously that the principles of judicial organisation require that the 
judiciary may not participate in the legislative function whatsoever. The prohibition 
                                                
138 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 715. 
139 The separation of the judiciary and the legislature and the separation of the judiciary and the 
administration were both treated as separation-of-power matters, Sandevoir P Études sur le 
Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 54. 
140 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 714, 715. Once again the constituants were motivated by the 
abuses perpetrated by the Parlements during the Ancien Régime (715). 
141 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 53-54. 
142 53-54. 
143 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 715. 
144 Through Bergasse (Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 
5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 715). 
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extended to taking an active part in the law or influencing the making of law in any 
way. The law, as the expression of the general will, had to be placed beyond any 
judicial influence.145 Therefore, in the Law of 16-24 August 1790, judges were 
expressly prohibited from participating in the making of law and from preventing or 
delaying the execution of law (article 10); judges were obliged to transcribe laws 
(article 11); they were prohibited from making regulatory decisions (article 12); and 
were obliged to refer any interpretation of the law to the legislature (article 12).146 
Thus, not only were judges unable to intervene with the legislative process, but also 
they were denied any power of interpretation.147  
Article 9 of the Second Constitutional Committee’s first draft addressed the 
relationship between the administration and judiciary as follows: the judicial power 
being distinct and having to be kept separated from the power of administering, the 
courts of justice cannot take any part in the administration’s matters, nor disrupt, in 
whatsoever manner, the operations of the administration, nor summon before them 
administrators for reasons relating to their functions, on penalty of forfeiture.148 This 
formulation, submitted by Thouret on 24 March 1790 as the expression of the 
intention to separate the judicial power from administrative functions, was approved 
by the Assembly, including proponents of the unity of jurisdiction.149 
On 5 July 1790 the second draft was presented to the Assembly. This draft 
modified the wording of the provision which would become article 13 of the Law of 
16-24 August 1790 by identifying two possible forms of encroachment on the 
administrative power, such as they had manifested themselves during the Ancien 
Régime, namely, the exercise of administrative functions through regulations and 
                                                
145 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 715. 
146 715.  
147 715. 
148 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 715; see Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine 
Juridiction (1964) 54. 
149 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 715; Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice 
Administrative et Séparation des Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-783 at 771-772. 
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administrative meddling by means of summonses and directives.150 The text of 5 July 
was adopted without any debate151 and on 16 August article 13, declaring the 
principle of the separation of authorities, became law.152 Therefore, according to 
Chevallier, the meaning of the text is perfectly clear: the practices of the former 
Parlements were incompatible with the doctrine of the separation of powers and in 
order to prevent a return to these abuses the judiciary was made subject to explicit 
limitations.153  
 
4 6 2 1 6 The Constituants had Faith in their Renovatory Work 
 
Due to these reforms there was no concern that the abuses of the Ancien Régime 
would continue.154 The constituants were confident that the courts would respect the 
law and that the infringements of the former Parlements would be curbed by the 
reformed structure of the judiciary.155 As far as the relationship between the judiciary 
and the legislature was concerned, the courts had a subordinate position which meant 
that the legislature had sufficient power to protect its position.156 Furthermore, since 
judges were now merely applying the law, judges were incapable of controlling the 
administration; in other words, the administration was subject to the law and not the 
courts.157 Thus, once the Law of 16-24 August 1790 prohibited the courts from 
interfering with the activities of the administration, administrative litigation could be 
allocated to the judiciary without contradicting the principles expressed in the Law.158 
 
                                                
150 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 716. 
151 716. 
152 Mestre JL “Le Contentieux Administratif sous la Révolution Française d’après des Travaux 
Récents” (1996) Revue Française de Droit Administratif 289-300 at 291. 
153 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 716. 
154 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 51; 
Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de 
Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
155 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 45-46. 
156 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 53. 
157 50.  
158 53. 
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4 6 2 2 The Limits of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 
 
4 6 2 2 1 Adherence to the Unity of Jurisdiction 
 
The former Parlement’s exercise of political functions was not the only Ancien 
Régime legacy requiring revision. Chevallier explains that the constituants also 
intended to modify the administrative-litigation system that had been operating under 
the Ancien Régime, a system characterised by complexity and unpopularity.159 How 
this system originated and its nature is important.160 The complexity of the system 
was due to the proliferation of jurisdictions competent to preside over administrative 
litigation; and the proliferation of jurisdictions resulted from the centuries-old 
conflicts between the monarchy and the Parlements for control over administrative 
litigation. 
As courts became more independent during the Ancien Régime, the monarchy tried 
to prevent them from presiding over administrative litigation. 161 Initially, from the 
fourteenth century onwards, the monarchy allocated administrative litigation to 
various special administrative jurisdictions, which were closely associated with the 
monarchy. However, as these institutions grew more independent they became 
aligned with the Parlements. This brought the monarchy to transfer again the function 
of administrative litigation to organs linked more directly to the monarchy. Thus, 
from the sixteenth century onwards, the intendant gradually became the 
administrative judge and the Conseil du Roi, apart from its traditional functions, 
presided over administrative complaints and actions brought by private individuals 
against the king concerning the policing of the kingdom.162 Subsequently, the Edict of 
Saint-Germain of 1641 formally recognised the specificity of administrative litigation 
by prohibiting the Parlements from presiding over matters which could concern the 
state, the administration or the government; nevertheless, despite this recognition one 
                                                
159 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 716-717. 
160 See Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue 
Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 716-717.  
161 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
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cannot deduce a true separation between administrative and private litigation during 
the Ancien Régime.163 Administrative litigation was shared haphazardly between, on 
the one hand, the true jurisdictions, the courts and the special jurisdictions, and, on the 
other hand, active administrative organs, which held administrative and jurisdictional 
competences simultaneously.164 
It is this confusion that was challenged during the Revolution and popular opinion 
demanded the elimination of the exceptional jurisdictions and the intendant. 165 How 
would the elimination of these offices be accommodated, though? Once again the 
separation of powers played a central role. The unity of jurisdiction, a corollary of the 
separation of powers, implied that the judicial function could only be performed by 
one branch and the function of deciding cases naturally fell to the judicial branch.166 
For the Assemblée the task of applying law to administrative action was no different 
to the application of law to private activities.167 Furthermore, in 1789 the specificity of 
administrative litigation in relation to administrative action was recognised; during 
the Revolution no one supported the idea that “to judge the administration is still 
administering”.168 The constituants and the members of the Assemblée were neither 
under the impression that judging the administration amounts to administering nor 
that administering includes judging the administration.169 Therefore references to any 
type of dispute or litigation, administrative or otherwise, implied the function of 
judges within the judiciary.170 Only one definition was possible in terms of the 
separation of powers and the revolutionary legislation: presiding over administrative 
                                                
163 717. 
164 717. 
165 717. 
166  Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 48-49; Chevallier J 
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Active (1970) 68. 
168 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 717. 
169 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 57. 
170 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 49; Chevallier J “Du Principe 
de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-
723 at 717. 
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litigation is simply judging, the natural function of the judiciary.171 In presiding over 
administrative litigation, the courts would remain within the limits of their sphere of 
competence and they would not be encroaching upon the administrative function.172 
Thus, in 1789 the intention of the majority of the Assemblée was for administrative 
litigation to be assimilated under judicial litigation.173 This was the solution to the 
unpopular system of administrative litigation that existed during the Ancien Régime. 
Nevertheless, although the definition of the judicial function was clear in this regard, 
its application was problematic.174 
 
4 6 2 2 2 The Will to Eliminate All Exceptional Jurisdictions  
 
The intention of eliminating all exceptional jurisdictions was evident from the 
onset, but the recognition of the specificity of administrative litigation meant that their 
elimination would be problematic.175 The First Constitutional Committee’s draft, 
presented by Bergasse on 17 August 1789, eliminated all exceptional jurisdictions in 
line with democratic demand. When this draft failed the Second Constitutional 
Committee proposed a different solution, whilst professing to have followed the 
Bergasse draft.  
                                                
171 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 57; 
Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 49. 
172 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 717. 
173  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 68; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 717. 
174 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 717. One argument holds that the constituants adopted a 
restrictive conception of the judicial function that implied the exclusion of administrative disputes 
from the onset: in considering that judges were appointed to protect only civil liberty, and not 
political liberty, or to apply civil law, and not political law, the constituants could have been 
expressing their intention to limit judicial competence to disputes between individuals; however, 
this interpretation advanced by Duguit has been criticised to the extent that the reference to 
political laws certainly includes constitutional laws (717). 
175  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 69-70; Chevallier J “Du Principe de 
Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 717-718. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 175  
On 22 December 1789 Thouret presented the Second Constitutional Committee’s 
draft which would also eliminate all exceptional jurisdictions. However, even though 
the report submitted that all litigation under the jurisdiction of the exceptional 
jurisdictions should be allocated to the ordinary courts, the complicated nature of a 
large kingdom meant that the courts would not be able to adjudicate matters of a 
certain nature without serious disadvantages.176 Therefore the committee proposed to 
establish a tribunal d’administration (“tribunal of the administration”) in each 
department, charged with presiding over litigation concerning the administration and 
taxation.177 This tribunal, composed of five elected judges and presiding over simple 
issues at no cost, would be competent to hear matters of taxation, public works, 
elections, and policing.178 Nevertheless, the proposed tribunal was a specialised 
tribunal within the judiciary.179 
Predictably, when the proposal was presented on 24 March, only the tribunal’s 
status as an exceptional jurisdiction was challenged in the Assemblée because this 
system would merely reinstate the multiplicity of tribunals which had prevailed during 
the Ancien Régime and which was rejected by the majority of the constituants and the 
public.180 Nevertheless, while the deputies staunchly defended the unity of jurisdiction 
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Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 718.  
180  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 70; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 718; Mestre 
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they were aware of the special character of administrative litigation.181 Thus, the 
constituants faced a dilemma: on the one hand, instituting specialised judicial 
tribunals was contrary to democratic demand and, on the other, allocating 
administrative litigation to the judiciary disregarded the specificity of administrative 
litigation.182 
The constituants subsequently agreed that the principles must be finalised before 
discussing the details of judicial organisation.183 To this end Barrère de Vieuzac 
provided a programme for discussion consisting of ten questions on 31 March 
1790.184 The ninth question enquired whether the same judges would decide all 
matters or whether there would be different jurisdictions for cases concerning 
commerce, administration, taxation and policing.185 Significantly, this question did 
not suggest the possibility of removing administrative litigation from the jurisdiction 
of the judiciary.186 The alternatives were limited to courts competent to preside over 
all matters and exceptional courts for specific categories of litigation where technical 
expertise would be required.187 When this question was submitted to the Assemblée on 
27 May for discussion, hostility toward exceptional tribunals resulted in postponement 
of the matter.188  
                                                                                                                                       
JL “Le Contentieux Administratif sous la Révolution Française d’après des Travaux Récents” 
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4 6 2 2 3 5 July 1790: The Question of the Tribunal of the Administration  
 
The debates and voting that took place on 5 July 1790 are crucial in the analysis of 
authors who challenge the traditional explanation. On 5 July the Constitutional 
Committee presented a new draft on the structure of the judiciary to the Assemblée189 
which included provisions proposing both the creation of a tribunal d’administration 
and the entrenchment of the separation of authorities.190 However, these proposals 
were treated independently and only the latter was voted upon and adopted in the Law 
of 16-24 August 1790. In particular, Heading 13 of the new draft, entitled “Judges for 
the litigation of administration and taxation”,191 proposed the institution of a tribunal 
d’administration, now consisting of three members.192 The suggestion of such a 
tribunal encountered the same opposition against the proliferation of jurisdictions as 
before, with concerns of high costs and conflicts of competence.193  
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On the 5th of July, the day that the draft was debated, Heading 13 was not 
discussed and Barrère de Vieuzac’s ninth question remained unaddressed and 
unresolved.194 Also, only the provisions that were presented during the debates were 
voted on195 and this included the measure that would later become Article 13.196 Thus, 
on the day that the provision that would later become Article 13 was adopted, the 
Assemblée had not as yet resolved the question of the allocation of administrative 
litigation.197 Later, on 12 August, the debate on the tribunal of the administration was 
adjourned again and on 16 August the law on judicial organisation was adopted, 
without Heading 13.198 Nevertheless, the majority of the measures were promulgated 
as law, including article 13 declaring the principle of the separation of authorities.199  
The implication of these events is that if a specialised administrative tribunal 
within the judiciary was so vehemently opposed, had the promulgation of the 
separation of authorities entailed a duality of jurisdictions, not merely specialisation 
within the judiciary, the supporters of the unity of jurisdiction would certainly have 
raised their concerns in the debates and would not have voted in favour of a system 
directly opposed to their foundational principles. 
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Some authors, such as Laferrière, Bonnard, Waline and Weil,200 claim that Article 
13, which prohibits judges from interfering with the activities of the administration, 
separated administrative and judicial litigation.201 Chevallier asserts that the debates 
prove that this view is completely inaccurate: partisans of the unity of jurisdiction 
adopted this view without the least discussion for it merely reaffirmed the separation 
of powers and the prohibition of the judiciary from performing administrative acts.202 
The problem of the allocation of administrative litigation, which had been set aside 
for the moment, remained in its entirety.203 
 
4 6 2 2 4 The Tribunal of the Administration: A Judicial Organ 
 
Chevallier points out that many notable authors on French administrative law204 
have wrongly believed that the tribunal d’administration was a true administrative 
jurisdiction, i.e. an independent jurisdiction competent to preside over administrative 
matters, and that its institution would have implemented the separation of the 
administrative jurisdiction and the active administration.205  However, Sandevoir, 
Chevallier and Mestre argue that the tribunal d’administration was merely a 
specialised judicial tribunal.206 The fact that the provision recommending such a 
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201  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71. See Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs 
et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 172. 
202  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71. See Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs 
et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 172. 
203  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71. 
204 Dareste, Laferrière, Duguit and Appleton. 
205  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 69. 
206  Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 56, 60; Chevallier J 
L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de 
l’Administration Active (1970) 69; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de 
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tribunal was inserted in the draft for the organisation of the judiciary, that Thouret 
claimed that the principles in the Bergasse draft had been followed, and that the 
debates of the most fervent supporters of the unity of jurisdiction only opposed the 
proliferation of jurisdictions and did not mention the separation of powers are cited as 
evidence that this tribunal would merely amount to a specialisation within the 
judiciary.207 As Sandevoir and Chevallier point out, the distinction between the 
ordinary courts and the tribunal d’administration was simply functional, not 
political.208 Thus, even if the tribunal d’administration had been instituted it would 
still have fallen within the judicial branch,209 as independent of the administration as 
the ordinary courts.210 Therefore, the proposition to institute this tribunal did not 
contradict the allocation of administrative litigation to the judiciary.211  
The nature of the tribunal d’administration is significant because it demonstrates 
that even the alternative solutions which were strongly opposed during the debates 
adhered to the unity of jurisdiction and the ordinary separation of powers. Even 
though administrative matters were decided in terms of different rules212 such matters 
nevertheless came within the judicial sphere due to the unity of jurisdiction.213 In 
terms of the prevailing principles it was theoretically possible to institute exceptional 
jurisdictions alongside the ordinary courts and within the judicial branch.214 However, 
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it was inconceivable to allocate the function of presiding over litigation to the 
executive.215 
 
4 6 2 2 5 The Import of the Law of 16-24 August 1790 
 
Chevallier explains quite clearly what the revolutionaries set out to achieve and 
what the limits of their intentions were concerning the separation of authorities.216 
Overall, there was a conscious attempt to prohibit and prevent all encroachments 
between the branches of state on the basis of the separation of powers. The separation 
of powers was understood narrowly, implying that each branch could exercise one 
function; this applied equally to the judiciary and the administration. Therefore, both 
the administration and the judiciary were formally prohibited from interfering with 
one another’s functional spheres. Preventing the judiciary from exceeding its mandate 
was the priority, though. 
However, this did not resolve all the problems related to the relationship between 
the administration and the judiciary. The Assemblée was still confronted with a 
dilemma dating from the Ancien Régime: should litigation between private individuals 
and the administration be allocated to the administrative or judicial branch? 
Consequently, the revolutionaries had to resolve the following question: does this type 
of litigation fall under the judicial function, the exclusive competence of the courts, or 
under the administrative function, the exclusive competence of the administration?217  
This question was not easily resolved, however, because the specificity of 
administrative litigation was recognised both in relation to administrative action and 
to judicial litigation.218 In other words, administrative litigation, administrative action 
and judicial litigation constituted three distinct, though overlapping, categories of 
state activity. Thus, the question was multipronged, but the Assemblée’s solution 
would not reflect the complexity of the matter.219 Since the constituants adhered to a 
dogmatic interpretation of the separation of powers, they were confined to two 
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choices: either administrative litigation is decided by tribunals within the judiciary,220 
or administrative litigation is decided by the administration itself. Thus, in terms of 
the conceptual framework of the time, there were two available solutions, neither of 
which was satisfactory; in both cases the specificity of administrative litigation would 
be undermined. Evidently, the singular problem of allocating administrative litigation 
could not be resolved by applying a narrow separation of powers alone. Nevertheless, 
the Assemblée constituante eventually settled on the administration which implied a 
return to the Ancien Régime’s merging of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration.221 
According to those authors who critique the traditional explanation, the debates of 
the Assemblée constituante make it clear that the Law of 16-24 August 1790 neither 
resolved the delicate problem of administrative litigation nor prohibited the ordinary 
courts from presiding over administrative litigation.222 The formulation adopted to 
prevent the courts from continuing the abuses of the Ancien Régime did not in any 
way anticipate the fate of administrative litigation, an issue which had not been 
resolved by 5 July or by the date that the Law of 16-24 August 1790 was 
promulgated.223 Thus the principle of the separation of authorities did not provide a 
solution to the problem of administrative litigation.224 
What was the scope of the separation of authorities in terms of such an analysis? 
Sandevoir argues that the constituants, in proclaiming the principle of the separation 
of authorities, were not referring to the duality of jurisdiction but exclusively to the 
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separation of powers; in turn, in proclaiming the separation of powers the constituants 
were not referring to a so-called French separation of powers, but exclusively to the 
separation of powers in the ordinary or narrow sense. 225  The distrust of the 
Parlements was absolutely independent of the existence of a justice administrative.226  
The act of presiding over administrative litigation was only added to the political 
abuses227 of the Ancien Régime in the nineteenth century.228 Sandevoir explains how, 
after the Revolution, the act of presiding over administrative litigation gradually came 
to be associated with the affirmation of the separation of authorities.229 However, the 
constituants did not take this link into consideration. In addition, initially there was no 
intention to allocate administrative litigation to the executive; the drafting of the Law 
of 22 December 1789 indicates that the litigious competence of administrative organs 
was not even considered.230 
Therefore, even though the Law of 16-24 August 1790 declared the principle of the 
separation of authorities the problem of the allocation of administrative litigation 
remained in its entirety.231 Article 13 expressing the separation of authorities only 
expounded the operation of the separation of powers in relation to the judiciary and 
administration’s relationship.232 Therefore, claims that the principle of the separation 
of authorities implies the duality of jurisdiction and that the separation of authorities is 
an expression of a French separation of powers are inaccurate.233  
 
                                                
225 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 52. 
226 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 46. This distrust certainly 
existed, but was relevant only as far as the separation of powers was infringed (46). 
227 In others words, encroachments contrary to the separation of powers. 
228 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 52. 
229 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 46, 54-56. 
230 This law did not express the French separation of powers, only the separation of powers in its 
ordinary sense (56-57). 
231 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 61; Troper M La Séparation 
des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 52; Chevallier J “Du Principe de 
Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 718. 
232 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 55. 
233 51, 52, 55. 
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4 7 The Principle of the Separation of the Administrative Jurisdiction and the 
Active Administration 
 
4 7 1 The Development of the Principle 
 
The principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration encompasses all the phases of the justice administrative’s evolution, 
from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century.234 Chevallier divides this evolution235 
into three major periods.236 During the first period, from the Middle Ages to An 
VIII,237 administrative and jurisdictional functions were merged; during the second, 
from 1799 to 1872,238 the principle progressed gradually; and during the third and 
final period, from 1872 to the twentieth century,239 the principle matured and came to 
be recognised as such. Thus, events such as the promulgation of the Edict of Saint-
Germain or the 1789 Revolution are included in the narrative of this principle. Each 
period is discussed briefly in order to identify the main events during this long 
evolution which would lead to the development of the principle. 
During the initial phase, the Ancien Régime, the administrative jurisdiction was 
unstable as the organs tasked with presiding over administrative litigation varied 
constantly.240 The decisive factor was the allocation of administrative litigation, the 
specificity of which was recognised early on.241 
                                                
234  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 32. 
235 According to Chevallier’s narrative of the justice administrative, the independence of the 
administrative jurisdiction is synonymous with the acceptance of the principle of the separation of 
the administrative jurisdiction and the active administration. Thus, on the whole, the development 
of the principle runs parallel to the evolution of the justice administrative. 
236  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 34. 
237  See Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 37-85. 
238  See Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 87-193. 
239  See Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 195-287. 
240 49 et seq. 
241 43 et seq. 
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Initially, the monarchy created special jurisdictions, linked to the administration 
and independent of the judiciary, to preside over administrative litigation. This was a 
response to the Parlements’ growing independence, towards the end of the thirteenth 
century, 242  since their adjudication of administrative matters was regarded as 
interference with royal power. Thus, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the 
separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active administration was in the 
process of being realised, despite a system of monarchical absolutism: all the 
contemporary requirements were known and only required development and 
synthesis.243 
However, this endeavour failed: from the sixteenth century 244  the special 
jurisdictions aligned with the judiciary, against the monarchy. Therefore, the 
monarchy withdrew the competence to hear administrative litigation from the 
judiciary and allocated it to the active administrative,245 a situation which would 
persist from the seventeenth century to the Revolution. From the middle of the 
seventeenth century the principle “juger l’administration, c’est encore administrer” 
dominated and efforts aimed at the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and 
the active administration stagnated.246 In terms of this principle, the administrative 
jurisdiction was merely the complement of the administrative function.247 Thus, the 
active administration and administrative jurisdiction were merged.248 The practices 
instituted in the sixteenth century persisted until the end of the Ancien Régime, 
                                                
242  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 50. See Uhler A Review of Administrative 
Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in 
France and the United States (1942) 9-10. 
243  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 53. 
244 54. 
245 50, 56. 
246  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 56. See 4 9 below on the principle “juger 
l’administration, c’est encore administrer”. 
247  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 57. 
248 62-63. 
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influencing thinking during the Revolution to such an extent that the constituants 
retained them.249 
During the Revolution, the point of departure, however, was that ordinary courts 
should have full jurisdiction and that all exceptional jurisdictions should be 
eliminated. 250  Therefore, from the onset, the constituants intended to allocate 
administrative litigation to the judiciary, that is, to incorporate administrative 
litigation with judicial litigation. 251  Accordingly, the Assemblée Constituante 
abolished the intendants on 22 December 1789 and exceptional jurisdictions on 7 
September 1790.252 Nevertheless, administrative litigation was incorporated with the 
administrative function and allocated to the active administration.253 In fact, although 
the Revolution provided a clean slate for constitutional innovation, the practices of the 
Ancien Régime persisted, a situation Chevallier calls “le conformisme 
révolutionnaire” (“revolutionary conformism”). 254  The characterisation of the 
Revolution as a period of conformism with the Ancien Régime contrasts strongly with 
the traditional explanation. 
Statutes such as the Law of 6, 7-11 September 1790 and the Law of 7-14 October 
1790 allocated competences to the local and central administration, respectively, 
which fell within the sphere of the judiciary in terms of the separation of powers.255 
This infringement of the principles was not justified by the prevailing conceptions of 
the Revolution:256 the solution was contrary to democratic demand, contrary to the 
revolutionary conception of the separation of powers, contrary to the preceding 
debates, and contrary to the published bills; nevertheless, it was adopted without 
                                                
249 63. 
250 65. 
251 68 et seq. 
252  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 65; Burdeau F Histoire du Droit Administratif 
(de la Révolution au début des années 1970) (1995) 41. 
253  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71-76. 
254  Own translation, Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la 
Juridiction Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 65-84. See Mestre JL “Le 
Contentieux Administratif sous la Révolution Française d’après des Travaux Récents” (1996) 
Revue Française de Droit Administratif 289-300 at 290. 
255 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 57. 
256 57. 
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discussion.257 The idea that judging the administration amounts to the judiciary 
administering or that the administrative function includes judging the administration 
was not then supported.258 The only definition possible in terms of the separation of 
powers, and the legislation promulgated during the Revolution, was that presiding 
over administrative litigation amounts to adjudication, a judicial function.259  
Other reasons justified such a drastic deviation from the separation of powers. The 
reasons for this surprising turnaround in relation to the initial principles are difficult to 
identify, though.260 Chevallier argues that a combination of factors justified a solution 
evidently in conflict with revolutionary principles.261 
The revolutionaries were aware of the shortcomings of judicial solutions proposed 
by August 1790.262 On the one hand, the specificity of administrative litigation 
precluded, as Thouret had indicated, allocating this type of litigation to ordinary 
courts and, on the other, the institution of any specialised court was contrary to the 
unity of jurisdiction and seemed like a return to the exceptional jurisdictions of the 
                                                
257  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71, 75; Chevallier J “Du Principe de 
Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 719. 
258 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 57; 
Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de 
Droit Administratif 712-723 at 717. 
259 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 57. 
260  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 720. 
According to Chevallier, several explanations are clearly incorrect and should be disregarded 
(Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative 
et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71-72): firstly, Esmein’s contention that one trend of thought 
did not exclude the incorporation of administrative litigation with the administrative function is 
unconvincing: the majority intended that the judiciary hear administrative litigation. Secondly, 
Duguit’s view that the Assemblée removed administrative litigation from the competence of the 
judiciary relies on a false assumption since political laws would have included constitutional laws. 
Finally, since the members of the Assemblée insisted on the unity of jurisdiction, any theory 
explaining this incorporation based on the separation of powers can be discounted. 
261  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 71. 
262  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 74; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
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Ancien Régime, to which the constituants were fundamentally opposed.263  This 
dilemma would be the decisive factor in the allocation of administrative litigation to 
the active administration. 
Pezous’s brief provided an alternative solution, which served as a catalyst, to the 
binary impasse: he argued, since either judicial solution was unacceptable, that the 
newly-created local administrative organs should preside over administrative disputes, 
in addition to their administrative tasks.264 The justification for this proposition was 
that these institutions were democratic, that is, composed of elected officials, and that 
they could make decisions speedily, free of charge and without formalism.265 These 
are the practical reasons which were identified to justify the infringement of the 
separation of powers.266 Pezous countered reservations of the active administration as 
jurisdiction by pointing out that its democratic officials rendered it as impartial and as 
independent as the judiciary, whose judges were elected in the same way:267 he was 
confident that these administrators, as elected representatives, would conduct 
themselves equitably and would not hesitate to denounce the administration.268  
Nevertheless, some authors argue that administrative litigation was incorporated 
with the administrative function by Montesquieu, in terms of the “political” or 
“French” conception of the separation of powers. However, Chevallier argues that this 
                                                
263  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 74; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
264  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 74, 75; Chevallier J “Du Principe de 
Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 721. 
265  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 75; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
266 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. See Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire 
Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 56. 
267  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 75. 
268 Mestre JL “Le Contentieux Administratif sous la Révolution Française d’après des Travaux 
Récents” (1996) Revue Française de Droit Administratif 289-300 at 291. 
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analysis is inaccurate.269 While it is possible to interpret Montesquieu so as to exclude 
administrative litigation from the competence of the judiciary, the revolutionaries, 
who interpreted the separation of powers very strictly, certainly did not adhere to this 
interpretation. Whereas there may be a French conception of the separation of powers, 
this conception resulted from the revolutionary legislation and did not constitute the 
inspiration for this legislation. Far from being an illustration of the separation of 
powers, the allocation of administrative litigation to the active administration was a 
clear violation of the separation of powers, as initially understood by the 
revolutionaries:270 the jurisdictional function was intended for the judiciary alone and 
no diverging view was presented at the Assemblée before July 1790.271 This is 
significant in itself for Chevallier acknowledges that the separation of powers is 
susceptible to an interpretation as radically different as the French system’s, but this is 
not what motivated the Assemblée to adopt the system it did. 
Pezous’s position, in addition to secondary factors,272 justified the decision to 
allocate administrative litigation to the administration. 273  Accordingly, the 
constituants allocated the majority of administrative litigation to the active 
administration. Thus, there was a complete departure from the initial principles in the 
process, from the unity of jurisdiction to the principle “to judge the administration is 
still administering”, a principle of the Ancien Régime. The latter is the only principle 
which could rationalise, in theory, the Law of 6, 7-11 September 1790, but only in 
retrospect. 
                                                
269  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 72. 
270  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 72; Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et 
l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 57. 
271 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 720. 
272 Other explanations for the decision to allocate administrative litigation to the administration 
served as factors, according to Chevallier, but were not decisive (Chevallier J L’Élaboration 
Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de l’Administration 
Active (1970) 72-74; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 
Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 720-721). These factors were the recollection 
of the abuses of the Parlements, the principles of the independence of the administration and “to 
judge the administration is still administering”, and the traditions of the Ancien Régime. 
273  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 75. 
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The classification of administrative and judicial litigation for allocation purposes 
was not arbitrary. 274 On the contrary, the eventual division revealed an awareness of 
the specificity of administrative litigation. The judicial function amounted to a 
mechanical application of the law, a syllogism. 275  Therefore, any decision not 
susceptible to such a mechanical application of the law fell into a category which 
could not be allocated to the judiciary. 276 Matters which fell outside the judicial 
power were those where the administration enjoyed a certain pouvoir or latitude 
d’appéciation, a so-called “power” or “scope of appreciation”.277 The scope of 
appreciation excluded strict conformity to the law.278 Wherever the administration 
enjoyed such a discretionary power the courts were unable to judge the matter by 
means of a strict application of the law because the litigious facts could not be brought 
under any law.279 Thus these matters fell outside the judicial power’s sphere of 
competence.280 For courts to have jurisdiction, it was absolutely necessary that the 
activities of the administration were capable of constituting facts capable of being 
brought under a law.281 Thus one observes the emergence, beyond the incidental 
reasons, of a material or intrinsic definition of administrative litigation.282 
Nevertheless, the specificity of administrative litigation was negated by its 
allocation to the administration, even though the division was made on the basis of the 
                                                
274 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
275 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 172. In 
terms of the separation of powers judges were not even permitted to interpret the law and were 
obliged to refer questions of interpretation to the legislature (170-172). 
276 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 172. 
277 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 174; 
Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de 
Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
278 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
279 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 174; 
Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de 
Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
280 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
281 Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française (1980) 172. 
282 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 721. 
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specificity of administrative litigation. Thus, through the denial of an independent 
administrative jurisdiction, the problem of allocating administrative litigation, a 
problem identified during the Ancien Régime and Revolution, remained in its 
entirety.283 
As a result of the system implemented during the Revolution administrative 
litigation was treated as administrative action.284 The solution adopted during the 
Revolution eventually led to the modern duality of jurisdiction, but, at first, it 
prevented the development of an independent administrative jurisdiction.285 Thus, the 
revolutionary institutions were characterised by a merging of functions. 286 This 
implied that the administration would be the judge in its own cause,287 which was, in 
principle, unacceptable.288 
The maxim “to judge the administration is still administering”, dating from the 
Ancien Régime, proved to be a theoretical justification for the revolutionary system in 
                                                
283  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 75. 
284  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 76; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 722. 
285 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 722. 
286  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 80. 
287 In contravention of the maxim nemo iudex in sua causa. 
288  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 80-81. The constituants’ interpretation of the 
separation of powers was the reason behind the merging of the active administration and the 
administrative jurisdiction (81). While the doctrine did not play a role in the Assemblée’s decision 
to incorporate administrative litigation with the administrative function, since logically 
administrative litigation should have been assimilated with judicial litigation, it did determine 
which institution should preside over administrative litigation. The constituants’ strict 
interpretation of the separation of powers implied that each function should be performed by one 
branch; to the extent that administrative litigation was incorporated with the administrative 
function it had to be performed by the branch which exercised this function, namely the 
administration. Thus the separation of powers played a negative role by prohibiting an organ 
specialised in administrative litigation. 
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the following manner.289 The merging of functions, which were distinct in the 
constituants’ view, and the system of the administrateur-juge were justified by a 
growing belief in the close connection between administrative litigation and 
administrative action. Since litigation resulted from administrative action, judging an 
administrative dispute amounted to the extension of the administrative action and the 
continuation of administration. Therefore the argument developed that it was 
necessary to allocate administrative litigation to the active administration.  
Although the principle “to judge the administration is still administering” and its 
rationalisation of the merging of functions had not yet been explicitly formulated 
during the Revolution, it had an underlying influence; the solution adopted by the 
constituants had the effect of reinforcing a thesis with which they were at complete 
odds.290 
According to Chevallier, the system for administrative litigation implemented 
during the Revolution was characterised by its conformity to the Ancien Régime, 
despite the initial desire for fundamental change. 291  In fact, the merging of 
administrative litigation and administrative action was now more systematised and 
complete than before and, thus, the Revolution regressed from the monarchical 
traditions of the Ancien Régime.292 Accordingly, by 1799 little progress had been 
made towards establishing an independent administrative jurisdiction and therefore 
the principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration did not exist.293 According to Chevallier’s analysis the originality of 
the revolutionary solution was minimal,294 in direct opposition to the traditional 
explanation’s characterisation of the revolutionary system as fundamentally novel. 
                                                
289  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 81; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 722. 
290  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 81; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au 
Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 722. 
291  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 83-84. 
292 66, 80, 84. 
293 37-63, 80. 
294 84. 
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Between 1799 and 1872 the principle progressed significantly.295 From 1799 
organic and formal distinctions between the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration were realised.296 Chevallier and Bénoit argue that a partial separation 
between the administrative jurisdiction and the administration was effected with the 
creation of the conseils and a process of internal specialisation.297 Specialised organs, 
endowed with a degree of formal and organic independence, were now presiding over 
administrative litigation while respecting the independence of the administration.298 
Although the purpose of this reform was to separate administrative and jurisdictional 
functions, it did not signal the end of the merging of functions: the principle “to judge 
the administration is still administering” was yet to reach its pinnacle during the July 
Monarchy. Nevertheless, even though the administrative jurisdiction remained within 
the administration, administrative litigation was now the task of specialised organs. 
This did not imply that the separation of jurisdiction and of administrative action was 
complete, however, in theory or practice.299  
During the Reformation the fundamental idea that administrative litigation is 
linked to administrative action was developed doctrinally and formulated as a 
principle, expressed in the maxim “to judge the administration is still 
administering”.300 From 1799-1870 the principle played an essential role in French 
positive law by justifying and maintaining the strong link between the administrative 
jurisdiction and administrative action.301 The dominance of the principle “to judge the 
                                                
295 89-90, 193. 
296  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 91-130; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif 
Français (1968) 283-284. 
297  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 89-90, 193; Chevallier J “Du Principe de 
Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 
at 722; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 283-284. 
298  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 193. 
299 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 722. 
300  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 97. 
301  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 99. Henrion de Pansey systematised this 
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administration is still administering” was finally undermined during the Second 
Republic.302 Until 1872 the system of the administrateur-juge prevailed, though.303 
With the Law of 24 May 1872 the principle of justice retenue came to an end and 
was replaced with the principle of justice délégué.304 Article 9 of this law conferred a 
true power of jurisdiction on the Conseil d’État which meant that it could rule 
sovereignly on matters of administrative litigation.305 With this the principle “to judge 
the administration is still administering” was rejected, but the administrative 
jurisdiction’s newly acquired independence was still limited and the theory of the 
administrateur-juge remained.306  
The theory of the ministre-juge still applied until it was definitively rejected in the 
case of Cadot, 13 December 1889.307 By 1905 the theory of justice retenue had been 
rejected; administrative judges had been granted a degree of independence; the theory 
of the ministre-juge was abandoned; and the remnants of the administrateur-juge were 
eliminated.308 However, the independence of the administrative judge did not exclude 
                                                                                                                                       
principle and, paradoxically, found support in the Law of 16-24 August 1790. According to him 
the executive is simultaneously the judge of the utility of its measures and of the complaints which 
these measures may cause; in other words, one can administer in two ways: by means of 
ordinances in the form of law and by decisions in the form of judgments. Thus, administrative 
litigation is a component of administering, and the right to rule on administrative litigation derives 
from the right to administering. (Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation 
de la Juridiction Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 97-98; Chevallier J “Du 
Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française de Droit 
Administratif 712-723 at 722.) 
302  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 98-99. 
303 131-158. 
304  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 199 et seq.; Uhler A Review of Administrative 
Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in 
France and the United States (1942) 16. 
305 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 723. 
306  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 197-198. 
307 219-243. 
308 283. 
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the preservation of organic and functional links with the active administration, by 
means of which the specificity of the administrative jurisdiction is apparent.309 
 
4 7 2 The Nature and Value of the Principle  
 
Chevallier discusses three main characteristics of the principle of the separation of 
the administrative jurisdiction and the active administration,310 which are indicative of 
its nature: firstly, the principle as such is not entrenched in any legal text, but is 
deduced from the rule of law; secondly, the principle is ambiguous; and, thirdly, the 
principle is functional. 
No legal text entrenches the principle as such, but it has been acknowledged by 
several commissaires du gouvernement. 311  In addition, contemporary doctrine is 
virtually unanimous that the principle is a general principle that explains the nature of 
the administrative jurisdiction as well as the corresponding body of jurisprudence.312  
Since the principle has no textual foundation, Chevallier argues that it can only be 
a deduced principle.313 He deduces the principle from the rule-of-law requirement that 
the jurisdictional function must be performed by an independent organ. If the active 
administration and the administrative jurisdiction are not separated, i.e. if the 
administrative jurisdiction is not independent, the administration will act as its own 
judge and resort to arbitrary rule. This independence is particularly important where 
the inequality between the litigants is significant, as is the case when the 
administration is party to litigation. Thus the principle is a manifestation of the rule of 
law, determined deductively; the principle aims to establish a relationship between the 
administrative jurisdiction and the active administration analogous to that between the 
judiciary and the administration. 
                                                
309 Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue Française 
de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 723.  
310  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 13-33. 
311 13, 16. 
312 13. 
313 17, 18, 291. 
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Since the principle is deduced, it also has an ambiguous nature, by implication.314 
By requiring the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration, the principle prohibits the administration from interfering with the 
administrative jurisdiction and, likewise, also prohibits the administrative jurisdiction 
from interfering with the administration.315 Thus, the principle can be reduced to two 
complementary principles, although they seem contradictory: the independence of the 
administrative jurisdiction and the independence of the active administration, 
respectively. 316  This ambiguity is the raison d’être of the principle for if the 
independence of only one branch is established in relation to the other, either judges 
would control administrators or the administration would act arbitrarily.317  The 
independence of the branches is interconnected.318 
The principle results from the intention to balance or establish an equilibrium 
between two ideals, the one guaranteeing the autonomy of the administrative 
jurisdiction and the other reserving a margin of decision-making for the 
administration.319 It is only once the independence of the administration and the 
administrative jurisdiction are equally secured that there is a separation.320 The two 
concerns of the principle are often in direct conflict and numerous fluctuating factors, 
mostly political, influence the equilibrium.321 Thus the equilibrium is dynamic and 
unstable. 
                                                
314 18. 
315 The result is that the principle can be cited for various and contradictory reasons (Chevallier J 
L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de 
l’Administration Active (1970) 13). 
316  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 13, 18. See Hauriou M Précis de Droit 
Administratif et de Droit Public (2002, 12th ed) 334-336. 
317  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 18, 291. 
318 20. 
319 20, 25. 
320  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 20-21. However, how to even determine 
whether the independence of the administration and administrative jurisdiction is adequately 
protected to establish an equilibrium is extremely difficult; there is considerable disagreement on 
which criteria are relevant (21). 
321  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 20. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 197  
The principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration is functional because its content cannot be determined in absolute, 
static and abstract terms; its content is uncertain, varies and is determined empirically, 
often a posteriori.322 Initially, the principle was invoked in order to stimulate the 
evolution of the justice administrative and, subsequently, to explain a body of 
jurisprudence: it is precisely the indeterminacy of the principle that renders it capable 
of accounting for the evolution of the relationship between the administrative 
jurisdiction and the active administration.323 The principle stimulates development 
and has a guiding and explanatory role. 324 Thus the principle is useful in prompting 
development, but incapable of determining all the conditions necessary for the 
independence of the administrative jurisdiction and administration or defining the 
scope of a particular incidence of the principle.325 
The value of the principle lies in its capacity to explain the different phases of the 
historical evolution of the justice administrative: all reforms find expression in this 
principle.326 Nevertheless, although the principle is useful to analyse the changing 
relationship between the active administration and the administrative jurisdiction, it 
cannot in itself explain the whole of the present system: the principle should not be 
taken to its logical conclusion, but understood as a compromise between opposing 
forces.327 With reference to Hauriou, Chevallier emphasises that the principle is 
relative and that the French system is above all a system of compromise.328 
 
                                                
322 25, 26, 292. 
323 26. 
324 30, 293. 
325 292. 
326 32. 
327  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 32, 294. Similarly, the pure separation of 
powers should not be understood and applied in an absolute sense. Not only is the absolute 
separation of the branches inefficient, but it excludes the possibility of checks and balances 
328  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 286. 
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4 8 The French Conception of the Separation of Powers as a Theory of the 
Nineteenth Century 
 
Serge Velley claims that the idea of a French conception of the separation of 
powers is a historical reconstruction formulated by public-law specialists during the 
nineteenth century. 329  Although it was unknown to the revolutionaries, this 
reconstruction has led to the characterisation of the justice administrative as ancient 
and implied.330 
Velley points out that Troper has demonstrated that a so-called French conception 
of the separation of powers is unfounded. 331  Troper indicates that during the 
Enlightenment the separation of powers was largely a negative prohibition in 
condemning the accumulation of two or more state functions within one organ; any 
distribution of functions was possible from that point of departure as the history of 
French constitutions demonstrates. 332 The constituants all acknowledged the 
fundamental character of the separation of powers, but were divided over its 
application.333 In addition, the constituants required more than a year after the 
promulgation of the separation of powers to find a solution for the problem of 
administrative litigation; the propositions were so varied that they eventually settled 
for an unforeseen solution, namely, the allocation to the administration of litigation 
strictly defined by law.334 Under these circumstances it seems highly unlikely that the 
constituants adhered to a particular conception of the separation of powers or that a 
particular conception could prevail. 
                                                
329 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 775. 
330 775. 
331 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 775. See Troper M La Séparation des Pouvoirs et l’Histoire Constitutionnelle Française 
(1980) 172. 
332 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 775-776, 776 n 36.  
333 776. 
334 776. 
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The idea of a “French conception” of the separation of powers only appeared after 
1840. 335  In response to parliamentary and liberal opposition contesting the 
administrative jurisdiction’s existence, the French conception was introduced to 
reinforce the legality and the legitimacy of the administrative jurisdiction.336 The 
manual of Chauveau, published in 1841, appears to be the first text to justify the 
existence of the administrative jurisdiction on the basis of the separation of 
administrative and judicial authorities presented expressly as the direct consequence 
of a particular interpretation of the separation of powers.337 Subsequently, this thesis 
was developed by Vivien and adopted as doctrine, before benefiting from the 
endorsement of Laferrière.338 Since then the French conception has been adopted by 
other notable authors such as Duguit, Barthélémy and Carré de Malberg; furthermore, 
the vast majority of public-law specialists has accepted it as doctrine.339 
 
4 9 “Juger l’Administration c’est aussi Administrer” and “Juger 
l’Administration, c’est encore Administrer”340 
 
According to Sandevoir, the principle “to judge the administration is also 
administering”341 is the raison d’être for and embodies the French conception of the 
                                                
335 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 776; Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 Revue 
Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712, 712 n 12. 
336 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 776. 
337 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 777. See Chevallier J “Du Principe de Séparation au Principe de Dualité” (1990) no. 5 
Revue Française de Droit Administratif 712-723 at 712 n 12. 
338 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783 at 777-778. 
339 778. 
340 “To judge the administration is also administering” and “to judge the administration is still [or 
only] administering” (own translation), respectively. 
341  This is distinguishable from the maxim “to judge the administration is still [or only] 
administering” mentioned in the preceding sections. 
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justice administrative. 342  Sandevoir emphasises the use of the term “justice 
administrative” as opposed to “administrative litigation” alone because the principle 
“to judge the administration is also administering” does not merely explain the 
existence of a particular type of litigation relating to administrative matters, but the 
system of the justice administrative as a whole.343 In the leading text344 on this 
principle, Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction,345 Sandevoir explains the 
content of the principle and how the principle characterised debates on the justice 
administrative after the Revolution. In this section Sandevoir’s position on the 
principle is set out. 
Sandevoir argues that even though the separation of powers, the unity of 
jurisdiction, France’s tradition of centralisation, and the distrust of the judicial 
tribunals influenced the Assemblée Nationale at the creation of the justice 
administrative, none of these factors was decisive.346 Instead, the maxim “to judge the 
administration is also administering” was the driving force; this principle is unrelated 
to article 13 of the Law of 16-24 August 1790.347 
The discussions of the Assemblée indicate that, from the onset of the Revolution, 
administrative litigation was regarded as indivisible from the administrative function 
and the administrative jurisdiction was seen as participating in administrative 
action.348 These ideas were encapsulated in the principle “to judge the administration 
is also administering”, although this principle was as yet undeveloped.  
The content of the principle was clarified during the early nineteenth century.349 In 
1818 Sirey argued that the function of dispensing administrative justice completes and 
perfects administrative action and that those who supported the allocation of that 
function to an independent court, rather than the king, had not considered this 
                                                
342 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 49, 69, 434-436; Chapus R 
Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 771; Chapus R Droit du Contentieux Administratif 
(2004, 11th ed) 42. 
343 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 79. 
344 See Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 42-49; Droit du Contentieux 
Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 42. 
345 Published in 1964.  
346 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 49. 
347 49. 
348 75.  
349 77-79. 
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attribute.350 Likewise, Henrion de Pansey said that, in the person of the king, the 
competence to judge derives from the competence to administer, and the office of 
judge derives from the office of administrator.351 Also, to provide for the execution of 
law, the security of the state, the maintenance of public order, and the needs of 
society, by ordinance, is to administer; and to judge the complaints caused by these 
ordinances and the legal disputes caused by the application of ordinances is “also” 
administering. In 1828 Joseph Marie-Portalis also described this foundational 
principle in reference to certain litigious matters which have both a judicial and 
administrative nature: there are questions of a mixed nature which cannot be decided 
by the courts without compromising administrative action and, even, constitutional 
order itself. In 1834 he stated that the administration does not stop administering even 
when it rules on litigious matters and that the jurisdiction which the administration 
exercises is the complement of administrative action. 352  Thus the foundational 
principle of the justice administrative was formulated. 
The principle “to judge the administration is also administering” has diverse 
origins.353 On the one hand, the principle is derived from the superimposition of 
revolutionary liberalism onto a French tradition of state control and centralisation. On 
the other, the principle reflects the duality of the administrative judge’s function, for 
as the judge who presides over administrative matters participates in administrative 
activity he also participates in the jurisdictional function. The principle “to judge the 
administration is also administering” contains three elements which reflect the 
traditions from which it derives and which reconciles this dual function.354  
Firstly, the normative element, derived from a tradition of centralisation, resulted 
in a distinct body of rules for administrative litigation.355 The first incidence of the 
normative element was the constituants’ realisation that administrative matters, 
having a singular nature, require particular rules,356 i.e. an autonomous and distinct 
                                                
350 Quoted by Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 77. 
351 Quoted by Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 77. 
352 Quoted by Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 78-79. 
353 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 80. 
354 80, 298. 
355 80-82. 
356 Particular rules were required for administrative matters in order to prevent individual interests 
from superseding the general interest (Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction 
(1964) 83). 
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“administrative law”.357 This fundamental idea was the initial driving force behind the 
creation of the justice administrative. 
Secondly, the material element, derived from liberalism, is concerned with the 
impact of administrative litigation on the general interest.358 Therefore this element 
has both a positive and negative effect on the operation of the principle “to judge the 
administration is also administering” depending on the type of administrative 
litigation. On the one hand, in the event of an administrative dispute where the 
decision to intervene will affect administration generally, the principle will have a 
positive effect and attribute the competence to preside over the dispute to the 
specialised judge. On the other hand, the principle will have a negative effect if it 
appears that the decision to intervene will not influence administration; consequently, 
the ordinary courts will preside over the case despite the administrative origin of the 
dispute. In the case of the latter, individual interests will not threaten the general 
interest and therefore the judge presiding over a matter caused by administrative 
action will neither be reconciling general and individual interests nor participating in 
public administration. Thus the rationale for a specialised administrative jurisdiction 
is absent. 
In addition, the material element has two significant implications for the scope and 
determination of administrative competence. Firstly, whether the administrative 
jurisdiction or judiciary is competent to hear an administrative dispute depends on the 
nature of the administrative litigation. The nature of administrative litigation is 
flexible and this flows from the principle. Thus, the same dispute caused by 
administrative activity may at one point in time fall within the competence of the 
administrative jurisdiction and at another within the competence of the judiciary. 
Therefore the scope of administrative competence fluctuates. 
Secondly, due to the fluctuating nature of administrative competence, the 
determination of administrative competence involves a continuous process of 
delimitation and permanent difficulties. 359 This also flows from the principle. The 
scope of the competences cannot be determined absolutely, without negating the 
                                                
357 This line of reasoning would culminate with the decision of Blanco, TC 8 February 1873. 
358 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 80, 82-87. 
359 According to Sandevoir, the only criterion according to which this determination is made is the 
extent to which the judge participates in administrative activity (Études sur le Recours de Pleine 
Juridiction (1964) 86).  
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foundational principle of the justice administrative. Thus the principle “to judge the 
administration is also administering” results, firstly, in decisions, concerning the 
scope of administrative litigation, which are transitory and secondly, requires, for the 
determination of this scope, a specific method for the classification of competences 
which requires an analysis of the administrative matters in question. 
Finally, there is the organic element which reconciles the ideals of administration 
and jurisdiction (or justice) in the system of juge-administrateur.360 In terms of a 
perfectly functioning justice administrative the administrative judge defends both 
justice and administration. The administrative judge protects the rights of the 
individual against the administration, while conscious that the individual invokes a 
personal interest against a defendant concerned with the general interest. In this way 
the administrative judge assesses the value and scope of the general interest which is 
an administrative function. Therefore, the organic element reconciles the dual 
function of the ideal justice administrative by combining justice and administration, it 
combines the two functions of the administrative judge concerned with the general 
interest by combining administering and judging, and it requires a specific type of 
judge, the juge-administrateur. 
Sandevoir explains how the separation of powers and the unity of jurisdiction 
prevented the development of an organic element until Napoleon’s reforms of 
1799.361 The debates indicate that between 1789 and 1790 the members of the 
Assemblée were unable to decide whether the executive or judicial branch is the 
appropriate organ to preside over administrative litigation. There were three stated 
alternatives: the administrateur-juge, royal judges and tribunaux d’administration.  
The difficulty arose because administrative litigation displayed characteristics of 
two opposing, and mutually exclusive functions, namely, the administrative and 
jurisdictional functions. Therefore, it was necessary to find an organ which could 
reconcile the two functions, but the three options were all unsatisfactory. The 
indecision of the constituants over the administrative jurisdiction is indicative of the 
hybrid nature of administrative litigation which required a jurisdictional organ of a 
                                                
360 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 80, 88-93. See Chapus R Droit 
du Contentieux Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 44. See 4 7 2 above on the ambiguous nature of the 
principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active administration. 
361 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 89-93. 
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hybrid character. This is the organic element of the principle “to judge the 
administration is also administering”. 
The organic element developed during Napoleon’s reign: after the creation of the 
Conseil d’État and the Conseils de Préfecture in 1799 the active administration and 
the administrative jurisdiction were gradually differentiated. Napoleon increasingly 
recognised that there was a degree of discretionary power,362 an administrative 
capacity, within administrative activity which characterised administrative litigation; 
therefore administrative litigation had to be allocated to an organ which was 
simultaneously administrative and jurisdictional.363 
These ideas were expressed by Napoleon to the Conseil d’État in 1806:364 
 
“I require a special tribunal for the judgment of public functionaries, for appeals from the 
conseils de préfecture ... for certain violations of the law by the State ... for large commercial 
concerns the State may have as the proprietor of land and as administrator. In all of these there 
is an inevitable discretion: I want to institute a semi-administrative, semi-judicial corps which 
will regulate the employment of this part of discretion necessary in the administration of the 
State; one cannot leave this discretion solely in the hands of the sovereign, because he will 
exercise it badly or neglect to exercise it. In the first case, there will be tyranny, the worst evil 
for a civilised people; in the second case, the government will be despised. This administrative 
tribunal can be called conseil des parties, or conseil des dépêches, or conseil du 
contentieux.”365 
 
Thus Napoleon was able to establish the organic element and counter the 
separation of power’s negative effect on the development of the administrative 
jurisdiction.366 
These three elements constitute the content of the principle “to judge the 
administration is also administering” which is the foundation of the French justice 
                                                
362 “[I]l existe dans l’activité administrative une portion particulière de pouvoir ‘arbitraire’ – c’est 
à dire, on le sait, de faculté d’appréciation” (Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine 
Juridiction (1964) 91 (emphasis added)). 
363 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 91. 
364 92. 
365 Quoted in Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 92 (own translation). 
See Chapus R Droit du Contentieux Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 43. 
366 Sandevoir P Études sur le Recours de Pleine Juridiction (1964) 92. 
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administrative, in terms of Sandevoir’s analysis.367 The French justice administrative 
cannot be reduced to the application of a single factor operating in isolation, but it 
results from the interaction of the normative, material and organic elements which are 
in themselves complex.368  
Chapus endorses Sandevoir’s characterisation of the justice administrative and 
links the principle to specific characteristics of the present system. 369  The 
administrative jurisdiction is the consequence of a specifically French conception of 
the justice administrative in terms of which an administrative judge must both be 
specialised in administrative matters and have the mindset of an administrator, 
conscious that the decision must complement administrative action. 370  This 
conception follows from the idea that presiding over administrative litigation is still 
administering. 371 In addition an equilibrium between the needs of the administration 
and private rights and interests is required. Chapus states that it could well be this 
objective of equilibrium and conciliation that Napoleon defined when he expressed 
the need for a Conseil d’État that is “a semi-administrative, semi-judicial corps”, that 
is, an organ which combines and harmonises the “spirit of administration” and the 
“sense of justice”.372 
The principle has also been given concrete expression in practice and ensures that 
administrative judges have the necessary qualities to defend administrative justice. 
Firstly, the principle rationalises the dual function of the Conseil d’État as the adviser 
and judge of the administration. Secondly, the principle explains how administrative 
                                                
367 92. 
368 93. 
369 Chapus R Droit du Contentieux Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 42-49. 
370 42. 
371 Chapus refers to the formulation “c’est encore administrer” (emphasis added), but does not 
distinguish between “juger l’administration, c’est encore administrer” and “juger l’administration 
c’est aussi administrer”; he specifically cites Sandevoir as the leading authority, see Chapus R 
Droit du Contentieux Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 42-49. Chapus acknowledges (43) that such a 
conception of the justice administrative entails inherent institutional risks that could result in an 
administrative jurisdiction that is subservient to the administration and overly concerned with the 
demands of administration. This imbalance occurred in the past. However, progressively an 
equilibrium was attained between the needs of administration and private interests as norms 
evolved, particularly in the sense that the general interest cannot be guaranteed unless the concern 
for the needs of administrative action is intertwined with the concern for redressing damages 
suffered by citizens. 
372 Chapus R Droit du Contentieux Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 43. 
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judges, unlike ordinary judges, fall within the ambit of the general statute of the 
public service. Finally, the principle also explains the content of the statute of 
administrative judges. Administrative judges are recruited from the ÉNA by concours, 
in the same way as active administrators. The practice of the tour extérieur integrates 
active administrators in the administrative jurisdiction; there are also numerous 
opportunities to perform functions other than one’s principle focus, such as the 
obligation de mobilité in terms of which members of the administrative jurisdiction 
and active administrators perform activities different to their principle task for a 
period of two years. 
Chevallier endorses Sandevoir’s analysis to a limited extent.373 Chapus endorses 
Sandevoir’s view in full while referring to the principle “to judge the administration is 
still administering”,374 however, thereby equating the two maxims. Chevallier, by 
contrast, distinguishes between “to judge the administration is also administering”, as 
employed by Sandevoir, and “to judge the administration is still administering”.375 In 
terms of the latter administrative litigation is an extension of administrative action and 
an administrative function.376 
Chevallier agrees with Sandevoir that the administrative jurisdiction is within the 
administration and not completely separated from the administration. He also agrees 
with Sandevoir that this institutional structure is based on a historical compromise 
between two opposing trends. However, Chevallier critiques Sandevoir for his use of 
ambiguous terminology. For instance, he confuses two principles by citing authors in 
favour of the principle “to judge the administration is still administering” in support of 
                                                
373  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 30-31. 
374 Chapus R Droit du Contentieux Administratif (2004, 11th ed) 42. However, Gaudemet refers to 
the principle “to judge the administration is also administering” and circumscribes it as the 
conception relative to the very nature of the contentieux administratif which justified the idea to 
allocate litigious affairs of the administration to organs within the administration itself (Gaudemet 
Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 329). 
375  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 31, 31 n 79, 97 n 26. 
376 For instance, this principle was employed by the partisans of the merging of the administrative 
jurisdiction and the active administration, early in the nineteenth century, and implies that in 
judging the administration, the administrative judge merely administers (Chevallier J 
L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction Administrative et de 
l’Administration Active (1970) 31). 
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his own argument, but these citations only confirm a movement against the principle 
of separation, namely equating administrative litigation with administrative action.377 
In particular, Sandevoir does not emphasise that the maxim he employs is his 
formulation alone: no author has employed it and it has not been invoked in case law. 
Chevallier also points out that Sandevoir’s maxim is reminiscent of the principle “to 
judge the administration is still administering” which has a very different meaning. 
Sandevoir, in referring to the principle “to judge the administration is also 
administering”, refers mainly to the historical compromise. 
 
4 10 The Conseil d’État 
 
4 10 1 Historical Development 
 
Napoleon established the Conseil d’État in article 52 of the Constitution of 22 
frimaire An VIII (13 December 1799)378  
 
“to draft new laws and administrative regulations, and perhaps more important, in view of later 
developments ‘to resolve difficulties which might occur in the course of the administration’. It 
is this last phrase which provided the constitutional basis for the subsequent growth of the 
judicial activity of the Conseil d’Etat.”379  
 
However, initially the Conseil d’État did not have the power to preside over 
administrative litigation, but only advised the head of state.380 As the ordinary courts 
were forbidden from hearing the administrative complaints of individuals, these 
complaints had to be submitted to the relevant minister in terms of the system of 
ministre-juge.381 A minister’s jurisdictional decision could be appealed before the 
                                                
377  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 31 n 79. 
378 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 450. 
379 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 46-47. 
380 47. 
381 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 47. See Uhler A Review of 
Administrative Acts: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Review in France and the United States (1942) 16. 
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Conseil d’État, but under the system of justice retenue, the decision was still formally 
made by the head of state.382  
Therefore, the Law of 24 May 1872 was a significant step in the development of an 
independent administrative jurisdiction:  
 
“the Conseil d’Etat was empowered ... to reach decisions without the formal pretence that it 
was merely advising the head of state on a decision which was legally his own. Thus, it is only 
since the beginning of the Third Republic (1870-1940) that the Conseil d’Etat has had the 
acknowledged jurisdiction of a court, competent to deliver judgments, not in the name of the 
head of state, but (like the ordinary courts) in the name of the French people ... In French 
parlance, this meant a shift of theory from ‘la justice retenue’ to that of ‘la justice délégué’.”383  
 
However, the doctrine of the ministre-juge would continue to have an effect: the 
complaint was first brought before the appropriate minister and his decision on the 
matter could then be taken on appeal to the Conseil d’État.384 Therefore, the case of 
Cadot, CE 13 December 1889 “marks a decisive stage of the Conseil’s evolution.”385 
In Cadot, the Conseil d’État ended the doctrine of the ministre-juge and recognised 
itself as the judge of the common law386 of first and final instance; thus complaints 
could be brought directly before the Conseil d’État without first submitting it to the 
minister.387 The rationale for the decision388 was that since the Law of 16-24 August 
                                                
382 Nevertheless, the advice of the Conseil d’État was virtually always followed (Brown LN & 
Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 47). 
383 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 47-48. 
384 48. 
385 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 48; Long M, Weil P, Braibant 
G, Delvolvé P & Genevois B Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence Administrative (2007, 16th 
ed) 37 (“[C]et arrêt ... a marqué en réalité une étape capitale dans l’évolution du contentieux 
administratif”). 
386 However, the Conseil d’État as the judge of the common law was replaced by the Tribunaux 
Administratifs in 1953. See Long M, Weil P, Braibant G, Delvolvé P & Genevois B Les Grands 
Arrêts de la Jurisprudence Administrative (2007, 16th ed) 39; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 48. 
387 Long M, Weil P, Braibant G, Delvolvé P & Genevois B Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence 
Administrative (2007, 16th ed) 37-39. See also Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law 
(1998, 5th ed) 48; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 
16th ed) 330-331. 
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1790 and the Law of 16 fructidor An III detached the administration from the 
judiciary a true administrative jurisdiction had developed. For a long time the Conseil 
d’État only had powers of justice retenue, but the Law of 24 May 1872 granted the 
Conseil d’État the power of justice délégué. Nevertheless, the legacy of the Conseil 
d’État’s origins was the doctrine of the ministre-juge. However, this last vestige of the 
era where the administration judged itself was no longer justified because of the 
existence of a true administrative jurisdiction presiding over litigation between the 
administration and private individuals. Thus, the active administration lost its 
jurisdictional function. The theoretical contribution of this finding was clearly 
distinguishing the administrative function from the jurisdictional function within the 
administration itself.  
 
4 10 2 Organisation 
 
The Conseil d’État was initially established in 1799 only as adviser to the 
government, but has since developed a dual role:389 it now advises government and 
judges the administration. In other words, the Conseil d’État has both administrative 
and jurisdictional functions. This dual role “is reflected in the internal structure of the 
Conseil [d’État].”390 In what follows I discuss the membership, the organisation, and 
the functions of the Conseil d’État in order to illustrate how the principles which 
characterise the relationship between the administration and the administrative 
jurisdiction have been applied practically in institutional terms.391 In the next chapter 
we shall see how these principles find application in doctrinal terms in the context of 
public contracting. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
388 Long M, Weil P, Braibant G, Delvolvé P & Genevois B Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence 
Administrative (2007, 16th ed) 38-39. 
389 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 450; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 62. 
390 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 64. See Chapus R Droit 
Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 454-455. 
391 For a useful overview of the workings of the Conseil d’État, from the perspective of an 
ethnographic study, see Latour B The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’État 
(2012). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 210  
4 10 2 1 Membership 
 
The personnel of the Conseil d’État are all civil servants, regardless of the function 
they perform, whether advisory or jurisdictional.392 The members of the Conseil 
d’État are distinguished as ordinary and extraordinary members.393  
The ordinary members are recruited by means of two methods: a combination of 
the open competitive examination for ÉNA graduates (le recrutement par concours) 
and the “outside” round (le recrutement au tour extérieur).394 The latter consists of, on 
the one hand, the recruitment of functionaries from the upper echelons of the active 
administration, such as directors or deputy directors in the central administration, 
prefects and civil administrators, and sometimes prominent persons in the private 
sector and, on the other hand, of members from the corps of conseillers of the 
Tribunaux Administratifs (TA) and the Cours Administratives d’Appel (CAA).395 The 
ordinary members of the Conseil d’État thus recruited are divided into three 
categories: auditeurs of either first or second class, maîtres des requêtes and 
conseillers d’Etat (en service ordinaire).396 
The recruitment of each category takes place as follows.397 The auditeurs are 
recruited exclusively by means of the concours for ÉNA graduates. At least three 
quarters of the maîtres des requêtes are appointed from among the auditors and the 
remaining from the tour extérieur. In turn, at least two thirds of the conseillers (en 
service ordinaire) are appointed from maîtres des requêtes and the remaining from 
the tour extérieur. The conditions for the appointment of maîtres des requêtes from 
the tour extérieur are a minimum of ten years experience in the public service and a 
minimum age of 30 years. Appointment to conseiller from the tour extérieur requires 
a minimum age of 45. 
                                                
392 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 79. 
393 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 451. 
394 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 451-452; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 82-83. 
395 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 452. The Tribunaux Administratifs and 
Cours Administratives d’Appel are administrative jurisdictions, inferior to the Conseil d’État, 
which operate at the regional level in France. 
396 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 452; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 84. 
397 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 452. 
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Although members of the Conseil d’État have the status of judge, they are not 
irremovable.398 The independence of the Conseil d’État’s members in relation to the 
government is assured by the practice of promotion by seniority, which does not 
permit government to favour certain persons for reasons of political convenience, and 
by a tradition demanding that the government respect the independence of the 
members of the Conseil d’État, which offers more protection than the best of texts.399 
One of the innovations of the 1963 reforms affected the Conseil d’État’s manner of 
employment:400 whereas each member had previously been appointed to only one of 
the sections, since 1963 conseillers could be appointed simultaneously to an 
administrative section and to the litigation section. Similarly, for the maîtres des 
requêtes and auditeurs the rule is double membership (la double appartenance): in 
principle, they are appointed simultaneously to an administrative section and to the 
litigious section. 
As for the extraordinary members of the Conseil d’État there are two categories. 
The first category consists of the twelve conseillers d’État en service extraordinaire 
who are prominent persons qualified in different areas of national activity, appointed 
by governmental decree en conseil des ministres401 for a mandate of four years; these 
conseillers, who may be in agriculture, industry, medicine, the military, or may even 
be professors of law, will benefit the Conseil d’État as adviser only by means of their 
competence and experience because they are excluded from the jurisdictional 
function.402 The second category is a single person, the president of the Conseil 
d’État, the Prime Minister of France.403 The president’s functions are limited to the 
chairmanship of formal assemblies and the effective presidency lies with the vice-
president; the vice-president is chosen from among the presidents of section and the 
conseillers en service ordinaire and appointed by decree en conseil des ministres.404 
                                                
398 453. 
399 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 453; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 85. 
400 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 453; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 63, 67-68, 80.  
401 En conseil des ministres refers to a decision at cabinet level. 
402 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 454; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 83-84. 
403 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 454. 
404 454. 
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Members of the Conseil d’État have many opportunities to be seconded to external 
posts or activities and they are often taken.405 
  
4 10 2 2 Structure and Functions of the Conseil d’État  
 
The organisation of the Conseil d’État reflects its dual functions of adviser to the 
government and judge of the administration. The internal structure of the Conseil 
consists of divisions which perform the tasks allocated to the Conseil d’État: on the 
one hand, there is the litigation section, from which emanate the decisions of the 
Conseil d’État exercising its jurisdictional function and, on the other hand, there are 
five administrative sections.406 The litigious section is known as the section du 
contentieux. The six administrative sections are the section de l’intérieur (home 
affairs), section des finances (finance), section des travaux publics (public works), 
section sociale (social), section de l’administration (administrative section)407 and 
section du rapport et des études (report and studies).408 Although the names of the 
administrative sections give an idea of each section’s particular function, which seems 
limited collectively, “[t]heir spheres of interest are wider than these names suggest, as 
between them they span all the various government departments.”409  
 
                                                
405 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 453. Examples of external activities 
include the chairmanship of administrative commissions, participation in the activities of 
commissions and participation in ministerial cabinets (453). 
406 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 454.  
407 This section was created in 2008, see Conseil d’État “La Section de l’Administration” (date 
unknown) Conseil d’État <http://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/la-section-de-ladministration-kue/> 
(accessed 27.08.2013). 
408 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 454-455. Brown and Bell regard the 
first four sections as administrative sections and the fifth section as sui generis, not falling directly 
under the litigious or administrative functions of the Conseil d’Etat (Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 64, 67, 77-79). “The Report Section ... in view of its distinctive 
role, [is] neither adjudicative nor consultative in the sense applied to the original four 
administrative sections.” (67). 
409 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 68. The names of the original 
five sections, when Napoleon established the Conseil d’État, are indicative of the primary 
concerns of the time: there were five sections, namely, the section de la guerre (war), the section 
de la marine (navy), the section des finances (finance), the section de législation (legislation) and 
the section de l’intérieur (internal affairs) (47). 
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4 10 2 2 1 The Conseil d’État as Court: The Section du Contentieux 
 
The section du contentieux exercises the jurisdictional function. It is divided into 
ten sous-sections (subsections).410 Litigious matters are apportioned among these ten 
sous-sections in order to prepare the cases for trial.411 Once the preparation has been 
completed and the commissaire du gouvernement has compiled conclusions the matter 
will be submitted to a division for judgment.412 
The formation for judgment can be constituted in four ways as follows.413 Firstly, a 
matter can be judged by the sous-section to which the preparation was allocated, 
implying at least three members; secondly, by two sous-sections collectively,414 
implying the sous-section which handled the preparation and at least five members 
including a conseiller representing the administrative sections; by the section du 
contentieux en formation de jugement, implying the president of the section, the ten 
presidents of the sous-sections and two conseillers representing the administrative 
sections; or, finally, by the assemblée du contentieux, which implicates the litigation 
section, the administrative sections and the relevant subsection, with the vice-
president presiding. The two larger formations are reserved for important cases and 
represent the litigation section as a whole and all seven sections of the Conseil d’État, 
respectively.415 
 
                                                
410 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 776; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 357; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 75. 
411 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 776. 
412 777. 
413 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 777; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 357-358. For the composition of the 
various formations for judgment, see Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th 
ed) 108-109.  
414 This is the usual formation, Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 75. 
415 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 75; Gaudemet Y Traité de 
Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 358. 
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4 10 2 2 2 The Conseil d’État as Adviser: The Administrative Sections 
 
All the administrative sections, except for the section du rapport et des études, 
perform the advisory function by compiling avis.416 The avis are only made public 
with the authorisation of the relevant minister and the decisions expressed in the avis 
must leave the jurisdictional divisions out of their decisions.417 This implies that the 
jurisdictional division can annul decisions even though they conform to avis, but this 
is rare; there cannot be an avis in response to questions also submitted to a 
jurisdictional division.418 
The purpose of these avis is to enlighten the government on the implications of 
their planned decisions, notably regulatory decisions, and to prevent illegalities which 
can taint decisions419 before the actual decision is taken.  
In terms of articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 4 October 
1958, it is obligatory for the government to consult the Conseil d’État on all bills, 
both for statutes and ordinances, before they are submitted to the Conseil des 
Ministres for deliberation.420 A law or ordinance emanating from a bill upon which 
the Conseil d’État had not been consulted could be marred by unconstitutionality, a 
law incurring the censure of the Conseil Constitutionnel and an ordinance that of the 
Conseil d’État (statuant au contentieux).421 
Depending on the case, consultation of the Conseil d’État on bills for decrees may 
be obligatory or optional.422 Regarding certain avis and the functions of the Report 
Section, firstly, ministers can approach the Conseil d’État for its opinion, by means of 
avis, on the manner in which juridical problems could be resolved; according to the 
importance of the issue the inquiry will be submitted to a section or to the assemblée 
                                                
416 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 455. 
417 455. 
418 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 455; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 66 n 6, 73 (“[N]o estoppel operates between the two sides of the 
Conseil d’Etat” (73)). 
419 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 455. 
420 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 456; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 64. See Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit 
Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 354. 
421 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 456. 
422 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 456; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 354. 
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générale.423 Thus, the Conseil will provide a consultation juridique in issuing its avis 
on, for example, the interpretation of a text.424  
 
“Quite apart from the legislative process, the Conseil d’Etat has the duty of acting as general 
legal advisor to the government and to individual ministers. In some matters indeed its advice 
must be both sought and followed ... Usually, however, the advice is sought voluntarily, as 
where a minister wishes to be reassured that he will be acting legally in some matter. This 
often becomes a formal request for advice where different branches of the administration 
cannot agree on the interpretation of particular legislation or on the legal solution of a 
particular difficulty.”425 
 
Some of these avis will be concerned with questions whose legal aspects cannot 
conceal the political implications.426 
Secondly, government can ask the Conseil d’État, as it could any research bureau, 
to proceed with studies aimed at reform; this is the responsibility of section du 
rapport et des études.427 Similarly, since 1945 the Conseil d’État could on its own 
initiative bring matters of legislative or regulatory reform which the Conseil d’État 
deems in the general interest to the attention of the public powers.428 The reforms of 
1963 included the innovation of compiling an annual report setting out the section’s 
activities which has facilitated this function.429 Thirdly, the section du rapport et des 
études has been tasked since 1963 to effect, along with the ministers, the interventions 
necessary to address the execution of judgments against the administration.430 
Finally, the section du rapport et des études compiles the rapport annuel of the 
Conseil d’État, which, after adoption by the assemblée générale, is presented to the 
                                                
423 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 459; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 65-66. 
424 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 459. 
425 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 65-66 (footnote omitted). 
426 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 459. 
427 459. 
428 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 460; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 355. 
429 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 460; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 355; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 66-67. 
430 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 460; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 78. 
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president of the Republic.431 The report, of which almost the full text is published in 
the études et documents, is notable because it is not merely a record or report of 
activities: in addition to the traditional doctrinal contributions, it includes 
developments in depth on a chosen theme, of both permanent interest and related to 
current affairs.432 
 
4 10 2 3 Implications of Organisation 
 
The Conseil d’État is not simply a state institution with a dual function: the Conseil 
d’État is the most important and prestigious adviser of the government and the 
supreme administrative jurisdiction.433 The two functions reinforce one another and 
contribute to establishing the moral authority of the Conseil d’État: the Conseil d’État 
is heard all the more as adviser because as judge it is able to censure decisions 
contrary to its advice and decisions which would be illegal; it is respected all the more 
as judge because its advisory role renders it in constant contact with the active 
administration, which is aware that it is known by the Conseil and consequently has 
confidence in the Conseil.434  
 
“[T]he Conseil d’Etat statuant au contentieux ... remains part of the administrative machinery 
of the French state, although a highly specialized part. This very fact has helped to make the 
judicial control which it exercises more readily acceptable to the official. The Conseil d’Etat 
commands the general respect of the administrator in action because he knows his judges are 
fully aware of the special problems besetting public administration.435 When called to account 
by the Conseil d’Etat statuant au contentieux he has to acknowledge that his judges are not 
strangers to the administrative process; they are not amateurs throwing legalistic spanners into 
the administrative works, which is how British ministers have sometimes tended to regard their 
High Court judges. On the contrary, the French official is well aware that his judges are 
peculiarly expert in the field of administration.”436 
                                                
431 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 460. 
432 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 460; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 78. 
433 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 450. 
434 450-451. 
435 See Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M 
(ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 303. 
436 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 80-81 (footnote omitted). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 217  
 
As for the ordinary members, the importance of the tour extérieur is that it 
contributes to the relationships between the Conseil d’État and the outside world, 
thereby averting the risk of becoming insulated and ceasing to be as well informed as 
is necessary of the realities, needs and difficulties of the active administration.437 
Furthermore, the manner of employment of the ordinary members, namely their dual 
responsibilities and double membership, ensures that the frame of mind which the 
jurisdictional function is likely to render, i.e. susceptible to legalism, is not 
superimposed over more realistic preoccupations which guide the exercise of the 
advisory function.438 The brassage thus organised, which affects three quarters of the 
Conseil d’État’s members, secures the advantages to be expected from training under 
ÉNA, from practice by the tour extérieur, and from the exercising of functions outside 
of the Conseil.439 Thus, the personnel of the Conseil d’État “is composed of the cream 
of the French civil service” and “constitute[s] therefore an élite.”440  
Where the Conseil d’État is consulted on the bill for a text, it will concern itself 
with the juridical regularity of the envisaged measures and, particularly in relation to 
bills of statute, with conformity to the Constitution, to prevent censure by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel.441 However, the examination of bills is not necessarily limited to their 
juridical regularity: the Conseil d’État can scrutinize any question it deems necessary 
such as the inappropriateness of planned measures in relation to the situation to which 
it must apply or the poor coordination between planned measures and the legislation 
or regulation already in force.442 The consultation of the Conseil d’État can result in 
the active intervention in the process of drafting texts, of which it could appear that it 
was co-author.443 
As for the avis on bills of decree, the fact that these avis are only formulated at the 
end of the process of the text’s elaboration contributes to their importance, because it 
permits the Conseil d’État to verify the regularity of the process and to be fully 
                                                
437 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 452. 
438 454. 
439 454. 
440 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 62, 63. 
441 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 458. 
442 459. 
443 459. 
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informed, notably, by the input of diverse organs, which had to or could be consulted 
before the Conseil d’État on the implications of the bill.444 The value of this order of 
things is that these avis find themselves at the boundary between consultation and 
decision-making.445 
The institution of the section du rapport et des études has also contributed 
significantly to the advisory function by 
 
“extending the influence of the Conseil d’Etat in two directions. On the one hand, the Section 
operates in advance of the consultative process of the administrative sections, for its studies 
seek to anticipate administrative problems and offer solutions; on the other hand, its 
monitoring function over the execution of judgments against the administration is subsequent, 
chronologically, to the work of the Section du Contentieux.”446 
 
Collegiality is a distinctive characteristic of the Conseil d’État’s decision-making, 
whether advisory or jurisdictional. On the one hand, Guy Braibant points out that, 
regarding the process of drafting legislative texts, the “Conseil d’Etat acts collegiately 
and at a later stage, amending or rejecting a text which has already been drafted by 
officials within the relevant ministry.” 447  On the other hand, the result of the 
organisation of formation for judgment “is that each judgment is the product of a 
collegiate examination”.448  
 
4 11 Conclusion 
 
In the wake of the 1789 Revolution, France embarked on a decisive break with the 
Ancien Régime. Politically this included revamping the monarchy’s institutional 
structure and addressing associated concerns. One such concern was the 
administration and judiciary having constantly encroached upon one another’s 
functional spheres during the Ancien Régime. The constituants considered these 
infringements as an abuse of power which had to be remedied. In particular, 
                                                
444 458. 
445 Quoting Marceau Long, Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 456. 
446 Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 79. 
447 74. 
448 77. 
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terminating the judiciary’s exercise of political functions, that is, administrative and 
legislative functions, was a priority.  
As far as the revolutionaries were concerned, the state had to be organised in terms 
of the separation of powers. The reorganisation of the judiciary was no exception: 
prohibiting the judiciary’s encroachment on other functions was simply an exercise in 
defining and applying the separation of powers. The Law of 16-24 August 1790 was 
the legal instrument which formally prohibited the judiciary from performing 
administrative and legislative functions and which applied the separation of powers to 
the judiciary. 
The crucial question is, how was the separation of powers defined and applied? 
There are significant differences of opinion which can be classified under two streams 
of thought, the one in favour of the so-called “French separation of powers”, the other 
rejecting the possibility of a French separation of powers, except in retrospect.  
In terms of the French separation of powers the duality of jurisdiction flows from a 
particular interpretation of the separation of powers itself. The aspect of the separation 
of powers which requires a separate jurisdiction for administrative litigation is the 
principle of the separation of authorities. The French separation of powers not only 
provides an alternative to the South African separation of powers, but also 
demonstrates that the separation of powers is susceptible to fundamentally different 
interpretations, beyond a narrow trias politica. Therefore, the separation of powers is 
sufficiently flexible to allow for an administrative jurisdiction within the 
administration. Even Chevallier, a vocal critic of the traditional explanation, 
acknowledges that the separation of powers can be interpreted thus.449 
Arguments undermining the French separation of powers, which fall under the 
latter stream, have been presented. These critiques show that the separation of powers 
was understood narrowly during the Revolution and illustrate how dogmatic 
adherence to a strict separation of powers can be restrictive. Such an approach may 
prevent the development of a system which reflects the contextual requirements, 
which is the case when administrative litigation was allocated to the active 
administration. 
Sandevoir’s analysis of the principle “to judge the administration is also 
administering” and Chevallier’s analysis of the principle of the separation of the 
                                                
449 Although, only after the fact. 
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administrative jurisdiction and the active administration provide principles which are 
wholly novel in the South African context. The essence of these principles is that the 
French administrative-law system is inherently a compromise between opposing 
forces, between the ideals of administration and justice. Importantly, the institutional 
structure of the French system reflects this interaction between the two ideals. These 
principles are also unique in that they explain, or at least purport to explain, the whole 
development of the French administrative-law system. 
Finally, another concern dating from the Ancien Régime, the question of the 
allocation of administrative litigation as a hybrid function, was identified. The matter 
was distinct from the prohibition of the judiciary from exercising political functions. 
Central to the thesis rejecting the French separation of powers is the conclusion that 
the Law of 16-24 August 1790 did not resolve the allocation of administrative 
litigation. In the light of this analysis, article 13, proclaiming the separation of 
authorities, contains a narrow, ordinary interpretation of the separation of powers. 
Therefore, the Law of 16-24 August 1790 cannot in itself explain the allocation of 
administrative litigation to the administration, and later to an administrative 
jurisdiction; other explanations are required. 
The course of administrative litigation, from the Middle Ages to the twentieth 
century, is the key to understanding the French system of today.450 The central role of 
administrative litigation in the development of the French administrative-law system 
is also critical to the enquiries of this dissertation, for it is the difficulty of classifying 
and allocating administrative litigation, and the recognition of these difficulties, which 
led the French to pursue solutions which would fall outside standard separation-of-
powers analysis.451 Thus the French concept of administrative litigation also provides 
a potentially useful conceptual instrument which may be employed to analyse 
administrative-law systems. Chevallier’s analysis demonstrates that the institutional 
structure was, eventually, adapted to the nature of the function performed by that 
                                                
450 At least according to Chevallier and the development of the principle of the separation of the 
administrative jurisdiction and the active administration. 
451 At least, the separation of powers as understood by the revolutionaries. In retrospect the French 
administrative-law system can be described in terms of the separation of powers, due to its broad 
nature. However, when the system was still in its infancy, the separation of powers was not the 
decisive factor. 
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institution. An opportunity for further research is certainly the question of the nature 
of administrative litigation in the light of the French example. 
In chapter five the concept of administrative litigation, the contentieux 
administratif, is explored. This is done by reference to one object of administrative 
litigation, the French administrative contract. The administrative contract has been 
selected because it illustrates how one legal instrument, the contract, comes to be 
classified as either subject to administrative law (i.e. public law) or to the private law 
of contract. A contract subject to administrative law falls within the jurisdiction of the 
administrative courts; a private-law contract falls within the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary courts. Therefore, the classification of a contract has far-reaching 
consequences: not only does it determine which legal rules are applicable, but it also 
determines which court has jurisdiction. Since administrative litigation played a 
formative role in the development of the French administrative-law system, 
administrative litigation as such is critical to understanding the system. And since the 
administrative contract illustrates how the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and the 
administrative courts is distinguished, it is discussed in the next chapter. Chapter five 
is not limited to the subject of the administrative contract. The nature of public 
contracts as a relatively new and fundamentally different legal instrument is 
discussed. The South African context receives particular attention and the 
adjudication of public contracts in South Africa and France is compared. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Public Law of Contract and the Contrat Administratif 
 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter “public contract” refers to that category of contracts where at least 
one of the contracting parties is a public organ. This is neither to say that 
administrative law should not, in certain cases, apply to contracts between private 
parties, nor that such contracts cannot be public in nature; nor is this choice intended 
to convey that all contracts concluded by a public organ are public in nature; there 
may well be instances where the administration contracts as a private person and the 
private law of contract applies. The purpose of limiting “public contracts” thus, is to 
identify the chapter’s focus on the legal regulation of the administration’s contractual 
activity. The use of “public contract” does not presuppose the existence of a distinct 
legal concept of governmental or public contract, in the sense of a contrat 
administratif. Rather, “public contract” merely entails that the state concludes 
contracts. 
In South Africa, public contracts, i.e. contracts where the administration is a 
contracting party, are either regulated by the private law of contract or public law, 
specifically, general administrative law. Thus, 
 
“[j]udicial regulation of state commercial activity in South African law is based on a 
classification approach. The basic premise of this approach is that all state legal action can be 
classified as either private or public in nature, and is therefore subject to private-law or public-
law regulation respectively.”1  
 
The South African courts, a unitary jurisdiction,2 preside over litigation resulting 
from public contracts. South Africa has no “public law of contract”, in the sense used 
                                                
1 Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 52. The concept “state 
commercial activity”, as defined by Quinot, is broader than “public contract”, as defined in this 
dissertation, but includes public contracting, see Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal 
Framework (2009) 6-12. 
2 See ss 165, 166 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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by Davies,3 or distinct legal concept of public contract. On the contrary, the contrat 
administratif is a public contract regulated by public law. The contrat administratif is 
also a legal category of contract separate to the contrat de droit commun, the private-
law contract. In other words, this is not merely a situation where administrative law is 
applied to a contractual situation as in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO,4 for 
example; in the French context, the law of contract is still applied, but that law is a 
public law of contract and the contract itself is a public-law concept.5 This may appear 
contradictory from the South African perspective where the contract itself is a private-
law creation and even the example par excellence of a private-law concept. Therefore 
the nature of the contrat administratif in relation to the contrat de droit commun is 
discussed first. 
Subsequently, the methods for classifying the contrat administratif as such are 
identified. This classification is an exercise in distinguishing between the contrats 
administratifs and the contrats de droit commun concluded by the administration. To 
this end two sets of criteria are applied, those derived from the law, in the broad sense 
of promulgated legal texts, and those derived from case law. The existence of two 
branches of contract law is foreign to the South African context. Therefore, 
understanding how the two forms of contract are differentiated is integral to an 
analysis of the contrat administratif. 
Nevertheless, the contrat administratif is characterised by its regulation of 
contractual performance, rather than the rules providing for its classification. 
Consequently, de Laubadère et al.’s exposition of the general concepts that govern the 
performance of the contrat administratif is surveyed. This is followed by a discussion 
of specific rules of performance. Rules concerning the powers of the administration, 
the rights of the contractor, and a change in circumstances constitute this section, that 
is, rules which regulate contractual performance differently to private-law rules. 
 
                                                
3 See Davies ACL The Public Law of Government Contracts (2008) 70-71. See also Quinot G 
State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 272. 
4 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 36. 
5 This is formally distinguishable from the South African context where “[classifying] the state 
action as administrative action does not mean that it is not also contractual in nature, it is simply 
not purely contractual, ie purely private-law regulated” (Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A 
Legal Framework (2009) 52 n 2 (emphasis in original)), because, in the French context, public law 
itself regulates the contract in its entirety, once the contract is classified as a contrat administratif. 
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5 2 The Classification of the Contrat Administratif 
 
In France, the administration can conclude both contrats administratifs 
(administrative contracts) and contrats de droit commun (private-law contracts), also 
referred to as contrats de droit privé.6 Contrats administratifs are subject to special 
administrative-law rules that are distinct from the rules of the civil law of obligations.7 
However, contrats de droit commun, even if concluded by the administration, are 
subject to civil law.8 Thus contracts concluded by the administration may be subject 
to administrative contract law or to the private law of contract.9 In other words, either 
the administrative law of contract or the private law of contract regulates contracts 
concluded by the administration, since each of these branches of law constitutes a law 
of contract in its own right.  
The administrative courts have jurisdiction over contrats administratifs and the 
ordinary, judicial courts have jurisdiction over contrats de droit commun.10 Therefore, 
distinguishing between the two forms of contract has significant implications, since 
both the applicable legal rules and the competent jurisdiction depend on the 
classification of the contract.11 However, there is no general legal definition for the 
contrat administratif or contrat de droit commun.12  
Even though the concept of “the contract” is the same in public law as in private 
law, this does not imply that the legal regulation under each branch is also the same.13 
                                                
6 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 71; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 664, 671; Brown LN & Bell JS 
French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 202; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité 
des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 125. 
7 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 671; see 
Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 72. 
8 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 671. 
9 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 18. 
10 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 671; 
see De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
126. 
11 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
125-126. 
12 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 18. 
13 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 9, 39-41; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 672; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
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On the one hand, both administrative law and civil law define the contract as an 
agreement (un accord de volontés), between two or more persons, which creates 
rights and obligations.14 On the other, distinct and autonomous rules regulate the 
contrat administratif.15 The contrat administratif is subject to administrative-law rules 
which, on the whole, differ from those of the civil law and which even contradict 
fundamental civil-law rules on contracting.16  
According to Richer the more important of these rules are characterised by the 
inequality of the contracting parties.17 With reference to Jèze, Richer explains that the 
contracting parties are in a relationship of inequality because the contractor is obliged 
to facilitate the provision of a public service and not merely to refrain from 
obstructing it. Thus the public service is integral to the theory of the contrat 
administratif. However, the concept of public service cannot justify all contrats 
administratifs equally well. For instance, certain contracts are not closely associated 
with the provision of a public service. With reference to Salon, Richer points out that 
in these instances the inequality of the parties is linked to the general interest or the 
presence of public authority.  
                                                                                                                                       
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 18, 28-29; Duguit L Law in the 
Modern State tr Laski F & Laski H (1970) 148-149. “La notion générale de contrat est et ne peut 
être que la même en droit public et en droit privé. [The general concept of the contract is and can 
but be the same in public law and private law.]”, Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs 
(2008, 6th ed) 9 (own translation); “Le contrat ... doit comporter une définition unique, commun à 
toutes les disciplines. [The contrat must have one definition, common to all disciplines.]”, De 
Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 28 (own 
translation). On the nature of the contrat administratif in relation to the contrat de droit commun, 
see the classic formulations of Duguit and Jèze, Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit 
Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 671-672; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité 
des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 18. See also, generally, De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 18-29; Street H Governmental 
Liability: A Comparative Study (1953) 81-83. 
14 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 9; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 672; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 29-39. 
15 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 9. 
16 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 672. 
17 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 9, 22-23. “The French regard an 
administrative contract as essentially an arrangement between unequal parties”, Brown LN & Bell 
JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 202 (footnote omitted). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 226  
Gaudemet states that the singularity of the contrat administratif is determined by 
the concept of the public service and its requirements: the purpose of contrats 
administratifs is to allow and facilitate the functioning of the public service.18 This 
description can be described as an expression of green-light theory.19 Contracts 
between a public person, as the administrator of a public service, and a private citizen 
result in unequal interests, and the general interest must take precedence over 
individual interests.20 As Jean-Marc Sauvé, the Vice-President of the Conseil d’État, 
said in 2009: 
 
“Citizens are demanding more effective and more robust justice that underpins fundamental 
rights and freedoms, and we must respond to that demand. The times we live in argue for a re-
evaluation of the public interest, and we must ensure that that interest takes precedence over 
individual private interests.”21 
 
Therefore, whenever the administration concludes a contract, the critical question 
is whether the contract is a contrat administratif or a contrat de droit commun.22 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of criteria for the classification of a 
contrat administratif: firstly, the qualification légale 23  (legal qualification) and, 
                                                
18 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 672; 
see Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 22-23. 
19 See Harlow C & Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) ch 1. 
20 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 672. 
21 Conseil d’État “The Conseil d’État in 2009” (2009) Public Report 11 <http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/media/document/annual_report_ce2009_gb.pdf> (accessed 01.09.2013). 
22 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 673. 
23  Qualification légale and détermination de la loi (determination by law) are often used 
interchangeably as synonyms, but De Laubadère et al. distinguish the two appellations, De 
Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 131-132, 
231-232. The qualification légale occurs when a particular contract is classified by law as either a 
contrat administratif or a contrat de droit commun by identifying the contract as such or by 
allocating disputes arising from that contrat to the administrative or ordinary courts. Classification 
by means of a détermination de la loi occurs when the law establishes general rules of a public-
law and “exorbitant” nature that apply to the contract and that render the contract administratif. 
Richer, Lichère and Gaudemet, for example, refer to the détermination de la loi in instances where 
De Laubadère et al. would use and prefer qualification légale. However, in order to avoid 
confusion and to remain true to referenced sources, the terminology used by each author is 
maintained where possible, unless specifically indicated otherwise.  
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secondly, the critères jurisprudentiels (jurisprudential criteria).24 In terms of the 
former, certain contracts are classified as contrats administratifs by law, especially, 
statutory qualification and, in terms of the latter, other contracts are classified as 
contrats administratifs by the application of jurisprudential criteria. Some legal 
writers, such as Richer and de Laubadère et al.,25 do not, however, categorise all 
contrats administratifs under these criteria, although they are acknowledged as the 
main categories. Richer’s two grand categories are the critères jurisprudentiels and 
contrats administratifs by means of qualification a priori, of which the category 
contrats administratifs par détermination de la loi is a subcategory. His form of 
classification is adopted below. 
Certain types of contracts will always qualify as contrats administratifs, namely, 
contrats administratifs par détermination de la loi and contracts with a particular 
                                                
24 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 73-132; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 90-120; Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 73; 
Gaudemet Y Droit Administratif (2005, 18th ed) 277-285; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics 
(2005) 18-23; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 
16th ed) 671-683; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I 
(1983, 2nd ed) 125-240; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 595-604. See Chapus 
R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 544-572. Bénoit and De Laubadère et al. refer to a 
third category, the intention of the contracting parties (De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P 
Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 127; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif 
Français (1968) 602-603). In such a case the parties themselves would decide whether or not the 
contract is subject to private law or administrative law. However, according to Richer and Guettier 
the “subjective method” is impermissible because in terms of this method jurisdictional 
competence is determined by the will of the contracting parties, whereas the distribution of 
competences between the jurisdictions is a legal and public-policy concern (Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 90; Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd 
ed) 72). Likewise, Chapus and Guettier, with reference to the decision Fabre, TC 9 June 1986, 
state that the nature of a contract can absolutely not be determined by the contracting parties’ 
classification (Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 54; Guettier C Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 72-73). One should bear in mind that Bénoit and De 
Laubadère et al.’s mentioned books were published in 1968 and 1983, respectively, well before 
the decision of the Tribunal des Conflits. See also De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité 
des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 212-213. 
25 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 110; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 128. 
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purpose; other types could qualify as either contrats administratifs or contrats de droit 
commun depending on the circumstances.26 
 
5 2 1 Contrats Administratifs through Qualification a priori  
 
Certain contracts are classified as contrats administratifs a priori: thus their nature 
is determined from the onset and a clause exorbitante or a link with the public service 
plays no role.27 Instead their status as contrats administratifs is derived from texts or 
the context of the contract and not from the content or purpose of the contract.28 For 
instance, those contracts concluded by the administration which are classified as 
contrats administratifs through a détermination de la loi are always contrats 
administratifs.29 A law may identify a contrat administratif either by classifying a 
certain type of contract as such or by providing that the administrative courts have 
jurisdiction over litigation resulting from certain types of contracts.30 
 
5 2 1 1 Les Qualifications Légales (Legal Qualifications) 
 
In terms of the Law of 28 pluviôse An VIII, a contract concerned with the 
performance of public works or with the sale of immovable property belonging to the 
state is a contrat administratif.31 Case law defines public works as work, of an 
immovable nature, on behalf of a public person for a general-interest purpose or work 
                                                
26 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 673; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 127. 
27 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 110. Certain contrats du droit commun 
are also classified as such by statutory determination, Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 
19; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
131. 
28 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 110. 
29 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 673. 
30 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 18; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: 
Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 673; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité 
des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 131, 133-142. 
31 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 111-112; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 18; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général 
(2001, 16th ed) 673; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I 
(1983, 2nd ed) 133, 140. 
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done by a public person towards a public service.32 Therefore the presence of a public 
person and a general-interest purpose are requirements of public works.33 
Contracts concerned with the occupation of public property fall within the 
jurisdiction of the administrative courts, originally in terms of the Decree-Law of 17 
June 1938 and, subsequently, since 2006, article L. 2331-1 of the Code générale de la 
propriété des personnes publiques (CGPPP).34 Likewise, certain contracts concerned 
with the occupation of private property are classified by law as contrats 
administratifs, regardless of their terms.35 In terms of article L. 1311-3 of the Code 
général des collectivités territoriales, emphyteutic leases passed by local entities fall 
within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.36 
The Law of 11 December 2001 determines that all litigation resulting from 
contracts which apply the Code des marchés publics falls within the jurisdiction of the 
administrative courts.37 Ordinance no 2004-559 of 17 June 2004 on contrats de 
partenariat and article L. 1414-1 of the Code général des collectivités territoriales 
determine that contrats de partenariat are contrats administratifs.38 
 
5 2 1 2 L’Identification Directe (Direct Identification) 
 
A contract which is subject to a régime exorbitant du droit commun is a contrat 
administratif, even without the presence of a clause exorbitante.39 The exorbitant 
                                                
32 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 111. 
33 There are instances where a the public person does not act in the general interest, Richer L Droit 
des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 111. 
34 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 79-82; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 113; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005)18; De Laubadère 
A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 134. 
35 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 79-82; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 114. 
36 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 75; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 114-115; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 18. 
37 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 84-86; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 115; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 19. 
38 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 82-83; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 116; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 19. 
39 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 116; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 23; see, generally, De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats 
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nature results not from the terms of the contract, but from external, predetermined 
rules that apply to the contract. These rules are imposed by law or regulation, and thus 
independent of the will of the contracting parties.40 
 
5 2 1 3 The Accessory Theory 
 
Certain contracts qualify as contrats administratifs because they are accessories of 
other contrats administratifs.41 Thus, such a contract has an administrative character 
regardless of the purpose of the contract, the terms of the contract or whether the 
parties to the contract are different to those of the original contract. 
 
5 2 2 Les Critères Jurisprudentiels (Criteria derived from Case Law) 
 
A fundamental enquiry, in the context of the jurisprudential criteria, is whether or 
not it is conceivable that a particular contract is not subject to public law.42 The 
question is concerned with determining the appropriate legal regime that should 
regulate a particular contract, the compatibilité,43 literally compatibility.  
A contract is classified by the jurisprudential criteria as a contrat administratif 
when two requirements are met.44 Firstly, one of the contracting parties must be a 
public person and, secondly, the contract must either be sufficiently linked to a public 
service or to the éléments exorbitants du droit commun; the former requirement is 
known as the critère organique and the latter as the critère matériel, the organic 
criterion and material criterion, respectively.  
                                                                                                                                       
Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 131-132, 145, 229-235. Lichère and De Laubadère et al. discuss the 
direct method under the jurisprudential criteria because of the role played by the judge in 
evaluating “exorbitant elements” rendering the contract administratif. 
40 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 116-117; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 23; Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 103; Lichère F Droit 
des Contrats Publics (2005) 22; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats 
Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 210, 229. 
41 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 71; Richer L Droit des Contrats 
Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 118. 
42 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 92. 
43 93. 
44 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 20; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P 
Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 144, 163-171. 
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In the case of the critère de la clause exorbitante du droit commun, the 
qualification of a contract depends on the presence of a certain type of contractual 
term that is unusual in civil-law contracts or incompatible with ordinary private-law 
relationships.45 Thus,  
 
“‘exorbitant’ in this phrase does not mean ‘inordinate’, ‘outrageous’ or ‘excessive’ and tends 
only to emphasize the fact that it derogates from private normal law. But the word ‘exorbitant’ 
may also serve to underline the ‘abnormal’ characteristics of this law, suggesting in turn that it 
should be made more ‘normal’ and acceptable.”46 
 
In the case of the critère du service public, the qualification depends on the 
contract having a sufficiently close connection with the public service.47 
 
5 2 2 1 The Organic Criterion 
 
In the vast majority of cases the presence of a public person is a requirement.48 
This is the case to the extent that the contract will not be a contrat administratif 
despite a link to the general interest or a clause exorbitante du droit commun.49 Where 
the contracting parties are both public persons, the contract is in principle a contrat 
administratif, after the decision of the Union des Assurances de Paris, TC 21 March 
1983.50 
                                                
45 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 92; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 144. Therefore, these clauses are 
also known as “clauses dérogatoires au droit commun [clauses exceptional in relation to the 
common law]” (144 (own translation)). 
46 Picard E “The Public-Private Divide in French Law through the History and Destiny of French 
Administrative Law” in Ruffert M (ed) The Public-Private Law Divide: Potential for 
Transformation (2009) 17-83 at 18. 
47 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 92. 
48 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 675; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 163-
168; see Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 20. 
49 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 20. 
50 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 546-548; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 677; see Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 20. 
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Few exceptions to the organic criterion exist.51 Firstly, a contract concluded 
between two private persons is a contrat administratif where one of the contracting 
parties is the proxy (mandataire) of a public person. This is rather a mode of 
application than an exception, since the contract, which is concluded between two 
private persons, in the material sense, is legally concluded between a public person, 
represented by its proxy, and a private person. Secondly, contracts concluded between 
two private persons will be contrats administratifs if one of the contracting parties 
acts on behalf of a public person, without a mandate.  
 
5 2 2 2 Le Critère de la Clause Exorbitante (The Exorbitant-clause Criterion) 
 
Once the organic criterion is satisfied, a contract qualifies as a contrat administratif 
when it contains clauses exorbitantes du droit commun. 52 The rationale for the 
presence of such a clause rendering a contract administrative is twofold: the criterion 
has a subjective and objective basis.53 The contracting parties can choose between 
gestion publique, and gestion privée, public management and private management, 
respectively. When the parties adopt provisions that derogate from private-law 
provisions, an intention to adopt public-law regulation is expressed. This is the 
subjective basis of the clause exorbitante. The objective basis implies that the clause 
exorbitante renders a contract administrative because of its nature, being unusual and 
a matter for public law.  
Despite attempts at a definition in case law and legal literature, there is no general 
definition to determine whether a clause qualifies as exorbitante or not. 54  For 
example, a clause allowing unilateral termination is not necessarily a clause 
                                                
51 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 20-21; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P 
Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 168-171. 
52 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 22; Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs 
(2008, 6th ed) 91; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I 
(1983, 2nd ed) 211. 
53 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
211-213; see Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 93; Lichère F Droit des 
Contrats Publics (2005) 22. 
54 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 94, 97-99; Lichère F Droit des 
Contrats Publics (2005) 22. See De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats 
Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 213 et seq. 
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exorbitante.55 However, the following are guiding elements indicating the presence of 
clauses exorbitantes.56 Firstly, clauses exorbitantes can result from references in the 
contract to external sources that would render the contract administrative. For 
example, references to sources such as a cahier des charges57 of the administration, to 
texts enacting règles exorbitantes (exorbitant rules) that apply through reference to 
them and not automatically, or to a type of contract, such as a public-works contract. 
Secondly, clauses exorbitantes can be linked to a prérogative exorbitante, or 
prérogative de puissance publique (public-power prerogative), such as a clause 
providing for the procédure de la décision exécutoire, or a clause recognising the 
right of the administration to impose unilateral measures (right to impose sanctions, 
rescind, modify etc.) Thirdly, clauses which are impossible in terms of private law, 
illegal or unusual in private-law contracts are sometimes clauses exorbitantes.58 
Mostly the clause exorbitante is either a clause that is impossible or extraordinary in 
the context of private relations.59 Impossible clauses require the public party to 
exercise functions which do not exist in private law; unusual clauses establish a 
notable inequality between the parties.60 
Finally, certain clauses are particular to public law due to their content or purpose, 
rendering them clauses exorbitantes. For example, clauses concerned with securing 
the general interest, which are extraordinary in private-law relationships, conform to 
this requirement. 
In the decision of the Stein, CE 20 October 1950, the clause exorbitante was 
defined as a clause which aims to confer rights or obligations on the contracting 
                                                
55 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 94-95; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 219. 
56 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
215-229. 
57 Standard terms and conditions, see Mitchell JDB The Contracts of Public Authorities: A 
Comparative Study (1954) 214-217. 
58 For example, an obligation that can only be performed by exerting public authority would be 
impossible in an agreement between private persons; a clause which results in an unequal 
relationship between the parties, such as clauses for unilateral termination for general-interest 
purposes, would qualify as a clause exorbitante; but the fact that a clause is illegal in private law 
does not necessarily mean that the clause is exorbitante, Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics 
(2005) 23. 
59 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 97. 
60 97. 
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parties which, due to their nature, are extraneous to those clauses freely consented to 
in the context of civil and commercial law.61 The definition in Soc. des combustibles, 
TC 19 June 1952 is considered more appropriate than the narrow definition of the 
Conseil d’État: a clause exorbitante is established where the reciprocal position of the 
contracting parties is not such as would typically result from an agreement in terms of 
the droit commun.62 
The idea of normalité (normality) is foundational to the jurisprudential definitions 
formulated in case law and therefore the clause exorbitante is defined as a clause that 
one would not normally find in a private-law contract.63 Thus the idea of normality 
plays a critical role in distinguishing between contrats administratifs and contrats de 
droit commun. 
 
5 2 2 3 Le Critère du Service Public (The Public-service Criterion) 
 
A contract, which is connected to a public service to a sufficient degree, qualifies 
as a contrat administratif.64 Therefore, the decisive inquiry, problematic in itself, is 
whether a connection with the public service is sufficiently strong.65 Three types of 
connection have been identified which would render a contract administratif.66 Firstly, 
in terms of the decision of Bertin, CE 20 April 1956, a contract which aims to assign 
the performance of a public service, i.e. to delegate the public service itself, to a 
private citizen is a contrat administratif. Secondly, contracts which amount to a 
method or means of performance (modalité d’application) of a public service are also 
contrats administratifs, in terms of Min. de l’agriculture c/ Grimouard, CE 20 April 
1956. Contracts which assign the execution of a public service and contracts which 
                                                
61 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 97. See Commune de Bourisp, TC 19 
November 1999. 
62 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 97. 
63 97. 
64 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 102; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 189-210. 
65 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 102; see De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 190. 
66 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 103; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 22; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I 
(1983, 2nd ed) 193, 197-207. 
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merely require the performance of the requirements of a public service are 
distinguishable. Finally, contracts which do not delegate the execution of a public 
service or do not amount to a method of performance may be contrats administratifs 
if the contracting party participates closely enough with the administration in 
providing a public service. 
Thus, in order to apply the critère du service public the court must first determine 
whether there is a public service and, subsequently, whether the contract has the 
necessary connection to the public service.67 The three forms of connection are not a 
closed list, but represent the most common forms found in the case law.68 
 
5 3 General Concepts Applicable to the Performance of Contrats 
Administratifs 
 
De Laubadère et al. identify three fundamental considerations, as well as other 
distinctive concepts, which inform the content of the contrat administratif’s 
performance.69 The general concepts are discussed in this section, with heavy reliance 
on De Laubadère et al.’s exposition, due to his identification and analysis of these 
concepts in the context of the contrat administratif, specifically. In addition, de 
Laubadère et al.’s Traité des Contrats Administratifs is the leading work on the 
contrat administratif.70 
 
5 3 1 The Common Will of the Contracting Parties 
 
Firstly, the common will of the parties is the primary consideration determining the 
content of a contract’s performance.71 For this reason the contrat administratif is also 
                                                
67 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 105. 
68 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
197, 207-210.  
69 699-700. 
70 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 23. 
71 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
699, 701-705; Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 228-232; Lichère F Droit 
des Contrats Publics (2005) 81-82; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 616. “En 
matière d’interprétation des contrats administratifs, la référence fondamentale a toujours été la 
commune intention des parties” (Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 228-
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referred to as “the law of the [contracting] parties” (la loi des parties).72 This builds 
on the foundation of modern French contract law,73 le consensualisme. One incidence 
of the primacy of consensus is that the general common-law rules of interpretation 
contained in the Civil Code are applicable to contrats administratifs since these rules 
are derived from the idea of consensus. 74  Nevertheless, certain principles of 
interpretation apply only to contrats administratifs. For instance, the concept of public 
service requires a stricter interpretation of the contractor’s obligations since they are 
connected to the general interest.75 
 
5 3 2 The Public Service 
 
The contrat administratif provides for the needs of the public service. Thus, 
secondly, the “requirements of the public service” (les exigences du service public) is 
another consideration that determines the content of contractual performance.76 This 
concept operates alongside the will of the parties. Therefore, the satisfaction of the 
contract’s obligations amounts to both the performance of the terms of the contract 
and, in addition, to a method for the provision of public services.77 This dual nature of 
the contrat administratif is important towards understanding the rules regulating its 
performance. 
Through the conclusion of a contrat administratif concerned with the public 
service, the contractor, in effect, collaborates with the administration in providing for 
                                                                                                                                       
229). Chapus expresses the role of consensus in less absolute terms: “[l]’exécution des contrats 
administratifs n’est sans doute pas soumise à un régime qui ignorerait purement et simplement 
l’obligation pour les parties contractantes de respecter les engagements souscrits et qui, par suite, 
ne laisserait pas beaucoup de raison d’être à la conclusion de tels contrats.” (Chapus R Droit 
Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1202). 
72 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 228. 
73 That is, the law regulating both contrats administratifs and contrats du droit commun. 
74 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
701-703; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 82. 
75 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
703. 
76 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
699, 706-708; see Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 202. 
77 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
706. 
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the general interest.78 Thus, the contractor is placed in a position and enjoys a role 
wholly different to that of the private-law contractor, who contracts for private 
interests. Likewise, Gaudemet identifies the objective of permitting or facilitating the 
public service as the foundation of the contrat administratif’s singularity.79  
The conclusion of Corneille to the decision of Société d’éclairage de Poissy, CE 8 
February 1918, is a classic formulation of the public-service consideration’s role in 
distinguishing the rules of performance of contrats administratifs from those of the 
contrat de droit commun.80 According to Corneille, whenever the state concludes a 
contract concerning the operation of public services it does not contract as a mere 
private individual. In this context the state is not managing private interests; rather the 
state is contracting on the public’s behalf for the general interest. Since this is 
different to private-law contracts, different rules apply. 
Furthermore, as mentioned, the concept of public service plays a role in 
interpreting the content of the contractor’s obligations.81 The administration has the 
right to demand the maximum d’efforts et de diligence and the judge will interpret the 
obligations of the contractor more strictly than under civil law. 
The concept of public service also confers rights on the contractor.82 In various 
cases the contractor has the right to indemnification for losses incurred.83 This right is 
based on l’équilibre financière which, in turn, is based on both equitable 
considerations and on enabling the contractor to continue performing the public 
service.  
 
5 3 3 The State as Contracting Party 
 
Thirdly, that one of the contracting parties is the state itself is another fundamental 
consideration. 84  The state remains a public authority with certain public-law 
                                                
78 “Le contrat administratif fait du cocontractant un collaborateur ... de l’administration” (De 
Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 699). 
79 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 696. 
80 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
706.  
81 707. 
82 708. 
83 708. 
84 699-700, 709-710. 
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prerogatives, privileges and characteristics, even when it concludes contracts. The 
incidence of public authority and the consensual nature of the contract must be 
balanced for the concept of the contract will be undermined by excessive unilateral 
decision-making.85 
Certain public-law prerogatives are integrated within the theory of contrats 
administratifs.86 These prerogatives can be employed to impose sanctions that ensure 
the performance of the terms of the contract or to align the obligations of the contract 
with the general interest independently of strict adherence to the terms of the 
contract.87 Thus the administration could impose obligations not provided for by the 
contract, which are necessary for the public service; the administration could also 
terminate the contract in the general interest.88 De Laubadère et al. point out that these 
rules illustrate the more significant differences between the legal regulation of 
performance under public and private law and where a balance between public 
authority and the will of the parties is difficult to achieve.89 
 
5 3 4 La Mutabilité (Adaptability) 
 
In addition to these three fundamental considerations there are other distinct and 
generally applicable concepts which distinguish the contrat administratif, namely, 
mutabilité and l’équilibre financier du contrat.90 The two concepts discussed below 
can be regarded as incidences of the fundamental considerations identified by de 
Laubadère. The concept of adaptability entails that a change in circumstances affects 
the scope of performance.91 This contrasts strongly with the private-law position in 
terms of which the clauses are considered fixed and legally guaranteed as such.92 
Nevertheless, the terms of the contrat administratif are also binding, but changes in 
                                                
85 700, 709. 
86 710. 
87 709. 
88 710. 
89 710. 
90 700. 
91 700, 711-715.  
92 700. 
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the requirements of public service and in circumstances are additional 
considerations.93 
The role of a change in circumstances manifests itself in several ways.94 Firstly, a 
change in circumstances can be used in interpreting the obligations of the parties. 
Secondly, a change in circumstances could lead to novation. Thirdly, changes in 
circumstances might entitle the administration to exercise its exorbitant powers, such 
as imposing new obligations or modifying the obligations of the contractor. Finally, a 
change in circumstances is the basis of the contractor’s pecuniary rights.95 
 
5 3 5 L’Équilibre Financier du Contrat (The Financial Equilibrium of the 
Contract) 
 
Due to the impact of a change in circumstances on the contrat administratif, the 
contractor is in a precarious position relative to that of private law. Therefore, the 
concept of l’équilibre financier du contrat, also known as l’équation financière, 
counterbalances the adaptability of the contrat administratif by maintaining 
contractual security/certainty.96 
More specifically, in terms of private law, contractual security or equilibrium is 
ensured by the fixed and static nature of the contract’s provisions.97 The ability to rely 
on the performance of the terms of the contract fosters contractual certainty, as 
expressed by the maxim pacta servanda sunt. However, since a change in 
circumstances can alter the original obligations, contractual security is also 
undermined and the public service itself could be harmed. L’équilibre financier 
enables the contractor to claim the restitution of the initial equilibrium established at 
the conclusion of the contract.98 
L’équilibre financier is the approximate correlation or balance between obligations 
and benefits, l’équivalence honnête, which the contractor agreed to at the conclusion 
                                                
93 700. 
94 711-715. 
95 See, for instance, the right to indemnification under l’imprévision. 
96 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
700, 716-721. 
97 700. 
98 716. 
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of the contract, expressed as a calculation, (comme un calcul).99 In the event that this 
balance is disturbed it may have to be restored.100  
De Laubadère et al. argue that the principle that the administration incurs liability 
for disturbing the equilibrium of the contract is a rule derived from case law and based 
on equitable concerns (counterweight to exorbitant powers of administration) and on 
the public-service interest (collaborator).101 Other authors argue that the principle is 
linked to the common will of the parties, which is to maintain the initial equilibrium 
of the contract.102 Thus the mechanism of l’équilibre financier serves as an example 
of the role of consensus, despite the existence of exceptional rules relative to the 
private-law regime. 
 
5 4 The Performance of Contrats Administratifs 
 
The singularity and originality of the contrat administratif, in relation to the 
private-law contract, is exemplified in particular by the rules that regulate its 
performance.103 According to De Laubadère et al. the rationale behind this singularity 
in relation to private-law contracts is twofold.104 Firstly, the contrat administratif 
provides for the needs of the public service. Secondly, one of the contracting parties is 
the state and its public authority is not nullified merely because it concludes contracts. 
Thus, the nature of the contrat administratif can be described as a conglomeration of 
interests and considerations, in particular the public service and general interest, in 
addition to those established by the parties through consensus. As a result of these 
                                                
99 717. 
100 717. 
101 721. 
102 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
721. This view is critiqued by De Laubadère et al. (703-705, 720-721). 
103 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 377; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 79; Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1202; Gaudemet Y 
Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 696; De Laubadère A, 
Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 699. See Boyron S 
“The Public-Private Divide and the Law of Government Contracts: Assessing a Comparative 
Effort” in Ruffert M (ed) The Public-Private Law Divide: Potential for Transformation? (2009) 
221-244 at 231-232; Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 202. 
104 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
699-700. 
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considerations the administration and the contractor enjoy exceptional powers, rights 
and obligations from a private-law perspective.105 
 
5 4 1 The Powers106 of the Administration  
 
The powers of the administration concerning the performance of the contract are 
extensive. In fact, according to Chapus and Guettier, the regulation of the 
performance of contrats administratifs is characterised by these powers. 107  The 
administration has four principal types of power at its disposal.108  
The administration enjoys certain powers which can be categorised as methods to 
guarantee performance (les garanties de l’exécution).109 These powers include the 
power of control and management, the power to impose sanctions and the rejection of 
the exception of non-performance. The administration also has powers of intervention 
in the performance of the contract, namely, the power of control and management and 
the power of unilateral modification.110  
                                                
105 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
700. Nevertheless, the contrat administratif remains a contract (699). The requirements of the 
public service and the identity of the state as contracting party operate in addition to the common 
will of the parties and do not replace it; the common will of the parties remains the primary 
consideration for both contrats de droit commun and contrats administratifs in line with the 
fundamental notion of consensualisme. 
106 Or prerogatives. Some authors refer to the “powers” of the administration (see Richer L Droit 
des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 248, 261, 266, 269; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 697) while others refer to the same 
powers as “prerogatives” (see Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 80-81; De 
Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 709). 
107 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 379; Chapus R Droit Administratif 
Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1202. 
108 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 699-
705. See Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 80-81. 
109 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 266-274. See Boyron S “The Public-
Private Divide and the Law of Government Contracts: Assessing a Comparative Effort” in Ruffert 
M (ed) The Public-Private Law Divide: Potential for Transformation? (2009) 221-244 at 234. 
110 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
377. 
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In principle, the administrative courts cannot annul these powers; in the event that 
the exercise of these powers was irregular, the contractor is only entitled to claim 
damages.111 This principle dates back to the nineteenth century.112 
 
5 4 1 1 Le Pouvoir de Contrôle (The Power of Control) 
 
Firstly, the administration has a power of management and control over the 
performance of the contract.113 This power is not absolute and varies according to the 
type of contrat administratif. In terms of the legal literature, the power of control over 
the contract is traditionally associated with public-service concessions and the public 
service justifies its existence.114 In addition, this power is counted among the powers 
of unilateral modification, sanction and unilateral rescission, i.e. those powers at the 
administration’s disposal regardless of the terms of the contract.115  
“Control” is a wide term and encompasses a variety of methods of intervention by 
the administration. 116  The power of control, in a strict sense, enables the 
administration to supervise the performance of the contract and to ensure the proper 
                                                
111 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1205-1206; Gaudemet Y Traité de 
Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 701. 
112 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1205. 
113 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 386-390; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 266-269; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 87-
88; Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1203; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 699; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 379, 383-387; Bénoit F-P Le Droit 
Administratif Français (1968) 644-652. See Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 
80; Gaudemet Y Droit Administratif (2005, 18th ed) 300; Mitchell JDB The Contracts of Public 
Authorities: A Comparative Study (1954) 183-188. Mitchell discusses the administration’s power 
to impose sanctions under the administration’s power of control. However, in the French legal 
literature the power to impose sanctions is considered as a separate category. 
114 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 267; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 87. 
115 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 267. Cf. Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 87. 
116 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
379, 383. 
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provision of public service.117 Supervision may entail “physical acts” of verification, 
such as site inspections or the request for information, or “legal acts”, such as 
injunctions. The power of management, another aspect of control, goes further.118 The 
administration intervenes by determining the modes of application that were not 
specified by the contract. This intervention does not entail any modification of the 
contract itself, but completes the contract. 
However, “control” does not extend to the alteration of a clause and is thus 
distinguishable from “modification” which implies a deviation from the initial 
conditions of the contract, although admittedly the two concepts are sometimes 
closely related.119 De Laubadère et al. illustrate the distinction with the following 
example.120 When the administration, in the context of a public-works contract, 
verifies whether the contractor is employing a material envisaged by the contract, or 
prescribes a certain material in the absence of such a provision, the administration 
would be exercising its power of control. By contrast, when the administration 
requires the use of a material other than the one stipulated in the contract, the 
administration would be exercising its power of modification. 
 
5 4 1 2 Le Pouvoir de Sanction (The Power to Impose Sanctions)  
 
Secondly, where the contractor is in breach of its contractual obligations the 
administration can impose sanctions.121 The range of sanctions is wide and includes 
                                                
117 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 87; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P 
Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 383. 
118 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 87-88; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P 
Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 383. 
119 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
379, 389. 
120 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
379; see Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 386. 
121 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 405-412; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 269-273; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 88-
89; Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1204-1205; Gaudemet Y Traité de 
Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 700-702; De Laubadère A, 
Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 99-178. See Peiser G 
Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 81; Gaudemet Y Droit Administratif (2005, 18th ed) 
297-299; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 618-621. 
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pecuniary (whether damages or penalties), coercive, and resolutive sanctions (the 
right to resile from the contract).122 These sanctions differ fundamentally from those 
available under civil law.123 
Pecuniary sanctions124 can be imposed for reasons such as the failure to perform, 
late performance or inadequate performance.125 Such a sanction implies a payment by 
the contractor to the administration.126 The purpose of the pecuniary sanction is to 
prevent deficient performance or to secure restitution for deficient performance.127 In 
general, the sanction is not imposed by a court, but by the administration itself.128  
Coercive sanctions129 aim to secure performance regardless of the contractor’s 
insolvency, or in order to overcome the contractor’s insolvency, and at the 
contractor’s own risk and expense.130 The rationale of the coercive sanction is that the 
public service and, more generally, the general interest require the performance of the 
contract.131 The administration secures performance by temporarily stepping into the 
                                                
122 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 269-270; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 700; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 100. De Laubadère et al. also 
identify criminal sanctions, but these are especially rare and only exist where provided for by 
statute (100, 174-178). 
123 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
99. Either the sanctions are unique to contrats administratifs or, where a particular type of 
sanction exists under civil and administrative law, the rules which regulate the sanction are quite 
different. 
124 See, generally, De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II 
(1984, 2nd ed) 132-144. 
125 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 269-270. Richer claims that it is 
unlikely that this power will be available in the absence of a provision determining the calculation 
of penalties (269). 
126 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
132. 
127 100. 
128 132. 
129 See, generally, De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II 
(1984, 2nd ed) 144-155. 
130 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 270; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 100, 145. 
131 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 701; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 144. 
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contractor’s position or by substituting a third party for the contractor.132 The contract 
is not terminated.133 Examples of coercive sanctions are state control of public 
procurement contracts or the sequestration of the contractor’s public-service 
concession.134 The imposition of coercive sanctions presupposes gross misconduct by 
the contractor.135 The administration has recourse to coercive sanctions even if the 
contrat administratif does not provide for such a sanction.136 
The resolutive sanction137 is the most severe sanction that the administration can 
impose and requires serious misconduct on the part of the contractor.138 The resolutive 
sanction terminates the contract.139 The resolutive sanction must be distinguished 
from rescission in the general interest. 
According to Gaudemet, these sanctions are justified by the inadequacy or 
inappropriateness of the ordinary private-law sanctions such as the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus or recourse to the courts.140 By contrast, the administrative-law 
sanctions aim both to address the shortcomings of the contractor and to ensure the 
continuation of the public service. Thus the power to impose sanctions illustrates how 
the actual impact of the legal instrument informs the applicable legal rules. 
 
                                                
132 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 701-
702; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
100, 144, 145. 
133 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 702. 
134 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 270; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 100, 145. In general contrats 
administratifs provide for these sanctions, but they are available regardless of the terms of the 
contract according to legal writers (270). For example, Gaudemet argues that the power to impose 
sanctions is always available to the administration (Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit 
Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 700). 
135 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 702. 
136 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
145. 
137 See, generally, De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II 
(1984, 2nd ed) 155-174. 
138 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 702. 
139 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
100. 
140 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 700.  
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5 4 1 3 Le Pouvoir de Modification Unilatérale (The Power of Unilateral 
Modification) 
 
Thirdly, in the course of the contrat administratif’s performance, the 
administration can unilaterally modify contractual provisions without the need for 
fault on the part of the contractor.141 The decision of Union des transports publics 
urbains et régionaux, CE 2 February 1983 confirmed the existence of this power 
among the règles générales applicables aux contrats administratifs (general rules 
applicable to contrats administratifs).142 Examples of the exercise of this power 
include changing the duration or the particular method of the performance.143 
The characteristics of the power of unilateral modification are the following.144 
Firstly, the power of modification is a general power that applies to all types of 
contrats administratifs; however, the scope of the power varies according to the 
contrat administratif’s association with the public service, and this varies with the 
type of contrat administratif.145 Secondly, the power exists even in the absence of a 
                                                
141 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 390-393; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 261-265; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 90-
91; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 702; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 388-
408. See Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 80-81; Auby J-B & Cluzel-Métayer 
L “Administrative Law in France” in Seerden RJGH (ed) Administrative Law of the European 
Union, its Member States and the United States: A Comparative Analysis (2007, 2nd ed) 61-92 at 
73; Gaudemet Y Droit Administratif (2005, 18th ed) 300-301. 
142 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 263; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 91; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II 
(1984, 2nd ed) 396. For the argument against the existence of a power of unilateral modification, 
obsolete since the decision of Union des transports publics urbains et régionaux, CE 2 February 
1983, see Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 655-659. For an overview of this 
debate, see De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 
2nd ed) 395-396. 
143 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
389. 
144 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 264-265; Lichère F Droit des 
Contrats Publics (2005) 90, 91-92; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit 
Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 703-704; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité 
des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 403-408. 
145 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
404. 
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clause providing for it and it cannot be excluded by agreement (the general interest is 
decisive). Thirdly, not all the clauses of a contrat administratif are susceptible to 
modification and only certain modifications are permitted. Thus the scope of this 
power is restricted. For instance, the administration can modify the scope of the 
contractor’s performance, within certain limits.146 However, a modification may not 
cause a “disruption” (bouleversement) of the essential terms of the contract; the 
modification may not affect the financial clauses (clauses financières) since the 
équation financière must be maintained; and the modification may not change the 
nature of the contract. Finally, the interests of the contractor are protected by the right 
to full indemnification against any loss caused by the modification. 
The rationale for the power of modification is rooted in the requirements of the 
public service, particularly the general principles of the adaptability and continuity of 
the public service.147 Since these requirements can change, the general interest may 
require modifying the original obligations of the contractor. However, De Laubadère 
et al. indicate that the power of unilateral modification does not mean that the 
administration is not bound to the contract. 148  This would conflict with the 
obligationary nature of contracts. Therefore, to avoid this conflict, the fundamental 
private-law principle of l’immutabilité does not apply with the same consequences to 
contrats administratifs. 
It is due to the rationale of the power, and the status of the power of modification 
as on of the règles générales applicables aux contrats administratifs, that the power 
                                                
146 406-407. 
147 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 703; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 402-
403. Cf. Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 91. “L’idée générale est que l’administration 
ne doit pas être indéfiniment liée par des contrats devenus inutiles ou par des stipulations 
contractuelles devenues inadaptées aux besoins du service. [The general idea is that the 
administration must not be bound indefinitely to contracts which have become unnecessary or to 
contractual provisions which have become unsuitable to the requirements of the [public] service.]” 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 402 
(own translation). 
148 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
394. 
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exists regardless of the terms of the contract, i.e. a clause establishing the power is 
unnecessary and the power cannot be excluded by agreement.149  
The rules applicable to the power of unilateral modification achieve a balance 
between the interest of public service and the private interest of the contractor.150 
 
5 4 1 4 La Résiliation Unilatérale pour Motif d’Intérêt Général (The Power of 
Unilateral Rescission in the General Interest) 
 
Finally, the administration can rescind the contract in favour of the general interest 
at any time without the need for fault on the part of the contractor. 151  The 
characteristics of the power of unilateral rescission are the following.152 Firstly, the 
power of rescission is a general power applicable to all contrats administratifs.153 
Secondly, the power exists regardless of the terms of the contract. Since the power 
numbers among the règles générales applicables aux contrats administratifs it exists 
despite the absence of a clause providing for it. The decision to rescind is also a 
public-policy decision and linked to the functioning of the public service which 
implies that the parties cannot exclude it by agreement. Thirdly, the decision to 
rescind is a discretionary power of the administration. Finally, the contractor is 
                                                
149 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 91; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: 
Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 703. 
150 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 703. 
151 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 393-396; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 249-256; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 90, 
91-92; Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1205; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 704; Bénoit F-P Le Droit 
Administratif Français (1968) 661-663. See Boyron S “The Public-Private Divide and the Law of 
Government Contracts: Assessing a Comparative Effort” in Ruffert M (ed) The Public-Private 
Law Divide: Potential for Transformation? (2009) 221-244 at 235; Peiser G Droit Administratif 
Général (2008, 24th ed) 81, 83; Gaudemet Y Droit Administratif (2005, 18th ed) 301. 
152 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 249-256; Lichère F Droit des 
Contrats Publics (2005) 92; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif 
Général (2001, 16th ed) 704. 
153 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 704; 
cf. Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 249-252, where the question whether 
the power of unilateral rescission in the general interest is applicable to all contrats administratifs. 
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entitled to indemnification against any loss. The rationale for this power is also 
founded on the interest of public service.154  
 
5 4 2 The Rights of the Contractor 
 
The contractor has a right to remuneration in terms of the contractual provisions.155 
To this end, the financial interests of the contractor are secured in two ways.156 Firstly, 
the administration may not unilaterally modify provisions securing the financial 
interests of the contractor. Secondly, the contractor is entitled to indemnification 
against prejudice, under certain circumstances. The more significant rights to 
indemnification are based on the équilibre financier du contrat, “a fundamental 
element of the theory of the contrat administratif”.157 
In the context of the contrat administratif, the contractor is exposed to more risk of 
prejudice than in that of the private-law contract due to its adaptability as illustrated 
by, for example, unilateral modification.158 This is the raison d’être for the équation 
financière. When the equilibrium is undone, the contractor is entitled to have the 
equilibrium restored by means of compensation. 
The concept of financial equilibrium was formulated by Blum in his conclusion to 
the decision of Compagnie générale française des tramways, CE 11 March 1910.159 
                                                
154 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 249; Chapus R Droit Administratif 
Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1207; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif 
Général (2001, 16th ed) 704. 
155 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 412; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 705. 
156 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 92; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: 
Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 705. 
157 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 705 
(own translation).  
158 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 706; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 716. 
159 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 706; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 716-
717. 
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The financial equilibrium is the approximate relationship between the obligations and 
interests of the contractor, as determined in the contract, expressed as a calculation.160 
 
5 4 3 The Effect of a Change in the Circumstances  
 
During the performance of a contract, a change in circumstances may alter the 
conditions within which performance will have to take place; “this might render 
performance more onerous or even impossible.”161 In terms of French private law, a 
change in circumstances might also entail legal consequences different to those 
foreseen by the contracting parties; however, the solutions to a change in 
circumstances envisaged by French administrative law are different to those of private 
law.162 The following theories regulate a change in circumstances under French 
administrative law: la force majeure, les sujétions imprévues, le fait du prince and 
l’imprévision.163 La force majeure is distinct from the other theories since it is the 
only theory that operates to release the contractor from the contractual obligations due 
to the impossibility of performance.164  
The rationale for these distinct theories is the requirements of public service.165 
Except for la force majeur, all of the theories require the continuation of performance, 
despite a change in circumstances; however, in these cases the contractor benefits 
from a right to indemnification.166 
 
                                                
160 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
717. 
161 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 709; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 497. 
162 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 709. 
163 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
497. 
164 497. 
165 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 709. 
166  Auby J-B & Cluzel-Métayer L “Administrative Law in France” in Seerden RJGH (ed) 
Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis (2007, 2nd ed) 61-92 at 73; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: 
Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 709; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité 
des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 497. 
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5 4 3 1 La Force Majeure 
 
The force majeure is an external and unforeseeable event that renders the 
performance of the contract absolutely impossible and has the legal effect of releasing 
the contractor from its obligations.167 De Laubadère et al. define these requirements as 
follows. 168  Externality implies that the event occurred independently of the 
contracting parties and the contract. Therefore, the parties should neither have caused 
the event nor have been able to prevent it. The event should have been unforeseen and 
reasonably unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The event must 
be insurmountable, in an absolute sense given the context and circumstances of the 
contractor.169  
Examples of events that might qualify as forces majeures are natural phenomena, 
such as storms and flooding, accidents and acts of third parties, such as sabotage, or 
the outbreak of war.170 Another example is the promulgation of social legislation that, 
for instance, reduces the number of hours in a workday. Contractors regularly invoke 
                                                
167 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 556-557; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 292; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 97-98; 
Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 709-710; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 727-
736, 740-741; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II 
(1984, 2nd ed) 647-651; Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 617-618. See Boyron S 
“The Public-Private Divide and the Law of Government Contracts: Assessing a Comparative 
Effort” in Ruffert M (ed) The Public-Private Law Divide: Potential for Transformation? (2009) 
221-244 at 235-236; Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 83; Brown LN & Bell 
JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 210. 
168 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
727-731. 
169 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
729-730. An event which renders performance extremely difficult is insufficient for the operation 
of the theory of force majeur. However, for the theories of fait du prince and l’imprévision, 
circumstances which render performance more onerous suffices for the operation of these theories. 
Cf. the so-called force majeure administrative, another administrative-law variation of the force 
majeure that does not require impossibility of performance as a requirement (De Laubadère A, 
Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 730-731; see Guettier C 
Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 558-559). 
170 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
731-736. 
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these interventions, but they are rarely granted. However, in principle, social 
legislation could lead to the operation of the theory of force majeure. 
The presence of all of the necessary requirements does not per se terminate the 
contract.171 The legal effects of the theory of force majeure only apply during the 
existence of the force majeur. Thus, the duty to perform the contractual obligations is 
only suspended for the duration of the events that render performance impossible: 
once the force majeure has come to an end the obligations are revived. However, if 
the performance is permanently rendered impossible, the force majeure provides a 
ground for rescission. Since the contractor is released from its obligations, the 
administration is precluded from imposing sanctions.172 
 
5 4 3 2 Le Fait du Prince 
 
In terms of public law, le fait du prince refers to those acts of a public authority 
that render the contractor’s obligations more onerous and result in liability without 
fault for the administration.173 Strictly speaking, the following requirements must be 
met for the theory of le fait du prince to apply.174 The contractor must be prejudiced 
                                                
171 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 710; 
740-741. 
172 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 710; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 739. 
173 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 417-419; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 296-297; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 96; 
Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1209-1211; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit 
Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 710; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 515-558; Bénoit F-P Le Droit 
Administratif Français (1968) 635-642; Mitchell JDB The Contracts of Public Authorities: A 
Comparative Study (1954) 193-198. See Boyron S “The Public-Private Divide and the Law of 
Government Contracts: Assessing a Comparative Effort” in Ruffert M (ed) The Public-Private 
Law Divide: Potential for Transformation? (2009) 221-244 at 232-233; Davies ACL The Public 
Law of Government Contracts (2008) 56-57; Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th ed) 
81-82; Brown LN & Bell JS French Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 207-208. 
174 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 711; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 521. 
The concept of fait du prince is defined in a wide sense, lato sensu, and in a strict sense, stricto 
sensu (Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 
710-712; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd 
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by measures taken by a public authority. In addition, le fait du prince is only 
applicable if the contracting public authority itself took the measures that affect the 
contractor. Only certain measures will entitle the contractor to a right of 
indemnification. Finally, the action must have been unforeseeable. Consequently the 
contractor is entitled to full indemnification against detriment to its situation and 
loss.175  
Determining which measures qualify as a fait du prince is a difficult and complex 
exercise. 176  The public authority can take measures aimed at the contractor 
specifically, in terms of its power of unilateral modification, or that affect the 
contractor indirectly. These measures may be general or specific. General measures 
such as legislation or regulations generally preclude a right to full indemnification on 
the ground that all citizens are affected by the general measure.177 However, where the 
general measures affect the contractual provisions themselves there may be a right to 
full indemnification. Where the measures only affect the conditions of performance, 
there is in principle no such right. This is the case unless the general measure affects 
the “essential purpose” (l’objet essentiel) by changing the situation the parties agreed 
upon.178 In principle, all specific measures imply a right to full indemnification. 
The right to full indemnification is based on the contractual liability of the 
administration and the maintenance of the équilibre financier du contrat.179 
 
                                                                                                                                       
ed) 516-518. Since the contractor is entitled to full indemnification when the fait du prince applies 
in the strict sense, only this definition is discussed. 
175 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 96; Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: 
Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 711, 712; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P 
Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 521, 552. 
176 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 711; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 527-
551. 
177 “Here compensation to the contractor is ruled out by the general principle that all must support 
equally burdens imposed by the state - the theory of ‘Egalité devant les charges publiques’ 
[“Equality before public duties].” Mitchell JDB The Contracts of Public Authorities: A 
Comparative Study (1954) 194 (own translation). 
178 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 711; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 535-
536. 
179 Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 712; 
De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 553. 
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5 4 3 3 Les Imprévues  
 
Les sujétions imprévues are exceptional and unforeseeable physical impediments, 
which render the obligations of the contractor more onerous.180 Physical impediments 
refer to natural phenomena, such as unexpectedly encountering hard rock instead of 
soft soil while digging, or human acts, such as the presence of a canal that is not 
indicated on the relevant map.181 The cause of the difficulties must be external. 
Therefore the contractor should not have contributed to the difficulty, exacerbated the 
difficulty or have been able to prevent the difficulty. 182  The requirement of 
unforeseeability requires that, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the 
difficulty was both unforeseen and unforeseeable.183 Consequently, the contractor will 
be entitled to full indemnification for the additional costs, unless the contractor does 
not continue to perform.184 As Lichère points out, les sujétions imprévues do not 
render performance impossible, but significantly more difficult.185 
According to De Laubadère et al. this theory is based on equitable considerations 
and on the need for a collaborative relationship between the administration and the 
contractor.186 Where the proper performance of the contract requires works, additional 
and essential to those foreseen in the contract, the contractor will be indemnified.187 In 
such a case the contractor completes works which are not required or foreseen by the 
                                                
180 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 419-422; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 275-276; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 95; 
Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1208; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 499-513; Bénoit F-P Le Droit 
Administratif Français (1968) 623-625.  
181 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1208; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, 
Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 507. 
182 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
507. 
183 507-509. 
184 512-513. 
185 Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 95. 
186 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 
505. This stands in contrast to the general view that the theory of les sujétions imprévues is based 
on the implicit common will of the parties (504-505). 
187 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 276-277; Lichère F Droit des 
Contrats Publics (2005) 95. 
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contract. That the additional works are essential, and not merely useful, to the 
performance of the contractual works is a requirement. 
 
5 4 3 4 L’Imprévision 
 
If events, unforeseeable at the time of a contract’s conclusion and which cause a 
bouleversement de l’économie du contrat, occur during the performance of the 
contract, the theory of l’imprévision applies.188 The events must occur independently 
of the parties. A bouleversement de l’économie du contrat is a lower standard than the 
impossibility of performance required by the theory of the force majeur. 
The purpose of l’imprévision is to safeguard the continuity of public service and 
the concept of the public service is central in this context.189 Continuity is ensured by 
l’imprévision in two ways. 190  Firstly, the contractor is obliged to continue 
performance despite the change in circumstances in order to qualify for the 
indemnification. This is an absolute precondition for the operation of the theory of 
l’imprévision. The operation of the l’imprévision does not release the contractor from 
its obligations.191 Secondly, the administration is obliged to come to the contractor’s 
                                                
188 Guettier C Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 2nd ed) 423-429; Richer L Droit des 
Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 277-281; Lichère F Droit des Contrats Publics (2005) 96-
97; Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1211-1215; Gaudemet Y Traité de 
Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général (2001, 16th ed) 712-716; De Laubadère A, 
Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 559-630; Bénoit F-P 
Le Droit Administratif Français (1968) 625-634. See Boyron S “The Public-Private Divide and 
the Law of Government Contracts: Assessing a Comparative Effort” in Ruffert M (ed) The Public-
Private Law Divide: Potential for Transformation? (2009) 221-244 at 233-235. Davies ACL The 
Public Law of Government Contracts (2008) 57; Peiser G Droit Administratif Général (2008, 24th 
ed) 82; Gaudemet Y Droit Administratif (2005, 18th ed) 299-300; Brown LN & Bell JS French 
Administrative Law (1998, 5th ed) 208-209. 
189 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 279; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 97; Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1212; De Laubadère A, 
Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II (1984, 2nd ed) 562-563. De 
Laubadère et al. and Richer refer the continuity of public service as a principle (le principe de la 
continuité du service public). 
190 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 279; Lichère F Droit des Contrats 
Publics (2005) 97; De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs II 
(1984, 2nd ed) 562-563. 
191 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1213. 
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assistance in preventing the contractor’s bankruptcy. However, l’imprévision does not 
entitle the contractor to full indemnification; the additional costs are shared between 
the contractor and the administration, although, in principle, the administration 
assumes responsibility for 90 per cent192 of the expenditure. L’imprévision only 
applies for the duration of the event which renders performance more onerous.193 
 
5 5 A Comparative Analysis of the Contrat Administratif 
 
In France, the administration can conclude two types of public contract: the contrat 
administratif and the contrat de droit commun, the former regulated by public law and 
the latter by private law. However, both fields of law together constitute the French 
theory of contract law. Thus, there is a public law of contract and a private law of 
contract. This can be contrasted to the South African position where the law of 
contract is inherently, even quintessentially, private in nature. Where administrative-
law rules are applied to contractual relationships, it is general administrative law. 
The critical question at this juncture is how are the contrat administratif and the 
contrat de droit commun, the public-law contract and the private-law contract, 
differentiated? The answer is not straightforward. In the first place the concept of “the 
contract” needs to be defined. An aspect of this definition is the inquiry whether the 
contrat administratif and contrat de droit commun are different legal concepts. Even 
though the vast majority of authors agree that the general concept is the same under 
both private and public law,194 this should neither obscure the differences identified 
                                                
192 Richer L Droit des Contrats Administratifs (2008, 6th ed) 281. 
193 Chapus R Droit Administratif Général I (2001, 15th ed) 1213. 
194 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 28. 
Gaudemet identifies an “important doctrinal debate”, in the context of the relationship between the 
theory of the contrat administratif and the contrat de droit commun, between Duguit and Jèze who 
represent opposing views, the former claiming that “essentially, there is no difference between a 
civil contract and a contrat administratif” and the latter that the two forms of contract are 
fundamentally different, Gaudemet Y Traité de Droit Administratif I: Droit Administratif Général 
(2001, 16th ed) 671-672 (own translation); see Mewett AW “The Theory of Government 
Contracts” (1959) 5 McGill Law Journal 222-246 at 222-223. However, de Laubadère et al. 
mention that this distinction should not be overstated and that Jèze should not be taken literally. 
Rather, Jèze merely intends that many fundamental rules of the contrat administratif differ from 
those of the contrat de droit commun, De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des 
Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 18 n 3. 
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by some authors, particularly Duguit, between civil and public-law definitions of the 
contract, nor the particular difficulties associated with distinguishing the contrat 
administratif from other bilateral administrative acts, unilateral acts and regulatory 
acts.195 Nevertheless, the contrat administratif is defined, in line with the private-law 
contract, as an agreement (un accord de volontés) that creates legal obligations.196 
This concept is quite familiar in the South African theory of contract law.197  
On the basis of the nature of the contrat administratif, criteria have developed to 
identify the contrat administratif and to distinguish it from private-law contracts. It is 
through the application of these criteria that contrats administratifs are differentiated 
from contrats de droit commun. 
It is noteworthy that there are various categories of classification, i.e. the 
qualifications légales and the critères jurisprudentiels. One the one hand, this 
demonstrates that the Conseil d’État has played an integral role in determining how 
contrats administratifs are classified. Uncharacteristically for French law in general, 
the law of the contrat administratif is largely judge-made. As a result, the rules 
pertaining to the contrat administratif have been able to adapt to changing 
circumstances over a long period of time, evolving during unprecedented 
developments such as World War II and the expanding role of the administration. 
However, the legislature has on occasion established a category of contrats 
administratifs from the onset or intervened where the Conseil d’État failed to regulate 
a particular sphere of contractual activity satisfactorily. 
The variety of sources constituting the criteria is valuable because through them 
different methods and motivations for classifying particular contracts as administratif 
are provided.198 Certain types of contract are always contrats administratifs, such as 
those classified as such by statute. Although statutory qualification does not 
necessarily simplify the process of classification, it does indicate that certain types of 
contract are in principle always subject to public-law regulation, ostensibly simply by 
                                                
195 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
19-28, 54-123.  
196 29-30, 35-41. 
197 Van der Merwe SWJ, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB, Lubbe GF Kontraktereg: Algemene 
Beginsels (2012, 4th ed) 7-8. “’n Kontrak word oor die algemeen ‘n verbintenisskeppende 
ooreenkoms genoem.” (7, footnote omitted). 
198 See De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd 
ed) 127. 
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virtue of being a particular type of contract. From a South African perspective, French 
statutory classification provides a diverse set of contrats administratifs, thus providing 
an extensive list of contract types that are virtually always subject to public-law 
regulation. These contracts illustrate that the nature of the contract can be indicative 
of which rules will be applied. At the very least, the type of contract can be adopted as 
a factor in determining the appropriate legal rules to apply. However, the rationale for 
classifying certain contracts as contrats administratifs is more significant than the set 
of contract types. 
The general principles that inform the distinction between contrats administratifs 
and contrats de droit commun have been formulated by the courts in case law.199 
These general principles constitute the critères jurisprudentiels, of which there are 
two, the exorbitant-clause criterion and the public-service criterion. Through these 
criteria various indicators are provided that contribute to differentiating between the 
nature of the contrat administratif and the contrat de droit commun. In the first place, 
there is the notion of compatibility. Though vague, it draws attention to an awareness 
that the rules regulating a contractual relationship should correspond to the nature of 
the contract. Secondly, the exorbitant-clause criterion renders contracts that contain a 
clause that is impossible, illegal or unusual in the private-law context as contrats 
administratifs. These clauses themselves render the contract administratif due to their 
nature. This classification is based on general administrative-law principles that 
require that all “matters or questions of public law” fall within the competence of the 
administrative court; the exorbitant clause is such a matter of public law.200 
Finally, in terms of the public-service criterion contracts that have a close link to 
the provision of a public service are contrats administratifs. De Laubadère et al. quote 
Long’s rationale for this position, as expressed in his conclusions to the case Bertin, 
CE 20 April 1956: 
 
                                                
199 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
132. 
200 212. 
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“One cannot permit the administration to entrust a public-service task to an ordinary private 
individual and simultaneously deprive it of the rights and prerogatives with which the public-
law regime provides it.”201 
 
The fundamental justification for this criterion is that the administration must 
retain control over the public service and the rules of the contrat administratif enable 
the administration to do so.202 
The rules of contractual performance demonstrate how the public-law powers of 
the administration and the general interest are safeguarded. In addition, the general 
principles applicable to the performance of the contrat administratif indicate that the 
contrat administratif and contrat de droit commun are not exclusive legal entities. To 
a significant extent the contrat administratif is an integrated legal concept that 
combines aspects of private and public law regulation. The primary role of consensus 
in determining the scope of the contractual obligations testifies to the integrated 
nature of the contrat administratif. This counters one of the principal critiques of an 
independent concept of public contract, namely, that the primacy of consensus is 
compromised. 
The contrat administratif also demonstrates that certain aspects are better regulated 
by public law, regardless of the incorporation of public-law values into private law 
itself. Examples include the legal facilitation of the administration in performing its 
functions and the protection of the general interest, as argued by Davies.203 Therefore, 
interests such as the adaptability and continuity of the public service can be protected. 
The contrat administratif also acknowledges the nature of the state or administration; 
the legal instrument it chooses to employ should not supersede its status automatically 
and comprehensively. Nevertheless, through these rules the contractor is in a position 
of risk, which is the platform for unique rules, the équilibre financier du contrat and 
strict limits to the administration’s capacity to unilaterally modify the contract. These 
opposing rules establish a balance between public-law concerns, such as the general 
                                                
201 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
198. Own translation from “Nous ne pouvons pas laisser l’administration confier à un simple 
particulier l’exécution d’une mission de service public et se dépouiller en même temps des droits 
et prérogatives que lui assure le régime de droit public”.  
202 De Laubadère A, Moderne F, Delvolvé P Traité des Contrats Administratifs I (1983, 2nd ed) 
198. 
203 See Davies ACL The Public Law of Government Contracts (2008) chs 1, 2. 
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interest or the provision of public service, and private-law interests, such as the 
economic security of the contract and contractual certainty. 
Thus, the French system maintains the institution of the contract in the public or 
administrative-law context, thereby combining interests characteristic of private and 
public law.204 This transcends the classic critique of the public-private divide, which 
the either-or, all-or-nothing classification process ostensibly perpetuates. However, 
this does not mean that the French system has no shortcomings concerning the public-
private divide, which can be regarded as formalistic. Nevertheless, the contrat 
administratif is instructive on how to combine interests that are typically public and 
private within a single branch of law, a sophisticated branch of law that has developed 
over a considerable period of time,205  evolving with the changing role of the 
administration. 
                                                
204 See Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 172. 
205 For a discussion on the development of the contrat administratif see the conclusion of Achille 
Mestre to the decision of the CE 21 January 1938. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 261  
CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
6 1 The Contextualised Administrative-Law System: A New Concept 
 
This dissertation introduces the concept of “the contextualised administrative-law 
system”. The administrative-law system emphasises the legal relationship between the 
public administration and the judiciary. However, the legal relationship is only one 
aspect of the administrative-law system. The administrative-law system in context 
recognises the impact of choices in political theory on the system itself as well as on 
administrative mechanisms such as public contracting; it also recognises the role of a 
given geo-political and socio-economic context. Thus, inquiries concerning 
alternative administrative-law systems or specific changes to that system should not 
be considered in isolation. Therefore, the interrelated and interdependent nature of 
political theory, context and the administrative-law system is set out; 1  the 
contextualised administrative-law system constitutes the point of departure for 
investigating an alternative administrative-law system. The contextualised 
administrative-law system also constitutes the approach for the investigation into an 
alternative administrative-law system in South Africa.  
In the South African context, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 expresses choices in political and constitutional theory. More specifically, the 
Constitution embodies a project of “transformative constitutionalism” that is driven 
by the Constitution itself and that entails a project of social and political 
transformation grounded in law.2 The Constitution also entrenches the separation of 
powers.3 Thus, the Constitution frames the political objectives of South Africa and 
determines, to an extent, the arrangement and functions of political institutions. The 
                                                
1 See ch 2. 
2 Klare K “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 146-188. 
3 Ss 44, 85, 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; South African 
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paras 18-22. 
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political objectives and constitutional structure are all informed by the South African 
context, which includes South Africa’s past and its aspirations.4 
The administrative-law system as such is central to this project. Firstly, the 
democratic function of the public administration, namely, implementing legislation 
and policy, includes the implementation of socio-economic rights and the right to 
administrative justice. Secondly, the judiciary’s function of upholding the supremacy 
of the Constitution entails protecting all rights, including socio-economic rights and 
the right to administrative justice, and ensuring the legality of all state conduct.  
Thus, on the whole, Klare’s idea of transformative constitutionalism also reinforces 
the interrelatedness of geo-political and socio-economic context, political theory and 
the administrative-law system.5 The South African administrative-law system operates 
within the normative context of the Constitution. The importance of considering the 
administrative-law system as such is the prominence of the relationship between the 
public administration and judiciary. They are not merely components of the system. 
Considering either institution in isolation fails to address their interaction and their 
position within a broader project and context. The argument is made that the judicial 
function has meaning in relation to the administrative function and, likewise, that the 
administrative function is informed by the judicial function. Thus, the functional 
spheres of the administration and the judiciary are not considered in isolation. Where 
either function is considered in isolation analysis tends to focus on the functional 
sphere of each institution and whether a particular act falls within that sphere. This 
amounts to a narrow separation-of-powers discussion and can descend into formalism. 
Also, where the judiciary adjudicates upon the administration, even legitimately, the 
administration and the performance of the administrative function are implicated. This 
contention is explained in the chapter on the French administrative-law system. 
Whether the judiciary finds for or against the administration also implicates the 
administration and the administrative function. This logical inference should not be 
neglected. Thus it is the interaction of the judiciary and the administration that is of 
critical importance. In turn, the relationship reveals whether judges understand 
administrative arguments, whether judges take account of administrative arguments, 
and whether the administration respects orders made against it. 
                                                
4 See, for instance, the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5 See also the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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6 2 The Separation of Powers: Normative, Flexible and Dynamic 
 
Given the importance of the administrative-law system, particularly in relation to 
the project of transformative constitutionalism, the separation of powers, which is the 
fundamental constitutional principle shaping the legal relationship between the public 
administration and judiciary in South Africa, is analysed. Firstly, the origins and 
development of the separation of powers are traced. The history of the separation of 
powers indicates that it is a normative doctrine, in terms of which particular normative 
objectives find institutional expression and protection. The separation of powers 
recognises that institutions should be arranged in a particular manner in order to 
promote identified normative objectives. Thus, the separation of powers is not an end 
in itself and implies neither the pure separation of powers nor the trias politica. The 
separation of powers understood thus can make all the difference in accommodating 
the rise of the administrative state. 
Although the value of the separation of powers in the modern context is contested, 
it is argued that the normative, flexible and dynamic nature of the doctrine can 
usefully be employed to evaluate fundamental political changes in society such as the 
rise of the administrative state and even the contracting state. 6  The essential 
separation-of-powers concerns remain: for instance, only power can check power. In 
addition, the separation of powers is essential to understanding the administrative-law 
relationship. However, traditionally the separation of powers implies a threefold 
classification of functions and state institutions, conflating the administration and 
executive. This obscures the impact of the rise of the administrative state as well as 
the distinct relationship between the public administration and the judiciary. 
Historically, the relationship between the executive and parliament, for instance, has 
been the subject of intense analysis, due to the power of each institution, among other 
reasons. The administration as such has been neglected in this sense. What is needed 
is a comprehensive analysis of the administration in terms of the separation of powers. 
In order to benefit from what the separation of powers has to offer, the administration 
as such should enjoy the same attention as the other branches under the separation of 
                                                
6 See Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998, 2nd ed) ch 13; Harlow C & 
Rawlings R Law and Administration (2009, 3rd ed) 23; Ackerman B “Good-bye, Montesquieu” in 
Rose-Ackerman S & Lindseth PL (eds) Comparative Administrative Law (2010) 128-133 at 129. 
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powers. Vile recommends distinguishing between the policy branch and 
administrative branch.7 Thus, with the recognition of at least a fourth branch the 
administration’s relationship with the policy branch, with the legislature and with the 
judiciary should be assessed. The separation of powers provides the conceptual 
framework for such an assessment by identifying the normative objectives that the 
institutional structure promotes. These normative objectives include, at least 
historically, efficiency, the common interest, the impartial rule of law, accountability 
and balance.8 The historical development and nature of the separation of powers 
provides a profound conceptual framework which can be employed to analyse the rise 
of the administrative state and its constitutional position. In South African law the 
need for this exercise has hardly been acknowledged, not to mention undertaken. 
Consequently, the separation of powers understood thus facilitates the formulation of 
new, fundamental questions such as what constitutes the administrative branch and 
function? Is the administration held accountable by the other branches? If so, how? 
Does the relationship between the branches safeguard the common interest?  
The administration wields immense power. It creates its own rules in response to 
broad policy and legislative constraints and mandates. The scale of the administration 
means oversight is limited and accountability to the executive branch is not feasible. 
The independence of the administration and the executive has not been investigated to 
the extent of the other branches. Thus, even though the separation of powers has 
limitations,9 it draws attention to a wide variety of values, objectives and potential 
solutions which affect institutions and are affected by institutions, such as the 
deconcentration of power and the necessity of independent political institutions. This 
can be applied to the administration. 
All these questions are prompted by the separation of powers properly understood 
as a normative and dynamic doctrine. In addition, the doctrine can assist in responding 
to these questions. On these terms and standards the administration as a distinct 
                                                
7 Vile MJC Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998, 2nd ed) 416. 
8 Gwyn WB The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from its 
Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965) 127-128. See Bellamy R “The 
Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative 
Democracy” (1996) 44 Political Studies 436-456 at 255; Meyerson D “The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers” (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 1-6. 
9 See ch 2 above. 
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branch and function should be included in separation-of-powers analysis. This 
involves a “new separation of powers”10 and a change in legal culture.11 
 
6 3 Analysing the South African Administrative-Law System 
 
The historical failure to recognise the distinct nature of the administration and the 
administrative function is illustrated by the example of South Africa. As a result of 
this failure, the South African context is characterised by the equating of judicial 
review and administrative law, by the over-emphasis of judicial review in the absence 
of a bill of rights, by a judicial rhetoric of deference and, generally, by a juridical 
approach which is pro-review and anti-administration.12 
In chapter three, the concept of the “contextualised administrative-law system” is 
drawn upon to analyse the legal relationship between the public administration and 
the judiciary in South Africa. That South Africa has a particular geo-political and 
socio-economic past that informs the aspirations of transformative constitutionalism is 
the point of departure. Therefore the geo-political and socio-economic context and 
political theory are not discussed in detail. The focus in the first part of the chapter is 
on the characteristics of the South African administrative-law system. To this end the 
                                                
10 Ackerman B “Good-bye, Montesquieu” in Rose-Ackerman S & Lindseth PL (eds) Comparative 
Administrative Law (2010) 128-133 at 129. 
11 Klare K “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 146-188 at 156:  
 
“The Constitution invites a new imagination and self-reflection about legal method, analysis 
and reasoning consistent with its transformative goals. By implication, new conceptions of 
judicial role and responsibility are contemplated. Judicial mindset and methodology are part of 
the law, and therefore they must be examined and revised so as to promote equality, a culture 
of democracy and transparent governance. Accordingly, the drafters cannot have intended 
dramatically to alter substantive constitutional foundations and assumptions, yet to have left 
these new rights and duties to be interpreted through the lens of classical legalist methods. 
They cannot have assumed that the document’s lofty ambitions would be interpreted according 
to, and therefore constrained by, the intellectual instincts and habits of mind of the traditional 
common or Roman-Dutch lawyer trained and professionally socialized during the apartheid 
era. On my reading, the Constitution suggests not only the desirability, but the legal necessity, 
of a transformative conception of adjudicative process and method”. (Emphasis in original). 
12 Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
South African Law Journal 484-519 at 484. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 266  
development and nature of this system is set out. On the whole, the South African 
system is still emerging from Dicey’s shadow and is characterised by the prominence 
of judicial review.  
On the basis of the administrative-law system’s nature, components and 
characteristics, as identified in the first part of chapter three, the legal relationship 
between the public administration and the judiciary is considered. The legal 
relationship is assessed by mean of six elements that inform this relationship, namely: 
one, the constitutional mandates of the South African courts and public 
administration; two, the South African understanding and application of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers; three, the idea of deference or respect; four, the 
public/private-law distinction; five, democracy and the counter-majoritarian dilemma; 
and, six, co-operative government. These elements determine the nature, components 
and characteristics of the legal relationship between the administration and judiciary.  
 
6 4 Calling for a Debate on Deference, Again 
 
As a matter of South African positive law, the main characteristic of this 
relationship is deference. Authors such as Dyzenhaus, Hoexter and Daly consider 
deference as pivotal to developing a new, integrated approach to adjudication that 
reflects the role of the administration in the modern state.13 The prominence of 
deference reinforces the notion of a fourth branch in terms of the separation of 
powers. In administrative-law adjudication, deference has developed into the courts’ 
main descriptor of the relationship between the administration and the judiciary in the 
event of judicial review. 14  Deference dominates the debate on the relationship 
between the administration and the judiciary without acknowledging the nature of the 
relationship between the two institutions. The emphasis is on the functional spheres 
and characteristics of the branches, which is largely a separation-of-powers matter. 
                                                
13 See Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M 
(ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307; Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial 
Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 484-519; 
Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012). 
14 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) paras 21-22; Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA) para 50; Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 48. 
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Quite how deference differs from the ideas of the separation of powers is unclear, 
especially in South African case law. The new terminology might contribute to 
emphasising a particular aspect of the separation of powers in general, but without 
underlining the relationship and the role of the contextualised administrative-law 
system, deference as such cannot provide holistic solutions nor describe the nature of 
the problems associated with this relationship. As the French system illustrates the 
administrative-law relationship is particularly problematic due to the hybrid nature of 
administrative litigation.  
Hoexter called for a debate on deference in the year 2000 for two reasons:15 to 
determine an appropriate, integrated role for judicial review and to formulate a theory 
of intervention and non-intervention. This debate has not yet taken place in the sense 
called for by Hoexter. As far as the South African courts are concerned deference is 
simply the broad strokes identified by Hoexter.  
Deference “flows” from the separation of powers, according to Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.16 With the publication of 
Hoexter’s article, “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative 
Law”,17  deference became a prominent topic that soon enjoyed judicial notice. 
However, without considering the credentials, nature or content of deference, the 
courts have established and applied it as a legal principle and rule.18 Nevertheless, 
despite the courts’ apparent enthusiasm for a principle of deference, the actual role of 
deference is not only obscure, but seems merely to repeat the language of the pure 
separation of powers. This approach threatens to descend into a method characterised 
by formalism and conceptualism. Instead of grappling with questions such as the 
appropriate role of administrative and judicial review or the content of administrative 
justice, courts invoke deference in a manner that suggests deference and its 
application are straightforward. On the basis of factors such as expertise, democratic 
legitimacy, seniority and complexity courts avoid substantive argument on the 
                                                
15 See Hoexter C “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 
117 South African Law Journal 484-519. 
16 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 46. 
17 (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 484-519. 
18 See Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA); Associated Institutions 
Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA). 
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implications the Constitution entails for the judicial and administrative functions. 
Thus, deference as applied is largely empty. This is precisely what calls for a new 
legal culture have sought to avoid. Consequently, courts do not engage with informing 
principles and considerations, including extra-legal considerations such as political 
theory, and therefore potential doctrinal and institutional innovations that the new 
constitutional dispensation may require are left unexplored. 
In response to the position of deference today, the following steps are suggested. 
First, a debate on deference, as proposed by Hoexter, should be conducted and 
regarded as the point of departure. Secondly, an integrated approach for judicial 
review must be considered. Hoexter has called for an integrated role for judicial 
review. This means that judicial review is one of a variety of methods to protect the 
right to administrative justice. PAJA supports this approach. Section 7 of PAJA 
obliges the courts to require applicants to first make use of internal remedies before 
applying for judicial review:  
 
“no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of this Act unless any 
internal remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted.”19 
 
This suggests a move towards green-light theory. An integrated role for judicial 
review is supported by the high cost, long duration and formal procedures of 
litigation. Litigation also has a narrow focus on the dispute between the parties and 
the court must rely on the arguments presented before the court.  
Therefore, on the basis of various, cogent reasons, other forms of effective 
protection must be investigated, both potential and existing forms of protection. If 
judicial review is integrated, in actual fact, then deference is a function of the 
administrative-law system in the sense that where protection increases within the 
administration or elsewhere, judicial review will arguably be informed by such a 
development. However, if the administrative-law system has not adapted to protect 
the interests of private individuals in ways other than judicial review, then the courts 
cannot remain passive as if alternative, adequate protection were available. 
Potentially, where the administration fails to transform, judicial review could 
conceivably retain its prominence. 
                                                
19 S 7(2)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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Nevertheless, by considering the administrative-law system as a whole attention is 
drawn to the role of judicial review within the system as one form of control among 
others. This emphasises the value of the concept of the administrative-law system as 
well as the relationship as a conceptual tool for analysis and comparison. Considering 
jurisdictional control, i.e. legal control of administrative acts, provides a far clearer 
picture of the protection available than simply discussing the judiciary’s role. In the 
French context this is more obvious, since analysing the relationship between the 
administration and judiciary would provide a warped impression of the protection 
against administrative acts available to an individual. 
Thirdly, the concept of deference is yet to be contextualised in the South African 
context, particularly the human-rights context.20 Similarly, in the fourth place, an 
appropriate theory of deference requires an assessment of deference in relation to 
considerations such a culture of justification, rule of law and equality as understood 
by Dyzenhaus. These considerations are integral to a South African understanding of 
deference, whatever it may turn out to be, given the primacy of equality and 
democracy in the South African context. Once again the connections between political 
theory, context, institutional arrangements and particular rules are evident. 
In the fifth place, Dyzenhaus’s entreaty to take administrative determinations of the 
law seriously requires further examination. Taking administrative determinations 
seriously requires at least the capacity to do so. To this end the French example is 
instructive. It exemplifies the measures that can be taken to guard against an isolated 
administrative jurisdiction, ignorant of administration. 
In the sixth place, the extent to which deference is already part of the law should be 
acknowledged. The distinction between appeal and review is already a form of respect 
towards the administrative function. The definition of “administrative action”21 also 
limits the application of administrative law and thereby the purview of the courts, 
although this may be sidestepped in certain circumstances by relying on the 
constitutional principle of legality. The variable standard of review, which excludes 
correctness or the substitution of the court’s view for the administration’s, also 
respects the administration. Section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA provides for a rationality test 
and section 6(2)(h) provides for the general reasonableness test. Even though the latter 
                                                
20 See Davis DM “To Defer and then When? Administrative Law and Constitutional Democracy” 
(2006) Acta Juridica 23-41 at 39. 
21 S 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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does allow for proportionality22 this standard maintains the distinction between appeal 
and review.  
The remedies available to the courts are also limited. Section 38 of the Constitution 
authorises the courts to “grant appropriate relief” where “a right in the Bill of Rights 
has [allegedly] been infringed or threatened”. Section 172 authorises the courts to 
“make any order that is just and equitable”. Similarly section 8(1) of PAJA provides 
that the courts “may grant any order that is just and equitable”. Seemingly these 
provisions grant wide and far-reaching powers to the courts. However, only in 
“exceptional circumstances” may the court replace or change the administrative 
decision or order the administration to pay compensation.23 The scope of remedies 
reflects the distinction between appeal and review and is also an incidence of 
deference.  
In the seventh place, the link between deference and the separation of powers is 
problematic if not questionable. According to O’Regan J “the need for Courts to treat 
decision-makers with appropriate deference or respect flows ... from the fundamental 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers”.24 She quotes from the House of 
Lords judgment, R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting 
Corporation,25 to support her view, where Lord Hoffmann indicates that 
 
“[i]n a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to 
decide which branch of government has in any particular instance the decision-making power 
and what the limits of that power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided 
by the courts.”26 
 
                                                
22 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012, 2nd ed) 346-350. 
23 S 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) and (bb). 
24 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 46 (footnote omitted). 
25 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL). 
26 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL) para 75. 
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Thus, 
 
“[t]he allocation of these decision-making responsibilities is based upon recognised principles 
… [W]hen a court decides that a decision is within the proper competence of the legislature or 
executive, it is not showing deference. It is deciding the law.”27 
 
Lord Hoffmann’s position is not that deference is underpinned by the separation of 
powers, as argued by O’Regan J, but that deference is empty in the sense that the 
allocation of functions by the courts is nothing more than a legal question in terms of 
the separation of powers and the rule of law.  
In addition, the emphasis on the separation of powers is not shared by Dyzenhaus 
and Daly, for instance. Daly points out that “developing general principles of judicial 
review from the separation of powers is a difficult task.”28 He nevertheless  
 
“explore[s] four lines of reasoning which might lead to the conclusion that the separation of 
powers can compel the adoption of a doctrine of curial deference. Each line of reasoning will 
be rejected in turn, but they are not to be dismissed out of hand: each contains a seed of truth 
which will flourish under different conditions.”29  
 
The four lines of reasoning are checks and balances, curial deference as discipline, 
automatic deference and curial deference as enhancing the legislature power.30 
In the final analysis, Daly states that “the tripartite division tells us little or nothing 
about the functions that are properly assigned to each branch”.31 This is even more so 
with political organs and functions that have developed more recently, such as the 
administration. Instead, Daly’s theory of deference is founded on the delegation of 
powers to the administration by the legislature and “practical justifications” for 
                                                
27 [2003] 2 All ER 977 (HL) para 76. 
28 Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application, Scope (2012) 44-45. 
29 45. 
30 45-48. 
31 44. 
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deference.32 For Dyzenhaus a theory of deference is based on democratic principles, 
the rule of law understood as equality and a “culture of justification”.33 
I do not attempt to argue that the separation of powers should be disregarded in 
relation to deference. Rather, the separation of powers, as such and without more, 
does not and cannot give content to a fully-fledged theory of deference. The 
separation of powers certainly informs deference. However, as illustrated by 
Dyzenhaus and Daly, the normative objectives that shape the separation of powers are 
more relevant to deference than the pure doctrine or trias politica. This emphasises 
the interrelatedness between political theory, context and the administrative-law 
system once again. 
Finally, the inquiry “when does deference apply” requires particular attention. At 
this stage it seems that deference permeates the entire legal landscape, from the 
allocation of constitutional competences to the application of particular rules and the 
formulation of remedies. Deference plays a role at the determination of justiciability, 
e.g. the definition of administration action;34 deference determines the type of scrutiny 
available to the courts, i.e. review instead of appeal; deference determines the 
standard of review, i.e. rationality, reasonableness or proportionality; and the scope of 
remedies are influenced by deference. Deference also influences the interpretation of 
legislation35 and deference is constituted by factors external to the facts of the 
particular case such as expertise, complexity, democratic legitimacy and discretion.36  
Thus, deference seems to be quite undeveloped in the South African context. Even 
where deference has a long history and established role, in Canada for example, 
deference as such is contested and critiqued. However, on a close reading of Hoexter, 
Dyzenhaus and Allan there is significant potential for a principle of deference. 
Without compromising on a “culture of justification” and context, deference can make 
at least three vital contributions. Firstly, deference can emphasise and embody the 
                                                
32 5, ch 2, ch 3. 
33 Dyzenhaus D “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Taggart M (ed) 
The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 at 302-305. 
34 S 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
35 See Daly P A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application, Scope (2012) ch 
2. 
36 Ch 3. 
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distinct relationship between the administration and the judiciary.37 Secondly, on 
Dyzenhaus’s interpretation, deference implies that courts should take administrative 
determinations of the law seriously. This involves a change in legal culture and, 
arguably, institutional innovation. Above all, it requires an appreciation of the 
administration and the administrative function and the capacity to do so.38 Finally, 
deference can facilitate a discussion on the appropriate role for judicial review within 
the administrative-law system, as proposed by Hoexter in 2000. I reiterate that this is 
a discussion that is yet to take place, despite the enthusiasm of the South African 
courts for a rhetoric of deference. 
 
6 5 The Relationship between the Administration and the Judiciary: 
Deference Aside 
 
Constitutional constraints can assist in the formulation of a South African theory of 
deference, but also of the administrative-law system as a whole. Although broad, the 
constitutional constraints within which the administration and judiciary must operate 
are identified. The judiciary is bound by section 172 to secure the supremacy of the 
Constitution. Section 195 sets out the values and principles to which the 
administration must adhere. Other broader principles such as the rule of law and 
legality are also entrenched by the Constitution, all of which establish the values of 
the administrative-law system and define the relationship between the administration 
and the judiciary. The Constitution also establishes a commitment to broad, societal 
change that includes justiciable, socio-economic rights. The sheer scale of the 
administration’s activities 39  renders it absolutely integral to the steering and 
achievement of these aspirations. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers and checks and balances also defines the 
relationship between the administration and the judiciary. The separation of powers is 
                                                
37 To an extent this is already the case, since the courts do not employ a rhetoric of deference to 
describe the expertise of the judiciary or all of the other branches of state and the respect their 
decisions and reasons should be accorded. If deference flowed from the separation of powers as a 
general principle one would expect the principle of deference to be equally valid between all 
branches of state. 
38 To this end the principles explaining and justifying the existence of independent administrative 
courts in France are examined in ch 4. 
39 See Quinot G Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (2008) 2-3, 3 n 8. 
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problematic, however, given the rise of the administrative state in South Africa and 
the adherence to a triadic conception of the separation of powers. Nevertheless, given 
the wording of the Constitution, a South African separation of powers can be 
formulated on the basis of the Constitution as is. The Constitution recognises the 
constitutional role of the administration.40 According to Constitutional Principle VI 
and South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath41 the separation of 
powers is entrenched in the Constitution. Fortunately, the Constitution does not define 
the separation of powers. On the basis of Constitutional Principle VI and South 
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath42 one can assert that the 
Constitution requires a separation between the executive, legislature and judiciary as a 
minimum requirement. The addition of the administration is in line both with the 
Constitution as a whole and the constitutional description of the separation of powers. 
The public/private-law divide also informs the relationship between the 
administration and the judiciary. In the first place, the public/private-law dichotomy 
has a restrictive effect on the analysis of concepts such as public contracting. Instead 
of engaging with the substance of public contracting, its role and impact, the focus is 
on classification, which can result in formalism.43 Secondly, the public/private-law 
dichotomy also reduces the analysis to an exercise in binary selection.  
Judicial review of administrative action is critiqued for being counter-majoritarian. 
Certainly, democratic principles are foundational to the role of the judiciary in relation 
to the administration and to the role of law in administrative action. However, 
democracy should not be reduced to populism or majoritarianism. One should also 
bear in mind that it is not the judiciary that institutes litigation against the 
administration, but private citizens or institutions.44 Although the appropriate role of 
the judiciary and of judicial review is the function of a variety of factors, notably 
choices in political and constitutional theory, which need to be balanced,45 judgments 
on administrative matters are not even inherently anti-democratic: 
                                                
40 S 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
41 2001 1 SA 883 (CC). 
42 2001 1 SA 883 (CC). 
43 Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 52-53. 
44  See Mokgoro JY “Ubuntu, the Constitution and the Rights of Non-citizens” (2010) 21 
Stellenbosch Law Review 221-229 at 225. 
45 Such as the rule of law embodied in human rights versus democracy as the will of the majority. 
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“the adjudicative powers of the Courts are derived from the Constitution, which is the basic 
law of our democracy, based on the will of the people. In other words, when Courts set aside 
legislative enactments or executive action, they do so on the basis that the legislation or 
executive action does not pursue the set constitutional project. The Courts thus fulfil a mandate 
assigned to them by the Constitution, pursuing a common goal they share with the other arms 
of government.”46 
 
Finally, the nature of the public administration and the role of the judiciary in 
intervening with administrative action should be circumscribed by the concept of co-
operative government. From a normative position, all of these elements that 
characterise the legal relationship between the administration and judiciary are 
equally important. As mentioned, the emphasis on deference is due to its enthusiastic 
reception by the South African courts and their identification of the concept as a 
principle informing the relationship between the administration and judiciary. 
 
6 6 Beyond the Pure Separation of Powers: The French Administrative-Law 
System 
 
It is suggested that taking administrative determinations of the law seriously 
involves judges having the capacity to do so and that this may require institutional 
innovation. The French administrative-law system is the classic example of an 
integrated administration and administrative jurisdiction, where the staff forms an 
elite specialised in administration. The Conseil d’État is well known for its prestige 
and for its judges trained in administrative matters at the ÉNA. Before setting out the 
structure of the Conseil d’État that allows for such an integrated system, the 
characteristics, explanations and justifications of the system are discussed. The 
development and structure of the system are drawn upon in order to explore the 
different institutional arrangements that are possible in terms of the same basic 
principle, the separation of powers.47 Thus, chapter five complements the theoretical 
discussion on the separation of powers set out in chapter two. 
                                                
46 Mokgoro JY “Ubuntu, the Constitution and the Rights of Non-citizens” (2010) 21 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 221-229 at 225-226 (emphasis added). 
47 At least in terms of the prevalent narrative, the traditional explanation. 
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The French administrative-law system is also the example par excellence of an 
alternative to the British constitutional model due to the early recognition of 
administrative law and the existence of a separate administrative jurisdiction. Dicey’s 
comparison of the British and French systems, though dated now, exemplifies the 
novelty of the French system in relation to common-law systems. This makes the 
French system useful for comparative purposes from the South African perspective as 
well. The French administrative-law system is characterised by an independent 
administrative jurisdiction, within the administration itself, performing a dual 
advisory and jurisdictional function. In chapter four the explanations and principles 
that describe and justify the French system are identified. This is mainly a historical 
discussion of the system’s development from the Middle Ages to the twentieth 
century. The present organisation, membership, structure and functions of the Conseil 
d’État are discussed briefly as the embodiment of these explanations and principles. 
The existence of administrative courts is explained in several, sometimes 
contradictory, narratives. The “traditional explanation” is the point of departure, even 
though it is not the earliest explanation, because it is the generally accepted 
explanation for the French system and it has been endorsed by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel.48 Also, the significance of other narratives is clearer in relation to the 
traditional explanation, which also justifies discussing this explanation first. 
In terms of the “traditional explanation” the French Revolution of 1789 is the 
critical event leading to the creation of the administrative jurisdiction. Article 13 of 
the Law of 16-24 August 1790 promulgated the principle of the separation of 
administrative and judicial authorities. This principle signified a break with the past 
by prohibiting the courts from adjudicating on administrative matters; the 
establishment of an administrative jurisdiction followed. The separation of authorities 
expresses the French interpretation of the separation of powers. The traditional 
explanation demonstrates that the separation of powers is not a narrow doctrine, 
allowing for interpretations as diverse as the French and pure versions. Even 
alternative explanations acknowledge this: according to Chevallier and Velley the 
                                                
48 CC decision no 86-224 DC of 23 January 1987. 
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separation of powers is capable of such an interpretation and was interpreted in this 
manner, but only retrospectively.49 
The traditional explanation also illustrates that the separation of powers, even when 
it is considered as the main principle behind the French system, is not omnipotent or 
all-pervasive. The separation of powers is one important principle amongst others, 
ultimately dependent on political theory and context. France is an example of how 
institutional structure and values are tied to context, although the system is 
constructed in terms of the very same principle as the common-law systems, namely 
the separation of powers. 
However there are other explanations and justifications for the French system. 
Another argument holds that the earliest incidence of the French system dates from 
the late Middle Ages.50 In terms of this narrative administrative jurisdictions resulted 
from a division of labour as state functions increased. Therefore, administrative 
jurisdictions were simply a practical solution. Thus, the duality of jurisdiction is 
regarded as a historical development based on the division of labour. One should 
guard against the retrospective superimposition of principles to developments such as 
the administrative jurisdiction. A contextual approach will contribute to the avoidance 
of this pitfall. This approach also shows that the characteristics and structure of the 
South African administrative-law system is possibly due more to its English heritage 
and the Diceyan legacy, than the separation of powers as such. This leads to a more 
nuanced debate about the role and potential of the separation of powers. 
                                                
49  Chevallier J L’Élaboration Historique du Principe de Séparation de la Juridiction 
Administrative et de l’Administration Active (1970) 72; Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un 
Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la 
Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-783 at 775-776, 776 n 36. 
50  Mestre JL Un Droit Administratif à la fin de l’Ancien Régime: Le Contentieux des 
Communautés de Provence (1976); “Les Racines Seigneuriales du Droit Administratif Français” 
(1981) IV Annuaire Européen d’Administration Publique 783-799; “La Contribution des Droit 
Romain et Canonique à l’Élaboration du Droit Administratif” (1982) V Annuaire Européen 
d’Administration Publique 925-943; “Les Fondements Historique du Droit Administratif 
Français” (1982-1983) n° 34 Études et Documents publiés par Le Conseil d’État 63-80; 
Introduction Historique au Droit Administratif Français (1985); Bénoit F-P Le Droit Administratif 
Français (1968); “Les Fondements de la Justice Administrative” in Mélanges offerts à Marcel 
Waline. Le Juge et le Droit Public II (1974) 283-295. See also Weidenfeld K Les Origins 
Médiévales du Contentieux Administratif (XIVe – XV Siècles) (2001). 
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Even the originality of the principle of the separation of authorities, as expressed 
during the Revolution, is questioned. The Edict of Saint-Germain, promulgated in 
1641, already contained wording virtually synonymous with article 13 of the Law of 
16-24 August 1790. This illustrates that from an early stage the French government 
regarded decisions on administrative matters as undue interference with the 
administration. It also questions the centrality of the Revolution itself to the 
development of the French administrative jurisdiction. 
More importantly, the early origins of the French administrative jurisdiction reveal 
other justifications for eventually removing administrative litigation from the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Firstly, it implicated and undermined the authority 
of the state or administration. Secondly, these reasons include a preference for 
administrative expertise and knowledge, speed and lower costs associated with 
“administrative” litigation. Thus, the reasons for the lack of separation reveal the 
distinct nature of administrative litigation. 
Chevallier also identifies another factor from well before the 1789 Revolution 
leading to the administrative jurisdiction: the French monarchy recognised the 
specificity of administrative litigation early on. Velley argues that the traditional 
explanation is a retrospective rationalisation, formulated in the nineteenth century, for 
the allocation of administrative litigation to the active administration.51 All of these 
observations challenge the originality of the revolutionary developments. 
Other explanations for the administrative jurisdiction are based on interpretations 
of the Revolution that differ from the traditional explanation. In other words, critiques 
of the “traditional explanation” do not disregard the role of the Revolution, but view 
the Revolution in a different light. Chevallier argues that the specificity of 
administrative litigation and the adherence to an ordinary separation of powers left the 
constituants with a dilemma. They recognised the hybrid nature of administrative 
litigation, but their dogmatic commitment to the unity of jurisdiction and the 
elimination of exceptional jurisdictions lead to difficulties in allocating administrative 
litigation. Unable to resolve this dilemma, the constituants allocated administrative 
litigation to the active administration. This shows that dogmatic adherence to the 
                                                
51 Velley S “La Constitutionnalisation d’un Mythe: Justice Administrative et Séparation des 
Pouvoirs” (1989) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et l’Étranger 767-
783. 
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separation of powers in a narrow sense can limit the potential options to a significant 
degree. 
However, eventually an independent administrative jurisdiction developed 
alongside the active administration, both falling within the administration. This 
realised the principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration. This principle explains the entire process leading to an administrative 
jurisdiction, from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. 
The principle “to judge the administration is also administering”, formulated by 
Sandevoir, is another comprehensive explanation for the administrative jurisdiction. 
This principle also recognises the hybrid nature of administrative litigation and it 
emphasises the link between administrative litigation, on the one hand, and 
administrative action and administration, on the other. Ultimately, adjudicating on 
administrative matters is a form of administration and administrative judgments 
complement administrative action. The principle consists of three elements. The 
normative element concerns the recognition of the necessity for a distinct and 
autonomous administrative law. The material element is concerned with the impact of 
administrative litigation on the general interest. Finally, the organic element balances 
the need for effective administration in the general interest and the need to protect 
individual rights. 
The reasons for the initial lack of separation between the active administration and 
the administrative jurisdiction are the result of dogmatic adherence to a narrow 
conception of the separation of powers. It was also the result of the dilemma of 
allocating administrative litigation. Thus the specificity of administrative litigation is 
central to the problems associated with the administrative jurisdiction as well as the 
allocation of administrative litigation. The solution can only take the form of 
balancing the opposing concerns embodied in administrative litigation, a balance 
between the administrative activity and administrative justice. This is in line with 
Sandevoir’s characterisation of the French development as a narrative of compromise 
and balance. 
Therefore the French comparison is instructive in the following regard. The 
opposing functions both implicated in administrative litigation are inherent and 
unavoidable. Administrative litigation concerns the spheres of both the administration 
and administrative jurisdiction. Above all, the French system introduces the nature of 
administrative litigation as a consideration that informs the relationship between the 
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administration and the administrative jurisdiction, with doctrinal52 and institutional 
implications. The French example also indicates just how flexible the separation of 
powers can be. In addition, the development of the administrative jurisdiction 
provides principles in addition to the French separation of powers with which to 
evaluate the legal relationship between the administration and judiciary, such as the 
principle of the separation of authorities, the principle of the separation of the 
administrative jurisdiction and the active administration, the principle “to judge the 
administration is also administering”, as set out by Sandevoir, and, finally, the 
principle “to judge the administration is still administering”. 
The Conseil d’État is the outcome of the various explanations and principles 
discussed in chapter four. For example, the hybrid nature of administrative litigation 
finds expression in the dual function of the Conseil d’État: the Conseil d’État is 
simultaneously the supreme administrative jurisdiction and the adviser to the 
administration. The administrative sections of the Conseil d’État encompass all the 
administrative functions of the state. Thus the same institution is simultaneously 
involved with the active administration and performing the jurisdictional function. 
There is also significant interaction between the Conseil d’État and the active 
administration. In this way the members of the Conseil d’État are well versed in 
administration and the specific challenges encountered by the administration. This 
cultivates the perception that the decisions of the Conseil d’État are informed 
decisions in an administrative sense. Within the Conseil d’État itself there is co-
operation and interaction. Members work for both the advisory and jurisdictional 
sections. In other words, members of the Conseil d’État are enabled to take 
administrative determinations of the law seriously, because they have the training and 
experience to do so. Notably, the structure of the administrative-law system enables 
and promotes close interaction between the administration and administrative 
jurisdiction.  
 
                                                
52 See ch 5 above. 
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6 7 The French Administrative-Law System in Practice: The Contrat 
Administratif 
 
In France the development of the administrative jurisdiction was influenced by the 
distinct nature of administrative litigation, i.e. the specificity of administrative 
litigation was recognised from an early stage and this contributed to the development 
of an independent administrative jurisdiction. The contrat administratif is one form of 
administrative litigation. The contrat administratif has been chosen as the subject of 
chapter five because the public contract embodies the opposing interests, values and 
characteristics of the public/private-law divide. On the one hand there are private 
interests, namely, the interests of the contracting parties as such. On the other hand, 
the administration often contracts in the general interest. Public contracts also 
question the boundaries of the judicial and administrative functions. The judicial 
function, in the sense of applying or stating the law, and the administrative function, 
in the sense of implementing legislation in the general interest, are both implicated. 
Thus, public contracts operate at the threshold of these concepts. Thus the rules in 
place to distinguish between private and administrative contracts in the French context 
implicate all of these considerations. 
In chapter five the legal status and regulation of the contrat administratif are 
discussed. Firstly, the classification of contrats administratifs is explained. A variety 
of methods exist to classify contracts as administrative. It is noteworthy that the 
contrat administratif is a distinct legal concept. In other words, the regulation of the 
contrat administratif is not equivalent to the application of general administrative-law 
rules to a private contract, as was the case in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson 
NO.53 The adjudication of a contrat administratif implies the application of specific 
administrative-law rules of contract to an administrative contract by the administrative 
courts. The importance of this comparison is that the French system provides a list of 
criteria for distinguishing between administrative and private-law contracts.  
Once a contract is classified as administrative different rules of contract apply than 
in the case of a private-law contract. The singularity of the contrat administratif is 
exemplified in the rules regulating performance and therefore the focus of the chapter 
is on the rules regulating contractual performance. 
                                                
53 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). 
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The rules of performance are characterised by a number of general concepts. 
Firstly, the contrat administratif is a concept distinct from the private-law contract in 
the sense that the former is regulated by different rules and falls within the jurisdiction 
of the administrative courts. Nonetheless, secondly, the common will of the parties is 
the primary consideration determining the content of performance. Thus, an essential 
feature of the concept of contract is maintained, namely, the foundation of consensus. 
The “requirements of the public service” is an additional consideration. It 
acknowledges the participation of the administration in the contractual relationship 
and the contrat administratif’s role as an administrative instrument. Furthermore, the 
contractor itself is viewed in a particular light, illuminating the specificity of the 
contrat administratif: the contractor collaborates with the administration in 
performing a public service in the general interest. Thus the nature and purpose of the 
administrative act itself is reflected in the applicable legal rules.54 
The contrat administratif has a particular perspective on the inequality of the 
contracting parties that can be instructive in the South African context. In South 
Africa the inequality of the contracting parties is concerned with the relative 
bargaining power of the parties.55 However, in the context of the contrat administratif, 
inequality relates not only to the presence of superior authority or power, but to the 
discrepancy between the interests each party represents. The interests each contracting 
party represents is directly related to the conclusion of the contract. On the one hand, 
the private party contracts for what can be described as individual or private interests. 
However, on the other hand, the administration contracts for the provision of public 
services and in the general interest. It is the relative interests of the respective parties 
that are unequal. Thus inequality is not limited to the characteristics of the contracting 
parties, but extended to include the content and impact of the contract. Inequality 
understood thus does not favour the administration as such vis-à-vis the private 
contracting party, but the administration contracting in the public interest, which is 
protected. This perspective could broaden the role of contractual inequality in the 
South African law of contract and addresses the charge of a “monolithic notion” of 
contract law. An over-emphasis on the interests of the contracting parties is a charge 
levelled against the South African law of contract: the privity of contract 
                                                
54 As opposed to factors external to the nature of the act. 
55 See Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 139. 
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“has the effect of limiting the substantive interests that are regarded as relevant in regulating 
state commercial activity. Not only are third parties and the public in general barred from 
enforcing judicial regulation of such state conduct, but their interests are also removed from 
private-law regulatory scrutiny. In the private-law approach such wider interests simply never 
enter the regulatory picture. This has the effect of reducing the perceived impact of the 
regulated conduct. Since the wider interests involved are not placed before the court, the wider 
impact of the (state) conduct on the environment and society is made to seem less important. 
Freedland notes another way in which the privity doctrine reduces the public interests involved 
in state conduct. He argues that where the relationships between the state and citizens are 
analysed in terms of contract, the result is that each instance of interaction amounts to a single 
contract, isolating it from other identical relationships and hence breaking up the cumulative 
public interest ... All of this obviously has a significant impact on the court’s weighing of 
interests which inevitably informs (whether expressly or not) the court’s conclusions. As 
Collins notes ‘the contractual relation creates new, more specific expectations, but 
simultaneously it tends to exclude the surrounding normative context in the evaluation of 
whether those expectations have been fulfilled or disappointed’.”56 
 
Acknowledging the inequality of the contracting parties as an incidence of public 
service and the general interest goes some way towards regulating contracts “on a 
continuum”.57 
The administration’s status as such also informs the rules of performance. This 
consideration recognises both the public authority of the administration and the 
consensual nature of the contract. These interests need to be balanced. If either 
interest dominates, either the public-law nature of the administration is undermined or 
unilateral decision-making is excessive, thereby undermining the will of the parties. 
“Adaptability” and the “financial equilibrium of the contract” illustrate how particular 
rules reflect the considerations of the will of the parties, the needs of the public 
service and equity. 
The broader purpose of the contract is not neutralised by the contractual 
relationship. However, it is a factor operating in addition to the will of the parties. 
Thus the agreement is protected, but the nature of the contract is not thereby denied. 
This arrangement illustrates a valuable consideration: the public/private-law divide 
                                                
56 Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 204 (footnotes omitted). 
57 273-285. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 284  
fosters a binary approach to legal regulation. The contract is regulated either by 
private law or by public law. This approach limits thinking on potential alternative 
solutions. Above all, the French administrative-law system, and the contrat 
administratif as a legal instrument within that system, draws attention to the core of 
administrative adjudication: the inherent, internal conflict and instability of 
adjudicating on administrative decisions. Judging the administration implicates the 
boundaries, overlaps and limitations of constitutional arrangements, such as the 
separation of powers, the delineation of functions, and the dynamic nature of the 
contextualised administrative-law system. Acknowledging the internal conflict and 
instability is a necessary step to developing institutional and doctrinal solutions that 
respond to the nature of the administrative-law system. 
Introducing administrative contracts is not necessarily a guarantee against the flaws 
of formalism, but the contrat administratif illustrates that various solutions are viable, 
even in terms of the framework of basic and established legal principles, such as the 
concept of contract founded on the will of the parties. In terms of this approach the 
applicable legal rules respond to the nature of the act. For example, the fact that the 
administration contracts for the general interest informs the rules applicable to such a 
contract. A formalistic and monolithic approach can artificially conform a singular act 
to the available legal categories; this can be described as “pigeonholing” public 
contracts. The hybrid nature of administrative litigation, in general, and of public 
contracting, in particular, militates against such an approach. 
This is compatible with the basic legal principles of South African law. Firstly, it 
acknowledges the primacy of consensus. Secondly, to an extent, the incidence of a 
variety of opposing public and private-law norms simultaneously regulating contract 
has been acknowledged by the South African courts. In Logbro Properties CC v 
Bedderson NO58 Cameron JA, responding to the argument that the province could rely 
on contractual conditions to evade principles of administrative justice, states that 
 
“[e]ven if the conditions constituted a contract ... its provisions did not exhaust the province’s 
duties toward the tenderers. Principles of administrative justice continued to govern that 
relationship, and the province in exercising its contractual rights in the tender process was 
obliged to act lawfully, procedurally and fairly. In consequence, some of its contractual rights 
– such as the entitlement to give no reasons – would necessarily yield before its public duties 
                                                
58 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) paras 5-7. 
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under the Constitution and any applicable legislation.”59 
 
Thus, in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO60 it was not a case of exclusively 
applying either private law or administrative law as a whole to the contract: “[t]o 
classify the state action as administrative action does not mean that it is not also 
contractual in nature, it is simply not purely contractual, ie purely private-law 
regulated.”61 
The underlying values of the contrat administratif, such as the needs of the public 
service, reflect the nature, role and impact of the act. These considerations are 
integrated in the applicable legal rules. They illustrate why the specificity of 
administrative litigation has been recognised from an early stage and how to respond 
to this specificity: ultimately developing a system informed by the specificity of 
administrative litigation itself. 
The fact that one instrument is employed by the administration rather than another 
is not wholly decisive for the applicable rules. It is problematic when the choice of 
instrument in the exercise of a particular function, such as the implementation of 
legislation in the general interest, can sidestep legal regulation based on the nature of 
the function. The assertion here is not that the French approach is somehow without 
defect, but that the French system, at the very least, acknowledges broader 
institutional and social actualities within the applicable rules themselves, even when 
the administration performs its constitutional mandates through contract. 
The distinct nature as such of administrative litigation is not discussed or analysed. 
This can be explained by means of the purpose of the comparison with the French 
system: the purpose is to identify the reasons behind the existence of an independent 
administration jurisdiction. One of the contributing factors is the specificity of 
administrative litigation. The discussion on the development of the French system 
does reveal, however, that administrative litigation is distinct because it concerns 
decisions where the administration has discretion, it precludes the direct application of 
the law as a mechanical process, it concerns the public interest, and it affects the  
administrative authority.  
 
                                                
59 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) para 7. 
60 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA). 
61 Quinot G State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009) 52 n 2 (emphasis in original). 
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6 8 On the Question of an Alternative South African System 
 
In this dissertation I have not attempted to develop an alternative administrative-
law system for the South African context. Therefore, concrete recommendations for 
an alternative system as such are not proffered. Rather, the study develops an 
approach to inquiries concerning administrative-law systems. This does not imply that 
specific recommendations are impossible or undesirable. However, without 
acknowledging the impact of the conceptual framework on administrative-law 
systems, determinations concerning such systems are inherently limited. 
Administrative-law systems do not operate in a vacuum and should not be considered 
in a vacuum only. Thus, on the whole, the dissertation is concerned with how one 
goes about developing an alternative system and not with proposing a particular 
alternative; instead a methodology for thinking about and developing alternative 
systems is proffered. 
The content of the South African conceptual framework has been extended. South 
Africa’s conceptual framework does not have to be restrictive; alternative systems can 
be developed by means of the principles that are already entrenched in South African 
law, such as the separation of powers and deference. The potential of the separation of 
powers to incorporate the administration as a fourth branch, or even multiple 
branches,62 illustrates this finding. The normative nature of the separation of powers, 
rather than its form as trias politica, provides a nuanced and multifaceted principle by 
means of which alternative systems can be assessed and developed. 
In the South African context the relationship between the administration and the 
judiciary must be informed by the Constitution and, it is argued, the project of 
transformative constitutionalism.63 Transformative constitutionalism, which builds on 
the idea of a culture of justification, sets out the normative content of the Constitution 
and, by implication, of the administrative-law system and the relationship between the 
administration and the judiciary. Thus, in the South African context, the separation of 
powers and deference should be considered and developed in the light of the 
normative framework established by the Constitution.  
                                                
62 Such as the “integrity branch”, in addition to the four proposed branches, incorporating 
institutions such as those created in chapter nine of the Constitution in the South African context. 
See 2 5 above. 
63 See 2 3 2 above. 
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In chapter three, on the South African system, six elements that characterise the 
relationship between the administration and the judiciary were identified. The concept 
of deference was discussed in particular detail, however. 64  The relative weight 
accorded to deference as an element does not constitute a normative position. Rather, 
the discussion sought to establish the discrepancy between the debate on deference 
Hoexter proposed, on the one hand, and the reception by the South African courts of 
deference as a legal rule and its application as such, on the other. Thus, the 
importance of deference as a point of positive law explains the focus on deference; the 
other elements are equally important in understanding the relationship between the 
administration and the judiciary, nevertheless.  
Despite the value of a broader, normative understanding of principles such as the 
separation of powers or checks and balances, certain preliminary debates cannot be 
avoided in the development of any alternative system. For instance, debates on 
deference or on the constitutional roles of the administration and judiciary must be 
conducted before concrete proposals on an alternative system can be formulated. The 
purpose of this dissertation has been to widen the discussion on an alternative system 
without pre-empting the necessary debates that are yet to be conducted. Again 
deference is a good example as the discussion of deference in chapter three concluded 
that the debate Hoexter called for must still take place. 
In chapter four, the discussion on the content of the separation of powers 
continues. This chapter, on the principles underpinning the French administrative-law 
system, demonstrates that the concept of the separation of powers is susceptible to 
numerous interpretations. This also broadens the potential role for the separation of 
powers in the South African context. Thus chapter four can be regarded as an 
extension of the discussion in chapter two on the content and nature of the separation 
of powers, rather than a purely comparative chapter.  
Chapter four also indicates that in France the distinct nature of the administration 
and the difficulty of reconciling the administrative and jurisdictional functions have 
been recognised for centuries. This contrasts strongly with those nations whose 
systems are still affected by a Diceyan legacy, such as that of South Africa. The 
French comparison provides several conceptual approaches to these difficulties and so 
provides a point of reference for the South African debate on an alternative 
                                                
64 See 3 3 3 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 288  
administrative-law system, including practical examples of how French principles 
find expression in practice, such as the training and recruitment of the members of the 
Conseil d’État and its organisation. The French example also demonstrates that the 
separation of powers is not necessarily the decisive factor in the structure of the 
French system: the separation of powers operates in conjunction with other principles 
and considerations that, collectively, characterise the French system. The separation 
of powers need not be the only principle informing the constitutional structure of the 
state or the relationship between the administration and judiciary. Consideration of 
French engagement with the notion of an administrative-law system thus serves a 
valuable function in opening up the debate that is put forward here in the South 
African context. As this dissertation has shown, at the level of principle the debates 
about the structure of a South African administrative-law system can be 
conceptualised more broadly than traditional views on the guiding principles in South 
Africa would suggest, without having to reject those principles.  
Where one moves from the level of principle to doctrine, the regulation and 
adjudication of public contracts provides a useful doctrinal perspective of the 
administrative-law system, providing a reference within a given context for the 
reconceptualisation of that system . The public contract is therefore discussed here as 
one form of administration, partly due to its conceptual ambiguity as a legal 
instrument on the boundary between public law and private law and partly due to the 
administration’s increasing contractual activity. The regulation of public contracts 
thus tests at doctrinal level most, if not all, of the important elements of principle that 
characterise the relationship between the administration and judiciary and that inform 
the administrative-law system. To an extent the contrat administratif of French law 
indicates that particular legal rules are an extension of the broader principles and 
considerations discussed in chapter four. The contrat administratif provides useful 
alternatives to the monolithic South African conception of contract and its binary 
approach to contractual regulation, illustrating at doctrinal level how a significantly 
different conceptualisation of one element of the administrative-law system can be 
achieved within the same framework of principles. 
This dissertation introduces an approach that emphasises the relationship between 
the administration and the administrative jurisdiction as well as the conceptual 
framework within which the administrative-law system operates. Through the 
application of this approach to the South African and French contexts and to public 
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contracting the key concepts and debates that could lead to an appropriate 
administrative-law system in South Africa are identified and investigated. This 
constitutes a platform for the development of a particular administrative-law system 
and an exposition of viable alternatives to the conceptual framework within which the 
system operates. 
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GLOSSARY OF FRENCH TERMS 
 
Accord de volontés Agreement, consensus. 
Administrateur-juge Literally, administrator-judge. Where an administrator acts as 
judge over the administration. 
Ancien Régime French constitutional regime before the French Revolution of 1789. 
Assemblée du contentieux A formation of the Conseil d’État as administrative 
jurisdiction. The court is constituted by the vice-president of the Conseil d’État, the 
section presidents, the president of the sous-section concerned and the rapporteur. 
Assemblée Générale General Assembly. 
Auditeurs Legal assistant. Junior members of the Conseil d’État. 
Avis Formal advisory opinion of the Conseil d’État. 
Bouleversement de l’économie du contrat Disruption of the economic balance of the 
contract. 
Brassage The simultaneous attachment of members to the administrative and litigious 
sections of the Conseil d’État.  
Cahier des charges Terms and conditions of a contract. 
Chambre des Comptes Chamber of Accounts. 
Clause exorbitante du droit commun Extraordinary clause in the context of the 
private-law contract. 
Clauses financières Financial clauses. 
Commissaire du gouvernement “Commissioner of the law”, a member of the Conseil 
d’État. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 291  
Compatibilité Compatibility of the type of law of contract, whether administrative or 
private-law, with the contract itself. 
Conseil Constitutionnel Constitutional Council. 
Conseil d’État statuant au contentieux The Conseil d’État presiding over 
administrative litigation as administrative jurisdiction. 
Conseil d’État Council of State. 
Conseil des Ministres Council of Ministers, the French Cabinet. 
Conseil du Roi Council of the King, Curia Regis. 
Conseiller d’État (en service extraordinaire) Counsellor of State (in extraordinary 
service). Senior member of the Conseil d’État. 
Conseiller d’État (en service ordinaire) Counsellor of State (in ordinary service). 
Senior member of the Conseil d’État. 
Conseils de Préfecture Councils of prefecture. 
Consensualisme The principle of (contractual) consensus. 
Constituant Member of the French National Constituent Assembly. 
Consultation juridique Legal opinion. 
Contentieux administratif Administrative litigation, dispute. 
Contrat administratif French administrative contract 
Contrat de droit commun/de droit privé French private-law contract. 
Contrats administratifs par détermination de la loi Administrative contracts in terms 
of law. 
Contrats de partenariat Type of administrative contract defined by Ordinance no 
2004-559 of 17 June 2004.  
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Cours Administratives d’Appel Administrative Courts of Appeal. 
Critère du service public Public-service criterion. 
Critère matériel Material criterion. 
Critère organique Organic criterion. 
Critères jurisprudentiels Criteria derived from case law. 
Double appartenance Double membership. 
Dualité de juridiction Duality of jurisdiction. 
École Nationale d’Administration National School of Administration. 
Équation/équilibre financière Financial equation/equilibrium. 
Équivalence honnête Balance between a contractor with the state’s rights and 
obligations. 
Faculté/latitude/pouvoir d’appréciation Scope for discretion. 
Fait du prince Governmental act or fiat. 
Force majeur Major force. 
Garanties de l’exécution Guarantees of performance. 
Gestion privée Private management. 
Gestion publique Public management. 
Grand Conseil Grand Council, a division of the Curia Regis concerned with 
governmental and legislative matters. 
Immutabilité Immutability refers to the obligationary nature of contracts and that 
contracts cannot be amended unilaterally. 
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Imprévision Principle in terms of which supervening circumstances result in the 
amendment of the terms of the contract. 
Intendants Royal administrative official. 
Juge-administrateur Literally, judge-administrator. Sandevoir’s term for the 
administrative judge. 
Juger l’administration, c’est aussi administrer To judge the administration is also 
administering.  
Juger l’administration, c’est encore administrer To judge the administration is still 
administering. 
Justice administrative French administrative jurisdiction. 
Justice déléguée The capacity of a French court to hand down judgments 
independently in the name of the French people. 
Justice retenue The system in terms of which French courts hand down judgments in 
the name of the sovereign and the judgment’s validity is subject to the sovereign’s 
approval. 
Le recrutement au tour extérieur Recruitment from the administration. 
Le recrutement par concours Admission or recruitment by competitive examination. 
Les exigences du service public The requirements of the public service. 
Loi des parties Law of the contracting parties. 
Maîtres des requêtes Legal adviser. Middle-ranked member of the Conseil d’État.  
Maximum d’efforts et de diligence A high and strict standard of contractual 
performance. 
Ministre-juge Literally, minister-judge. A post-revolutionary arrangement in terms of 
which ministers were the supreme administrative jurisdiction. 
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Modalité d’application Mode or manner of implementation. 
Mutabilité The principle of the variability, in the general interest, of contractual 
terms. 
Normalité Normality. 
Objet essential Primary purpose of the contract. 
Obligation de mobilité Obligation of mobility, in terms of which members of the 
Conseil d’État are obliged to perform activities different to their principle task.  
Parlements Literally, parliaments. Parlements were pre-revolutionary courts 
exercising wide powers. 
Pouvoir de contrôle Power of control. 
Pouvoir de modification unilatérale Power of unilateral modification. 
Pouvoir de sanction Power to impose sanctions 
Prérogative de puissance publique Public-power prerogative. 
Prérogative exorbitante Extraordinary prerogative in relation to the civil law. 
Principe de séparation de la juridiction administrative et de l’administration active 
Principle of the separation of the administrative jurisdiction and the active 
administration. 
Procédure de la décision exécutoire The process followed by the administration in 
unilaterally exercising its public authority to modify a juridical position. 
Qualification légale Legal qualification or classification of the contrat administratif. 
Rapporteur Office occupied by members of the Conseil d’État in the administrative 
and litigious sections.  
Régime exorbitant du droit commun Extraordinary regime in relation to civil law. 
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Règles exorbitants Extraordinary rules in relation to civil law. 
Règles générales applicables aux contrats administratifs General rules applicable to 
contrats administratifs. 
Résiliation unilatérale pour motif d’intérêt générale Unilateral termination of the 
contrat for the purpose of the general interest. 
Section administrative Counsel section or division of the Conseil d’État. 
Section de l’administration Administrative department or division of the Conseil 
d’État. 
Section de l’intérieur Department or division of home affairs of the Conseil d’État. 
Section des finances Finance department or division of the Conseil d’État. 
Section des travaux publics Department or division of public works of the Conseil 
d’État. 
Section du contentieux Litigation section of the Conseil d’État. 
Section du contentieux en formation de jugement A formation of the Conseil d’État 
as administrative jurisdiction. The court is constituted by the president of the 
litigation section, three vice-presidents, the ten presidents of the sous-sections, the 
rapporteur, and two conseillers from the administrative departments. 
Section du rapport et des études Department of reports and studies of the Conseil 
d’État. 
Section sociale Social department or division of the Conseil d’État. 
Séparation des autorités administratives et judiciaires Separation of the 
administrative and judicial authorities. 
Sous-section Subsection of the Conseil d’État. 
Sujétions imprévues Unforeseen physical constraints or impediments. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 296  
Travaux publics Public works. 
Tribunal Administratif Administrative courts of first instance. 
Tribunal d’administration Specialised administrative court proposed during the 1789 
Revolution. 
Tribunal des Conflits Jurisdiction Disputes Court. This court determines whether the 
administrative courts or ordinary courts have jurisdiction where there is an 
apparent conflict. 
Unité de juridiction Jurisdictional unity, i.e. a single jurisdiction. 
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